

Christian Body, Christian Self: Concepts of Early Christian Personhood

Edited by
CLARE K. ROTHCHILD and
TREVOR W. THOMPSON

*Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen
zum Neuen Testament
284*

Mohr Siebeck

Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen
zum Neuen Testament

Herausgeber / Editor
Jörg Frey (Zürich)

Mitherausgeber / Associate Editors
Friedrich Avemarie (Marburg)
Markus Bockmuehl (Oxford)
James A. Kelhoffer (Uppsala)
Hans-Josef Klauck (Chicago, IL)

284



Christian Body, Christian Self: Concepts of Early Christian Personhood

edited by

Clare K. Rothschild and
Trevor W. Thompson

with the assistance of
Robert S. Kinney

Mohr Siebeck

Clare K. Rothschild, born 1964; 1986 B.A. University of California, Berkeley; 1992 M.T.S. Harvard University; 2003 Ph.D. University of Chicago; currently Associate Professor of Theology at Lewis University, Romeoville, IL.

Trevor W. Thompson, born 1975; 1998 B.A. Oklahoma Christian University; 2002 M.A., M.Div. Harding University Graduate School of Theology; 2007 M.A. University of Chicago; 2009 Ph.D. (candidate) University of Chicago; currently Instructor of New Testament at Abilene Christian University.

e-ISBN PDF 978-3-16-151861-4

ISBN 978-3-16-150950-6

ISSN 0512-1604 (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament)

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data is available on the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>.

© 2011 by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Germany.

This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that permitted by copyright law) without the publisher's written permission. This applies particularly to reproductions, translations, microfilms and storage and processing in electronic systems.

The book was typeset by Martin Fischer in Tübingen, printed by Gulde-Druck in Tübingen on non-aging paper and bound by Buchbinderei Spinner in Ottersweier.

Printed in Germany.

To all leaders and participants of the
Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti Section
of The Society of Biblical Literature
2005–present

Acknowledgments

It has been so long since the *Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti* (hereafter: CHNT) SBL section's steering committee – consisting today of David Aune (Notre Dame), Rainer Hirsch-Luipold (Göttingen), Paul Holloway (Sewanee, The University of the South), Troy Martin (Xavier), Margaret M. Mitchell (Chicago), Christopher Mount (DePaul), George Parsenios (Princeton Theological Seminary), and Clare K. Rothschild (Lewis; hereafter: LU) – came up with the foundational idea for this book that precisely who it was – at which meeting, in which breakfast restaurant or cocktail bar, and in which city – is lost to history. No matter, at that time, the idea triggered the section's immediate conviction that the topic was complex, underexplored, and imperative for future research in the field of New Testament and Early Christian Literature and should be taken up as a theme for the foreseeable future. Today, more than five years since we made this commitment, CHNT presenters and participants have dedicated countless hours to papers and discussions on concepts of personhood among early Christians. This volume represents a mere sample of the fruit of this research.

The manuscript was collaboratively edited and prepared by Clare K. Rothschild and Trevor W. Thompson (Abilene Christian; hereafter: ACU) between November 2010 and May 2011. We received excellent direction and feedback on aspects of our work from all authors and others, including: Hans Dieter Betz (Chicago), James A. Kelhoffer (Uppsala), Hans-Josef Klauck (Chicago), and Margaret M. Mitchell (Chicago). J. Albert Harrill (Indiana) initially acted as co-editor with Rothschild until he was forced to withdraw to carry out other commitments. Bert, nevertheless, knows the topic like few others world wide and offered invaluable criticism of essays at an early stage in their collection.

Individual colleagues to whom we are also grateful include Johan Thom (Stellenbosch), L. Curt Niccum (ACU), and David Kneip (ACU). We also wish to thank Deans Bonnie Bondavalli (LU College of Arts & Sciences) and Jack R. Reese (ACU College of Biblical Studies) for generously permitting us (respectively) to take on (yet another!) time-consuming, but important publication project.

Finally, we wish to express utmost gratitude to Dr. Henning Ziebritzki at Mohr Siebeck for his interest in and special attention to the details of this manuscript and to Prof. Dr. Jörg Frey (Zürich) for its recommendation to the WUNT series. We also wish to thank Robert S. Kinney (assistant editor) who put in strenuous hours of copy-editing and to all at Mohr Siebeck who assisted in the production of this work. In the spirit of the international collaboration represented by Cor-

pus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti and consistent with other WUNT volumes, the editors have permitted individual authors to adhere to their own stylistic and bibliographic conventions.

Of course, without the generous support of our spouses, Doug Rothschild and Alana Thompson, and the strength and flexibility of our children, Maxwell and Luke Rothschild and Atticus Thompson, no project of this magnitude comes to completion. For them, among other things, we hope to have modeled teamwork – a somewhat rare but valuable tool in academics today.

We dedicate this book to the leaders and participants of the CHNT SBL section who uphold the mission to read and discuss ancient Greek and Latin texts for their insight into the literary and religious worlds of early Christianity and to offer papers that analyze early Christian texts in dialogue with these texts and their representative contexts. Over the years, this SBL section has become a highlight of the annual meeting for us. We are grateful to all those who exert time and energy to offer excellent programs year after year.

Chicago/ Abilene, May 1, 2011

Clare K. Rothschild
Trevor W. Thompson

Table of Contents

Abbreviations and References	XI
------------------------------------	----

I. Introduction

<i>Clare K. Rothschild and Trevor W. Thompson</i> <i>Status quaestionis: Christian Body, Christian Self</i>	3
--	---

II. Jewish Literature

<i>Karina Martin Hogan</i> The Mortal Body and the Earth in Ben Sira and the Book of the Watchers	21
--	----

<i>Matthew Goff</i> Being Fleshly or Spiritual: Anthropological Reflection and Exegesis of Genesis 1–3 in 4QInstruction and First Corinthians	41
---	----

<i>Alec J. Lucas</i> Distinct Portraits and Parallel Development of the Knowledge of God in Romans 1:18–32 and Wisdom of Solomon 13–15	61
--	----

III. Pauline Literature

<i>Troels Engberg-Pedersen</i> A Stoic Concept of the Person in Paul? From Galatians 5:17 to Romans 7:14–25	85
---	----

<i>Stefan Krauter</i> Is Romans 7:7–13 about akrasia?	113
--	-----

IV. Canonical Gospels and Acts

<i>Martin Meiser</i> Anthropologie im Markusevangelium	125
---	-----

V. Extra-canonical Gospels and Acts

Manfred Lang

The Christian and the Roman Self: The Lukan Paul and a Roman Reading . 151

*Troy W. Martin*Clarifying a Curiosity: The Plural *Bloods* (αἱμάτων) in John 1:13 175*Richard I. Pervo*

Identification Please: Aspects of Identity in Ancient Narrative 187

*Janet E. Spittler*The Anthropology of the *Acts of Thomas* 203*Romulus D. Stefanut*From *Logos* to *Mythos*: The *Apocalypse of Paul* and Plato's *Phaedo*
in Dialogue 217*Robert Matthew Calhoun*The Resurrection of the Flesh in *Third Corinthians* 235

VI. Later Witnesses

Annette Bourland Huizenga

"Epitomizing Virtue: Clothing the Christian Woman's Body" 261

David Konstan

Torture and Identity: Paganism, Christianity, and Beyond 283

Fritz Graf

Apollo, Possession, and Prophecy 299

VII. History of Interpretation

*John R. Levison*Assessing the Origins of Modern Pneumatology: The Life and Legacy
of Hermann Gunkel 313

Index of References 333

Modern Authors 358

Abbreviations and References

The Greek New Testament is cited from *Novum Testamentum Graece*, the Nestle-Aland 27th Edition. Abbreviations correspond to *The SBL Handbook of Style* (72009); the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, rev. ed. (32003); Liddell, Scott and Jones, McKenzie, *A Greek-English Lexicon*; and G. W. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, including the following:

AB	Anchor Bible
AB	Anchor Bible
ABD	Anchor Bible Dictionary
AGJU	Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums
AJEC	Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity
AnBib	Analecta biblica
ANRW	Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung.
b.	born
B. L. Add.	British Library Additional
BAGB	Bulletin de l'Association G. Budé
BBB	Bonner biblische Beiträge
BDAG	Bauer, Danker, Arndt, and Gingrich. <i>A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature</i> . 3rd ed.
BECNT	Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament
BETL	Bibliotheca ephemeridum theologicarum lovaniensium
BHT	Beiträge zur historischen Theologie
Bib	Biblica
BibInt	Biblical Interpretation
BICS	Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies
BN	Biblische Notizen
BThS	Biblisch-theologische Studien
BWANT	Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten und Neuen Testament
BZNW	Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft
c.	century
ca.	circa
CahO	Cahiers d'orientalisme
CBET	Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology
CBQ	Catholic Biblical Quarterly
CBQMS	Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series
CBR	Currents in Biblical Research
CC SL	Corpus Christianorum Series Latina
CMG	Corpus Medicorum Graecorum
Cod. Vat. gr.	Codex Vaticanus graecus
DJD	Discoveries in the Judaean Desert
DSD	Dead Sea Discoveries

EABS	European Association of Biblical Studies
EBib	Etudes bibliques
EdF	Erträge der Forschung
EHS	Evangelische Hochschule Dresden
EKKNT	Evangelisch-katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament
ET	English translation
ETS	Erfurter theologische Studien
EWNT	Exegetisches Wörterbuch zum NT
FF	Forschungen und Fortschritte
FKDG	Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, Göttingen
FRLANT	Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments
FS	Festschrift
FSRKA	Frankfurter Studien zur Religion und Kultur der Antike
GCS	Die griechische christliche Schriftsteller der ersten [drei] Jahrhunderte
GTB	Van Gorcum's theologische bibliotheek
HBS	Henry Bradshaw Society
Heb.	Hebrew
HNT	Handbuch zum Neuen Testament
HNTC	Harper's New Testament Commentaries
HThK	Herders theologischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament
HTR	Harvard Theological Review
HUCA	Hebrew Union College Annual
HUT	Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie
ICC	International Critical Commentary
IDB	The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible
IdF	Impulse der Forschung
ILS	Inscriptiones Latinae selectae
JBL	Journal of Biblical Literature
JECS	Journal of Early Christian Studies
JJS	Journal of Jewish Studies
JR	Journal of Religion
JSJSup	Journal for the Study of Judaism Supplement Series
JSNT	Journal for the Study of the New Testament
JSNTSup	Journal for the Study of the New Testament: Supplement Series
JSOT	Journal for the Study of the Old Testament
JSOTSup	Journal for the Study of the Old Testament: Supplement Series
JSP	Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha
JSPSup	Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha: Supplement Series
JSQ	Jewish Studies Quarterly
JTS	Journal of Theological Studies
KEK	Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament
KJV	King James Version
KuD	Kerygma und Dogma
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
LNTS	Library of New Testament Studies
LSJ	Liddell, Scott, and Jones. A Greek-English Lexicon
LXX	Septuagint

MBPS	Mellen Biblical Press Series
m. E.	„meines Erachtens (“in my opinion”)
MPL	Monumenta polyphoniae liturgicae sanctae ecclesiae Romane
MS(S)	manuscript(s)
MThA	Münsteraner theologische Abhandlungen
NA ²⁷	Novum Testamentum Graece. 27th ed.
NEB	New English Bible
NIB	The New Interpreter's Bible
NICNT	New International Commentary on the New Testament
NIV	New International Version
NovT	Novum Testamentum
NovTSup	Novum Testamentum Supplements
NPNF	Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers
NRSV	New Revised Standard Version
NT	New Testament
NTAbh	Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen
NTOA	Novum Testamentum et Orbis Antiquus
NTS	New Testament Studies
NW	Neuer Wettstein
OCT	Oxford Classical Texts
ÖTK	Ökumenischer Taschenbuch-Kommentar
OTL	Old Testament Library
PG	Patrologia graeca [= Patrologiae cursus completus: Series graeca]
PGL	Patristic Greek Lexicon
PGM	Papyri Graecae Magicae
PrJ	Preussische Jahrbücher
RAC	Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum
RevQ	Revue de Qumran
RGG	Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart
RHPR	Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses
RNT	Regensburger Neues Testament
RSV	Revised Standard Version
SBB	Stuttgarter biblische Beiträge
SBL	Society of Biblical Literature
SBLDS	Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series
SBLEJL	Society of Biblical Literature Early Judaism and Its Literature
SBLMS	Society of Biblical Literature Monograph Series
SBLRBS	Society of Biblical Literature Resources for Biblical Study
SBL SBS	Society of Biblical Literature Sources for Biblical Study
SBLSymS	Society of Biblical Literature Symposium Series
SBLWGRW	Society of Biblical Literature Writings from the Graeco-Roman World
SBS	Stuttgarter Bibelstudien
SBT	Studies in Biblical Theology
SC	Sources chrétiennes
SNTSMS	Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series
STDJ	Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah
SUNT	Studien zur Umwelt des Neuen Testaments

TAbR	Table Ronde
TB	Theologische Bücherei: Neudrucke und Berichte aus dem 20. Jahrhundert
TDNT	Theological Dictionary of the New Testament
TLZ	Theologische Literaturzeitung
TTZ	Trierer theologische Zeitschrift
TWAS	Twayne's World Author Series
TynBul	Tyndale Bulletin
UBS	United Bible Societies
UTB	Uni-Taschenbücher
VTSup	Supplements to Vetus Testamentum
WBC	Word Biblical Commentary
WKGLS	Wissenschaftliche Kommentare zu griechischen und lateinischen Schriftstellern
WMANT	Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament
WUNT	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament
ZNT	Zeitschrift für Neues Testament
ZNW	Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche
ZTK	Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche

I. Introduction

Status quaestionis: Christian Body, Christian Self

Clare K. Rothschild and Trevor W. Thompson

γνώθι σε[ε]αυτόν.

I. Introduction

In her 1917 University of Chicago dissertation (“‘Know Thyself’ in Greek and Latin Literature”), Eliza G. Wilkins identifies eight different interpretative trajectories for the famed maxim engraved in the forecourt of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi: ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΥΤΟΝ: (1) Know Your Measure, (2) Know What You Can and Cannot Do, (3) Know Your Place, (4) Know the Limits of Your Wisdom, (5) Know Your Own Faults, (6) Know You are Human and Mortal, (7) Know Your Own Soul, and (8) ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΥΤΟΝ is Difficult.¹ With regard to the eighth interpretative trajectory, Wilkins cites the famous exchange between Socrates and Alcibiades in the Platonic *Alcibiades*.²

Socrates: Is it, then, an easy thing to know oneself, and was it some simple person who inscribed this on the temple at Delphi; or is it something difficult and not for everyone? *Alcibiades*: It has often seemed to me, Socrates, that it is for everyone; but often, too, that it is very difficult.³

The evident challenge faced by Greeks and Romans attempting to interpret the concept of self in this brief saying has never abated. Today, different cultures and individuals within them define and interpret the self and what it signifies in different ways. It is common to ask: What is the self? How is the self related to

¹ Eliza G. Wilkins, “‘Know thyself’ in Greek and Latin literature” (Ph.D. diss., The University of Chicago, 1917). She includes one additional category in a concluding chapter, “ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΥΤΟΝ in Early Ecclesiastical Literature.” Cf. Pierre P. Courcelle, *Connais-toi toi-même; de Socrate à saint Bernard* (3 vols.; Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1974–1975); Hans Dieter Betz, “The Delphic Maxim ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΥΤΟΝ in Hermetic Interpretation,” *HTR* 63 (1970): 465–84; idem, “The Delphic Maxim ‘Know Yourself’ in the Greek Magical Papyri,” *HR* 21/2 (1981): 156–71 (both articles by Betz are reprinted in *Hellenismus und Urchristentum* [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990]).

² On the date and authenticity of the *Alcibiades* see Nicholas Denyer, ed., Plato: *Alcibiades* (Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics; Cambridge University, 2001), 11–25.

³ Translation ours. Plato/Ps-Plato, *Alcibiades* 1.129A. Socrates: Πότερον οὖν δὴ ῥάδιον τυγχάνει τὸ γνῶναι ἑαυτόν, καὶ τις ἦν φαῦλος ὁ τοῦτο ἀναθεὶς εἰς τὸν ἐν Πυθοὶ νεών, ἢ χαλεπὸν τι καὶ οὐχὶ παντός; Alcibiades: Ἐμοὶ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις μὲν ἔδοξε παντός εἶναι, πολλάκις δὲ παγχάλεπον. John Burnet, ed., *Platonis opera* (6 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1901).

the body and the body to the self? Is the body synonymous with the self or is it a part of the self? How is the self related to the soul? Does the self exist after the demise of the body?

Likewise, within and across academic disciplines, definitions of both self and body range widely.⁴ Different definitions are the result of two major factors. First, knowledge and understanding of the objects and ideas represented by the terms self and body are not static. Entire social and cultural evolutions, coupled with inconceivable technological and scientific advances, continually challenge understandings of humanity (e.g., human origins, chemical make-up) forcing redefinitions of key concepts. Second, as concepts, self and body are multivalent. Thinking only of self, Jerrold Seigel argues that the modern intellectual history of selfhood comprises three related but distinct modes of existence: material/bodily, relational/social, and reflexive/self-positing dimensions.⁵ An abundance of synonyms pertaining to these three modes of self further obfuscates meaning. The self is related to, yet distinct from, a number of expressions and ideas: body, character, conscience, consciousness, human, human being, identity, mind, person, personality, psyche, reason, soul, and thought – to name a few.

Complicating matters even more, definitional questions are posed diachronically and cross-culturally. What is an *ancient* body or self? The ability to speak about such a concept is hindered when ancient contexts are merely implicit in ancient texts. What is more, “ancient concepts on ancient terms” – upheld as an ideal – admits compromise (e.g., anachronism) for concepts as intensely personal as self and body.

II. Recent History of Research

Needless to say, early Christian texts are replete with the language of self and body. Clearly, such concepts were important to early Christians. Yet definitions rarely make sense across texts. Despite attempts to establish a single biblical or Christian vision of either self or body, the evidence demonstrates clear plurality

⁴ For example, Jerrold Seigel (*The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe Since the Seventeenth Century* [Cambridge University, 2005], 3) defines the self as, “The particular being any person is, whatever it is about each of us that distinguishes you or me from others, draws the parts of our existence with a slightly different emphasis, together, persists through changes, or opens the way to becoming who we might or should be.” Richard Sorabji defines the self, a person, as an “I” who owns psychological states, experiences, actions, a body, and bodily characteristics (*Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life and Death* [University of Chicago, 2006], 21). Cf. Barry Dainton, *The Phenomenal Self* (Oxford University, 2009); Galen Strawson, *Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics* (Oxford University, 2009); Shaun Gallagher, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the Self* (Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy; Oxford University, 2011).

⁵ Seigel, *Idea of the Self*, 3–44.

of opinion. Different early Christian writers, of texts both within and outside of the New Testament, offer distinct, often competing, visions of these concepts. Notable examples include:⁶

- “The spirit (πνεῦμα) is eager but the flesh (σάρξ) is weak.” (Mark 14:38)⁷
- “May the God of peace himself sanctify you completely, and may your spirit (πνεῦμα), *psyche* (ψυχή), and body (σῶμα) be kept blamelessly whole at the parousia of our Lord Jesus Christ.” (1 Thess 5:23)
- “If I pray in a tongue, my spirit (πνεῦμα) prays but my mind (νοῦς) is unproductive.” (1 Cor 14:14)
- “A physical body (σῶμα ψυχικόν) is sown; a spiritual body (σῶμα πνευματικόν) is raised. If there is a physical body (σῶμα ψυχικόν), there is also a spiritual body (πνευματικόν).” (1 Cor 15:44)
- “For I delight in the law of God in my inner human being (κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον). But I see another law in my members that is at war with the law of my mind (νοῦς) taking me captive to the law of sin present in my members ... So then, on the one hand, I myself am a slave in mind (νοῦς) to the law of God, but, on the other hand, I am slave in flesh (σάρξ) to the law of sin.” (Rom 7:22–23...25b)
- “A double-minded human being (ἀνὴρ δίψυχος), unstable in every way.” (Jas 1:8)
- “Beloved, I urge you, as foreigners and exiles, to abstain from fleshly desires (σαρκικαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι) that wage war against the *psyche* (ψυχή).” (1 Pet 2:11)
- “For who would not marvel at their nobility, endurance, and love of the Master? Those who, although having been torn to shreds by whips to the point that the structure of the flesh (ἡ τῆς σαρκὸς οἰκονομία) was visible as deep as the inner veins and arteries, endured.” (Mart. Pol. 2.2)
- “They happen to be in the flesh (ἐν σαρκί) but they do not live according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα).”... “The *psyche* (ψυχή) is sown throughout all the members of the body (σῶμα); and Christians [are sown] throughout the cities of the world. On the one hand, the *psyche* (ψυχή) dwells in the body (σῶμα), but, on the other hand, it is not from the body (σῶμα); and Christians dwell in the world, but they are not from the world.” (Diogn. 5.8, 6.2–3)

What is more, reception history multiplies interpretations. Depending upon the particular anthropological-philosophical paradigm of the interpreter (e.g., Platonic, Cartesian), Christian texts reflect any of a great number of pictures of the self and body – often combining qualities – deliberately or accidentally – for new, unique formulations.

A comprehensive history of scholarship on treatments of the self and body in Early Christian texts is beyond the scope of this introduction.⁸ Thus, recogniz-

⁶ Cf. also Matt 27:50; 2 Cor 4:16; 1 Pet 3:18–20; 4:6; Heb 12:23.

⁷ Translations ours.

⁸ For more detailed treatments see Robert Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of their Use in Conflict Settings* (AGJU 10; Leiden: Brill, 1971). For each of Paul's anthropological terms, Jewett begins the discussion with a “History of Research.” Cf. Robert H. Gundry, *Sōma in Biblical Theology with Emphasis on Pauline Anthropology* (SNTSMS 29; Cambridge University, 1976), 3–8; Udo Schnelle, “Neutestamentliche Anthropologie: Ein Forschungsbericht,” *ANRW* 26.3:2658–714.

ing the broader interest in the self⁹ and the body¹⁰ among classicists, scholars of ancient Judaism, and scholars of late antiquity, the following summary merely highlights a few recent and significant developments on the topic in New Testament Studies during the second-half of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries.¹¹

⁹ Among other important works, see: Christopher Gill, ed., *The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy* (Oxford University, 1990); idem, *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: The Self in Dialogue* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995); idem, *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought* (Oxford University, 2006); Phillip Cary, *Augustine's Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist* (New York: Oxford University, 2000); Carol A. Newsom, *The Self as Symbolic Space: Constructing Identity and Community at Qumran* (STDJ 52; Leiden: Brill, 2004); Gretchen J. Reydam-Schils, *The Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility, and Affection* (University of Chicago, 2005); Shadi Bartsch, *The Mirror of the Self: Sexuality, Self-knowledge, and the Gaze in the Early Roman Empire* (University of Chicago, 2006); Shadi Bartsch and David Wray, eds., *Seneca and the Self* (Cambridge University, 2009); Vincent Farenaga, *Citizen and Self in Ancient Greece: Individuals Performing Justice and the Law* (Cambridge University, 2006); Pauliina Remes, *Plotinus on Self: The Philosophy of the 'We'* (Cambridge University, 2007); Chiara Thumiger, *Hidden Paths: Self and Characterization in Greek Tragedy: Euripides' Bacchae* (BICS Supplement 99; London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2007); Pauliina Remes and Juha Sihvola, eds., *Ancient Philosophy of the Self* (The New Synthese Historical Library; Dordrecht: Springer, 2008); Maha Elkaissy-Friemuth and John M. Dillon, eds., *The Afterlife of the Platonic Soul: Reflections of Platonic Psychology in the Monotheistic Religions* (Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradition 9; Leiden: Brill, 2009).

¹⁰ Notable works include: Aline Rousselle, *Porneia: On Desire and the Body in Antiquity* (trans. Felicia Pheasant; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988); John J. Winkler, *The Constraints of Desire: The Anthropology of Sex and Gender in Ancient Greece* (New York: Routledge, 1990); Maria Wyke, *Gender and the Body in the Ancient Mediterranean* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); Dominic Montserrat, ed., *Changing Bodies, Changing Meanings: Studies on the Human Body in Antiquity* (London: Routledge, 1998); John P. Wright and Paul Potter, eds., *Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment* (Oxford University, 2000); David Fredrick, ed., *The Roman Gaze: Vision, Power, and the Body* (Arethusa Books; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2002); Mark W. Hamilton, *The Body Royal: The Social Poetics of Kingship in Ancient Israel* (Biblical Interpretation Series 78; Leiden: Brill, 2005); Mladen Popović, *Reading the Human Body: Physiognomics and Astrology in the Dead Sea Scrolls and Hellenistic-Early Roman Period Judaism* (STDJ 67; Leiden: Brill, 2007); Thorsten Fögen and Mireille M. Lee, eds., *Bodies and Boundaries in Graeco-Roman Antiquity* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009); Benjamin D. Sommer, *The Bodies of God and the World of Ancient Israel* (Cambridge University, 2009); Brooke Holmes, *The Symptom and the Subject: The Emergence of the Physical Body in Ancient Greece* (Princeton University, 2010).

¹¹ Other important works include: Udo Schnelle, *Neutestamentliche Anthropologie: Jesus, Paulus, Johannes* (BThS 18; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1991); idem, *The Human Condition: Anthropology in the Teachings of Jesus, Paul, and John* (trans. O.C. Dean, Jr.; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996); Graham J. Warne, *Hebrew Perspectives on the Human Person in the Hellenistic Era: Philo and Paul* (MBPS 35; Lewiston, N.Y.: Mellen, 1995); George H. van Kooten, *Paul's Anthropology in Context: The Image of God, Assimilation to God, and Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity* (WUNT 232; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008); Lorenzo Scornaiench, *Sarx und Soma bei Paulus: Der Mensch zwischen Destruktivität und Konstruktivität* (NTOA/SUNT 67; Göttingen, Niedersachs: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008); Michael Labahn and Outi Lehtipuu, eds., *Anthropology in the New Testament and its Ancient Context Papers from the EABS-Meeting in Piliscsaba* (CBET 54; Leuven: Peeters, 2010);

We begin with *Rudolf Bultmann* (1948–53), whose legacy signals the end of the dominance of bipartite (body-soul) or tripartite anthropologies (body-soul-spirit) in interpreting early Christian anthropology.¹² Influenced by Søren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger, Bultmann argues for a unified concept of the human being. With a particular emphasis on the importance of σῶμα in Pauline anthropology, Bultmann famously observes: “It is clear that the *soma* is not a something that outwardly clings to a man’s real *self* (to his soul, for instance), but belongs to its very essence, so that we can say man does not *have* a *soma*; he *is soma*, for in not a few cases *soma* can be translated simply ‘I.’”¹³ According to Bultmann, the human being is not a composite entity, but a unified whole.

Krister Stendahl (1963) challenges Bultmann’s existentialist view of Pauline anthropology,¹⁴ in particular his view of Paul’s letters “as documents of human consciousness.”¹⁵ Specifically, Stendahl questions the imposition of “introspection” and a “troubled conscience” on to Paul.¹⁶ In contrast to what he regards as the Augustinian and/or the Lutheran reading of a weakened or feeble conscience, Stendahl apprehends a “robust conscience” in Paul’s letters, particularly at Gal 1:13–14¹⁷ and Phil 3:4–11.¹⁸ Following Bultmann, Stendahl’s interpretation reopens thinking about early Christian anthropology.

Benjamin H. Dunning, *Aliens and Sojourners: Self as Other in Early Christianity* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2009).

¹² Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament* (trans. by K. Grobel; 2 vols.; New York: Scribner, 1951–55), 2:190–259. Although Bultmann does not explicitly engage the dominant *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule* in his treatment of New Testament anthropology, a tacit critique is clear in his opposition to ancient Greek models of the human being. Cf. John A. T. Robinson, *The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology* (SBT 5; London: SCM 1952), and David W. Stacey, *The Pauline View of Man: In Relation to Its Judaic and Hellenistic Background* (London: Macmillan, 1956). For criticism of Bultmann, see Ernst Käsemann, “On Paul’s Anthropology” in *Perspective on Paul* (trans. by M. Kohl; London: SCM, 1971), 1–31.

¹³ Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, 2:194. “Aber an einer Reihe dieser Stellen ist deutlich, daß das σῶμα nicht etwas dem eigentlichen Ich des Menschen (etwa seiner Seele) äußerlich Anhaftendes ist, sondern wesentlich zu diesem gehört, so daß man sagen kann: der Mensch hat nicht ein σῶμα, sondern er ist σῶμα. Denn nicht selten kann man σῶμα einfach durch ‘ich’ (bzw. Ein dem Zusammenhang entsprechendes Personalpronomen) übersetzen.” [*Theologie des neuen Testaments* (9th edition; edited and updated by Otto Merk; Tübingen: Mohr, 1984) 2:195].

¹⁴ Krister Stendahl, “The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West,” *HTR* 56/3 (1963): 199–215, here: 207–8.

¹⁵ Stendahl, “Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West,” 199.

¹⁶ Stendahl, “Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West,” 200. In a note, Stendahl rightly recognizes, “The actual meaning of the Greek word *syneidesis*, usually translated ‘conscience,’ is a complex linguistic problem,” (200 n. 2).

¹⁷ Gal 1:14 καὶ προέκοπτον ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ ὑπὲρ πολλοὺς συνηλικιώτας ἐν τῷ γένει μου, περισσότερως ἢ τῆς ὑπάρχουσας τῶν πατρικῶν μου παραδόσεων.

¹⁸ Stendahl, “Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West,” 200, 210. Phil 3:4 καίπερ ἐγὼ ἔχων πεποιθήσιν καὶ ἐν σαρκί. Εἴ τις δοκεῖ ἄλλος πεποιθέναι ἐν σαρκί, ἐγὼ μᾶλλον. Phil 3:6 κατὰ ζήλος διώκων τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, κατὰ δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐν νόμῳ γενόμενος ἀμεμπτος.

Likewise, Robert Jewett (1971) rejects Bultmann's existentialist reading of Pauline anthropology, rather favoring the explanation that Paul's anthropological teaching emerged from and was shaped by exchanges with opponents. Jewett's research, drawing heavily upon parallels in the Septuagint and Second Temple Jewish writings, focuses on eight specific anthropological terms in Paul: σάρξ, πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, σῶμα, καρδιά, ψυχή, νοῦς, ἔξω/ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, and συνείδησις.¹⁹ Important for subsequent interpretation of Pauline anthropology, Jewett argues that Paul: (1) never uses ψυχή in the sense of "soul"; (2) views "the human spirit simply as the apportioned divine spirit";²⁰ (3) does not use πνεῦμα and ψυχή interchangeably; and (4) develops his concept of σῶμα with the specific intent of countering "gnostic dualism."²¹ The details of Jewett's construction, in particular those tied to theories of Gnosticism, are no longer persuasive. His larger argument in favor of contextualized anthropology, however, remains an important insight.

Equally important, Dale B. Martin's (1995) interpretation of the Corinthian correspondence calls into question simplistic notions of body and self in Paul's letters by situating expressions like body among the competing anthropologies of Paul's day. Martin draws upon contemporary philosophical and medical literature to distinguish two competing models of the body in the Corinthian correspondence.²² One model, shared broadly by philosophers and medical writers, regards a healthy body as a state of balance, the diseased body suffering from a distortion of balance. The second model, a more popular view, understands the body as a dangerously permeable entity constantly threatened by outside malevolent forces.²³ Martin's work has inspired a number of subsequent monographs and shorter essays comparing self and body in early Christian texts with other philosophical and medical evidence.

At roughly the same time as Martin's work on the Christian body in First Corinthians, Stanley K. Stowers (1995) appeals to ancient rhetoric to wager something new and important about the Christian self in Romans. Stowers argues that Paul's use of the first person singular in Rom 7:7–25 represents προσωποποιᾶ,

¹⁹ For a "Summary of Results," see Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms*, 447–60. Jewett explicitly rejects the assumed Jewish *versus* Hellenistic divide evident in many earlier works on Pauline anthropology. For more on the end of the divide, see Egon Brandenburger, *Fleisch und Geist; Paulus und die dualistische Weisheit* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag des Erziehungsvereins, 1968); Martin Hengel, *Judentum und Hellenismus; Studien zu ihrer Begegnung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Palästinas bis zur Mitte des 2. Jh. v. Chr.* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1969); idem, *Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in their Encounter in Palestine During the Early Hellenistic Period* (trans. John Bowden; 2 vols.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974); John J. Collins, *Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic Diaspora* (New York: Crossroad, 1983 [2d ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000]).

²⁰ Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms*, 451.

²¹ Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms*, 458.

²² Dale B. Martin, *The Corinthian Body* (New Haven: Yale University, 1995).

²³ Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 3–37.

the rhetorical technique also known as speech-in-character.²⁴ Speech-in-character, a conventional component of the ancient educational curricula, entails that a speaker or writer plausibly constructs what a particular character (πρόσωπον), real or fictitious, would say or write in a given situation. Although interpreters continue to debate the *precise* identity of “I” in Rom 7:7–25, Stowers established that Paul creates a new persona to meet specific rhetorical exigencies of his letter. And, as Stowers notes, the strategy can be seen elsewhere in Paul’s letters and in other early Christian texts.

Only a few years after Martin and Stowers and in contrast to their Greek-based comparative analyses, Jörg Frey (1999) seeks to understand and explicate early Christian anthropological concepts on Jewish terms. Specifically, building upon the early comparative analyses of Karl G. Kuhn²⁵ and William D. Davies,²⁶ Frey attempts to move beyond explanations of Paul’s use of σάρξ on the basis of purely Hellenistic or Gnostic usage, rather emphasizing the relevance of texts from Qumran for its understanding.²⁷ According to Frey, in Paul, “σάρξ is strongly associated with the notion of evil and iniquity. It even seems to denote a sphere or power opposed to God and his will.”²⁸ With others, Frey acknowledges that Paul’s use of σάρξ certainly transcends the meaning and semantic domain of the Hebrew נֶפֶשׁ. Yet, recognizing differences between Paul and the Jewish tradi-

²⁴ Stanley K. Stowers, “Romans 7:7–25 as a Speech-in-Character (προσωποποιία),” in *Paul in his Hellenistic Context* (ed. T. Engberg-Pedersen; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 180–202; idem, “Apostrophe, Προσωποποιία, and Paul’s Rhetorical Education,” in *Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe* (ed. J. T. Fitzgerald, T. H. Olbricht, and L. M. White; NovTSup 110; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 351–69. On the use of προσωποποιία in pseudepigraphic texts see Karl Matthias Schmidt, *Mahnung und Erinnerung im Maskenspiel: Epistolographie, Rhetorik und Narrativik der pseudepigraphen Petrusbriefe* (HBS 38; Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2003).

²⁵ Karl G. Kuhn, “New Light on Temptation, Sin, and Flesh in the New Testament,” in *The Scrolls and the New Testament* (ed. K. Stendahl; New York: Harper, 1957), 94–113, here: 101–8.

²⁶ William D. Davies, “Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls: Flesh and Spirit,” in *The Scrolls and the New Testament* (ed. K. Stendahl; New York: Harper, 1957), 157–82.

²⁷ Jörg Frey, “Die paulinische Antithese von ‘Fleisch’ und ‘Geist’ und die palästinisch-jüdische Weisheitstradition,” *ZNT* 90 (1999): 45–77. Cf. idem, “Different Patterns of Dualistic Thought in the Qumran Library: Reflections on Their Background and History,” in *Legal Texts and Legal Issues: Proceedings of the Second Meeting of the International Organization for Qumran Studies Cambridge 1995* (ed. M. Bernstein, F. García Martínez, and J. Kampen; STDJ 23; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 275–335; idem, “Flesh and Spirit in the Palestinian Jewish Sapiential Tradition and in the Qumran Texts: An Inquiry into the Background of Pauline Usage,” in *The Wisdom Texts from Qumran and the Development of Sapiential Thought* (ed. C. Hempel, A. Lange, and H. Lichtenberger; BETL 159; Leuven University, 2002), 367–404. Also compare Eibert Tigchelaar, “‘Spiritual People,’ ‘Fleshly Spirit,’ and ‘Vision of Meditation’: Reflections on 4QInstruction and 1 Corinthians,” in *Echoes from the Caves: Qumran and the New Testament* (ed. F. García Martínez; STDJ 85; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 103–18.

²⁸ Jörg Frey, “The Notion of ‘Flesh’ in 4QInstruction and the Background of Pauline Usage,” in *Sapiential, Liturgical and Poetical Texts from Qumran: Proceedings of the Third Meeting of the International Organization for Qumran Studies, Oslo, 1998* (ed. D. K. Falk, F. García Martínez, E. M. Schuller; STDJ 35; Leiden: Brill, 2000), 197–226; here: 197.

tion on the topic of the law, Frey demonstrates strong parallels between Paul's understanding of *σάρξ* and the broader use of *בָּשָׂר* in Jewish wisdom traditions at Qumran (e.g., 1Q/4QInstruction and 1Q/4Q Mysteries). As Matthew Goff (see: Chapter 2) and others recognize, anthropologies evident in the texts from Qumran offer promising new venues for the exploration of Early Christian anthropological concepts.

Within only a few years of Martin, Stowers, and Frey, *Troels Engberg-Pedersen* (2000) launches a visionary campaign of viewing Paul's anthropology as closely aligned with Hellenistic moral philosophy, in particular, Stoicism.²⁹ Engberg-Pedersen (see: Chapter 3) maintains that Paul's anthropological terms should not be understood as metaphors. Rather, for Paul, anthropological language is concrete and physical as in certain Stoic anthropological concepts (e.g., *πνεῦμα* is a real, physical, and cognitive entity). Like Martin, Engberg-Pedersen's interpretation of Pauline anthropology highlights options available in the ancient world for thinking about concepts of personhood and challenges traditional approaches to thinking about Paul and the various anthropologies represented by his letters.

At about this same time, yet in contrast to programs such as Engberg-Pedersen's, *Hans Dieter Betz* (2000) explores Paul's use of the "inner human being" (*ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος*) in Rom 7:22 and 2 Cor 4:16.³⁰ Betz argues that, shaped by the theological debate in Corinth, Paul rejects the soul-body dualism of Middle Platonism while recognizing the human experience of internal and external antagonisms. With Bultmann, Betz argues that Paul maintains the fundamental unity of the human being, a feat accomplished by conceptually reconfiguring the terms *ἔσω* and *ἔξω ἄνθρωπος* to avoid dualism. Paul integrates these terms into his non-materialistic "mythico-historical doctrine of creation of the primordial Adam-*ἄνθρωπος*" as well as his "eschatological redemption through the Christ-*ἄνθρωπος*"³¹ with the result of, according to Betz, "an alternative to a Platonist anthropological dualism" that makes "a decisive contribution to ancient anthropology."³²

²⁹ Troels Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul and the Stoics* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2000); idem, *Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit* (Oxford University, 2010). The recently published dissertation of Emma Wasserman engages Engberg-Pedersen extensively: *The Death of the Soul in Romans 7: Sin, Death, and the Law in Light of Hellenistic Moral Psychology* (WUNT 2.256; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008). Cf. Volker Rabens, *The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul: Transformation and Empowering for Religious-Ethical Life* (WUNT 2.283; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010).

³⁰ Cf. Eph 3:16. Hans Dieter Betz, "The Concept of the 'Inner Human Being' (*ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος*) in the Anthropology of Paul," *NTS* 46 (2000): 315–41. Among others, Betz specifically engages Theo K. Heckel (*Der innere Mensch: Die Paulinische Verarbeitung eines Platonischen Motivs* (WUNT 2.53; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1993) and Walter Burkert, "Towards Plato and Paul: The 'Inner' Human Being," in *Ancient and Modern Perspectives on the Bible and Culture: Essays in Honor of Hans Dieter Betz* (ed. A. Y. Collins; Atlanta: Scholars, 1998), 59–82.

³¹ Betz, "Concept of the 'Inner Human Being,'" 340.

³² Betz, "Concept of the 'Inner Human Being,'" 340.

Drawing upon the work of Martin, Stowers, and Betz, J. Albert Harrill (2005) calls attention to Paul's selection of an *enslaved* persona in Rom 7:7–25 as model human being “containing both an ‘outer’ and ‘innermost self.’”³³ According to Harrill, the Romans recognized an internal faculty of assent in slaves, preferring slaves who could recognize their master's wishes and take initiative (e.g., the comedic exchanges between master and slave in the *Vita Aesopi*), an expression of slave authority (*auctoritas*). The persona in Romans is a “captured slave”³⁴ whose external members are under the control of Sin, but the inner parts delight in God's law. The enslaved persona is, according to Harrill, a “religious self” that “though captured, retains its subjective agency.”³⁵ The slave of Rom 7:7–25 provides an important frame for Pauline and later Christian self-understandings and self-definitions.

Finally, sharing a comparative approach with Betz, Harrill, and others but to a different end, Christopher N. Mount (2005) categorizes Pauline Christianity as a form of “spirit-possession cult”³⁶ in which “individuals within the community had come under the control of an alien spirit that subordinated the ‘I’ of the individual to that of the occupying spirit.”³⁷ According to Mount, the physical bodies of early Christ-believers are thought to be: “possessed by a crucified and resurrected deity.”³⁸ Such possession results in the exhibition of various phenomena, including *glossolalia* (cf. 1 Corinthians 12, 14). With an entirely new formulation of the early Christian concept of self, Mount's work emphasizes how the early Christian body and self together (“I”) house a foreign and divine spirit (i.e., the spirit of the Lord) creating of the believer's “I” a primary, new, and alternate identity (2 Cor 5:17).

Today scholarship on the concepts of self and body in early Christian texts advances in a number of different directions. In addition to the approaches mentioned above, scholars interpret the texts in conversation with contemporary phi-

³³ J. Albert Harrill, “Paul and the Slave Self,” in *Religion and the Self in Antiquity* (ed. D. Brakke, M. L. Satlow, and S. Weitzman; Bloomington: Indiana University, 2005), 51–69, here: 53. Cf. idem, “Investive against Paul (2 Cor 10:10), the Physiognomics of the Ancient Slave Body, and the Greco-Roman Rhetoric of Manhood,” in *Antiquity and Humanity: Essays on Ancient Religion and Philosophy Presented to Hans Dieter Betz on His 70th Birthday* (ed. A. Y. Collins and M. M. Mitchell; WUNT 2.164; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 189–213 (both articles are reprinted with slight revision in *Slaves in the New Testament: Literary, Social and Moral Dimensions* [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006]).

³⁴ Harrill, “Paul and the Slave Self,” 63.

³⁵ Harrill, “Paul and the Slave Self,” 63.

³⁶ Christopher N. Mount, “1 Corinthians 11:3–16: Spirit Possession and Authority in a Non-Pauline Interpolation,” *JBL* 124/2 (2005): 313–40, here: 316.

³⁷ Mount, “1 Corinthians 11:3–16: Spirit Possession and Authority in a Non-Pauline Interpolation,” 317.

³⁸ Mount, “Religious Experience, the Religion of Paul, and Women in Pauline Churches,” in *Women and Gender in Ancient Religions: Interdisciplinary Approaches* (ed. S. Ahearne-Kroll, P. A. Holloway, and J. A. Kelhoffer; WUNT 263; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 323–48, here: 342.

losophy, psychology,³⁹ political science, and advances in the hard sciences, in particular the neurosciences, all but doing away with the notion of self.⁴⁰ Recent studies and monographs focus on the suffering self,⁴¹ the asexual self/body,⁴² embodied knowledge,⁴³ religion and the self,⁴⁴ the disabled body,⁴⁵ the gendered body,⁴⁶ the slave body,⁴⁷ the martyr's body,⁴⁸ and the relevance of ancient scientific and medical treatises for understanding the body.⁴⁹ The essays in this volume individually and collectively participate in these ongoing discussions about the

³⁹ Gerd Theissen, *Psychologische Aspekte paulinischer Theologie* (FRLANT 131; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983); idem, *Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology* (trans. J. P. Galvin; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987); Klaus Berger, *Historische Psychologie des Neuen Testaments* (SBS 146–47; Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1991); idem, *Identity and Experience in the New Testament* (trans. by C. Muenchow; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003).

⁴⁰ Joel B. Green, *Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008).

⁴¹ Judith Perkins, *The Suffering Self: Pain and Narrative Representation in the Early Christian Era* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995).

⁴² Peter Brown, *The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity* (New York: Columbia University, 1988; Second-Anniversary Edition 2008); Elizabeth A. Clark, *Reading Renunciation: Asceticism and Scripture in Early Christianity* (Princeton University, 1999); Richard Valantasis, *The Making of the Self: Ancient and Modern Asceticism* (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 2008).

⁴³ Jennifer A. Glancy, *Corporal Knowledge: Early Christian Bodies* (Oxford University, 2010).

⁴⁴ David Shulman and Guy G. Stroumsa, eds., *Self and Self-Transformation in the History of Religions* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University, 2002); David Brakke, Michael L. Satlow, and Steven Weitzman, eds., *Religion and the Self in Antiquity* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University, 2005).

⁴⁵ Hector Avalos, Sarah J. Melcher, and Jeremy Schipper, eds., *This Abled Body: Rethinking Disabilities in Biblical Studies* (SemeiaSt 55; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2007); Jeremy Schipper and Candida Moss, eds., *Disability Studies and Biblical Literature* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

⁴⁶ Jorunn Økland, *Women in Their Place: Paul and The Corinthian Discourse of Gender and Sanctuary Space* (JSNTSup 269; London: T & T Clark International, 2004); David G. Horrell, "Disciplining Performance and 'Placing' the Church: Widows, Elders and Slaves in the Household of God (1 Tim 5,1–6,2)," in *1 Timothy Reconsidered* (Colloquium Oecumenicum Paulinum 18; Leuven: Peeters, 2008), 109–34; Caroline Vander Stichele and Todd Penner, *Contextualizing Gender in Early Christian Discourse: Thinking Beyond Thecla* (London: T & T Clark, 2009); Adela Yarbro Collins, "The Female Body as Social Space in 1 Timothy," *NTS* 57/2 (2011): 155–75.

⁴⁷ Carolyn Osiek, "Female Slaves, *Porneia*, and the Limits of Obedience," in *Early Christian Families in Context* (ed. D. L. Balch and C. Osiek; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 255–76. Compare also the discussion of Harrill's work above.

⁴⁸ Brent D. Shaw, "Body / Power / Identity: Passions of the Martyrs," *JECS* 4/3 (1996): 269–312; David Frankfurter, "Martyrology and the Prurient Gaze," *JECS* 17/2 (2009): 215–45; Candida R. Moss, *The Other Christs: Imitating Jesus in Ancient Christian Ideologies of Martyrdom* (New York: Oxford University, 2010).

⁴⁹ Annette Weissenrieder, *Images of Illness in the Gospel of Luke: Insights of Ancient Medical Texts* (WUNT 2.164; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003); Troy W. Martin, "Paul's Pneumatological Statements and Ancient Medical Texts," in *The New Testament and Early Christian Literature in Greco-Roman Context: Studies in Honor of David E. Aune* (ed. John Fotopoulos; NovTSup 122; Leiden: Brill, 2006), 105–26; idem, "Ancient Medical Texts, Newly Re-Discovered: The Medical Background of Biblical Breathing," *Early Christianity* 1/4 (2010): 513–38.

early Christian self and body. They do not proceed with a uniform notion of either concept. Rather, recognizing competition on the topic ably captured in Wilkin's dissertation on the Delphic maxim and in the wide variety of different approaches today, these essays offer nuanced analyses of texts and/or passages exhibiting particular ancient perceptions of these highly crucial and enigmatic concepts.

III. Essays

This volume offers seventeen new essays picking up on the latest developments in examinations of early Christian concepts of personhood. The volume is organized in six sections: (1) Jewish Literature; (2) Paul; (3) Canonical Gospels and Acts; (4) Extra-canonical Gospels and Acts; (5) Later Witnesses; and (6) History of Interpretation.

The collection opens with a piece by *Karina Martin Hogan (Fordham)*, entitled "The Mortal Body and the Earth in Ben Sira and the Book of the Watchers." Picking up on Leo G. Perdue's (*Wisdom and Creation*) argument that cosmology and anthropology are two prominent, tightly intertwined strands of the theology of wisdom literature, such that what the wisdom tradition has to say about the human person can only be understood properly within the context of what it says about creation as a whole, Hogan makes the case that this insight can be extended to Second Temple Jewish texts that address creation. Her essay first focuses on the place of the earth in the cosmology of the Wisdom of Ben Sira and the Book of the Watchers, before turning to the relationship of the human body to the earth in these two works.

The second piece in this section is *Matthew Goff's (Florida State)* "Being Fleshly or Spiritual: Anthropological Reflection and Exegesis of Genesis 1–3 in 4QInstruction and First Corinthians." Motivated by the assumption that the Dead Sea Scrolls provide a context for assessing the extent to which early Christian authors were influenced by post-biblical traditions attested in Palestine, Goff explores conceptions of humankind and interpretations of Genesis 1–3 in Paul in relation to 4QInstruction (1Q26, 4Q415–18, 423). He focuses on First Corinthians 3 and 15 insofar as these texts demarcate individuals along anthropological lines (e.g., flesh, spirit). Debate over the background of these issues in Paul's writings often focuses on Hellenistic Jewish texts such as the Wisdom of Solomon and the writings of Philo. Goff suggests that Paul draws from and reformulates a wider scope of early Jewish sapiential traditions attested in Palestine for the view he puts forward in this letter.

In "Distinct Portraits and Parallel Development of the Knowledge of God in Romans 1:18–32 and Wisdom of Solomon 13–15," *Alec Lucas (Loyola Chicago)* defends the value of a close comparative analysis of Romans and Wisdom of Solomon on the point of epistemology. In the long history of scholars relating the

Pauline corpus, especially Romans, to the Wisdom of Solomon, the topic of anthropology sometimes arises. For example, Otto Pfleiderer and Hermann Gunkel debated the role of Wisdom 7–9 (esp. Wis 7:22 ff.; 9:6–17) in shaping Paul's doctrine of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Following a review of the history of scholarship including these two positions, Lucas takes up his own comparative analysis of the relationship between Rom 1:18–32 and Wisdom 13–15. Lucas argues that, although these two texts have frequently been related to one another, such comparisons have obscured an important difference between the texts concerning the “knowledge of God.” Namely, Rom 1:18–32 presents humanity as having initially possessed the knowledge of God, but as having suppressed that knowledge in the descent into idolatry and immorality whereas Wisdom 13–15 depicts the knowledge of God as something not even Graeco-Roman nature worshippers achieved, much less idolaters and/or theriolatrous Egyptians.

Essays dedicated exclusively to concepts of personhood in the letters of Paul open with a new piece by *Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Copenhagen)*, “A Stoic Concept of the Person in Paul? From Galatians 5:17 to Romans 7:14–25.” Following on previously published arguments in which he argues that one need not choose between Paul as Platonic or Stoic in Romans 7, Engberg-Pedersen argues that in Rom 8:1–13 Paul presupposes a Stoic cognitive understanding. According to Engberg-Pedersen, it is important to make a strict case for Stoicism in this case because of the passage's implications for Paul's notion of person. To this end, Engberg-Pedersen examines a few verses in Galatians 5:16–18. He concludes by summarizing all three ideas in Paul: Christian body, Christian self, and Christian person.

Stefan Krauter's (München) “Is Romans 7:7–13 about ἀκρασία?” also picks up on the theme of ancient Stoicism in Paul's letters in a careful treatment of ἀκρασία in Romans 7. Krauter begins with the “weakness of will” philosophical *topos*, discussed in ancient philosophy under the title of ἀκρασία. The various philosophical schools developed different models of explaining ἀκρασία, including paradoxical behaviours. According to Krauter, in the wake of Rudolf Bultmann's and Werner Georg Kümmel's work on Romans 7, it became fashionable to deny any connection between Paul's text and the ancient philosophical debates. Today, however, exegetical research focuses on interpreting Rom 7:14–24 in the context of these debates. Therefore, in dialogue with recent monographs and articles on this topic, Krauter analyzes the structure of Rom 7:7–24 and the relationship between Rom 7:7–13 to Genesis 3 in order to propose that Rom 7:7–13 does not deal with the effects of law on a person who is *already* in the state of ἀκρασία, but rather with the problem of how law contributes to the process in which a person *becomes akratic*. Krauter concludes that Rom 7:7–13 fits nicely in the ancient philosophical *topos* of the paradoxical effect of prohibitions.

With regard to the canonical gospels and Acts, *Martin Meiser's (Saarland)* “Anthropologie im Markusevangelium” makes a case for the suffering self as an

anthropological concept in the Gospel of Mark adapted from ancient Judaism. Meiser argues that faith functions as an exemption to act establishing a type of critical social advantage by economic and social non-elites.

Moreover, in "The Christian and the Roman Self: The Lukan Paul and a Roman Reading" *Manfred Lang* (Halle) explores the Christian vis-à-vis a Roman self in terms of Luke-Acts and against a background of Greek contemporary texts. His contribution focuses less on modern concerns (e.g., Kantian discourse) than recent conclusions of, for example, Christopher Gill where the (ancient) self reflects a non-Cartesian model of selfhood.

Concluding this section is a piece entitled, "Clarifying a Curiosity: The Plural *Bloods* (αἱμάτων) in John 1:13" by *Troy Martin* (Xavier) on the value of ancient medical texts for understanding "bloods" in John 1:13. According to Martin, the plural may refer exclusively to the flows of blood from the mother that provides the material for a fetus. By using the plural, however, John may express contributions to the procreative process by both the mother and the father. If the phrase "the will of the flesh" relates to the woman's role in conception (and the phrase "the will of a husband" certainly relates to a man's role), then these two phrases together elaborate on the plural use of *bloods* in John 1:13 to refer contributions by both father and mother in conception and formation of the fetus. This natural process is precisely what John wants to exclude as a characteristic of the children of God, born again from water, Spirit (John 3:5), and God (1:13).

The section on non-canonical writings opens with a reflection entitled, "Identification Please: Aspects of Identity in Ancient Narrative" by *Richard I. Pervo* (Minneapolis) on personhood and identity in the non-canonical Acts. The thesis of this essay is that identity is a fundamental concern of ancient popular narrative, working at both the center and fringe of such texts. Identity, according to Pervo, is always both an individual and a corporate matter. Implicit answers to such basic questions as: what is and/or makes a genuine person, what prevents me/us from becoming what I/we ought and wish to be, underlie most, if not all, of these disparate texts and permit broad comparisons with other ancient writings.

Janet Spittler (Texas Christian) in "The Anthropology of the *Acts of Thomas*" provides an exposition of the Christian self in the *Acts of Thomas* against the background of contemporary Platonism. In two relatively recent articles on the *Acts of Andrew*, L. R. Lanzillotta takes a narrow view of the anthropology of the text offering insights on how the text fits into the theological and philosophical landscape of the second century. Building on Lanzillotta's work, Spittler presents a comparison of the anthropology of the *Acts of Andrew* and the *Acts of Thomas* demonstrating that they have fundamentally different understandings of what comprises the human being.

Also on the apocryphal Acts, *Romulus Stefanut* (Chicago) in his essay, "From Logos to Mythos: The Apocalypse of Paul and Plato's *Phaedo* in Dialogue" ex-

amines the *Acts of John*. As the classical historian Jean-Pierre Vernant points out in his work *Les origines de la pensée grecque* (*Origins of Greek Thought*), the beginnings of Greek philosophy are associated with the paradigm shift from μῦθος (*mythos*) to λόγος (*logos*). Beginning with Thales of Miletus, philosophy – defined as a rational discourse about the universe – departed from the mythical language of Homer and the other poets by offering a rational comprehensive principle (ἀρχή) accounting for the whole of existence. Stefanut suggests that this ‘history of philosophy’ trajectory can be found in Judaism and Christianity: the pattern beginning with μῦθος in Genesis and carried out in the New Testament emphasis on λόγος. Stefanut, however, asks what happens when rational discourse (i.e., λόγος) becomes insufficient? Narrative gaps left by revelatory discourse may be filled (or amplified), as in the *Apocalypse of Paul*, by mythical discourse.

This section concludes with a Greek text and translation of *Third Corinthians* by Robert Matthew Calhoun (*Chicago*). The essay, entitled “The Resurrection of the Flesh in Third Corinthians,” argues that, unlike Irenaeus and Tertullian who perform “exegetical acrobatics” in their debates with heretics, the author of *Third Corinthians* adopts Paul’s persona in order to prove his endorsement of the concept of the resurrection of the flesh, and to usher Paul into line with the Gospels and the emerging “orthodox” consensus. Calhoun further argues that the author of Third Corinthians does not compose his pseudepigraphon to refute specific Gnostic movements or doctrines (as much of the secondary literature on the text supposes), but to resolve an internal controversy regarding the resurrected body. Since Paul’s remarks grind against the secure establishment of a coherent doctrine, the author designs *Third Corinthians* not to *clarify* the argument of 1 Corinthians 15, but to *replace* it.

The section on later witnesses opens with a piece entitled “Epitomizing Virtue: Clothing the Christian Woman’s Body.” In this essay, Annette Bourland-Huizenga (*Dubuque Seminary*) takes up the problem of ancient moralizing advice on proper feminine adornment. According to Bourland-Huizenga, like several other Greek philosophical sources, *On the Harmony* constructs a conceptual link between a woman’s external appearance and her internal uprightness. The truly “harmonious” woman is recognized by simplicity of adornment. The author of First Timothy formulates some of the same ideas. Thus, this essay compares advice in 1 Timothy 2 to that of other moral-philosophical texts, including the letter *Melissa to Kleareta*, the treatises by Periktione, *On the Harmony of a Woman*, and by Phintys, *On the Moderation of a Woman*, Plutarch’s *Advice to the Bride and Groom*, and Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*. First Peter is also taken into account. The essay covers the following questions: (1) which elements of female adornment these sources address, and what they represent; (2) what perceptions of gender-differentiation, of femininity and masculinity, lie beneath the philosophical judgments expressed in this literature; (3) when First Timothy promotes such cultural

assessments, what distinctive concepts its theological justifications introduce. The investigation shows that two concerns stand behind the references to specific items of adornment: (A) a concern over the display of wealth, and (B) a gender perspective viewing women as weaker and more likely to act out sexual desires, than men.

Also treating later witnesses, in "Torture and Identity: Paganism, Christianity, and Beyond," *David Konstan (Brown)* challenges traditional thinking about victims of persecution. Konstan argues that the idea of the soul's separability from the body lent itself to the idea that torture need not effect intellectual conviction and may be symptomatic, not so much of early Christian texts, as contemporary novels and martyr stories.

In "Apollo, Possession, and Prophecy," *Fritz Graf (Ohio State)* explores the contentious topic of how the Pythia, the medium of Apollo in Delphi, communicated with her god and with her clients. According to most modern scholarship, she was in a state of possession and frenzy, even if the ritual means for achieving this state of mind were unclear in antiquity and continues to be debated by modern scholars. Graf offers the various possibilities, including a related discussion of the theories of the oracle's origin, concluding that in Delphi, and perhaps other Apolline oracles, there was a tension between the ritual of the oracles and the stories told about them, between practice and ideology. Modern scholars, under the influence of Christian readings of spirit possession, reduce to a single theory what in reality were various, even contradictory, perspectives of the phenomena.

The volume concludes with a piece by *John R. Levison (Seattle Pacific)* entitled "Assessing the Origins of Modern Pneumatology: The Life and Legacy of Hermann Gunkel." This essay reflects on Gunkel's *Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes nach der populären Anschauung der apostolischen Zeit und der Lehre des Apostels Paulus* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1888), a landmark work on the spirit in early Christian texts, dominating biblical and theological perspectives on early Christian pneumatology throughout the twentieth century. Identifying the three ways in which Gunkel defined pneumatology, Levison then evaluates Gunkel's association of the spirit with the spectacular and the spontaneous. Calling for reparation of this legacy, Levison argues that Gunkel's life helps us appreciate the cost that challenges to contemporary assumptions about pneumatology entail. The essay concludes with a theme we see as emblematic of the volume overall; namely, an exhortation to the guild to keep all avenues of inquiry open as we move forward in the study of early Christian concepts of personhood.

II. Jewish Literature

The Mortal Body and the Earth in Ben Sira and the Book of the Watchers

Karina Martin Hogan

In *Wisdom and Creation*, Leo G. Perdue argues that cosmology and anthropology are the two most prominent strands of the theology of the wisdom literature, and that they are tightly intertwined.¹ What the wisdom tradition has to say about the human person can only be properly understood within the context of what it says about creation as a whole. More recently, scholars applying an ecological hermeneutic to the Bible have made a similar point “from the perspective of Earth.”² Although the Bible (especially Gen 1:28) has been used to justify the exploitation of nature by human beings,³ it is a rich resource for ecological theology in that it presents numerous opportunities for reflection on the place of human beings in the intricate web of life that is understood to be God’s creation. This insight can certainly be extended beyond the Hebrew Bible to many Jewish texts of the Second Temple period that address the theme of creation. This essay will first

¹ Leo G. Perdue, *Wisdom and Creation: The Theology of Wisdom Literature* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994), 48 *et passim*.

² Among the many contributions to ecological hermeneutics in recent years, some of the most influential have been the five volumes of essays by the Earth Bible team: *Readings from the Perspective of Earth*, *The Earth Story in Genesis*, *The Earth Story in Wisdom Traditions*, *The Earth Story in Psalms and Prophets*, and *The Earth Story in the New Testament* (ed. Norman C. Habel *et al.*; Sheffield Academic and Pilgrim Press, 2000–2002); the work of the SBL Ecological Hermeneutics group, represented by the volume *Exploring Ecological Hermeneutics* (ed. Norman C. Habel and Peter L. Trudinger; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008); and the work of Terence E. Fretheim, especially *God and the World in the Old Testament: A Relational Theology of Creation* (Nashville: Abingdon, 2005). For a more complete bibliography, see Gene M. Tucker, “Ecological Approaches: The Bible and the Land,” in *Method Matters: Essays on the Interpretation of the Hebrew Bible in Honor of David L. Petersen* (ed. Joel M. LeMon and Kent H. Richards; SBLRBS 56; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2009), 349–68.

³ The pernicious influence of Gen 1:28 on the development of Western culture was certainly exaggerated by Lynn White, Jr. in his influential article “The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis,” *Science* 155 (1967): 1203–7. Jeremy Cohen (“*Be Fertile and Increase, Fill the Earth and Master It*”: *The Ancient and Medieval Career of a Biblical Text* [Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989]) has shown that pre-modern interpretation of this verse focused almost entirely on the divine command to procreate, and that it was not understood to give license to exploit the environment. Nevertheless, White’s article sparked a widespread interest in environmental ethics and drew biblical scholars into the discussion; for a review of the debate and an alternative to the “mastery” and “stewardship” interpretations of Gen 1:28, see J. Baird Callicott, “Genesis and John Muir,” in *Covenant for a New Creation: Ethics, Religion and Public Policy* (ed. Carol S. Robb and Carl J. Casebolt; Maryknoll, N. Y.: Orbis, 1991), 107–40.

examine the place of the earth in the cosmology of two early Jewish works, the Wisdom of Ben Sira and the Book of the Watchers, and will then narrow its focus to the relationship of the human body to the earth in the two works. This investigation sheds light on an important resource for understanding early Christian concepts of personhood, insofar as early Christianity was informed by both the wisdom and apocalyptic traditions in early Judaism.

It has become popular in recent years to compare the Wisdom of Ben Sira with the early apocalypses contained in *1 Enoch*.⁴ This trend reflects a growing recognition that the wisdom and apocalyptic genres are not as discrete as they were once assumed to be, and they probably emerged out of similar social contexts. That is, both wisdom and apocalyptic literature have been recognized as productions of scribal elites, and in Second Temple period Judea there would have been a limited number of institutions that supported scribal activity.⁵ Thus the likelihood that Ben Sira and the authors of the early Enochic apocalypses were aware of one another's existence is quite high, and certainly the concerns of the texts overlap.

The Book of the Watchers (BW) is an especially fertile field for comparison with Ben Sira. Completed about a half-century earlier than Ben Sira's book (which can be dated fairly securely to the early second century BCE), the BW shares with Ben Sira an exegetical interest in the primeval narratives in Genesis, although Ben Sira refers most often to Genesis 1–3, while the BW concentrates on Genesis 6–9.⁶ Perhaps more to the point, the two texts share an interest in questions of theodicy and of theological anthropology raised by the primeval narratives. While the earth has a much more prominent place in the cosmology of the BW than in that of Ben Sira, they share certain cosmological assumptions that inform their respective anthropologies.

⁴ The first monograph comparing them was Randal A. Argall, *1 Enoch and Sirach: A Comparative Literary and Conceptual Analysis of the Themes of Revelation, Creation and Judgment* (SBLJL 8; Atlanta: Scholars, 1995). Since then a number of scholars have brought Ben Sira into dialogue with the Enochic apocalypses on various themes, including Benjamin G. Wright III, Gabriele Boccaccini, Richard Horsley, John J. Collins, George W.E. Nickelsburg and Patrick Tiller.

⁵ Benjamin G. Wright III, "Wisdom, Instruction and Social Location in Ben Sira and *1 Enoch*," in *Praise Israel for Wisdom and Instruction: Essays on Ben Sira and Wisdom, the Letter of Aristeas and the Septuagint* (JSJSup 131; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 147–63, esp. 161. Originally published in *Things Revealed: Studies in Early Jewish and Christian Literature in Honor of Michael E. Stone* (ed. Esther Chazon, David Satran and Ruth Clements; JSJSup 89; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 105–21.

⁶ There are exceptions: Ben Sira emphasizes the human *yetzer* in his discussion of responsibility for sin, a concept that he probably derived from Gen 6:5 and 8:21; he also (probably) mentions the giants (16:7), and Enoch and Noah are the first two ancestors he praises (44:16–18). As for the BW, there are numerous possible allusions to the Eden myth in the second journey narrative (*1 Enoch* 20–36), and one definite one (32:6).

The Earth in the Cosmology of Ben Sira

The book of Sirach contains four poems treating the observable works of creation (16:24–17:14; 33:7–15; 39:12–35; and 42:15–43:33).⁷ There are also two Wisdom hymns in the book (1:1–10 and chapter 24) that allude to aspects of creation that are beyond human observation.⁸ One might expect the earth to have a prominent place among the observable works of creation, but in fact Ben Sira rarely discusses the earth as a creation in its own right. Instead, his meditations on creation tend to focus on phenomena of the heavens and on humankind, while the earth and the rest of its creatures remain in the background.

Only in the context of the “hidden” aspects of creation does Ben Sira express wonder at the earth itself: “The height of heaven, the breadth of the earth, the abyss, and wisdom – who can search them out?” (1:3).⁹ An answer to this question comes later in the book: apart from God, only Wisdom herself can claim to have “searched out” heaven, earth and the abyss (24:5–6). Significantly, however, Wisdom seeks a “resting place” on earth in the central wisdom hymn, and in fact “takes root” in the land of Israel, in Jerusalem (24:7–12). Wisdom’s connection with the earth is reinforced in this hymn by comparing her to earthly phenomena, especially trees (24:13–17) and rivers (24:25–27). The lack of attention to the earth in Ben Sira’s poems about the observable creation is not an indication of disregard or disdain for the earth, therefore, since he does not hesitate to associate transcendent Wisdom closely with the earth and its creatures. Rather, it seems to be related to the standpoint of the observer, whether divine or human.

In the first poem about the observable works of creation, after introducing the theme of order in creation “from the beginning” (16:26–28), Ben Sira envisions the original state of the earth as that of an empty receptacle, or a *tabula rasa*: “Then the Lord looked upon the earth, and filled it with his good things. With all kinds of living beings he covered its surface, and into it they must return” (16:29–30). Here the divine perspective on the earth from above, as a blank sur-

⁷ It is not clear where the first of these poems ends: Patrick W. Skehan and Alexander A. DiLella (*The Wisdom of Ben Sira* [AB 39; New York: Doubleday, 1987] 276–86) treat 16:24–18:14 as a single unit, while John J. Collins (*Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age* [OTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997] 58–61) sees 17:20 as the conclusion of the instruction beginning in 16:24. A number of scholars break the poem off at 17:14, however. See especially Luis Alonso Schökel, “The Vision of Man in Sirach 16:24–17:14,” in *Israelite Wisdom: Theological and Literary Essays in Honor of Samuel Terrien* (ed. J. G. Gammie et al.; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press for Union Theological Seminary, 1978) 235–45.

⁸ The distinction between observable and “hidden” aspects of creation, according to which Argall organizes his chapter on creation in *1 Enoch and Sirach*, might seem more relevant to the BW than to Sirach, since Enoch is shown many aspects of the creation that are hidden from ordinary human beings, while Ben Sira cautions his disciple, “what is hidden is not your concern” (3:22). Nevertheless, Ben Sira ends his longest poem on creation with the statement, “Many things greater than these lie hidden, for I have seen but few of his works” (43:32).

⁹ Unless otherwise noted, translations of Ben Sira are from the NRSV.

face waiting to be filled, is in tension with the perspective from below at the end of the 16:30, which is narrowly focused on the earth as a container for the dead. The point about all living things returning into the earth, which is repeated with respect to human beings in particular in 17:1, will be discussed in the section on Ben Sira's anthropology. The important point for Ben Sira's cosmology is the subtle contrast between the orderly but unspecified "works" of creation that Ben Sira describes in 16:26–28, which "neither hunger nor grow weary, and they do not abandon their tasks" (16:27), on the one hand, and the creatures of earth on the other, which are not described at all. Although most scholars infer that the "works" Ben Sira is describing in 16:26–28 are the heavenly luminaries, he does not identify them clearly.¹⁰ The result is that the message about the goodness of creation as a whole comes across more strongly than the contrast between the heavens and the earth.

The next poem on "the works of the Most High" (33:7–15) follows a similar pattern. It begins by discussing the days of the year: some of them God creates to be ordinary, others to be exalted and holy, yet the same sun illumines all of them (33:7–9). The order of the heavenly luminaries is once again implied, since it is through the movements of the sun and especially the moon that God "appointed the different seasons and festivals" (33:8; cf. 43:6–7; Gen 1:14; Ps 104:19).¹¹ Ben Sira then draws a clear, but not exact, analogy between different types of days and different types of people: "Some [people] he blessed and exalted, and some he made holy and brought near to himself; but some he cursed and brought low, and turned them out of their place" (33:12). This problematic analogy will be analyzed further in the section on Ben Sira's anthropology. From the point of view of cosmology, scholars have tended to read the whole passage through the lens of the "doctrine of opposites" with which it concludes: "Look at all the works of the Most High; they come in pairs, one the opposite of the other" (33:15).¹² Yet that is only half of the cosmological/anthropological paradox Ben Sira is

¹⁰ Maurice Gilbert, "Ben Sira, Reader of Genesis 1–11," in *Intertextual Studies in Ben Sira and Tobit* (ed. Jeremy Corley and Vincent Skemp; CBQMS 38; Washington, DC: The Catholic Biblical Association, 2005), 89–99 (here 93); Skehan and DiLella, *Wisdom of Ben Sira*, 281; Argall, *1 Enoch and Sirach*, 136; Alonso Schökel, "Vision of Man," 235–36. For Alonso Schökel, the implicit distinction between celestial beings and creatures of earth is essential background to Ben Sira's "vision of man" as sharing characteristics of both groups.

¹¹ Argall, *1 Enoch and Sirach*, 138–39.

¹² On the "doctrine of opposites" as Ben Sira's main innovation in theodicy, see O. S. Rankin, *Israel's Wisdom Literature: Its Bearing on Theology and the History of Religion* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1936), 34–35; Skehan and DiLella, *Wisdom of Ben Sira*, 401; Collins, *Jewish Wisdom*, 85, 95. Greg Schmidt Goering considers that the importance of the "doctrine of opposites" within Ben Sira's thought has been exaggerated. See his *Wisdom's Root Revealed: Ben Sira and the Election of Israel* (JSJSup 139; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 26–27. Even in 33:7–15, which is the *locus classicus* for Ben Sira's doctrine of opposites, Goering thinks the dynamic of election, rather than binary opposition, is meant to be transferred by analogy from the days to the people (ibid., 49–61). This argument will be treated below, in the context of Ben Sira's anthropology.

presenting here. The doctrine of opposites is balanced by Ben Sira's initial claims about the commonalities of days ("all the daylight in the year is from the sun") and human beings ("all human beings are vessels of clay, for from dust Adam was formed"). The earth is mentioned here only by implication, in the context of an anthropological claim, but it nevertheless serves to ground Ben Sira's cosmological argument that a tension between sameness and difference is built into the order of creation.

The third poem on creation (39:12–35) is more hymnic than the previous two, but its primary purpose is to develop a theodicy that is hinted at in the previous poem. Its refrain, repeated with variations in verses 21 and 33–34, is introduced in verses 16–17: "All the works of the Lord are very good, and whatever he commands will be done at the appointed time. No one can say, 'What is this?' or 'Why is that?' – for at the appointed time all such questions will be answered." The phenomena of earth are emphasized more here than in the other three creation poems, because Ben Sira's purpose is to explain why different people experience the world differently: "From the beginning good things were created for the good, but for sinners good things and bad" (39:25). Things like "fire and hail and famine and pestilence ... the fangs of wild animals and scorpions and vipers" (39:29–30) were created for the purpose of punishing evildoers. The eager obedience of these "works" to God's commands is emphasized (39:31), in contrast to the human tendency to question that is implied in the refrain. Even the "basic necessities of human life," which are obtained from the earth, "turn into evils" for sinners (39:26–27). The earth is not given any credit for supplying either good or bad things. Ben Sira's theodicy requires that it is the Lord who will "supply every need in its time" (39:33).

The last and longest of Ben Sira's creation poems, 42:15–43:33, is the most hymnic of all, in the sense that it praises God for particular works of creation. It also contributes to advancing Ben Sira's theodicy. In the introductory section, he reprises his doctrine of opposites (42:24–25), as well as the idea that "each creature is preserved to meet a particular need" (42:23). He adds that God "searches out the abyss and the human heart; he understands their innermost secrets" (42:18), alluding to the opening poem of the book (esp. 1:3) on how much divine wisdom exceeds that of human beings, a theme picked up in the conclusion of this poem. For present purposes, the most striking feature of the main body of the poem is its neglect of the earth and its living creatures, especially by contrast with Job 38–41, which it resembles in form and echoes here and there. After fairly extensive descriptions of the sun, the moon, the stars and the rainbow (43:1–12), the poem turns to meteorological phenomena (43:13–22) and then, briefly, to the sea (43:23–26), before moving to the conclusion (43:27–33). The heavenly provenance of the meteorological phenomena is emphasized more than their effect on the earth: "By his command he sends the driving snow and speeds the lightnings of his judgment. Therefore the storehouses are opened, and the clouds fly out

like birds" (43:13–14).¹³ Curiously, although Ben Sira marvels at the variety of "living things" in the sea (43:25), the only terrestrial form of life he mentions in the body of the poem is the "tender grass," which is withered by God's heat and then refreshed by the "falling dew" (43:21–22). The exception to this rule is the human observer, whose vantage point on earth is implied throughout the poem, and is alluded to several times in the body of the poem (43:3–4, 11, 18, 24).

In the concluding stanza (43:27–33), the relationship of the human observer to the Creator and to the rest of creation becomes the explicit subject. Ben Sira makes two related points: first, that God is greater than all the works of creation and human beings can never praise God enough (43:27–30); and second, that creation itself is greater than the human capacity to observe it (43:31–32). No reason is given for these human limitations, but they are apparently not due to human beings' terrestrial nature, since in the introductory stanza Ben Sira claims that "The Lord has not empowered even his holy ones [i. e., heavenly beings] to recount all his marvelous works" (42:17).¹⁴ The main point of both the introductory and concluding stanzas is God's transcendence and sovereignty over all of his creations. Yet it is striking that three of the four creation poems in Ben Sira focus on heavenly luminaries and human beings, devoting relatively little space to the earth and the rest of its creatures.

The Earth in the Cosmology of the Book of the Watchers

Ben Sira's lack of interest in the earth as a divine creation in its own right stands out in contrast to the BW. The earth is a focus of attention in every part of the BW.¹⁵ The introductory chapters (1 *Enoch* 1–5) contain an exhortation to observe

¹³ The notion that meteorological phenomena issue from heavenly storehouses is fairly common in the Bible; cf. Sir 39:30; Deut 28:12; Job 38:22; Ps 135:7; Jer 10:13; 51:16. The same idea occurs in the BW in 1 *Enoch* 17:3; and cf. 1 *Enoch* 41:4–5; 60:12, 15, 19–21.

¹⁴ The sentiment is similar to one found in the Qumran *Songs of Sabbath Sacrifice*: Blessed be the Lord, King of all, (who is) above all blessing and praise" (4Q403 1 i 28). This paradoxical expression, probably meant to be an example of an angelic hymn, is discussed by Eric D. Raymond in "Poetry of the Heavenly other: Angelic Praise in the *Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice*," in *The 'Other' in Second Temple Judaism: Essays in Honor of John J. Collins* (ed. Daniel C. Harlow, Karina Martin Hogan, Matthew Goff and Joel S. Kaminsky; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 368–80. In the Qumran Hodayot, however, the human incapacity both to comprehend and autonomously to praise God's works is frequently tied to the human person's fleshly and terrestrial nature; e. g., 1QH 5:19–22. The speaker of the Hodayot claims to be transformed, however, by the divine gift of insight. See Carol A. Newsom, *The Self as Symbolic Space: Constructing Identity and Community at Qumran* (STDJ 52; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 191–286.

¹⁵ The book is typically divided by scholars into the following sections: chapters 1–5, 6–11, 12–16, 17–19 and 20–36. There is general agreement that the earliest material in the book is found in chapters 6–11 and that chapters 1–5 were composed last, but the order of composition of the remaining sections is disputed. For present purposes, it will suffice to treat the sections synchronically, in the order in which they appear.

the orderly phenomena of creation, concluding with a condemnation of the human propensity to “turn aside” from obedience to the divine commandments (2:1–5:4). While the message of this speech is similar to that of Ben Sira’s creation poems (especially 16:26–30), it occurs in the context of a scene of eschatological judgment (1:4–9, 5:5–9) unlike anything in Ben Sira. A less obvious contrast with Ben Sira is in the distribution of the natural phenomena listed: a single verse (2:1) is devoted to “the works of heaven,” while the remaining seven verses (2:2–5:3) relate to the earth and “the works that take place on it.” If the sea and rivers (5:3) are considered a separate realm (as they apparently are in Sir 43:23–25), the earth and its works still occupy five or six verses out of eight (since 5:2 is a general summary, coming before the mention of the sea and rivers). The changing seasons and the weather are described from the point of view of the earth, not of their origins in the heavens:

Contemplate the signs of winter, that all the earth is filled with water, and clouds and dew and rain rest upon it ... Observe the signs of summer, whereby the sun burns and scorches, and you seek shelter and shade from its presence, and the earth burns with scorching heat, and you are unable to tread on the dust or the rock because of the burning (2:3, 4:1).¹⁶

The earth is also the locus of the eschatological judgment scenes that frame the exhortation: in the first “the earth will be wholly rent asunder, and everything on earth will perish, and there will be judgment on all” (1:7), but in the final verdict “the chosen” are twice promised that “they will inherit the earth” (5:6, 7). Clearly the earth that the chosen will inherit will be a renewed earth, but no explanation is offered at this point for the destruction of the present earth.

Chapters 6–11 contain two intertwined myths of the descent of rebellious Watchers to earth. The first, an elaboration of Gen 6:1–4, recounts a conspiracy of Watchers, led by Shemihazah, to beget children with human women, while the second assigns primary responsibility to another Watcher, Asael, for revealing secret knowledge (including instruments of war and personal adornment) to human beings.¹⁷ The defilement of the Watchers through sexual unions with human women will be addressed below; what is of interest here is the effect of the Watchers’ rebellions upon the earth, which is also described in terms suggesting

¹⁶ Translations for the BW are from George W.E. Nickelsburg and James C. VanderKam, *1 Enoch: A New Translation* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2004). The translation of 2:3 follows a textual emendation by Nickelsburg; see his commentary *1 Enoch 1: A Commentary on the Book of 1 Enoch, Chapters 1–36; 81–108* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), 150, 156.

¹⁷ On the stages of development of the Watchers mythology in *1 Enoch* 6–11, see Nickelsburg, *1 Enoch 1*, 165–72, and cf. Archie T. Wright, *The Origin of Evil Spirits: The Reception of Genesis 6:1–4 in Early Jewish Literature* (WUNT 2/198; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 96–165. A helpful analysis of the final form of *1 Enoch* 6–16 is Annette Yoshiko Reed, “Heavenly Ascent, Angelic Descent, and the Transmission of Knowledge in *1 Enoch* 6–16,” in *Heavenly Realms and Earthly Realities in Late Antique Religions* (ed. R.S. Boustani and A.Y. Reed; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 47–66.

defilement.¹⁸ Both rebellions lead to an increase in “bloodshed” and “godlessness and violence” (9:1) on the earth. In the first case, the giants, offspring of the Watchers and human women, begin to devour both human beings and animals and to drink their blood (7:3–5), and in the second “all the earth was made desolate by the deeds of the teaching of Asael (10:8; cf. 8:2).

Remarkably, the earth itself brings “accusation against the lawless ones” (7:6) and intercedes for the Watchers’ victims: the earth “raises the voice of their cries to the gates of heaven” (9:2).¹⁹ The earth is not fully personified here – it is not given its own voice or a relationship to the dead – but it nevertheless has some agency. Four of the “holy ones of heaven” (Michael, Sariel, Raphael and Gabriel) present the earth’s suit to the Most High, and are in turn commissioned to various tasks aimed at “the healing of the earth” (10:7). The great flood of Genesis 6–9 is interpreted as cleansing the earth from its defilement, brought about by the sins of the Watchers (10:20–22). The flood can be viewed as a prototype of the eschatological judgment, but as a past event it must be seen as only partly effective, since the utopian situation described in 10:16–11:2 clearly does not correspond to the present state of the earth.

Chapters 12–16 will be central to the discussion of the earth in the anthropology of the BW, but they also shed some light on the present state of the earth in the cosmology of the BW. According to these chapters, the flood was not completely effective at eliminating the giants. Although their bodies have been destroyed, they continue to plague the earth as “evil spirits,” because of their hybrid nature as immortal spirits begotten on earth (15:8–10). They will continue to attack humankind and the earth “until the day of the consummation of the great judgment” (16:1). Human beings share the blame for earth’s ills, however; through the mystery revealed to them by the Watchers “the women and men are multiplying evils on the earth” (16:3). So the present state of the earth is hopelessly corrupt, but the ultimate responsibility for that situation lies with the Watchers, not with human beings.

The final two sections of the BW (chs. 17–19 and 20–36) relate Enoch’s journeys to the ends of the earth, in the course of which he is shown, by angelic tour guides, “the extremities of all things,” which no other human being has seen (19:3). Thus, although many of these chapters purport to describe parts of the earth, they are mainly concerned with the “hidden,” rather than the “observable,” aspects of creation, to return to Argall’s distinction. The author of the BW does

¹⁸ The defilement of the earth by bloodshed and other grave sins is part of the concept of moral defilement/impurity, to be distinguished from ritual impurity. For the distinction, see Jonathan Klawans, *Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 21–42, esp. 26–27, 33–34 on the defilement of the land by grave sins.

¹⁹ The text of 9:2 is uncertain; Nickelsburg’s translation follows the Ethiopic. See Nickelsburg, *1 Enoch 1*, 202–3. There may be a vague allusion to Gen 4:10–11, where the ground (הָאֲדָמָה) is personified as opening its mouth to receive Abel’s blood, but it is the blood itself that cries out to God from the ground.

not show any of Ben Sira's reticence about describing things that are beyond human observation; this is one of the crucial differences between the wisdom text and the apocalypse.²⁰ On the other hand, the geography of chapters 17–36 of the BW seems deliberately disorienting; Philip S. Alexander described it as “general, full of fantasy, and hard to relate to the world as we know it.”²¹

A major focus of these journey narratives is on “places of eschatological significance,” to borrow another phrase from Argall.²² Enoch is shown first the abysses of punishment for the rebellious Watchers (18:10–11; 19:1–2; 21:7–10) and for errant stars (18:12–16; 21:1–6); second, the “hollow places” where the spirits of dead human beings will be held until the judgment (ch. 22); third, the mountains where the righteous will be rewarded (25:3–26:2) and fourth, the cursed valley “for those who are cursed forever” (26:3–27:4). As in Ben Sira, a concern for theodicy underlies the cosmology, and especially the geography, of the BW.²³ As Argall observes, the author emphasizes that these places were *created* in anticipation of the eschatological judgment, while Ben Sira argues that good things were created for the good, and bad things to punish the wicked (39:25–29, 40:10).²⁴ For Ben Sira, the justice of the created order is apparent to anyone who has eyes to see. The BW, on the other hand, acknowledges the apparent lack of justice in the world, while insisting that the mechanisms of divine justice lie beyond the temporal and spatial horizons of ordinary people.

Thus the pessimism of the BW concerning the defilement of the earth by the Watchers generates more attention to the earth in its cosmology than in that of Ben Sira, which is much more positive about the present condition of the earth. Somewhat paradoxically, in the BW both the observable parts of the earth (1 *Enoch* 2:2–5:3) and the parts hidden from ordinary human observation (chapters 20–36) bear witness to God's justice and wisdom in ordering creation, yet the present earth is doomed to destruction on the day of judgment (1:5–7). Ben Sira

²⁰ In fact, it has been suggested that Ben Sira is reacting specifically against the Enochic type of speculation in Sir 3:22–24, “Reflect upon what you have been commanded, for what is hidden is not your concern. Do not meddle in matters that are beyond you, for more than you can understand has been shown you. For their conceit has led many astray, and wrong opinion has impaired their judgment.” See Benjamin G. Wright III, “Putting the Puzzle Together: Some Suggestions concerning the Social Location of Ben Sira,” in *Conflicted Boundaries in Wisdom and Apocalypticism* (ed. Benjamin G. Wright III and Lawrence M. Wills; SBLSymS 35; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005), 89–112, esp. 96–97.

²¹ Philip S. Alexander, “Notes on the ‘Imago Mundi’ of the Book of *Jubilees*,” *JJS* 33 (1982): 197–213, here 211, cited in Kelley Coblentz Bautch, *A Study of the Geography of 1 Enoch 17–19: No One Has Seen What I Have Seen* (JSJSup 81; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 4.

²² Argall, *1 Enoch and Sirach*, 120–24. See also George W. E. Nickelsburg, “The Apocalyptic Construction of Reality in *1 Enoch*,” in *Mysteries and Revelations: Apocalyptic Studies since the Uppsala Colloquium* (ed. John J. Collins and James H. Charlesworth; JSOTSup 9; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991) 51–64.

²³ John J. Collins, *The Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to Jewish Apocalyptic Literature* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 58.

²⁴ Argall, *1 Enoch and Sirach*, 163.

directs his audience's gaze upward to the heavenly luminaries and other celestial phenomena when seeking examples of the orderly working of creation. He does not denigrate the earth by any means, but he tends to ignore it except as it relates to the mortal, material nature of humankind, the theme to which I now turn.

The Earth in the Anthropology of the Book of the Watchers

Discussing the earth in the context of theological anthropology obviously entails moving into the realm of symbolism or metaphor. Rather than straightforward descriptions of the earth and its phenomena, the following discussion will focus on the metaphorical associations of the earth with certain aspects of human nature. In the BW, humankind's relationship to the earth must be inferred mainly from the accusations against the Watchers, which are concentrated in chapters 12–16, especially 15–16. At the beginning of these chapters, the transgression of the Watchers is described in terms both of spatial dislocation and of defilement (12:4):

- A. [they] forsook the highest heaven, the sanctuary of their eternal station
- B. and defiled themselves with women.
- C. As the sons of earth do, so they did
- B'. and took wives for themselves.
- A'. And they worked great desolation on the earth.

The chiasmic structure of this description places the earth at the center, as part of the idiom “sons of earth,” referring to humankind. “Sons of earth” is a kinship metaphor of the form “kin of y,” in which “the kinship term inherits the property of y, or a property with which y is associated.”²⁵ The question is, which property of the earth does humankind inherit here? I argue that it is fertility, because the central clause, “as the sons of earth do, so they did,” is explicated by “and took wives for themselves,” which is parallel to “and defiled themselves with women.” The unexpressed assumption (seen more clearly in 15:3) is that the primary goal of sexuality and marriage is procreation. The central parts of the chiasm posit a correlation between sexuality (or marriage), defilement and “the sons of earth.” It is initially unclear whether “defiled themselves” refers to the ritual impurity that results from all sexual relations (Lev 15:16–18) or to the much more serious moral impurity that is the result of forbidden sexual unions (Lev 18:24–25).²⁶ Nevertheless, it is clear that the Watchers are responsible for their own defilement. The outer parts of the chiasm (A and A') similarly blame the Watchers for

²⁵ Mark Turner, *Death is the Mother of Beauty: Mind, Metaphor, Criticism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 34.

²⁶ In the larger context, the impact of these unions on the earth suggests that moral impurity is at issue. See note 18.

the damage caused by their dislocation – both to heaven, since they abandoned their “eternal station,” and more dramatically, to the earth, upon which they “worked great desolation” (ἀφανισμόν μέγαν ἠφάνισατε τὴν γῆν).

This chiasmic description is effectively a summary of the longer oracle against the Watchers in 15:2–16:4. In fact, 15:3, addressed to the Watchers, repeats many of the phrases in 12:4:

Why have you forsaken the high heaven, the eternal sanctuary;
and lain with women, and defiled yourselves with the daughters of men;²⁷
and taken for yourselves wives, and done as the sons of earth;
and begotten for yourselves sons, giants?

The main difference between the two verses is the final clause: “and [why have you] begotten for yourselves sons, giants?” in 15:3 takes the place of “and they worked great desolation on the earth” in 12:4. This raises the question of whether it was through their offspring, the giants, that the Watchers “worked great desolation on the earth.” Interestingly, although the giants certainly wreak havoc on the earth in the Shemihazah myth, the earliest of the Watchers traditions (7:3–5, 9:9), the verb “make desolate” (ἀφανίζω) occurs only in the later Asael passages of chapters 6–11, with either the Watchers or human beings as its subject (8:2, 10:7,8).²⁸ In the present oracle, however, the spirits of the giants (on them, see below) are said to “make desolate” (15:11, 16:1). Thus, for the author of the present oracle at least, it was primarily by begetting the giants that the Watchers made the earth desolate.

Another question raised by the summary in 12:4, that of the relationship of defilement to sexuality and the “sons of earth,” is also addressed in more detail in the oracle against the Watchers, which continues (15:4–6):

You were holy ones and spirits, living forever.
With the blood of women you have defiled yourselves,
and with the blood of flesh you have begotten,
and with the blood of human beings you have lusted,
and you have done as they do –
flesh and blood, who die and perish.
Therefore I gave them women,
that they might cast seed into them,
and thus beget children by them,
that nothing fail them on the earth.
But you originally existed as spirits, living forever,
and not dying for all the generations of eternity;
therefore I did not make women among you.

²⁷ The phrase “daughters of men” is an allusion to Gen 6:1–4; cf. *1 Enoch* 6:1–2.

²⁸ Nickelsburg (*1 Enoch* 1, 196) notes that this verb occurs in connection with Asael’s instruction, but he thinks it refers both to the desolation caused by human wars (using the weapons that Asael taught them to make) and to “the murderous activity of the giants who were spawned as a result of the seduction of the watchers.”

Although the earth is mentioned once in this passage as the abode of human beings, the dominant symbol in these verses is clearly blood. Since in the first instance blood is mentioned in connection with women and defilement, a number of scholars who read this oracle (or the whole myth of the Watchers) as a coded attack on the Jerusalem priesthood have understood the repetition of the word “blood” in reference either to family purity (priests having intercourse with their wives during their menstrual periods) or to bloodlines (priests marrying wives from non-priestly families).²⁹ But if these verses are understood more abstractly as a reflection on the implications of the Watchers myth for theological anthropology,³⁰ it makes sense to read blood as a symbol for mortal life, as it frequently is in the Bible (e. g., Gen 9:4–5, Lev 17:14, Deut 12:23). The defilement of the Watchers arises from the “improper mixing” of “spirits, living forever” with mortal “flesh and blood” through procreation with women, which is here explained as a divinely-ordained antidote to mortality.³¹ Despite the regrettable view of women as instruments for procreation, sexual intercourse with their wives is not seen as morally defiling for human men.³²

The earth is associated primarily with mortality in the second half of the oracle (15:8–16:1), which focuses on the spirits of the giants. On the one hand this section calls into question the dualistic distinctions in the first half of the oracle by drawing attention to the nature of the giants, who were “begotten by the spirits

²⁹ David W. Suter, “Fallen Angel, Fallen Priest: The Problem of Family Purity in 1 Enoch,” *HUCA* 50 (1979): 115–35; idem, “Revisiting ‘Fallen Angel, Fallen Priest,’” in *The Origins of Enochic Judaism: Proceedings of the First Enoch Seminar, University of Michigan, Sesto Fiorentino, Italy, June 19–23, 2001*, ed. G. Boccaccini (Turin: Zamorani, 2002 = *Enoch* 14:1–2 [2002]) 137–42; George W.E. Nickelsburg, “Enoch, Levi and Peter: Recipients of Revelation in Upper Galilee,” *JBL* 100 (1981): 575–600; idem, *Commentary*, 230–32, 269–72; Benjamin G. Wright III, “Ben Sira and the Book of the Watchers on the Legitimate Priesthood,” in *Intertextual Studies in Ben Sira and Tobit* (ed. Jeremy Corley and Vincent Skemp; CBQMS 38; Washington, DC: The Catholic Biblical Association of America, 2005) 241–53; Martha Himmelfarb, “Levi, Phinehas, and the Problem of Intermarriage at the Time of the Maccabean Revolt,” *JSQ* 6 (1999): 1–24; eadem, “The Book of the Watchers and the Priests of Jerusalem,” in *Origins of Enochic Judaism*, 131–35; eadem, “Temple and Priests in the Book of the Watchers, the Animal Apocalypse, and the Apocalypse of Weeks,” in *The Early Enoch Literature* (ed. G. Boccaccini and John J. Collins; JSJSup 121; Leiden: Brill, 2007), 219–35.

³⁰ John J. Collins, “The Sons of God and the Daughters of Men,” in *Sacred Marriages: The Divine-Human Sexual Metaphor from Sumer to Early Christianity* (ed. Martti Nissinen and Risto Uro; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2008) 259–74, esp. 268–69, where he calls this passage “the most explicit formulation in 1 Enoch of the metaphysical implications of the descent of the Watchers.”

³¹ Cf. William Loader, *Enoch, Levi and Jubilees on Sexuality: Attitudes towards Sexuality in the Early Enoch Literature, the Aramaic Levi Document and the Book of Jubilees* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 28–30.

³² As mentioned above, all sexual relations are ritually defiling according to the Priestly Law, but ritual defilement is not sinful and sexual relations in particular cause a relatively insignificant state of ritual impurity, since it can be removed by washing with water and waiting until sunset (Lev 15:18). See Klawans, *Impurity and Sin*, 24

and flesh" (15:8). On the other hand, the mixing of the two realms (heaven and earth) and natures (spirit and flesh) yields evil spirits, and the oracle goes on to describe the evil that they do as being directed against the earth and against human beings, "for they have come forth from them" (15:11–12). Although the bodies of the giants are mortal (and in fact this oracle assumes that they have already been killed), their spirits are immortal, inherited from their Watcher fathers.³³ From their human mothers they inherit their mortal bodies and their earthly abode, but not their evil nature. It is because they were begotten on earth through forbidden unions, or an improper mixing of "spirits" and "flesh," that their spirits are evil (15:8–10). As immortal, earth-bound evil spirits, they will continue to "make desolate [the earth] until the day of the consummation of the great judgment" (16:1).

Thus the earth has two distinct but related associations in the anthropology of these central chapters of the BW: procreation and mortality. The primary association of "sons of earth" in 12:4 and 15:3 is with marriage and procreation, but as 15:4–6 spell out, procreation is a response to mortality, and a legitimate activity only for "flesh and blood, who die and perish" (15:4). A similar correlation of marriage with mortality can be seen in Luke's version of Jesus' response to the Sadducees' "trick question" about the woman who married seven brothers (Luke 20:34–36):³⁴

Those who belong to this age marry and are given in marriage; but those who are considered worthy of a place in that age and in the resurrection from the dead neither marry nor are given in marriage. Indeed they cannot die anymore, because they are like angels and are children of God, being children of the resurrection.

A more direct connection between the earth and human mortality is not made explicit in the BW, but is implied by contrast with the immortality of the "spirits of heaven" (15:6–7). It may also be implied in the gathering of the souls of the dead into hollow places in a mountain shown to Enoch on his second journey (chapter 22), but the burial of bodies in the earth is mentioned only in an offhand way there (22:10). Although human beings are called "sons of earth," the earth is not personified as the mother of humankind in the BW, at least not as explicitly as in Ben Sira.

³³ This is a significant reinterpretation of the Watchers traditions in chapters 6–11, because there Michael is explicitly commanded to "destroy all the spirits of the half-breeds and the sons of the watchers" (10:15).

³⁴ Par. Mark 12:24–25, Matt 22:29–30. Luke's version of the saying spells out the relationship between marriage and mortality more clearly than his Markan source.

The Earth in the Anthropology of Ben Sira

Despite the anthropocentrism of Ben Sira's cosmology and the relatively little emphasis on the earth within it, as discussed above, humankind's relationship to the earth is central to his anthropology. The first significant statement linking human beings to the earth comes in 17:1, in the context of his first poem on creation: "The Lord created humankind (ἄνθρωπον) out of earth (ἐκ γῆς), and makes them (lit., him) return back (πάλιν) into it" (my translation). The Hebrew text is not extant for this verse, but אדם was almost certainly the word used for humankind in the original, given that it is present in the Syriac and the Greek uses ἄνθρωπον without an article and a singular pronoun in the second half of the verse. The echo of Gen 2:7 and 3:19 makes it likely that the expression for "out of earth" was either מן עפר as in the Syriac, or מן האדמה (the rhythm of the verse would not allow for the combined expression עפר מן האדמה as in Gen 2:7).³⁵ In either case, humankind, in Ben Sira's view, is made from the same material as the earth's surface (as the lack of a definite article in the Greek conveys), into which they (re)turn back after death – the wording of the Greek suggesting decomposition as well as burial.

Human beings share this property of "turning back into earth" with all living things, according to 16:30, but Ben Sira sees fit to emphasize that humankind's origin is also from the earth. He is not referring only to Adam, as the shift to plural pronouns in the subsequent verses makes clear. As in Gen 3:19 and 2:7, being made from dust entails mortality, but Ben Sira adds in 17:2 that "he gave them a fixed number of days." This is possibly an allusion to the later decision by God to limit the human lifespan to 120 years (Gen 6:3), but 17:2 continues, "but granted them authority over everything on earth," a clearer allusion to Gen 1:28.³⁶ In other words, Ben Sira declares that God created human beings to be mortal, but at the same time "in [God's] own image" (17:3), giving them dominion over other animals (17:4) – a paradoxical train of thought very similar to Psalm 8.³⁷ Despite the recognition that humankind shares a common material nature with all living creatures on earth (16:30–17:1), the remainder of the poem is thoroughly anthropocentric.

The same is true of the creation poem in 33:7–15, which begins with a discussion of differences between days (ordinary and holy) and ends with the generalization that "all the works of God ... come in pairs, one the opposite of the other." The main message of the poem, however, has to do with different types

³⁵ Pace Gerald T. Sheppard, *Wisdom as a Hermeneutical Construct: A Study in the Sapientializing of the Old Testament* (BZAW 151; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), 75.

³⁶ Sheppard (*Wisdom as a Hermeneutical Construct*, 76) rightly observes that "... a statement that arises out of an etiological setting of requisite divine judgment upon the emergence of postcreation sin is now taken simply as generally indicative of created humanity."

³⁷ Alonso Schökel, "Vision of Man," 237–38.

of people. Greg Schmidt Goering has argued that Ben Sira's anthropology in this poem is not as dualistic as has generally been supposed: the wisdom tradition uses the "noncomprehensive dyads" wise/foolish and righteous/wicked to represent ends of a continuum, and Ben Sira adopts this dyadic mode of expression along with the understanding that most people fall somewhere between the two poles.³⁸ Goering argues mainly on the basis of the analogy with the days and the vocabulary of election and of blessing and cursing in 33:11–12 that Ben Sira's anthropology in this poem is based on the biblical concept of the election of Israel, which includes a large neutral category of "non-elect" people between the elect and the "anti-elect."³⁹ Further support for Goering's reading can be gained from Ben Sira's first assertion about human beings in this poem: "All human beings are vessels of clay (כלי חמר); for from dust Adam was formed" (33:10; Goering's translation).⁴⁰ Just as Ben Sira begins the poem by asking, "Why is one day more important than another, when all the daylight in the year is from the sun," here he establishes what human beings have in common before turning to what distinguishes them from one another. All human beings share the same "earthy" nature as Adam. In this case, Ben Sira may have chosen the word חמר "clay" in anticipation of his deterministic-sounding conclusion: "Like clay in the hands of a potter, to be fashioned according to his will, thus is the human being in the hands of its Maker, to be rewarded according to his decision" (33:13, Goering's translation, following the Greek in the last colon).⁴¹ In this poem, being made from clay or dust does not primarily connote mortality, as in the previous poem, but rather a common human nature that entails subjection to the will of God, their Maker.

The common lot of human beings, despite their different stations in life, is also the theme of a third poem, 40:1–11, which begins with a very illuminating statement about the relationship of human beings to the earth:⁴²

³⁸ Goering, *Wisdom's Root Revealed*, 56–57.

³⁹ Ibid., 57–61, following Joel Kaminsky, "Did Election Imply the Mistreatment of Non-Israelites?" *HTR* 96 (2003): 397–425; and idem, *Yet I Loved Jacob: Reclaiming the Biblical Concept of Election* (Nashville: Abingdon, 2007).

⁴⁰ Goering translates from the Hebrew MS E, partially reconstructed from the Greek (*Wisdom's Root Revealed*, 256–57). The NRSV, following the Greek version in the first stich of 33:10, has "All human beings come from the ground (ἐδαφος)," but in the second stich, "and humankind was created out of the dust," it departs from the Greek, which treats Adam as a proper name.

⁴¹ Although Goering does not discuss this verse, read in connection with 33:10 it supports his contention that "Ben Sira grounds election in 'primordial determinism'" (*Wisdom's Root Revealed*, 63–68). In his translation of the final colon of 33:13 (ibid., 257), Goering notes that the Hebrew of MS E "makes little sense ('to take their stand before him, a portion')."

⁴² I see 40:1 and 40:11, which both allude to Gen 3:19 and include the word כל and the root שׁוּב, as forming an inclusio to a poem about the difficulty of human life, in the context of which death is seen as a release. Others have divided the chapter differently. Gian Luigi Prato (*Il problema della teodicea in Ben Sira. Composizione dei contrari e richiamo alle origie* [AnBib 65; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1975], 312–13) sees 40:1–17 as a single poem, with a major break between verses 7 and 8, and a minor break between vv. 11 and 12 – that is, he groups verse 11

עסק גדול חלק אל ועול כבד על בני אדם
מיום צאתו מרחם אמו עד יום שובו אל אם כל חי

A great burden has God apportioned, and a heavy yoke, upon the children of Adam, from the day of his going forth from his mother's womb to the day of his return to the Mother of All the Living. [my translation]

Most of the poem (40:2–10) expands upon the first line of this couplet, but I will focus here on the second line. I have translated in a very literal manner in order to draw attention to the grammatical slippage between the first line and the second: the grammatical antecedent of the masculine singular pronominal suffixes in the second line is “Adam,” although the semantic antecedent is apparently “the children of Adam.” The motivation for this shift from plural to singular may be partly metrical, but more importantly, it enables the metaphor to work on two different levels at once. On one level, taking the implied subject to be Adam, the line works as a straightforward allusion to Genesis 2–3: Adam's being formed from “dust from the ground” (Gen 2:7) can be understood metaphorically as a birth from the same “mother” to which he will return when he dies (Gen 3:19). The problem with reading this line as an allusion to Genesis 2–3 is that the title Ben Sira applies to the earth, “the Mother of All the Living,” is connected etymologically with *Eve's* name in Gen 3:20.⁴³ Transferring this title to the earth may be quite deliberate on Ben Sira's part, since Eve was not in fact *Adam's* mother, nor strictly speaking the mother of *all* the living, but only of the rest of humankind (cf. 16:30, in which “all kinds of living things” are said to return to the earth).⁴⁴

with vv. 8–10. Skehan and DiLella (*Wisdom of Ben Sira*, 469) see 40:1–10 and 40:11–17 as two separate poems, but their rationale for connecting v. 11 to vv. 12–17 seems arbitrary: “The point of 40:11, which serves as an introduction to the poem, is that the impious who are prosperous will perish as do all other living beings (cf. Ps 49:6–21).” If that is in fact the point of the verse, then it coheres very closely with verses 8–10. Eric D. Raymond (*Innovations in Hebrew Poetry: Parallelism and the Poems of Sirach* [Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2004], 27–32) treats 40:11–17 as a unit, pointing out the similar use of grammatical parallelism in 40:11 and 40:12, but he also points out the semantic parallelism between 40:12 and 40:17, which, in my view, also form an inclusio. Raymond does not treat 40:1–10, so he does not consider the possibility of an inclusion between 40:1 and 40:11. Maurice Gilbert offers a different reason for reading v. 11 as an introduction to vv. 12–17: “the latter text contrasts injustice, which will be annihilated, with loyalty and goodness, which endure forever” (“Ben Sira, Reader of Genesis 1–11,” in *Intertextual Studies in Ben Sira and Tobit* [ed. Jeremy Corley and Vincent Skemp; CBQMS 38; Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Biblical Association, 2005] 89–99, here 96–97. But this reason depends on a paraphrase of 40:11 by Israel Lévi: “all that is rude, base, earthly necessarily produces something earthly; conversely all that is elevated and noble cannot but reach something elevated” (translated and cited by Gilbert, *ibid.*, 97), which imports a set of assumptions about the earth which is foreign to Ben Sira. I am grateful to Jeremy Corley for helping me to develop this point.

⁴³ Perhaps because the allusion to Gen 3:20 is confusing, the Greek, Latin and Syriac versions all change the end of the line, the Greek and Latin to “the mother of all,” and the Syriac omitting the Mother Earth concept altogether.

⁴⁴ According to Jeremy Corley (personal communication), while the phrase *כל חי* most often means “every human being” in Ben Sira (7:33; 42:1, 8; 44:23; 45:16, 49:16 and the gloss in

In fact, in light of Sir 40:1, Claus Westermann has raised the possibility that a title originally belonging to the earth has been transferred to Eve in Gen 3:20.⁴⁵

Ben Sira tends not to use אָדָם to refer specifically to the first man, however, but to humankind generically (49:16 is the only exception).⁴⁶ Moreover, following upon the first line of the couplet, it is more natural to read the second line as a general statement about humankind. If one were initially disposed to read the first colon of the second line literally, to refer to each person's birth from his or her own mother's womb, both the verb "return" and the title "Mother of All the Living" in the second colon force a reevaluation of the first colon. It is not coherent to read the first colon literally and the second metaphorically, because the verb "return," especially in grammatical parallelism with "go forth," implies that the mother's womb and the Mother of All the Living are one and the same. Alternatively, the phrase "his mother's womb" refers to two things at the same time: his literal mother's womb and the earth. As Gregory Vall has shown, Ben Sira exploits the very same ambiguity of the phrase "mother's womb" as Job 1:21a: "Naked I came forth from my mother's womb, and naked I shall return there."⁴⁷ Although some commentators deny that the Mother Earth concept is present in Job 1:21a, it is nearly impossible to explain Sir 40:1 without acknowledging that the notion of Mother Earth is in the background.

In fact, what Sir 40:1 is saying is entirely consistent with 17:1 and 33:10, which assert that all human beings are, in some metaphorical sense, made from the earth like Adam, and, in a more literal sense, return back into the earth after they die. What is striking about this verse is the title "Mother of All the Living" applied to the earth. The full personification of the earth as a mother is found only here in Ben Sira, and only here does Ben Sira associate the earth equally with birth and death, or procreation and mortality.

46:20), in 43:25 it clearly means "all kinds of living things," and in 42:23, although the phrase has a verbal sense, the context refers to creatures generally, not only human beings. Although the Hebrew of 16:30 is not extant, the Greek has πάντος ζώου, the same phrase used (also in the genitive) to translate כל חי in 43:25.

⁴⁵ Claus Westermann, *Genesis 1–11: A Commentary* (tr. John R. Scullion, S. J.; Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1984), 268.

⁴⁶ See John R. Levison, *Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism From Sirach to 2 Baruch* (JSPSup 1; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1988), 33–48. The Greek version renders אָדָם as a proper name in 33:10 and 40:1, but in 24:28 (for which the Hebrew is not extant), it refers to the first man as ὁ πρῶτος. Assuming consistency of translation, it is unlikely that Ben Sira used the word אָדָם to refer to the first man there.

⁴⁷ Gregory Vall, "The Enigma of Job 1.21a," *Bib* 76 (1995): 325–42, esp. 326–29, 335–39.

Conclusion

Reading the Book of the Watchers and Ben Sira “from the perspective of Earth” yields some unexpected findings.⁴⁸ Although the central chapters of the BW (12–16) set up a binary opposition between heaven and earth, seeming to denigrate the earth by contrasting it with the realm of immortal spirits, what the oracle in chapters 15–16 actually condemns is the transgression of the boundary between heaven and earth by the (former) inhabitants of heaven, the Watchers. The earth and its inhabitants are the victims of this transgression. The Watchers are blamed for their own defilement, but also (and with as much emphasis) for the desolation of the earth that results from the offspring of their improper unions with women, the giants. The earth is directly associated with procreation, which is the defining activity of “sons of earth” (12:4, 15:3) and somewhat less directly with mortality, the defining characteristic of “flesh and blood” (15:4–5). In chapters 7 and 9, the earth is presented as an autonomous subject, capable of bringing accusation against the giants (7:6) and of raising up the cries of their victims to the gates of heaven (9:2). The earth’s concern in those contexts seems to extend to all of its inhabitants (animals are mentioned in 7:5), while the angelic intercessors emphasize the human victims (9:9–10). Nevertheless, the BW stops short of a full personification of the earth.

Ben Sira, on the other hand, does not hesitate to ascribe to the earth the title “Mother of All the Living” (40:1). Although “All the Living” may be taken to include all creatures (based on 16:30), Ben Sira’s interest in the earth is generally focused on its relationship to humankind. That is not too surprising, given the generally anthropocentric orientation of his book and of wisdom literature in general.⁴⁹ According to the cognitive linguist Mark Turner, the Mother Earth concept derives from the conceptual metaphor BIOLOGICAL RESOURCE AS PARENT.⁵⁰ In a similar way, Ben Sira understands the earth as providing the material substance out of which human beings are made, as well as sustaining them while alive and reabsorbing them after death.

Although the BW does not formulate the relationship between human beings and the earth in exactly the same way as Ben Sira, both texts are important

⁴⁸ *Readings from the Perspective of Earth* is the title of the first volume of the Earth Bible series (see note 3).

⁴⁹ I am not using “anthropocentric” in the pejorative sense in which it is often used by practitioners of ecological hermeneutics; I simply refer to the human-centered perspective of the wisdom literature, relative to the rest of the Hebrew Bible.

⁵⁰ Turner, *Death is the Mother of Beauty*, 38. Setting conceptual metaphors in small capital letters is a convention of cognitive linguistics. Since the metaphorical concept of Mother Earth is prevalent in many cultures, the cognitive linguistics approach to metaphor would suggest that it is grounded in common bodily experience. See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), esp. 16–59.

resources for understanding early Christian cosmology and anthropology, and how they are interrelated. For example Paul's striking image in Rom 8:22, "the whole creation has been groaning in labor pains until now," may represent an extension of the maternity of Earth to creation as a whole.⁵¹ In a *locus classicus* for Pauline anthropology, 1 Cor 15:35–58, Paul's vocabulary and metaphors reflect the same assumptions as Ben Sira and the BW about the association, or kinship, of the mortal body with the earth, even as he challenges those assumptions with his paradoxical notion of a "spiritual body" (1 Cor 15:44).⁵² Outside of the New Testament canon, two examples will suffice to show the continuity of these themes in early Christian literature. Melito of Sardis, in reflecting on Adam's transgression, writes, "This man became fecund and long-lived, yet through tasting of the tree he was destroyed, and was dissolved into the earth ... and as an inheritance he left his children: not purity but lust, not incorruption but decay ..." (*Peri Pascha*, 49).⁵³ Irenaeus of Lyon, by contrast, emphasizing the pristine state of Adam before the Fall, argues for the virgin nature of the earth from which he was formed: "The first-formed himself, Adam, had his substance from untilled earth that was still virgin – 'for God had not yet brought rain and man had not worked the earth'" (*Haer.* 3.21.10; cf. *Epid.* 32).⁵⁴ My point is not that Ben Sira and the BW directly influenced these Christian authors; rather, they are two of the earliest Jewish exegetes to develop a cosmology and anthropology from the primeval narratives of Genesis that had a far-reaching influence on Christianity.

⁵¹ See Brendan Byrne, S. J., "Creation Groaning: An Earth Bible Reading of Romans 8.18–22," in *Readings from the Perspective of Earth* (ed. Norman C. Habel; Sheffield: Academic Press, 2000), 193–203; and Luzia Sutter Rehmann, "To Turn the Groaning into Labor," in *A Feminist Companion to Paul* (ed. A. J. Levine with Marianna Blickenstaff; Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2004), 74–84.

⁵² See the essay by Matthew Goff in this volume on "fleshly" and "spiritual" forms of humanity in 4QInstruction and 1 Corinthians.

⁵³ Translation by Alistair Stewart-Sykes, *Melito of Sardis On Pascha* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2001), 50.

⁵⁴ See Benjamin H. Dunning, "Virgin Earth, Virgin Birth: Creation, Sexual Difference and Recapitulation in Irenaeus of Lyon," *Journal of Religion* 89:1 (2009): 57–88 (here 72).

Being Fleshly or Spiritual: Anthropological Reflection and Exegesis of Genesis 1–3 in 4QInstruction and First Corinthians¹

Matthew Goff

Introduction

The Dead Sea Scrolls provide a context for assessing the extent to which early Christian authors were influenced by post-biblical traditions attested in Palestine. I would like to explore one example of this broader issue by examining the apostle Paul's conceptions of humankind and interpretations of Genesis 1–3 in relation to a text from the Dead Sea Scrolls entitled 4QInstruction (1Q26, 4Q415–18, 423). It is beyond the scope of this article to examine comprehensively the full range of the writings of Paul. The focus will be on 1 Corinthians, in particular chapters 3 and 15. I am interested in these chapters because they demarcate different kinds of people, drawing on conceptions of flesh and spirit. They also combine anthropological reflection with exegesis of Genesis 1–3. 4QInstruction, which was published in 1999, also includes a dualistic understanding of humankind, using “flesh” and “spirit” terminology that is grounded in an interpretation of Genesis 1–3.² The debate regarding the tradition-history background of these issues for Paul has often focused on Hellenistic Jewish texts such as the Wisdom of Solomon and the writings of Philo.³ The evidence from

¹ This is a substantially revised and expanded version of my “Genesis 1–3 and Conceptions of Humankind in 4QInstruction, Philo and Paul,” in *Early Christian Literature and Intertextuality. Volume 2: Exegetical Studies* (eds., C. Evans and H.D. Zacharias; London: T & T Clark, 2009), 114–25. Translations of biblical verses are from the NRSV, with occasional modifications.

² The official edition of this work is John Strugnell and Daniel J. Harrington, *Qumran Cave 4.XXIV: Sapiential Texts, Part 2. 4QInstruction (Mūsār Lē Mēbin): 4Q415 ff. With a re-edition of 1Q26 (DJD 34; Oxford: Clarendon, 1999)*. T. Elgvin is the editor of 4Q423.

³ See, for example, Egon Brandenburger, *Fleisch und Geist: Paulus und die dualistische Weisheit* (WMANT 29; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1968); Gregory E. Sterling, “Wisdom among the Perfect: Creation Traditions in Alexandrian Judaism and Corinthian Christianity,” *NovT* 37 (1995): 364–76; Jeffrey S. Lamp, *First Corinthians 1–4 in Light of Jewish Wisdom Traditions: Christ, Wisdom and Spirituality* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2000); Richard A. Horsley, “Pneumatikos vs. Psychikos Distinctions of Spiritual Status among the Corinthians,” *HTR* 69 (1976): 269–88; George H. van Kooten, *Paul's Anthropology in Context: The Image of God, Assimilation to God and Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity* (WUNT 2.232; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 269–312. Note also Stephen Hult-

4QInstruction suggests that Paul draws from and reformulates Early Jewish sapiential traditions that are attested in Palestine.

4QInstruction

4QInstruction is plausibly dated to the second century BCE.⁴ The composition is reasonably considered a wisdom text. It frequently uses the admonition form and contains instruction on mundane, practical topics including marriage and the payment of debts. Its author wrote the composition to a student who is usually called a מְבִין, “understanding one.” The work is an explicitly pedagogical document. 4QInstruction stands in the tradition of the worldly, commonsensical wisdom of the book of Proverbs.

Unlike Proverbs, however, 4QInstruction demonstrates substantial reliance upon the apocalyptic tradition. It is the best example available of a wisdom text with an apocalyptic worldview.⁵ This is above all evident in the prominence in the work of the enigmatic רַז נְהִיָּה. This phrase denotes a form of supernatural revelation. The expression can be translated “the mystery that is to be.”⁶ The phrase רַז נְהִיָּה occurs over twenty times in 4QInstruction and only three other times in all other ancient Jewish texts (1Q27 1 i 3–4 [2x]; 1QS 11:3–4). The word

gren’s speculation in “The Origin of Paul’s Doctrine of the Two Adams in 1 Cor 15:45–49,” *JSNT* 25 (2003): 343–70, that 1 Cor 15:45–49 relies on Palestinian traditions attested in later rabbinic texts. Menahem Kister takes a similar approach. See his “‘First Adam’ and ‘Second Adam’ in 1 Cor 15:45–49 in the Light of Midrashic Exegesis and Hebrew Usage,” in *The New Testament and Rabbinic Literature* (eds., R. Bieringer et al.; JSJSup 136; Leiden: Brill, 2010), 351–65.

⁴ Recent studies of 4QInstruction include Jean-Sébastien Rey, *4QInstruction: sagesse et eschatology* (STDJ 81; Leiden: Brill, 2009); Matthew J. Goff, *Discerning Wisdom: The Sapiential Literature of the Dead Sea Scrolls* (VTSup 116; Leiden: Brill, 2007), 9–68; idem, *The Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom of 4QInstruction* (STDJ 50; Leiden: Brill, 2003); Benjamin G. Wold, *Women, Men and Angels: The Qumran Wisdom Document ‘Musal leMevin’ and its Allusions to Genesis Creation Traditions* (WUNT 2.201; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005). See further Matthew J. Goff, “Recent Trends in the Study of Early Jewish Wisdom Literature: The Contribution of 4QInstruction and Other Qumran Texts,” *CBR* 7 (2009): 376–416; Daniel J. Harrington, “Recent Study of 4QInstruction,” in *From 4QMMT to Resurrection: Mélanges qumraniens en hommage à Émile Puech* (eds., F. García Martínez, A. Steudel and E. J. C. Tigchelaar; STDJ 61; Leiden: Brill, 2006), 105–23.

⁵ Goff, *The Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom*, 216–19.

⁶ Armin Lange, *Weisheit und Prädestination: Weisheitliche Urordnung und Prädestination in den Textfunden von Qumran* (STDJ 18; Leiden: Brill, 1995), 60; Torleif Elgvin, “Wisdom and Apocalypticism in the Early Second Century BCE – The Evidence of 4QInstruction,” in *The Dead Sea Scrolls Fifty Years After Their Discovery: Proceedings of the Jerusalem Congress, July 20–25, 1997* (eds., L. H. Schiffman et al.; Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society/Shrine of the Book, Israel Museum, 2000), 226–47 (esp. 235); Daniel J. Harrington “The Raz Nihyeh in a Qumran Wisdom Text (1Q26, 4Q415–418, 423),” *RevQ* 17 (1996): 549–53; Bilhah Nitzan, “Key Terms in 4QInstruction: Implications for its Ideological Unity,” *Megillot* 3 (2005) 101–24 (esp. 104) (Hebrew).

רז is of Persian origin.⁷ It occurs often in Early Jewish literature, typically to signify heavenly revelation. The term is used several times in Daniel 2, for example, to describe God's disclosure of Nebuchadnezzar's dream to Daniel (vv. 18–19, 27–30, 47 [2x]; cf. 1 En. 106:19). נהיה is a Niphal participle of the verb “to be.” While it has been argued that the participle refers to a future action, the word can denote the entire range of history – past, present and future.⁸ In the Treatise on the Two Spirits of the Community Rule the Niphal participle of הוה, while referring to the future, is associated with the full scope of history: “From the God of Knowledge stems all there is and all there will be” (1Q5 3:15) (כול הוה ונהיה).⁹ In 4QInstruction the participle appears to have an equivalent comprehensive chronological range (4Q418 123 ii 3–4; cf. 4Q417 1 i 3–4). The mystery that is to be signifies God's deterministic plan that shapes the entire breadth of history and creation, presented to the addressee as a revealed truth. He possesses a form of elect status. He is in “the lot of the angels” (4Q418 81 4–5). This provides him access to supernatural revelation in the form of the mystery that is to be. The addressee is repeatedly asked to meditate upon and think about this mystery (e.g., 4Q418 43 4). In this way he can attain knowledge of the full extent of God's dominion over the cosmos. The זר הנחי is the chief means by which the addressee can obtain wisdom.

The Vision of Hagu, the Fleshly Spirit and the Spiritual People

The other expression in 4QInstruction that signifies heavenly revelation is “the vision of Hagu” (חזון ההגוי).¹⁰ While the mystery that is to be occurs throughout the composition, this vision is mentioned only twice, in a much discussed lesson regarding the “spiritual people” and the “fleshly spirit” in 4Q417 1 i 13–18.¹¹ This passage reads:

⁷ Samuel I. Thomas, *The “Mysteries” of Qumran: Mystery, Secrecy, and Esotericism in the Dead Sea Scrolls* (SBLEJL 25; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2009), 245–52.

⁸ Note, for example, Milik's translation “mystère futur” of רז נהיה in the Book of Mysteries. See D. Barthélemy and J. T. Milik, *Qumran Cave 1* (DJD 1; Oxford: Clarendon, 1955), 103.

⁹ See also CD 2:9–10; 1QH 19:16–17; 4Q402 4 12. נהיה can refer to either the past or the future exclusively. For further discussion, see Goff, *The Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom*, 54–61.

¹⁰ This phrase can be translated in various ways. In Strugnell and Harrington, *DJD 34*, 155, for example, it is rendered as “the appearance/vision of the meditation.” I use the translation “the vision of Hagu.” The latter term can also be transcribed “Haguy” or “Hagi.” See also Eibert J. C. Tigchelaar, “Spiritual People’, ‘Fleshly Spirit’, and ‘Vision of Meditation’: Reflections on 4QInstruction and 1 Corinthians,” in *Echoes from the Caves: Qumran and the New Testament* (ed. F. García Martínez; STDJ 85; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 103–18 (esp. 109); Cana Werman, “What is the Book of Hagu?” in *Sapiential Perspectives: Wisdom Literature in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium of the Orion Center, 20–22 May 2001* (eds., J. J. Collins; G. E. Sterling and R. A. Clements; STDJ 51; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 125–40.

¹¹ See the catalogue of scholarship on this passage in Tigchelaar, “Spiritual People,” 103–5. Consult Goff, *The Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom*, 80–126; Wold, *Women, Men and Angels*,

13. And you,
14. understanding one, inherit your reward by remembering the mi[ght because] it is coming. Engraved is the statute, and ordained is all the punishment,
15. because engraved is that which has been ordained by God against all the in[iquities of] the sons of Sheth. The book of remembrance is written before him
16. for those who keep his word – that is, the vision of Hagu for the book of remembrance. He bequeathed it to Adam (אָדָם) together with a spiritual people, be[cau]se
17. he fashioned it (lit. “him”) according to the likeness of the holy ones. But no more did he give Hagu to the fleshly spirit because it did not distinguish between
18. [go]od and evil according to the judgment of its [sp]irit.¹²

The passage is addressed to the “understanding one” and presented as a teaching that he is to contemplate and study. Part of this lesson includes understanding that the final judgment is divinely ordained (cf. 4Q416 1; 4Q418 69 ii). The term “the vision of Hagu” is obscure but reminiscent of “the book of Hagu” mentioned in the Damascus Document and the Rule of the Congregation (CD 10:6; 14:6–8; 1QSa 1:6–7). In 4QInstruction the vision of Hagu is equated with a heavenly book and thus reasonably considered a form of divine revelation. Lines 14–15 indicate that the vision of Hagu conveyed supernatural knowledge regarding the final judgment.

4QInstruction is more interested in explaining who has access to the vision of Hagu than its contents. The “spiritual people” (עַם רוּחַ) receive this vision and the “fleshly spirit” (רוּחַ בָּשָׂר) do not. These expressions denote two different types of humanity. The spiritual people are connected to angels (קְדוּשִׁים) and revelation (Hagu). The fleshly spirit possesses neither supernatural revelation nor the knowledge of good and evil. The “spirit” of the spiritual people signifies their affinity with the heavenly world. The “flesh” of the fleshly spirit conveys disconnection from this realm. 4QInstruction never employs the phrase “spiritual people” elsewhere in the text. It does, however, use “fleshly spirit” outside of the Hagu pericope. In 4Q416 1 12 “every fleshly spirit will be laid bare,” or destroyed, at the moment of final judgment.¹³ The death of this spirit is ordained by God. The fleshly spirit is separated from the intended audience of the composition.

124–49; John J. Collins, “In the Likeness of the Holy Ones: The Creation of Humankind in a Wisdom Text from Qumran,” in *The Provo International Conference on the Dead Sea Scrolls* (eds., D.W. Parry and E. Ulrich; STDJ 30; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 609–19; Lange, *Weisheit und Prädestination*, 80–90.

¹² Materially the passage is in poor condition. For discussion of the transcription upon which this translation is based, see Goff, *The Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom*, 84–88. Tigchelaar, “Spiritual People,” 105–16, includes a transcription with several minor differences from the one used above. Note that the reading “the mi[ght]” ([הַעֲזָוָה]) is not entirely certain and has been reconstructed as הַעֲזָוָה לְרוּחַ. Consult Strugnell and Harrington, *DJD* 34, 160–66; Eibert J. C. Tigchelaar, *To Increase Learning for the Understanding Ones: Reading and Reconstructing the Fragmentary Early Jewish Sapiential Text 4QInstruction* (STDJ 44; Leiden: Brill, 2001), 52–54; André Caquot, “Les Textes de sagesse de Qoumrân (Aperçu préliminaire),” *RHPR* 76 (1996): 1–34 (esp. 17–19).

¹³ John J. Collins, “The Eschatologizing of Wisdom in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in *Sapiential Perspectives: Wisdom Literature in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Proceedings of the Sixth Interna-*

4Q418 81 1–2 tells the addressee that he has been removed from the fleshly spirit in order to distinguish him “from all that he (God) hates.”

The Hodayot can shed light on the fleshly spirit in 4QInstruction.¹⁴ In these hymns from Qumran, the speaker refers to himself as a “fleshly spirit.” He asks “In the mystery of your understanding [you] have apportioned all these things ... [But how i]s a spirit of flesh (רוח בשר) to understand all these matters?” (1QH 5:30–31; cf. v. 15; 1QS 11:9).¹⁵ The poet of this psalm describes his base humanity with the term “fleshly spirit.” He struggles with the tension between his flesh and his possession of heavenly revelation. In 4QInstruction, the fleshly spirit is refused revelation. In the Hodayot, the expression denotes human mortality and bodily existence in a way that is distinguished from a soul or spirit that has affinity with the heavenly realm. The claim in 4Q418 81 that the addressee is separated from the fleshly spirit suggests that the expression does not have this exact ‘biological’ meaning in 4QInstruction.¹⁶ In this composition, the term likely denotes the non-elect, all of humankind, aside from the community to which the composition is addressed. 4Q418 81 asserts that God “hates” the fleshly spirit, but polemic about its evil nature is not a prominent feature of the text.¹⁷ This spirit is never described as wicked. It is not associated with darkness or Belial. People in this category would include the wicked but are not limited to wicked people alone. Those among the fleshly spirit are not in the lot of the angels. They have not been given the mystery that is to be and do not have the knowledge of good and evil. The situation differs with regard to the spiritual people. They have access to supernatural revelation, in the form of the vision of Hagu. 4QInstruction claims that the angels have eternal life (4Q418 69 ii 13). Since the spiritual people are connected to the angels, the spiritual people can be linked to eternal life as well. They presumably have the prospect of life after death.¹⁸ The core issue

tional Symposium of the Orion Center, 20–22 May 2001 (eds., J. J. Collins, G. E. Sterling and R. A. Clements; STDJ 51; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 49–65.

¹⁴ Matthew J. Goff, “Reading Wisdom at Qumran: 4QInstruction and the Hodayot,” *DSD* 11 (2004): 263–88.

¹⁵ Hartmut Stegemann, Eileen Schuller and Carol Newsom, *Qumran Cave 1.III: 1QHodayot^a with Incorporation of 1QHodayot^b and 4QHodayot^{a-f}* (DJD 40; Oxford: Clarendon, 2009), 86.

¹⁶ Rey, *4QInstruction*, 315–16.

¹⁷ “Flesh” could be construed as something wicked in the unfortunately fragmentary reference to a “fleshly [incl]ination” in 4Q416 1 16. This is presumably similar to the “evil inclination” (יצר הרע) that is widespread in Early Jewish texts and mentioned in 4QInstruction (4Q417 1 ii 12). See Johann Cook, “The Origin of the Tradition of the יצר הטב and the יצר הרע,” *JSJ* 38 (2007): 81–92; John J. Collins, “Wisdom, Apocalypticism and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in *Seers, Sibyls and Sages in Hellenistic-Roman Judaism* (JSJSup 54; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 369–83.

¹⁸ According to Wold, *Women, Men and Angels*, 134, those of the fleshly spirit are “just as immortal” as the spiritual people because “they survive for punishment in the hereafter.” The fleshly spirit is destroyed in the final judgment (4Q416 1 12). If one grants that the people of this spirit suffer eternal punishment after death, a position never explicit in the text, this would be manifestly different from any type of immortality possessed by the spiritual people.

for understanding the fleshly spirit is not that it signifies people who are evil, but rather those who do not have the prospect of a blessed afterlife.

The spiritual people are not only associated with the angels. The vision of Hagu is given to אנוש as well (l. 16). The interpretation of this term has been extensively debated.¹⁹ Strugnell and Harrington, the editors of 4QInstruction, propose that אנוש is either a reference to the patriarch Enosh or humanity in general.²⁰ Both interpretations are possible but difficult to sustain. Enosh is never depicted as a recipient of revelation in Early Jewish literature. If אנוש refers to humankind in 4Q417 1 i 16, the line states that all of humanity receives the vision of Hagu.²¹ This does not accord well with the assertion in line 17 that this vision is not given to the fleshly spirit.²²

It is reasonable to consider the word אנוש of 4Q417 1 i 16 a reference to Adam, as John Collins has claimed.²³ The term is used this way in the Treatise on the Two Spirits when referring to the grant of dominion given to Adam (1QS 3:18). The theme of the knowledge of good and evil in the Hagu passage evokes Genesis 1–3, and thus Adam. The expression “according to the likeness of the holy ones” (כתבנית קדושים) can be interpreted as paraphrasing “in the image of God” (בצלם) from Gen 1:27, with אלהים considered a reference to angels. 4QInstruction appropriates the “image of God” language of Genesis 1 as part of the claim that the spiritual people are “fashioned” (יצרו) so as to be like the holy ones.²⁴ This likely alludes to the famous account of creation of Adam in Gen 2:7: “The Lord God fashioned (ייצר) the man.” The spiritual people are correlated to the portrait of Adam of Genesis 1–3, in particular his association with the image of God in Gen 1:27. The composition also makes a connection between Adam and the envisioned addressee of the composition, who has elect status. 4Q423, for example, describes his privileged status by asserting that the student-addressee has been given authority over the Garden of Eden, like Adam before him.²⁵

¹⁹ For the most recent treatment of the issue, see Tigchelaar, “Spiritual People,” 107.

²⁰ Strugnell and Harrington, *DJD* 34, 164. Lange has argued for the former and Wold the latter. See Lange, *Weisheit und Prädestination*, 87–88; Wold, *Women, Men and Angels*, 148.

²¹ This interpretation would have more support if the word had a definite article (האדם). But the *lamed* preposition attached to the word obscures whether the author considered the term to have a definite article or not.

²² That the term does not denote humankind in general is also suggested by “the book of remembrance.” This heavenly book is established “for those who keep his word” (4Q417 1 i 15–16). This is presumably a reference to the elect or at least the righteous, a select group of people who possess this book. Humankind as a whole does not have access to this book, which the passage equates with the vision of Hagu.

²³ Van Kooten, *Paul’s Anthropology*, 24–26, is critical of my endorsement of this reading, understanding אנוש instead as referring to all of humankind. See also Collins, “In the Likeness of the Holy Ones,” 613, 615; Strugnell and Harrington, *DJD* 34, 165–66.

²⁴ The word יצר is understood as a verb with a suffix. The term can also be read as a noun, its יצר (“inclination”), that of the spiritual people.

²⁵ Goff, *Discerning Wisdom*, 36–38.

If the spiritual people are associated with the Adam of Genesis 1, one can infer that 4QInstruction's description of the fleshly spirit draws from the depiction of Adam as a fallible human being in Genesis 2–3. The phrase *רוח בשר* may paraphrase the expression *נפש חיה* ("living being") of Gen 2:7.²⁶ This verse is a *locus classicus* for a base assessment of humankind, since the text emphasizes the creation of Adam in relation to the dust of the earth. An allusion to Gen 2:7 with regard to the fleshly spirit, however, cannot be established with certainty. 4Q417 1 i never appeals to this verse directly. And even if one grants this allusion, 4QInstruction does not contain a neat dichotomy in which the spiritual people are connected to Gen 1:27 and the fleshly spirit with Gen 2:7 since, as mentioned above, there may be an allusion to Gen 2:7 in the text's description of the spiritual people. 4QInstruction, however, probably alludes indirectly to Adam in its brief description of the fleshly spirit. The assertion that God "but no more" (*ועוד לוא*) gave Hagu to the fleshly spirit in 4Q417 1 i 17 may suggest that the fleshly spirit once possessed the vision of Hagu, but that it was later taken away from this spirit.²⁷ The line would then include an oblique reference to Adam's expulsion from Eden and thus his lack of access to the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.²⁸ The association between Adam and the spiritual people demonstrates that the author had a positive conception of Adam. This explains why the text would not explicitly mention his disobedience in the garden and subsequent removal. The text's view of Adam thus helps make sense of the fact that 4QInstruction shows little interest in explaining how the fleshly spirit could have had the vision of Hagu taken away from it.

²⁶ Goff, *Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom*, 98–99. See also Kister, "First Adam," 352–56.

²⁷ Wold, *Women, Men and Angels*, 119, has been critical of my earlier reading of the key Hebrew phrase of 4Q417 1 i 17 *ועוד לוא נתן*, which I translated "Moreover he did not give ..." (*Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom*, 84, see also 99). He argues instead that *ועוד לוא* means "but no more." This would imply, he suggests, that God at one point gave this spirit access to the vision but then stopped providing the vision to this spirit. Tigchelaar, "Spiritual People," 113, is critical of Wold's argument, on the grounds that no example exists in the Hebrew Bible or the Dead Sea Scrolls of the phrase *ועוד לוא* used with either a perfect or a participle. This is true and some additional nuance of meaning would likely be evident if more evidence for this expression were available. However, *עוד* and *לוא* are both common words and the translation "but no more" seems fully plausible, particularly since the expression also has a disjunctive *waw*. Wold's translation in my view seems reasonable; he uses it to argue that humanity as a whole was originally created in the likeness of the holy ones and that later on a distinction was made between the spiritual people and the fleshly spirit. I find this an interesting idea but it raises unresolved problems that merit further exploration, such as the fact that 4QInstruction shows no understanding, if the two were originally together, how they came to be separated. See further my "Recent Trends," 384–85.

²⁸ John J. Collins, "The Mysteries of God: Creation and Eschatology in 4QInstruction and the Wisdom of Solomon," in *Wisdom and Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls and in the Biblical Tradition* (ed. F. García Martínez; BETL 168; Leuven: Leuven University Press/Peters, 2003), 287–305 (esp. 302); idem, "Before the Fall: The Earliest Interpretations of Adam and Eve," in *The Idea of Biblical Interpretation: Essays in Honor of James L. Kugel* (eds., H. Najman and J. H. Newman; JJSup 83; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 293–308.

The figure of Adam is explicit in the case of the spiritual people and at best implicit with regard to the fleshly spirit. It takes the evidence too far to conclude that 4QInstruction attests a “spiritual” Adam and a “fleshly” one. A similar dichotomy is evident in the trope of the double creation of man in Philo, which he uses to exegete Genesis 1–3 (*Opif.* 134).²⁹ 4QInstruction nevertheless offers an interesting parallel to the later ‘two Adams’ tradition of Philo. Adam is in the background of 4QInstruction’s description of *both* the spiritual people and the fleshly spirit. In this respect, the author employs two different conceptions of Adam. At the very least, 4QInstruction supports two very different modes of human existence, the finitude of the body and eternal life after death for the elect, through appeal to the figure of Adam in Genesis 1–3.

The ultimate goal of the vision of the Hagu pericope is for the elect addressee to identify with and emulate the spiritual people. The spiritual people and the fleshly spirit represent opposed ways of being human. The former group has the vision of Hagu; the addressee possesses the mystery that is to be. He is in the lot of the angels; the spiritual people are in the likeness of the holy ones. The addressee is distinguished from the fleshly spirit (4Q418 81 1–2), as are the spiritual people. The affinity with the angels suggests that the spiritual people have the prospect of a blessed afterlife, in contrast to the fleshly spirit. This is also the case with the elect addressee of 4QInstruction. He is promised an “inheritance of glory” (4Q416 2 iii 12) and taught, presumably, that he would join the angels after death.³⁰ As the spiritual people are associated with Adam, 4QInstruction describes the addressee as entrusted with Eden in 4Q423. The Hagu passage contains a lesson for the addressee about his elect status. The spiritual people signify an ideal to which the addressee is to aspire. This pedagogical goal, and the instructional nature of the work as a whole, presumes that the addressee could follow either the right or the wrong path. He can live in a way that is like the spiritual people or the fleshly spirit. 4QInstruction teaches that it is God’s plan that the “understanding one” should be among the elect. However, he has to realize this destiny through moral conduct and comprehension of the nature of his elect status before God. Reflection on the Hagu passage helps him do this.

Paul, Flesh and Spirit

A dichotomy between flesh (σάρξ) and spirit (πνεῦμα) is a central aspect of Pauline anthropology.³¹ This should not be understood as a Cartesian distinc-

²⁹ Goff, “Genesis 1–3 and Conceptions of Humankind,” 119–21; Collins, “In the Likeness of the Holy Ones,” 617.

³⁰ Goff, *Discerning Wisdom*, 43–44; Collins, “The Mysteries of God,” 294–98.

³¹ Standard studies include Robert Jewett, *Paul’s Anthropological Terms: A Study of their Use in Conflict Settings* (AGJU 10; Leiden: Brill, 1971); Robin Scroggs, *The Last Adam: A Study*

tion between matter and non-matter.³² Broadly speaking, “spirit” often refers in Paul to the Holy Spirit, which can act upon and indwell within a person, and thus denotes the aspect of the human that has affinity with the heavenly world (e.g., 1 Cor 2:12; 3:16).³³ “Flesh” can represent not simply the physical body but also a general orientation that focuses on base and creaturely concerns.³⁴ As discussed below, Paul can also describe this worldly orientation with the Greek term ψυχή. In Romans 8 and Galatians 5, famous texts for assessing Paul’s flesh-spirit antithesis, flesh represents a negative force that works against God’s dominion by leading people astray.³⁵ The quest to delineate the tradition-history behind Paul’s use of the term σάρξ is extensive.³⁶ The traditionally dominant view, well described by James Dunn, is “that the idea of flesh as material body reflects the typical Hebrew sense of בשר, whereas the idea of flesh as antagonistic to God is more Hellenistic.”³⁷ Earlier in scholarship, it was common to understand the negative construal of flesh in Paul as primarily influenced by gnosticism.³⁸

in *Pauline Anthropology* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966). See also James D. G. Dunn, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 51–78; Daniel Boyarin, *A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 57–85; van Kooten, *Paul’s Anthropology*, 269–312; Graham N. Stanton, Bruce W. Longenecker and Stephen C. Barton, eds., *The Holy Spirit and Christian Origins: Essays in Honor of James D. G. Dunn* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004).

³² For the material nature of the ‘pneumatic’ or spiritual “body” that Paul asserts the faithful are to receive, see Dale Martin, *The Corinthian Body* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 126–27.

³³ Troels Engberg-Pedersen, *Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Volker Rabens, *The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul* (WUNT 2.283; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 83; Calvin Roetzel, *The Letters of Paul: Conversations in Context* (5th ed.; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2009), 190; Christopher Mount, “1 Corinthians 11:3–16: Spirit Possession and Authority in a Non-Pauline Interpolation,” *JBL* 124 (2005): 313–40.

³⁴ Dunn, *The Theology of Paul*, 72, 77; Sterling, “Wisdom among the Perfect,” 370–72.

³⁵ E.g., Rom 8:7–8: “the mind that is set on flesh is hostile to God . . . those who are in the flesh cannot please God”; Gal 5:24: “And those who belong to Christ Jesus have crucified the flesh with its passions and desires.” For an overview of the relevant Pauline texts, see Dunn, *The Theology of Paul*, 64–65. Consult also Emma Wasserman, *The Death of the Soul in Romans 7: Sin, Death and the Law in Light of Hellenistic Moral Philosophy* (WUNT 2.256; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008).

³⁶ Consult the summary of the relevant scholarship in Jörg Frey, “Flesh and Spirit in the Palestinian Jewish Sapiential Tradition and in the Qumran Texts: An Inquiry into the Background of Pauline Usage,” in *The Wisdom Texts from Qumran and the Development of Sapiential Thought* (eds., C. Hempel, A. Lange and H. Lichtenberger; BETL 159; Leuven: Leuven University Press/Peeters, 2002), 367–404 (esp. 371–74).

³⁷ Dunn, *The Theology of Paul*, 62.

³⁸ Important studies for this perspective are Ulrich Wilckens, *Weisheit und Torheit: Eine exegetisch-religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zu 1. Kor 1 und 2* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1959) and Walter Schmithals, *Gnosticism in Corinth: An Investigation of the Letters to the Corinthians* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1971). Their work can be seen in continuity with earlier scholars such as Wilhelm Bousset and Richard Reitzenstein. See further Frey, “Flesh and Spirit,” 372; Lamp, *First Corinthians 1–4*, 92–96; James D. G. Dunn, *1 Corinthians* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 34–41. Subsequent scholarship has critiqued earlier conceptions of gnosticism as

In the early days of Qumran scholarship it became evident that the Dead Sea Scrolls complicated the view that Paul's conception of flesh was gnostic or at least had primarily Greek antecedents. In the 1950s and 60s, for example, scholars noticed that the *Hodayot* uses the term *בשר* in reference to bodily existence, construed as base and denigrated, as discussed above. The composition, commentators realized, has a conception of flesh that is broadly compatible with Paul's usage of *σάρξ*.³⁹ 4QInstruction, the last lengthy Qumran text to be published, offers a new perspective with regard to this issue. Jörg Frey has argued forcefully that the flesh-spirit dichotomy in Paul was influenced by Palestinian wisdom traditions attested by 4QInstruction.⁴⁰ Frey has in particular stressed that both 4QInstruction and Paul have a negative understanding of "flesh." In the tradition represented by this Qumran wisdom text "flesh is linked directly with sin and iniquity and viewed as a ruling and misleading power."⁴¹ He contends further that 4QInstruction is a pre-Essene document that circulated in the Temple that would have been taught and transmitted in Pharisaic circles. Thus Paul, he suggests, could have been exposed to the traditions attested in 4QInstruction as a Pharisaic student in Jerusalem (cf. Acts 22:3; 26:4–5). The provenance of 4QInstruction should probably not be situated at the Temple.⁴² One also must rely on Acts, rather than the

an artificial construct imposed on a wide range of disparate texts. See, for example, David A. Williams, *Rethinking "Gnosticism": An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

³⁹ See, for example, William D. Davies, "Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls: Flesh and Spirit," in *The Scrolls and the New Testament* (ed. K. Stendahl; New York: Harper, 1952), 157–82. In the same volume, consult Karl Georg Kuhn, "New Light on Temptation, Sin, and Flesh in the New Testament," 94–113. The core IQH texts and scholarship are cited in Frey, "Flesh and Spirit," 378–82. See also Heinz-Wolfgang Kuhn, "The Impact of the Qumran Scrolls on the Understanding of Paul," in *The Dead Sea Scrolls: Forty Years of Research* (eds., D. Dimant and U. Rappaport; STDJ 10; Leiden: Brill, 1992), 327–37.

⁴⁰ Aside from his "Flesh and Spirit" article, note Jörg Frey, "The Eschatologizing of Wisdom in the Dead Sea Scrolls," in *Sapiential, Liturgical and Poetical Texts from Qumran, Proceedings of the Third Meeting of the International Organization for Qumran Studies, Oslo 1998* (eds., D. K. Falk, F. García Martínez and E. M. Schuller; STDJ 35; Leiden: Brill, 2000), 197–226; idem, "Die paulinische Antithese von 'Fleisch' und 'Geist' und die palästinisch-jüdische Weisheitstradition," *ZNT* 90 (1999): 45–77.

⁴¹ Frey, "Flesh and Spirit," 403.

⁴² For the view that 4QInstruction has a Temple provenance, see Armin Lange, "In Diskussion mit dem Tempel: zur Auseinandersetzung zwischen Kohelet und weiseheitlichen Kreisen am Jerusalemer Tempel," in *Kohelet in the Context of Wisdom* (ed. A. Schoors; BETL 136; Leuven: Leuven University Press/Peeters, 1998), 113–59. I critique this opinion in *The Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom*, 11–12. Certain terms of Paul suggest familiarity with Hebrew idioms that are attested in 4QInstruction. For example, the phrase *כלי [ה] יקבה* ("vessel of your [bo]som") of 4Q416 2 ii 21 has been compared to 1 Thess 4:4. Tigchelaar, "Spiritual People," 116–18, discusses 4QInstruction in relation to 1 Cor 2:6–16. See Strugnell and Harrington, *DJD* 34, 108–10; Menahem Kister, "A Qumran Parallel to 1 Thess 4:4? Reading and Interpretation of 4Q416 2 II 21," *DSD* 10 (2003): 365–71; Benjamin G. Wold, "Reconstructing and Reading 4Q416 2 ii 21: Comments on Menahem Kister's Proposal," *DSD* 12 (2005): 205–11; Heinz-Wolfgang Kuhn, "The Wisdom Passage in 1 Corinthians 2:6–16 Between Qumran and Proto-Gnosticism," in

letters, to understand Paul as a Pharisee in Jerusalem. Frey is probably correct, however, that Palestinian sapiential traditions to some extent influenced Paul.

Flesh and Spirit: 1 Corinthians 3

Not unlike 4QInstruction, Paul makes a distinction between fleshly and spiritual types of people. 1 Cor 3:1 reads: “And so, brothers and sisters, I could not speak to you as spiritual people (ὡς πνευματικοῖς), but rather as people of the flesh (ὡς σαρκίνοις), as infants in Christ.” In this verse, Paul operates with a negative conception of the flesh. This is also evident in his use of the term σάρξ elsewhere (e.g., Rom 8:7–8). But in 1 Corinthians 3 Paul does not castigate the people of the flesh or polemicize against them as wicked. Rather such people are “infants in Christ” who are not fully developed in terms of their progress as ethical devotees of Jesus. They are, Paul hopes, making progress away from an exclusively worldly, σάρξ-focused perspective, which he relates to the factionalism at Corinth (vv. 3–4; cf. 1:26). Paul would speak to them as spiritual people, it is implied, if he were convinced that they had progressed as believers in Christ to the point that, in his opinion, they will attain a blessed afterlife after death.⁴³ Such rewards are not possible if the Corinthians remain people of the flesh. Paul presumes that those who are fleshly are not, but can become, members of the spiritual people. His missionary efforts among the Corinthians presumes he thinks they can change. The missionary dimension of Paul does not resonate with 4QInstruction, which never addresses the fleshly spirit directly. The composition encourages its intended audience to be more like the spiritual people than the fleshly spirit. In this Qumran wisdom text the addressee is free to make moral decisions, as argued above. In both Paul and 4QInstruction, an individual can act either ‘fleshly’ or ‘spiritually’. They can act in a way that is focused on either creaturely or heavenly concerns.

The affinity between 4QInstruction and 1 Corinthians 3 regarding the distinction that both texts delineate spiritual and fleshly types of people can be reasonably understood as a consequence of influence from the Jewish sapiential tradition upon this section of 1 Corinthians.⁴⁴ Chapters 1–4 of this letter are well known as

Sapiential, Liturgical and Poetical Texts from Qumran: Proceedings of the Third Meeting of the International Organization for Qumran Studies, Oslo 1998 (eds., D. K. Falk, F. García Martínez and E. M. Schuller; STDJ 35; Leiden: Brill, 2000), 240–53.

⁴³ For Paul the issue of their spiritual development cannot be separated from his view that their progress should be conducted under his guidance and leadership (cf. 1 Cor 3:10–15).

⁴⁴ By making this claim I do not suggest that this means that dualistic conceptions of humankind in Paul are not informed by Hellenistic modes of thought, such as, for example, Platonic dualism. For the sapiential characteristics of 1 Corinthians 1–4, see Helmut Koester, *Ancient Christian Gospels* (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1990), 55–62; Sigurd Grindheim, “Wisdom for the Perfect: Paul’s Challenge to the Corinthian Church (1 Cor 2:6–16),” *JBL* 121 (2002): 689–709 (esp. 692–97); Sterling, “Wisdom among the Perfect,” 367–70; James A. Davis,

distinct within the Pauline corpus for their unusually large amount of sapiential terminology. For example, the word σοφία occurs sixteen times in this unit, but only three times elsewhere in Paul (Rom 11:33; 1 Cor 12:8; 2 Cor 1:12).⁴⁵

The emergence of 4QInstruction provides a clearer impression of the Jewish wisdom tradition in the late Second Temple period. The composition establishes that in this era it was possible for a sapiential text to contain extensive appeals to supernatural revelation. Paul in 1 Corinthians 1–4 uses the term “mystery” in a way that is similar to 4QInstruction.⁴⁶ This text and Paul both describe the “spiritual people” as having access to mysteries. The pious, described as “spiritual people” in 1 Cor 3:1, know the hidden wisdom of God: “Think of us in this way, as servants of Christ and stewards of God’s mysteries (μυστηρίων θεοῦ)” (4:1). Paul makes a similar assertion in 1 Cor 2:7: “But we speak God’s wisdom, secret and hidden (θεοῦ σοφίαν ἐν μυστηρίῳ τὴν ἀποκεκρυμμένην), which God decreed before the ages for our glory.”⁴⁷ Paul does not repeatedly ask his addressees to reflect upon a “mystery” as 4QInstruction does with regard to the mystery that is to be. He uses the term “mystery,” however, to denote heavenly, revealed knowledge that he imparts to his fledgling Christian communities.⁴⁸ This is consistent with the mystery terminology of 4QInstruction.

Ψυχὴ and Πνεῦμα: 1 Corinthians 15

The Hagu passage of 4QInstruction merits comparison with 1 Cor 15:45–49.⁴⁹ This famous pericope makes a distinction between two Adams as part of the chapter’s broader effort to teach the Corinthians about the nature and significance of the resurrection of the dead:

Wisdom and Spirit: An Investigation of 1 Corinthians 1:18–3:20 against the Background of Jewish Sapiential Traditions in the Greco-Roman Period (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984). Consult also Hermann von Lips, *Weisheitliche Traditionen im Neuen Testament* (WMANT 64; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1990).

⁴⁵ For the meanings of the word “wisdom” in this pericope, see Dunn, *1 Corinthians*, 41–44; Sterling, “Wisdom among the Perfect,” 371; Grindheim, “Wisdom for the Perfect,” 692–701.

⁴⁶ Marcus Bockmuehl, *Revelation and Mystery in Ancient Judaism and Pauline Christianity* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990); Béda Rigaux, “Révélation des Mystères et Perfection à Qumran et dans le Nouveau Testament,” *NTS* 4 (1958): 237–62 (esp. 250–52); Raymond E. Brown, *The Semitic Background of the Term “Mystery” in the New Testament* (Biblical Series 21; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968).

⁴⁷ Tigchelaar, “Spiritual People,” 117.

⁴⁸ Paul may be using Jewish traditions of esoteric revealed wisdom to distinguish his message from that of members of his Corinthian audience, some of whom were schooled in Greek rhetoric, a public form of wisdom (1:17–25). See Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 47.

⁴⁹ Scholarship on this well-known passage include Jeffrey R. Asher, *Polarity and Change in 1 Corinthians 15: A Study of Metaphysics, Rhetoric, and Resurrection* (HUT 42; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2000); Hultgren, “The Origin of Paul’s Doctrine of the Two Adams,” 343–70. See also the bibliographic references in John P. Heil, *The Rhetorical Role of Scripture in 1 Corinthians* (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005), 236–46; Kister, “First Adam,” 352.

Thus it is written, “The first man, Adam, became a living being (εις ψυχὴν ζῶσαν);” the last Adam became a life-giving spirit (πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν). But it is not the spiritual (πνευματικόν) that is first, but the ‘psychical’ (ψυχικόν), and then the spiritual. The first man was from the earth, a man of dust; the second man is from heaven. As was the man of dust, so are those who are of the dust; and as is the man of heaven, so are those who are of heaven. Just as we have borne the image of the man of dust (τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ), we will also bear the image of the man of heaven (τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου) (15:45–49; cf. v. 22).⁵⁰

This passage does not make a distinction between σὰρξ and πνεῦμα in the same manner as 1 Cor 3:1. Rather the pericope centers around two related oppositions. One is between ψυχή and spirit. The other is between Adam and Christ. This latter dichotomy is manifested in three different pairs of expressions – the first Adam and the last Adam (v. 45), the first man and the second man (v. 47), and the man of dust and the man from heaven.⁵¹ In the passage ψυχή is connected to the man of dust and πνεῦμα the man from heaven.

While ψυχή and πνεῦμα have a range of meanings, in 1 Corinthians the former denotes the vitality of a living human being, in the sense of mere bodily existence, whereas the latter typically signifies the aspect of the human being that has affinity with the heavenly world.⁵² Paul, one can infer, views a fleshly existence as characterized by immorality. This is suggested by his use of the term “corruption” (φθορά; 15:50), which elsewhere in Paul has a moral sense, denoting not simply material decay (Gal 6:8; Rom 8:21). But 1 Cor 15:45–49 emphasizes the finite rather than the wicked nature of ‘psychical’ existence. The passage, for example, repeatedly associates this mode of life with “dust” (vv. 47, 48, 49) and “earth” (v. 47), drawing on the depiction of Adam in Genesis 2 as a creaturely, mortal being (see further below). The word ψυχή signifies a form of human existence that will not continue after death. The meaning of the term ψυχή in 1 Cor 15:44–49 is thus similar to that of the word σὰρξ (σαρκίνους) in 1 Cor 3:1 and רוּחַ בָּשָׂר (“fleshly spirit”) in 4QInstruction.⁵³ The compatibility

⁵⁰ In v. 51 Paul imparts a “mystery” regarding the imminent resurrection to his intended audience, a usage of the term that is similar to that of the word מֵסֵתֵר sketched above: “Listen, I will tell you a mystery (μυστήριον)! We will not die, but we will all be changed.”

⁵¹ 1 Cor 2:13–15 associates spiritual things with God (τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ θεοῦ) and affirms that they cannot be fathomed by a ‘psychical’ (ψυχικός) man.

⁵² This dichotomy is a distinctive feature of 1 Corinthians. The term ψυχή can elsewhere, like πνεῦμα, refer to aspects of the human being that are associated with the heavenly or divine realm. For example, Heb 6:19 connects hope, “a sure and steadfast anchor of the soul (ψυχῆς),” to the conviction that Jesus has entered the heavenly temple. See further Horsley, “Pneumatikos vs. Psychikos,” 271–27; Dunn, *The Theology of Paul*, 78; Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975 [orig. pub., 1969]), 67–68; van Kooten, *Paul’s Anthropology*, 298–302.

⁵³ *Contra* Tigchelaar, “Spiritual People,” 116, who argues that the ψυχή-πνεῦμα distinction of 1 Corinthians offers a better comparison for the Hagu passage than the flesh-πνεῦμα opposition found in 1 Cor 3:1.

of ψυχή and σάρξ in this passage is supported by v. 50: “flesh and blood (σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα) cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor does the perishable inherit the imperishable.” I am not arguing for a general identification of the terms in Paul but rather that their meanings are analogous in these two texts. All three expressions (ψυχή, σάρξ and רוח בשר) in their respective compositions refer to forms of human existence that end with the death of the body. All three phrases denote a category of humankind – the non-elect who will not obtain a blessed eternal life after death. The similarities regarding the fleshly people of 1 Cor 3:1 and the fleshly spirit of 4QInstruction were explained above. In 1 Corinthians 15, the two anthropological categories conveyed respectively by ψυχή and πνεῦμα are clearly distinguished at the eschatological moment of the resurrection of the dead – the ‘psychical’ people will see their existence completed upon physical death, whereas the ‘pneumatical’ will live on, not with their ‘psychical’ bodies but rather their ‘pneumatic,’ that is, spiritual, bodies (v. 44; cf. v. 21). 1 Corinthians 3 and 4QInstruction operate with a flesh-spirit distinction and 1 Corinthians 15 employs a ψυχή-πνεῦμα dichotomy. Both compositions associate “spirit” with eternal life after death.

One should not conclude, however, that the two compositions contain the same conception of “spirit” or of the nature of the eternal life awaiting the elect. For example, nothing compares well in 4QInstruction to Paul’s notion of an eschatological “spiritual body” that accompanies a general resurrection of the dead. The Qumran wisdom text does not operate with a conception of resurrection.⁵⁴ There is also Stoic influence on Paul’s conception of spirit, whereas this is not the case in 4QInstruction.⁵⁵ Despite these differences, the affinities between 4QInstruction and Paul suggest that influence from the Early Jewish wisdom tradition is one factor that helped shaped Paul’s flesh-spirit distinction in 1 Corinthians 3 and his ψυχή-πνεῦμα opposition in 1 Corinthians 15.

⁵⁴ The case for resurrection in 4QInstruction, however, has been made. See Émile Puech, “Les Fragments eschatologiques de 4QInstruction (4Q416 i et 4Q418 69 ii, 81–81a, 127),” *RevQ* 22 (2005): 89–119; Torleif Elgvin, “Early Essene Eschatology: Judgment and Salvation according to Sapiential Work A,” in *Current Research and Technological Development on the Dead Sea Scrolls: Conference on the Texts from the Judean Desert, Jerusalem, 30 April 1995* (eds., D. W. Parry and S. D. Ricks; STDJ 20; Leiden: Brill, 1996), 126–65. 4QInstruction, as is common in Early Jewish literature (e.g., Dan 12:3; 1 En. 104:4–6), depicts life after death for the righteous as joining, or becoming one of, the angels. There is little need in this arrangement for resurrection. I make this argument in more detail in *The Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom*, 206–14.

⁵⁵ For example, Paul’s conception of “spirit” as a force that can act upon and effect people (e.g., 1 Cor 12:1–11) is compatible with and may reflect influence from the Stoic tradition, whereas there is no such discernible influence regarding the term רוח in 4QInstruction. See Michelle V. Lee, *Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ* (SNTSMS 137; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 49–54, 153; van Kooten, *Paul’s Anthropology*, 301; Troels Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul and the Stoics* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2000).

Adam and the Elect in 1 Corinthians and Early Judaism

1 Corinthians 15 famously makes a distinction between two Adams. This is explicit in verse 45: “Thus it is written, ‘The first man, Adam, became a living being’; the last Adam became a life-giving spirit.” Two Adams are also conveyed indirectly in the term “man” (ἄνθρωπος; v. 47), a common term that Paul uses for both Adam and Christ that is important in both LXX Gen 1:27 and 2:7. Paul’s conception of Christ is modeled after Adam, in that Christ is superior yet analogous to Adam. Rom 5:14 gives this view classic expression. In Paul, the elect are portrayed as similar to Adam, insofar as Christ is similar to Adam. This construal of the elect can be understood as a further elaboration of an older Palestinian tradition, attested in 4QInstruction and other texts, in which the elect and their ultimate rewards are described with language that evokes Adam and/or Eden. The addressee of 4QInstruction is likened to Adam, since God has given him authority over the garden of Eden (4Q423), as mentioned above. With this claim 4QInstruction puts forward a metaphorical description of his elect status that includes the prospect for eternal life. In that sense, 4QInstruction operates with an association between Adam and the trope of eternal life for the elect. Several other Qumran texts connect eternal life with the “glory of Adam.” The Community Rule, for example, teaches that the elect should understand “the wisdom of the sons of heaven” so that they can receive “the glory of Adam” (כבוד אדם; 1QS 4:22–23).⁵⁶ Paul, it seems, is familiar with some variant of this tradition and applies it to Christ. As the last Adam, he is the ‘new Adam’ that represents the new mode of creation ushered in after the resurrection of the dead, which includes eternal life for the elect.⁵⁷ Oddly, Paul appropriates the traditional association between Adam and eternal life in such a way as to turn it against the biblical figure of Adam himself, who is disparaged as a typological signifier for death and human finitude.

Gen 1:27 and 2:7 in 4QInstruction and 1 Corinthians

Paul and the author of 4QInstruction appropriate Genesis 1–3 in similar ways. 4QInstruction describes the spiritual people in a way that evokes Adam in Genesis 1. The expression “image of God” from Gen 1:27 is paramount in 4QInstruc-

⁵⁶ See also CD 3:20 and 1QH 4:27. Consult Kevin P. Sullivan, *Wrestling With Angels: A Study of the Relationship Between Angels and Humans in Ancient Jewish Literature and the New Testament* (AGJU 55; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 85–90; Crispin H. T. Fletcher-Louis, *All the Glory of Adam: Liturgical Anthropology in the Dead Sea Scrolls* (STDJ 42; Leiden: Brill, 2002), 95–97; Eibert J. C. Tigchelaar, “Eden and Paradise: The Garden Motif in Some Early Jewish Texts,” in *Paradise Interpreted: Representations of Biblical Paradise in Judaism and Christianity* (ed. G. P. Luttikhuisen; TBN 2; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 37–57.

⁵⁷ Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 287; Richard A. Horsley, *1 Corinthians* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1998), 219.

tion's exegesis of this chapter, as discussed above. The text's account of the fleshly spirit alludes indirectly to Adam in Genesis 2–3. 4QInstruction may utilize Gen 2:7 to describe the fleshly spirit, but, as argued earlier, this is not clear. In 1 Corinthians 15, Adam, the man of dust, is described with language that signifies Adam in Genesis 2–3, while for Jesus, the man from heaven, terminology is employed that draws upon that used for Adam in Genesis 1. Paul's claim in 1 Cor 15:49 that "we will also bear the image (τὴν εἰκόνα) of the man of heaven" clearly alludes to Gen 1:27.⁵⁸ The word εἰκών corresponds to צֶלֶם in LXX Gen 1:27. Gen 2:7, as discussed below, is also important for Paul.

Paul's use of Gen 1:27 is more complicated than that of 4QInstruction. In 1 Corinthians 15, Paul not only connects this verse to the man from heaven. The distinction between the two Adams is conveyed with the assertion that there are two opposing "images," both of which allude to Gen 1:27. The "image" language in 1 Cor 15:49 is used in relation to Adam, the first man. Paul does not emphasize that either the first man or the second man, or even humankind in general, is fashioned in the image of God. Rather, those who are of the dust bear the image of the man of dust and those who are of heaven will bear, when the resurrection occurs, the image of the man of heaven (v. 49). The passage can be understood as assuming that Christ is himself the image of God, which Paul elsewhere says explicitly (2 Cor 4:4; cf. Col 1:15; 3:10).⁵⁹ To describe the spiritual body that those who are of heaven will receive, Paul writes that they will "put on" (φορέω) the image of the heavenly man himself. It is not clear how exactly Paul intends the clothing metaphor to depict the eschatological transformation of the elect, but one finds this trope elsewhere in his letters (Rom 8:29; 13:14; 2 Cor 3:18).⁶⁰ The basic point of the clothing image seems to be that at the resurrection of the dead those who are of the man of heaven will assume a form of existence that is similar to that of the resurrected Christ.⁶¹ He is the "first fruits" of the resurrection. Paul teaches that followers of Jesus can hope for new life, in the form of a spiritual body, after the resurrection because of him.⁶² As the acquisition of the spiritual body is likened to bearing the image of the heavenly man, the possession of the

⁵⁸ Hultgren, "The Origin of Paul's Doctrine," 366, prefers to understand Paul's use of the word εἰκών in terms of Paul's personal experience of the risen Christ than as an allusion to Gen 1:27 (cf. 2 Cor 4:4). Paul's own Christology is undeniably a factor in his use of the expression but this does not mitigate the importance of the allusion to Genesis 1.

⁵⁹ 1 Cor 11:7 states that a man should not be veiled "since he is the image and reflection of God" whereas woman is "the reflection of man." See Jason D. BeDuhn, "Because of the Angels": Unveiling Paul's Anthropology in 1 Corinthians 11," *JBL* 118 (1999): 295–320.

⁶⁰ Compare the well-known rabbinic tradition that God made Adam "garments of light (אור)" instead of, as Gen 3:21 states, "garments of skin (עור)" (*Gen. Rab.* 20:12; cf. *Tg. Ps.-Jon.* to Gen 3:21).

⁶¹ Dunn, *The Theology of Paul*, 468; Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 128.

⁶² 1 Cor 15:22: "as all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in Christ."

body bears the image of Adam (cf. Rom 1:23). Adam signifies the death of the physical body whereas Christ denotes life after death.

As the “image” language from Gen 1:27 describes both Adam and Christ in 1 Corinthians 15, the terminology from Gen 2:7 is also applied to both of them. This is obvious in the case of the “man of dust.” The passage’s repeated use of “dust” (χοϊκός) terminology (vv. 47, 48, 49) is a clear allusion to Gen 2:7. 1 Cor 15:45 also appeals to this verse: “Thus it is written, ‘The first man, Adam became a living being (εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν)’; the last Adam became a life-giving spirit (πνεῦμα ζωοποιῶν).” LXX Gen 2:7 states: “God formed man, dust from the earth (τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς), and breathed into his face a breath of life, and the man became a living being (εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν).”⁶³ The phrase εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν, which Paul uses for Adam, occurs verbatim in Gen 2:7. He connects the expression “life-giving spirit” (πνεῦμα ζωοποιῶν) to Jesus. This phrase also alludes to this verse from Genesis, which states that God blew a “breath of life” (πνοὴν ζωῆς) into Adam.⁶⁴ The word ψυχὴ of Gen 2:7 is connected to Adam and the term πνοή to Christ through Paul’s use of πνεῦμα.⁶⁵ The ψυχὴ-πνεῦμα opposition is supported with language from Gen 2:7, a key text for Paul’s understanding of the creation of humanity. Paul, with his ψυχὴ-πνεῦμα dichotomy, asserts that both the physical body and the potential to attain a spiritual body after death are inherent to the human condition.⁶⁶ In 1 Corinthians 15, Paul does not attest a simple distinction between Gen 1:27 and 2:7. Instead he draws upon each verse with regard to *both* the man of dust and the man of heaven, who are opposed to one another. He puts forward two very different modes of human existence and grounds them both in exegesis of Genesis 1–3.

Paul’s utilization of Gen 1:27 and 2:7 in 1 Corinthians 15 is similar but not equivalent to that of 4QInstruction. This Qumran wisdom text uses language from Genesis 1–3 to form its contrast between the spiritual people and the fleshly spirit. This opposition between the Adam of Genesis 1 and the one of Genesis 2–3 is not itself foundational to 4QInstruction. Nevertheless, the Hagu passage

⁶³ Note the similarity to 1 Cor 15:47: ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός. The translation of LXX Gen 2:7 used above is from Albert Pietersma and Benjamin G. Wright, *A New English Translation of the Septuagint* (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 7.

⁶⁴ Birger A. Pearson, *The Pneumatikos-Psychikos Terminology in 1 Corinthians: A Study in the Theology of the Corinthians Opponents of Paul and its Relation to Gnosticism* (SBLDS 12; Missoula: Society of Biblical Literature, 1973), 24–26, argues that Paul and his Corinthian opponents have rival interpretations of Gen 2:7, with the latter denying the resurrection on the basis of their view of an “a-somatic immortality” based on a reading of Gen 2:7 that was current in Hellenistic Judaism. Paul’s understanding of Gen 2:7 relies on Jewish exegetical traditions that are preserved in Qumran and rabbinic literature (e.g., 1QS 11:20–22). 4QInstruction, which was not available when Pearson put forward his thesis, supports the idea that are Palestinian antecedents to Paul’s use of Gen 1:27 and 2:7. See also Sterling, “Wisdom among the Perfect,” 358; Horsley, “Pneumatikos vs. Psychikos Distinctions,” 270.

⁶⁵ Sterling, “Wisdom among the Perfect,” 358. *Contra* Horsley, *1 Corinthians*, 211.

⁶⁶ Horsley, “Pneumatikos vs. Psychikos Distinctions,” 280.

provides an earlier Palestinian parallel to Paul's idea that there are two Adams. Both Paul and 4QInstruction, to describe the eternal afterlife that the elect can attain, utilize a conception of spirit that relies on language that describes Adam in Genesis 1. Paul makes explicit what can be considered implicit in 4QInstruction – that the finite existence of the body is described with language used for Adam in Genesis 2. Paul in 1 Corinthians 15 relies and expands upon Palestinian exegetical traditions that are attested in 4QInstruction. This should be taken into consideration when assessing Paul's use of flesh and spirit terminology. His flesh and spirit dichotomy has often been understood in terms of Hellenistic Judaism, in particular the Wisdom of Solomon and Philo.⁶⁷ Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss, the emergence of 4QInstruction suggests that Wisdom of Solomon and Philo are also shaped by exegetical traditions regarding Genesis 1–3 that are attested earlier in Palestine in this Qumran wisdom text.⁶⁸ This paper has focused on 1 Corinthians. The thesis that Early Jewish sapiential traditions evident in 4QInstruction influence this letter suggests that the combination of anthropological reflection and exegesis of Genesis 1–3 throughout the Pauline corpus should be investigated anew in order to re-assess the extent to which they were influenced by late Second Temple wisdom traditions.

Conclusion

The flesh-spirit dichotomy in Paul is reasonably read as shaped by Palestinian sapiential traditions attested by 4QInstruction, as Frey advocates. The ψυχή-πνεῦμα opposition in 1 Corinthians 15 appears to be influenced by these traditions. Frey's assessment that in both Paul and 4QInstruction flesh should be associated with sin, however, should be qualified somewhat.⁶⁹ Romans 8 and Galatians 5 express the view that σάρξ represents a negative force opposed to God's dominion that can delude people. 4QInstruction and the texts from 1 Corinthians upon which this article has focused put forward a somewhat different view. In 1 Corinthians 3 and 15 Paul does not polemicize against the evils of

⁶⁷ See, for example, Sterling, "Wisdom among the Perfect," 366–67; Frey, "Flesh and Spirit," 374–77; idem, "Die paulinische Antithese," 49–53; Hultgren, "The Origin of Paul's Doctrine of the Two Adams," 344–57; Horsley, "Pneumatikos vs. Psychikos Distinctions," 270–80; Kister, "First Adam," 353; van Kooten, *Paul's Anthropology*, 272–308; idem, "The Two Types of Man in Philo of Alexandria and Paul of Tarsus: The Anthropological Trichotomy of Spirit, Soul and Body," in *Philosophische Anthropologie in der Antike* (eds., L. Jansen and C. Jedan; Frankfurt am Main: Ontos Verlag, 2010), 263–310.

⁶⁸ Matthew J. Goff, "Adam, the Angels and Eternal Life: Genesis 1–3 in 4QInstruction and the Wisdom of Solomon," in *Studies in the Book of Wisdom* (eds., G. Xeravits and J. Zsengellér; JSJSup 142; Leiden: Brill, 2010), 1–21; idem, "Genesis 1–3 and Conceptions of Humankind," 119–21; Collins, "Mysteries of God," 304–5; idem, "In the Likeness of the Holy Ones," 617.

⁶⁹ Frey, "Flesh and Spirit," 403. See also Tigchelaar, "Spiritual People," 108.

the flesh, although one can easily infer that he considers a fleshly existence to be one that is immoral. Flesh represents a mode of being human that has a distinct and final end – the expiration of the body. The terms σὰρξ and ψυχή denote a type of human existence that will not continue after death. The essential issue, at least in these chapters, is not the inherent evil of the body but its finitude. This is also what 4QInstruction conveys by the term “fleshly spirit.” In both 4QInstruction and Paul, the issue is not simply that they stress, with “flesh” terminology, the frailty or lowliness of the human body, as do texts of the Hebrew Bible (e. g., Pss 56:5; 78:39). Both 1 Corinthians and 4QInstruction use “spirit” language to assert that the elect can attain a form of existence after death that does not involve the flesh. They turn to the figure of Adam and the language of Genesis 1–3 when describing a kind of existence that is terminal and fleshly, and another “spiritual” form of life that is available after the expiration of the body. In terms of both Paul’s anthropology and exegesis of Genesis, it is reasonable to conclude that he reworked and appropriated Palestinian wisdom traditions attested in 4QInstruction. This realization provides a new perspective for future study of the intellectual heritage of Paul’s anthropology. The ways in which scholars assess how his conceptions of humankind rely upon a variety of traditions, including Platonic dualism, Stoicism and Jewish exegetical and sapiential traditions, need to take into consideration the evidence from 4QInstruction.

Distinct Portraits and Parallel Development of the Knowledge of God in Romans 1:18–32 and Wisdom of Solomon 13–15*

Alec J. Lucas

Because of the striking similarities between the excoriations of idolatry and immorality in Wis 13–15 and Rom 1:18–32, whether due to literary dependence or shared tradition, scholars have often compared these two texts to one another.¹ Such comparison, not surprisingly, sometimes comes at the cost of forcing one text into the mold of the other. Randall D. Chesnutt, for example, states that the author of Wisdom “affirms in 13.1–9, as Paul does in 1.19–20, that at least some knowledge of God is attainable through human reason and that failure to attain such knowledge is inexcusable.”² As we shall see, Chesnutt reads Rom 1:19–20

* I would like to thank Clare K. Rothschild and Trevor W. Thompson for their detailed feedback on an earlier draft of this essay which has led to numerous improvements. Of course, I alone am responsible for any errors that remain. All translations, whether of biblical or secondary sources, are my own unless otherwise noted.

¹ In my dissertation, “The Puzzle of Paul’s Argument in Romans 1:18–2:11,” directed by Thomas H. Tobin, SJ, of Loyola University Chicago, I provide a thorough review of the history of scholarship on Paul’s writings (especially Romans) and Wisdom. An abbreviated form of this analysis appears in Alec J. Lucas, “Unearthing an Intra-Jewish Interpretive Debate? Romans 1:18–2:4; Wisdom of Solomon 11–19; and Psalms 105(104)–107(106),” *Annali di Storia dell’Esegesi* 27, no. 2 (2010): 69–91[69–70, n. 2, and 80–81]. Earlier histories of the scholarship on Romans in relation to Wisdom include: C. Larcher, *Études sur le Livre de la Sagesse (Ebib)*, Paris: J. Gabalda, 1969), 11–30; Beverly Roberts Gaventa, “The Rhetoric of Death in the Wisdom of Solomon and the Letters of Paul,” in *The Listening Heart: Essays in Wisdom and the Psalms in Honor of Roland E. Murphy, O. Carm.* (ed. Kenneth G. Hoglund, et al.; JSOTSup 58; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1987), 127–45[127–31]; and Joseph R. Dodson, *The ‘Powers’ of Personification: Rhetorical Purpose in the Book of Wisdom and the Letter to the Romans* (BZNW 2/161; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 4–13. The last, however, suffers from several errors in regard to particular details. Dodson (p. 3, n. 7; p. 5, n. 17.), for instance, twice states that the scholarly consensus from the mid-1800s to the early 1900s regarding Paul’s dependence on Wisdom was first challenged in the 1899 edition of Herman Gunkel’s *Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes* (2d unchanged ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht), even though, to the extent that Gunkel addresses the issue of dependency, he seems to assume that Paul knew Wisdom (cf. p. 79). For other examples of errors, see Alec J. Lucas, review of Joseph R. Dodson, *The ‘Powers’ of Personification, Early Christianity* 2 (2011): 133–38[137].

² Randall D. Chesnutt, “Covenant and Cosmos in Wisdom of Solomon 10–19,” in *The Concept of the Covenant in the Second Temple Period* (ed. Stanley E. Porter and Jacqueline C. R. de Roo; JSJSup 71; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 223–49[244–45]. Others who tend to force the portrayal of the knowledge of God theme in Wis 13:1–9 into the mold of Rom 1:18b–21 include Brendan

into Wis 13:1–9. Closer to the mark is Jonathan A. Linebaugh, who notes “a sharp contrast between Wisdom of Solomon’s insistence that though people could and should have known God they are nevertheless ignorant of God (13.1) and Paul’s declaration that people, γνόντες τὸν θεόν [‘although they knew God’], have failed to honour him” (Rom 1:21).³ Yet, even Linebaugh, likely because he presumes a relationship of literary dependence and concentrates his comparison on Rom 1:18–2:11 and Wis 13–15,⁴ fails to observe that the epistemological anthropology of Wis 9:13–17a complicates, if not calls into question, his assumption that, according to the author of Wisdom, people could have arrived at a knowledge of God through unaided reason.⁵ Moreover, Linebaugh’s stress upon sharp contrast may also be mitigated, at least to some degree, by tracing the development of the knowledge of God theme in both books.⁶ The aim of this essay is to engage in just such an exercise. Prescinding from the issue of literary dependence, I shall argue that the distinct portraits of the knowledge of God initially encountered in Rom 1:18–32 and Wis 13–15 participate in a parallel development through the

Byrne, *Romans* (SP 6; Collegeville: Liturgical, 1996), 64; John J. Collins, “Natural Theology and Biblical Tradition: The Case of Hellenistic Judaism,” *CBQ* 60 (1998): 1–15[8].

³ Jonathan A. Linebaugh, “Announcing the Human: Rethinking the Relationship Between Wisdom of Solomon 13–15 and Romans 1.18–2.11,” *NTS* 57 (2011): 214–37[228]. The translation in brackets is drawn from a subsequent sentence on the same page in which Linebaugh glosses διότι γνόντες τὸν θεόν from Rom 1:21a as “For although they knew God.”

⁴ Linebaugh (“Announcing,” 214–37) argues that in Rom 1:18–2:11 Paul presents a theological anthropology opposed to that of Wis 13–15. Against the dualism of Wis 13–15, in which non-idolatrous Jews are set apart from idolatrous Gentiles, Paul advocates an anthropological universalism that allusively incorporates Israel’s own idolatrous episode with the golden calf into the plight of Adamic humanity (cf. Gen 1:26; Ps 106[105]:20; Rom 1:23). Developed independently from Linebaugh, I have argued elsewhere for placing similar interpretive weight on the allusion to Ps 106(105):20 in Rom 1:23, when considering Paul’s argument in and of itself (Alec J. Lucas, “Reorienting the Structural Paradigm and Social Significance of Romans 1:18–32,” *JBL*, forthcoming), and in relation to Wisdom (idem, “Unearthing,” 69–91). As spelled out most fully in my dissertation (see n. 1), I differ from Linebaugh in arguing that Wis 15:1–3, rather than abstracting its allusions to Exod 34:6–7, 9 from the interpretive context of the golden calf, actually reflects an implicit interpretation of this event, one that Paul opposes by evoking Ps 106(105):20 in Rom 1:23 and LXX Deut 9–10 throughout Rom 2:5–11.

⁵ Linebaugh’s (“Announcing,” 226) assumption in this regard is most clearly expressed in his statement, made in reference to Wisdom, that “Non-Jewish humanity has foolishly failed to exercise their rational potential, but this failure renders them ignorant, not epistemologically incapable.”

⁶ In addition to Gaventa and Dodson (cf. n. 1), thematic comparison of Wisdom to the Pauline epistles, especially Romans, has been undertaken by Paul-Gerhard Keyser, “Sapientia Salomonis und Paulus. Eine Analyse der Sapientia Salomonis und ein Vergleich ihrer theologischen und anthropologischen Probleme mit denen des Paulus im Römerbrief” (Halle-Wittenberg: Martin-Luther-Universität, 1971), 2 vols (vol. 1, pp. 1–235: text; vol. 2, pp. 236–325: endnotes). Cf. also idem, “Sapientia Salomonis und Paulus,” *TLZ* 98 (1973): 951–52; Nikolaus Walter, “Sapientia Salomonis und Paulus: Bericht über eine Hallenser Dissertation von Paul-Gerhard Keyser aus dem Jahre 1971,” in *Die Weisheit Salomos im Horizont Biblischer Theologie: Mit Beiträgen von Hans Hübner, Lothar Ruppert und Nikolaus Walter* (ed. Hans Hübner; Biblisch-Theologische Studien 22; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1993), 83–108.

interpretive lens of universalism and particularism, one that proves illuminating for each book considered in its own right.

To make this argument, I first undertake separate analysis of Rom 1:18–32 and Wis 13–15, with particular attention to the distinction, rightly emphasized by Linebaugh and others,⁷ that whereas Rom 1:18–32 presents humanity as having initially possessed the knowledge of God, but as having suppressed that knowledge in the descent into idolatry and immorality, Wis 13–15 depicts the knowledge of God as something not even Greco-Roman nature worshipers achieved, much less idolaters and theriolatrous Egyptians. The ensuing comparison of Rom 1:18–32 and Wis 13–15, in light of my analysis, paves the way for tracing a parallel development of the knowledge of God theme in each book. Beginning with Wisdom, I shall propose that this theme provides a neglected window into Wisdom's tension between universalism and particularism, one that reveals implicit particularism in the epistemological anthropology of Wis 7–9, chapters typically regarded as belonging to the most universal portion of the book. Looking then at Romans, I shall show how the parabolic path of the knowledge of God theme between Rom 1:18–32 and 12:1–2 may also be related to the tension between universalism and particularism in Paul's thought with the result that, in the end, we shall find an overarching coherence in the knowledge of God motif in Romans and Wisdom, once the lens of universalism and particularism is taken into account. With this outline of the argument in mind, we turn now to the analysis of Rom 1:18–32 and Wis 13–15.

I. Analyzing the Texts

A. Romans 1:18–32

Paul's discussion of natural theology occurs in the context of an indictment of idolatry and immorality, which may be divided into two interrelated sections: vv. 18–21, the basis for the indictment; and vv. 22–32, the indictment proper.⁸ The former section, following the opening proclamation of God's heavenly

⁷ Besides Linebaugh, see James M. Reese, *Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and Its Consequences* (AnBib 41; Rome: Biblical Institute, 1970), 54; H. P. Owen, "The Scope of Natural Revelation in Rom. I and Acts XVII," *NTS* 5 (1959): 133–43[138]; Mark A. Seifrid, "Unrighteous by Faith: Apostolic Proclamation in Romans 1:18–3:20," in *The Paradoxes of Paul* (ed. D. A. Carson, Peter T. O'Brien, and Mark A. Seifrid; vol. 2 of *Justification and Variegated Nomism*; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 105–45[114]. Kathy L. Gaca ("Paul's Uncommon Declaration in Romans 1:18–32 and Its Problematic Legacy for Pagan and Christian Relations," *HTR* 92 [1999]: 165–98) traces the reception history of this distinction.

⁸ With greater attention to the knowledge of God theme, the following discussion draws upon the extensive structural analysis in Lucas, "Reorienting," forthcoming. See also idem, "Unearthing," 73–75. Those wishing interaction with other scholarly positions, especially the influential view of Erich Klostermann ("Die adäquate Vergeltung in Rm 1_{22–31}," *ZNW* 32 [1933]: 1–6) and

wrath against *all* human impiety and unrighteousness in v. 18a, focuses upon the knowledge of God, a focus indicated by the parallel phrases διότι τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ (“for what is known about God”) in v. 19a and διότι γνόντες τὸν θεόν (“for although they knew God”) in v. 21a.⁹ In between these phrases, the stress upon the intelligibility of God’s revelation in creation demonstrates the universality of knowledge concerning the divine one, including his attributes. It is this knowledge, initially denoted simply as the “truth” (ἀλήθεια), that humans unrighteously suppressed (v. 18b), leaving them without excuse (v. 20b). The function of this section, then, is to establish human culpability for suppressing the natural knowledge of God. Rather than glorifying or giving thanks to God *whom they knew*, humans instead became vain in their “reasoning” (διαλογισμός) and their hearts, which thereby “lacked understanding” (ἄσύνετος), became darkened (v. 21), paving the way for the descent into idolatry and immorality that follows.

This descent into idolatry and immorality in the indictment proper (vv. 22–32), articulated by means of a sin–retribution pattern, revolves around the triadic interplay between (μετ)ήλλαξαν (“they [ex]changed”; vv. 23, 25, 26) and παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεός (“God gave them over”; vv. 24, 26, 28). The structure emerging from this seemingly simple interplay, however, is quite complex. With *a* designating the “(ex)change” part of the pattern and *b* the “giving-over” portion, the structure of Rom 1:22–32 may be represented as follows:¹⁰

- a1:** vv. 22–23
- b1a2:** vv. 24–25
- b2a3:** vv. 26–27
- b3:** vv. 28–32

The verb ἀλλάσσειν (“change”), rather than μεταλλάσσειν (“exchange”) in vv. 25, 26b, indicates the foundational nature of the idolatrous change of vv. 22–23, thereby encouraging isolation from vv. 24–25. These verses, in turn, are linked together by the retrospective οἵτινες (“who”) that introduces v. 25 and set apart by the doxology that concludes it. Verses 26–27 focus on homosexual passions, while the concept of knowledge (ἐπίγνωσις in v. 28 and ἐπιγινώσκειν in v. 32) unites the final subsection.

the dialectic of reactions to it, should consult these publications. On the relationship between Rom 1:16–17 and 1:18–32, see Linebaugh, “Announcing,” 224–27.

⁹ The articular adjective τὸ γνωστὸν in v. 19a is often translated as “what can be known,” even though the term usually means, “known” (cf. e.g., Exod 33:16; Isa 19:21; Ezek 36:32; Acts 1:19; 2:14; 4:16; John 18:15, 16). Joseph A. Fitzmyer (*Romans* [AB 33; New York: Doubleday, 1993], 279) objects to translating τὸ γνωστὸν here as “what is known” because he thinks it would be tautological in light of the immediately following φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς. In my view, however, the statement “what is known about God is clear to them” is not so much tautologous as it is emphatic. Moreover, the parallel use of the concessive γνόντες in v. 21a suggests that τὸ γνωστὸν in v. 19a does, in fact, mean, “what is known.”

¹⁰ Adding bold script and underlining, I reproduce here the chart in Lucas, “Unearthing,” 73–74.

These structural demarcations allow one to discern the development of thought in the indictment proper. The idolatrous change of the incorruptible God for corruptible creatures in **a1**, one that subtly includes Jews and Gentiles within its purview (cf. Gen 1:26; Ps 106[105]:20),¹¹ elicits God's punitive handing-over of these persons "to desires to dishonor" (ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ... τοῦ ἀτιμάζεσθαι) their bodies in *b1*. These same persons, then, in exchanging worship of the creator for creation in **a2** recapitulate the foundational **a1** (hence the bold script for both). Similarly, the subsequent handing-over "to dishonoring passions" (εἰς πάθη ἀτιμίας) in *b2* parallels *b1* (thus the italics). The exchange of *a3*, however, does not recapitulate **a2** and, in turn, **a1**, as might be expected. Instead, *a3* details the outcome of the desires depicted in *b1* and *b2*: same sex practices on the part of both genders. The resultant conflation of the (ex)change/giving-over pattern in vv. 26–27 subtly suggests that idolatrous acts and their amorous consequences collapse into one another, eventually becoming indistinct.

Following such a suggestion, the preoccupation with passionate excess ceases as the handing-over of *b3* broadens to include societal sins of all sorts, each of which may be traced to the initial idolatrous change. The ground for this last punitive measure, absent because of the prior conflation of the (ex)change/giving-over pattern, is provided by a word-play: Καὶ καθὼς οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν τὸν θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει, παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς εἰς ἀδόκιμον νοῦν ("And just as *they did not approve* of God as possessing knowledge, God gave them over to an *unapproved* mind"; v. 28ab). The emphasis on knowledge in this word-play, which, as noted, unites *b3*, sets up an ironic contrast that returns us to the basis for the indictment. The suppression of naturally-endowed knowledge of God culminates in undiscerning minds, leading these culprits to engage in a plethora of vices; and yet this lack of discernment does not preclude their "knowing" (ἐπιγινόντες) God's righteous requirement that such practices are worthy of death, or their approval of others who do the same. Defiance of knowledge concerning the divine, in other words, remains consistent and communal until the end.

B. Wisdom of Solomon 13–15

Wis 11–19, the third and final part of the book, utilizes pentateuchal material from the plague accounts and wilderness wanderings to construct seven contrasts between provision/mercy for the Israelites and punishment of the Egyptians.¹²

¹¹ See Lucas, "Unearthing," 77–80; idem, "Reorienting," forthcoming; Linebaugh, "Announcing," 229–33.

¹² There is debate about where to begin this last section of Wisdom (10:1; 11:1; 11:2; or 11:5). On the structure of Wisdom, see Michael Kolarcik, *The Ambiguity of Death in the Book of Wisdom 1–6: A Study of Literary Structure and Interpretation* (AnBib 127; Roma: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1991), 1–28; Maurice Gilbert, "The Literary Structure of the Book of Wisdom. A Study of Various Views," in *The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research: Studies on Tradition*,

The second contrast in Wis 11:15–16:4 concerns the animal plagues upon Egypt *versus* the provision of quail for the Israelites. This contrast opens with the statement that “in place of their [the Egyptians’] senseless, wicked reasoning” (ἀντὶ δὲ λογισμῶν ἀσυνέτων ἀδικίας αὐτῶν), which led them to worship “irrational” (ἄλογος) serpents and worthless animals, God sent a multitude of “irrational” (ἄλογος) creatures for vengeance (Wis 11:15). These animal plagues come about so that the Egyptians, not to mention the readers of Wisdom, would know that one is punished by the things through which he or she sins (Wis 11:16), a principle so important that it finds expression in five of Wisdom’s seven contrasts.¹³ Yet, in spite of this principle, the apparent harshness of the verdict occasions two excursuses, one on God’s mercy in judgment (Wis 11:17–12:22) and the other, after a brief resumption of the animal-plagues judgment (Wis 12:23–27), on deviant forms of Gentile worship (Wis 13:1–15:19). As Maurice Gilbert notes, “[T]he second digression will show that the animal worship practiced in Egypt is the worst of the religious aberrations.”¹⁴ Once this second excursus is complete, the contrast then concludes with an account of the provision of quail for Israel, comparing it to the privation of the Egyptians, a privation effected by the appetite-suppressing appearance of the animals sent upon them (Wis 16:1–4).

With the context of Wis 13–15 now established, we turn to analyze its structure and content. The text has the following form:¹⁵

- A (Greco-Roman) Deification of Divine Works (13:1–9)
 - B Human-made Idols: The Carpenter and Wood (13:10–19)
 - C Reflection on God’s Saving Providence at Sea (14:1–8)
 - D Idolatry: Punishment, Etiology and Consequences, Punishment (14:9–31)
 - C’ Reflection on God’s Mercy (15:1–6)
 - B’ Human-made Idols: The Potter and Clay (15:7–13)
- A’ (Egyptian) Idolatry and Theriolatry (15:14–19)

Redaction, and Theology (ed. Angelo Passaro and Giuseppe Bellia; Deuterocanonical and Cognate Literature Yearbook 2005; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005), 19–32.

¹³ Michael Kolarcik (“The Book of Wisdom: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections,” in *NIB*, vol. 5 [ed. Leander E. Keck; Nashville: Abingdon, 1997], 528–29; cf. 443–46, 449–50) observes: “Exegetes have noticed two organizing features for the author’s interpretation of the plagues associated with the exodus One is a system of [seven] antitheses that compare and contrast the Egyptian punishments with Israel’s blessings. This system follows a moral principle enunciated in 11:5, 13.... The other system consists of five diptychs that draw a parallel between Egypt’s sins and the ensuing punishments of the plagues. This system follows the moral principle enunciated in 11:16....” See especially the comparative chart on p. 446.

¹⁴ “[L]a deuxième digression montrera que la zoolâtrie pratiquée en Égypte est la pire des aberrations religieuses,” “La connaissance de Dieu selon le Livre de la Sagesse,” in *La Notion biblique de Dieu: Le Dieu de la Bible et le Dieu des philosophes* (ed. J. Coppens; BETL 41; Leuven: Leuven University, 1976), 191–210[201].

¹⁵ Although based on my own analysis, this outline is indebted to Kolarcik, “Book of Wisdom,” 446; and, in turn, to Maurice Gilbert, *La Critique des Dieux dans le Livre de la Sagesse* (Sg 13–15) (AnBib 53; Rome: Biblical Institute, 1973), 245–57.

Although the concentric structure focuses attention on the central section (14:9–31), there is nonetheless progression throughout which highlights the comparative wickedness of Egyptian worship in relation to the veneration of divine and human works (13:1–9; 13:10–19; 15:7–13). On the one hand, the designations that commence each section clearly mark such progression: μάταιος (“vain”) for nature worship (13:1); ταλαίπωρος (“wretched”) for idolatry (13:10); and ἀφρονέστατος (“most foolish”) for the Egyptians (15:14).¹⁶ On the other hand, more subtle indicators appear as well. Idolatry, the worship of human art, is worse than nature veneration, the worship of divine art, a contrast underscored by several parallels in vocabulary.¹⁷ The Egyptians, in turn, are the most foolish because they are guilty of both idolatry (15:14–17) and theriolatry (15:18–19). The section on Egyptian idolatry, carefully crafted so as to recall the indictments of the carpenter and potter (13:10–19; 15:7–13),¹⁸ suggests that all of the vitriol heaped on idolaters thus far holds for the Egyptians as well. In addition, however, the Egyptians also worship animals, even the most hateful among the animals (the most hateful because they are more “mindless” [ἄνοια] than the rest), animals so appalling that they have escaped the praise and blessing of God (15:18–19), a god who, earlier in the book, is said to love and not detest all of his creation (11:24–25).¹⁹

In terms of content related to the knowledge of God theme, two texts from Wis 13–15 deserve detailed attention. The first is the “(Greco-Roman) Deification of Divine Works” in 13:1–9. This passage – following upon the heels of 12:27, a text in which the Egyptians are said to have θεὸν ἐπέγνωσαν ἀληθῆ (“recognized the true God”) as a result of the animal plagues, to which we shall return – is bounded and subdivided by *inclusios* into vv. 1–2, 3–5, and 6–9.²⁰ The opening statement sets the tone: Μάταιοι μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἄνθρωποι φύσει, οἷς παρῆν

¹⁶ So e.g., David Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB 43; Garden City: Doubleday, 1979), 248–49.

¹⁷ (1) Divine vs. Human ἐργ-: τοῖς ἔργοις [13:1]; ὁ γενεσιουργός [13:5]; τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ [13:7] vs. ἔργα χειρῶν and χειρὸς ἔργον [13:10]; ἐργασίας [13:12, 19]; (2) Divine vs. Human τεχ-: τεχνίτην [13:1] vs. τέχνης [13:10]; τεχνησάμενος [13:11]; (3) Divine vs. Human κατασκευάζειν: ὁ κατασκευάσας [13:4] vs. κατεσκεύασεν [13:11].

¹⁸ In relation to the carpenter: ἐποίησεν in 15:16 recalls ποιήσας (13:15; cf. also 14:8, 15); ἐργάζεται recalls ἐργασίας (13:12, 19; cf. also 14:8, 20); 15:15b is reminiscent of 13:16–19, especially περὶ δὲ ὁδοιπορίας τὸ μηδὲ βάσει χρησθαι δυνάμενον (13:18c) vs. οἱ πόδες αὐτῶν ἀργοὶ πρὸς ἐπίβασιν (15:15b); and the living-person/dead-idol irony of 15:17 is paralleled in 13:10, 17, 18 (cf. 14:15, 29). In relation to the potter: ἐπλάσεν and πλάσαι in 15:16 recall πλάσσει, ἀνεπλάσαστο (15:7); πλάσσει (15:8, 9; cf. also χαλκοπλάστας in 15:9); πλάσαντα; and the phrase τὸ πνεῦμα δεδανεισμένος in 15:16 is reminiscent of τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαιτηθεὶς χρέος in 15:8.

¹⁹ On this tension between Wis 11:24–25; 15:18–19, see Kolarcik, “Book of Wisdom,” 570.

²⁰ These *inclusios* are: ἴσχυσαν εἶδεναι (13:1, 9); θεοῦ, θεοῦς (13:1, 2); καλλονῇ, καλλονῆς (13:3, 5); εὐρεῖν, εὗρον (13:6, 9). Although dividing the text in the same way, Gilbert (*La Critique des Dieux*, 2–5) observes the first and last *inclusios* but not the middle two. He also notes that εἶδεναι and ἐπέγνωσαν are *mot-crochets* with the preceding verse (cf. 12:27; 13:1) and that the μέν of 13:1 is paired with the δέ of 13:10.

θεοῦ ἀγνώσῃα (“For vain are all humans by nature, who were ignorant of God”; 13:1a).²¹ This *universal, natural* human ignorance of God is subsequently stressed in vv. 1b–2: humans were “unable to know” (οὐκ ἴσχυσαν εἰδέναι) the existent one, or to “recognize” (ἐπιγινώσκειν) the artisan; instead, left to their own, they “regarded” (νομίζειν) various elements as rulers of the cosmos. Verses 3–5 are composed of two conditional clauses, each of which has an imperative in the apodosis that is, in turn, followed by a statement grounding the imperative. The first clause concerns beauty. Humans, who were so delighted by the beauty of the elements that they adopted them as gods, are to “know” (γινώσκειν) how much better is the master of these elements; for he, the originator of beauty, created them. The second clause concerns power. Humans astounded by the elements’ power and force are to “understand” (νοεῖν) that the one preparing them is more powerful; “for, from the majesty and beauty of created things, the generator of them is analogously beheld” (v. 5). These calls to “know” and “understand” implicitly underscore the human ignorance of God with which this chapter began.

The final section, vv. 6–9, engages in necessary equivocation. On the one hand, the author of Wisdom must grant that these nature worshipers deserve little blame because they are, after all, persuaded by the genuine beauty of the divine handiwork. He even concedes that “perhaps” (τάχα; cf. Wis 14:19; Rom 5:7; Phlm 15) they go astray, though seeking and wanting to find God. On the other hand, these persons are not to be pardoned because if they “had been able to know” (ἴσχυσαν εἰδέναι) such beauty, so that they could speculate about the world, then how did they “not find” (οὐχ εὑρον) sooner the master of these things?²² The apodosis, however, produces tension. The question of how these nature worshipers did not sooner discover the master of creation seems to have already been answered in v. 1: humans are vain by nature, ignorant of God, unable to know or recognize him. At the very least, Wis 13:1–9 lacks any indication that humans actually had arrived at the knowledge of God on their own.

Our second text, the “Reflection on God’s Mercy” in Wis 15:1–6, comes after the central section (Wis 14:9–31), a description of the origin (14:15–21), outcome (14:12–14, 22–29), and punitive end of idolatry (14:9–11, 30–31). Regarding the outcome of idolatry, for example, this section says that the “intention” (ἐπίνοια) of making idols was the beginning of sexual immorality, their invention the corruption of life (14:12), and their worship the beginning, cause, and extremity of

²¹ As Reese (*Hellenistic Influence*, 55) comments, “For the Sage, any effort to achieve union with God without divine help must necessarily fail.”

²² Although the apodosis lacks the particle (ἄν), the aorist tenses suggest that this is a Second Class, or Contrary to Fact, Conditional. As Stanley E. Porter (*Idioms of the Greek New Testament* [2d ed.; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994], 260, italics his) notes, such a clause indicates that “the speaker is asserting for argument (but may not believe) that the protasis is contrary to fact. Whether it is *actually* to be considered contrary to fact must be determined by context.” In this case, the context shows that the author does believe that humans had been able to know the beauty and power of creation.

every evil (14:27), claims corroborated by a vice list (14:22–26). Wis 15:1–6, itself, is united and divided by vocabulary into two parts, vv. 1–3, and vv. 4–6.²³ Beginning with the latter, the author, identifying himself with Israel for the second time (cf. 15:1, 4; cf. also 12:6; 18:6), denies that we Israelites have been misled by the “intention of evil-art” (κακότεχνος ἐπίνοια), that is idolatry, or the fruitless toil of painters, a variegated image arousing desire only in fools who would long after an inanimate icon. This denial in vv. 4–5 and the subsequent denunciation of idolaters in v. 6 is composed of vocabulary and imagery dispersed throughout Wis 13–15, with ἐπίνοια serving as the most conspicuous example.²⁴ The effect is to disassociate Israel from the idolatry, immorality, and judgment that is the subject of this second excursus.²⁵

David Winston attempts to mitigate the significance of this disassociation. He states, “The writer is thinking of his own period,” and then cites texts such as Jdt 8:18: “For never in our generation, nor in these present days, has there been any tribe or family or people or town of ours that worships gods made with hands, as was done in days gone by” (NRSV).²⁶ The problem with this parallel, in particular, is that Jdt 8:18 refers to Israel’s past problems with idolatry, even acknowledging in the next verse, “That was why our ancestors were handed over to the sword and to pillage, and so they suffered a great catastrophe before our enemies” (Jdt 8:19 NRSV). Given Israel’s repeated dalliances with idolatry chronicled in biblical and extra-biblical writings and the historically-oriented nature of Wisdom’s account, one may be excused for thinking that the author of Wisdom is being less than forthright.

Yet, such a judgment proves premature in light of the allusions that precede in Wis 15:1–3. The text begins with an address to ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν (“our God”), who is χρηστὸς καὶ ἀληθής, μακρόθυμος καὶ ἐλέει διοικῶν τὰ πάντα (“kind and true, patient and [the one] governing all things with mercy”). This address recalls the divine attributes revealed in the aftermath of the golden calf incident

²³ The passage as a whole is bound together by ἡμῶν (v. 1) and ἡμᾶς (v. 4). Verses 1–3 are united by: Σὺ (v. 1), σοί (2x, v. 2); ἀμάρτωμεν, ἀμαρτησόμεθα (v. 2); εἰδότες (2x, v. 2), εἰδέναι (v. 3); κράτος (vv. 2, 3); and verses 4–6 are united by κακότεχνος (v. 4), κακῶν (v. 6); εἶδος (vv. 4, 5), ποθεῖ (v. 5), ποθοῦντες (v. 6). In terms of relation to what precedes and follows, *mot-crochets* include: ἀμαρτανόντων (14:31), ἀμάρτωμεν, ἀμαρτησόμεθα (15:2); and ἡμῶν (15:1), ἡμᾶς (15:4), ἡμῶν (15:7), although the latter is not restricted to Israel as are the former two. Cf. Gilbert, *La Critique des Dieux*, 193–96, 198.

²⁴ The other examples of vocabulary include: πλανᾶν (13:6; 14:22; 15:4); ἄνθρωπος (13:1, 10, 13; 14:5, 11, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21; 15:4, 16[2x]); κακ- (14:22, 27, 29, 30; 15:4, 6, 8, 12, 18); τεχ- (13:1, 10, 11; 14:2, 4, 18, 19; 15:4); χροῖα (13:14) and χρώμα (15:4); ὄψις (13:7; 14:17[2x]; 15:5, 19); ἄφρων (14:11; 15:5, 14); ὄρεξις (14:2; 15:5); νεκρός (13:10, 18; 14:15; 15:5, 17); εἰκῶν (13:13, 16; 14:15, 17; 15:5); ἄξιος (13:15; 15:6); ἐλπὶς (13:10; 14:6; 15:6, 10); δρᾶν (14:10; 15:6); σεβ- (14:20; 15:6, 17, 18). For thematic parallels, see: 13:14 vs. 15:4; 14:18–21 vs. 15:5.

²⁵ Cf. Wis 14:11; 15:15. These two verses explicitly associate idolatry with the Gentiles and thus, implicitly, not with Israel.

²⁶ *Wisdom of Solomon*, 282.

(cf. ἐλεήμων/πολυέλεος/ἔλεος, μακρόθυμος, ἀληθινός in Exod 34:6–7).²⁷ The author then states in Wis 15:2: καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν ἁμαρτῶμεν, σοὶ ἔσμεν, εἰδότες σου τὸ κράτος· οὐχ ἁμαρτησόμεθα δέ, εἰδότες ὅτι σοὶ λελογίσμεθα (“for even if we sin, we are yours, since we know your power; but we will not sin, since we know that we are reckoned to you”). In view of the evocation of Exod 34:6–7 and the prior use of the verb ἁμαρτάνειν (“sin”) in Wis 14:31, these references to sin imply idolatry, specifically the golden calf incident.²⁸

Corroboration for discerning an allusion to the golden calf is found in the expression σοὶ ἔσμεν of Wis 15:2. This expression recalls the nearly identical phrase which concludes Exod 34:9,²⁹ a text in which Moses prays for the LORD to accompany his λαός ... σκληροτράχηλος (“stiff-necked people”; a characterization, especially associated with the golden calf)³⁰ and to take away Israel’s ἁμαρτία (“sin”) and ἀνομία (“lawlessness”) so that ἐσόμεθα σοὶ (“we will be yours”). Moses’ prayer is then followed by the LORD’s assurance that he will go with Israel, an assurance that in Exodus leads to the re-inscription of the covenant tablets and resolves the golden calf crisis. The confident declaration in Wis 15:2 that “we will not sin” and the subsequent denial of complicity in contemporary idolatry suggests that the author of Wisdom regarded Moses’ prayer as having been answered. Israel’s “stiff-necked” nature, her “sin” and “lawlessness,” had been removed. In other words, Wis 15:1–6 reflects an implicit interpretation of the golden calf incident as recounted in Exod 32–34,³¹ one that, like Wisdom’s

²⁷ While the parallels between Wis 15:1 and Exod 34:6–7 are often noted (e.g., Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 281; C. Larcher, *Le Livre de la Sagesse ou La Sagesse de Salomon* [Ebib 5; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1985], 3.847–48; Kolarcik, “Book of Wisdom,” 561; Helmut Engel, *Das Buch der Weisheit* [Neuer Stuttgarter Kommentar Altes Testament 16; Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1998], 233; Giuseppe Scarpata, *Libro della Sapienza: Testo, traduzione, introduzione e commento* [Biblica Testi e Studi 6; Brescia: Paideia, 1999], 3.152), Gilbert (*La Critique des Dieux*, 174–88) goes further, arguing that the renewal of the covenant in the aftermath of the golden calf incident is presupposed in Wis 15:1–2. This interpretation is similar to the one I propose, although mine was developed independently. More recently, John M. G. Barclay (“I will have mercy on whom I have mercy”: The Golden Calf and Divine Mercy in Romans 9–11 and Second Temple Judaism,” *Early Christianity* 1 [2010]: 82–106[90–91]) has also discussed the echoes of Exod 34 in Wis 15:1–2, suggesting that “*Wisdom of Solomon* has read the references to divine goodness and mercy in Exodus 34 without reference to their context as the aftermath to the Golden Calf apostasy.” Cf. Linebaugh, “Announcing,” 222.

²⁸ Cf. Gilbert, *La Critique des Dieux*, 181; Kolarcik, “Book of Wisdom,” 562.

²⁹ So also Gilbert, *La Critique des Dieux*, 181–82; Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 281; Engel, *Das Buch der Weisheit*, 234; Barclay, “I will have mercy on whom I have mercy,” 90.

³⁰ Cf. Exod 33:3, 5; 34:9; Deut 9:6, 13; Sir 16:11; Bar 2:30; Acts 7:51; cf. also ἐσκήρυναν τὸν τράχηλον αὐτῶν used twice respectively in 2 Esd 19:16, 17 (Neh 9:16, 17). The one exception in which σκληροτράχηλος occurs without reference to the golden calf incident is LXX Prov 29:1.

³¹ I assume here that the author of Wisdom’s account of Exod 32–34 essentially matches our own. On the general textual stability of the LXX Pentateuch, see Dietrich-Alex Koch, *Die Schrift als Zeuge des Evangeliums: Untersuchungen zur Verwendung und zum Verständnis der Schrift bei Paulus* (BHT 69; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1986), 51.

hermeneutic elsewhere, minimizes Israel's sin.³² The important point, for our purposes, is that the statements about knowledge in Wis 15:2–3 occur within a context that is thoroughly covenantal. Indeed, these allusions to the golden calf incident suggest that the knowledge of God's power at issue is his power to overlook Israel's most infamous idolatrous act (and, by extension, all others), the awareness that Israel is reckoned as God's own in spite of her sin. Verse 3 further suggests that knowledge of God is salvific: τὸ γὰρ ἐπίστασθαί σε ὁλόκληρος δικαιοσύνη, καὶ εἰδέναι σου τὸ κράτος ρίζα ἀθανασίας ("For to understand you is complete righteousness, and to know your power is the root of immortality").³³ The salvific nature of knowledge concerning the divine explains why the nature worshipers depicted in Wis 13:1–9 must ultimately fall short in their quest, even if sincere, to know God; for to admit that they had achieved such knowledge would reckon them among the elect.

II. Comparing the Texts

Turning from analysis to comparison, a number of differences are apparent. The account in Wis 13–15 is considerably longer than that in Rom 1:18–32 (1210 words *versus* 270) and contains sections, such as an etiology of idolatry (Wis 14:15–21), that have no clear parallel. Other differences prove to be only on the surface, receding as one probes further. Three such differences deserve mention. First, while Rom 1:18–32 lacks the clear classification of aberrant forms of worship into nature worship, idolatry, and theriolatry found in Wis 13–15 and other texts (e.g., Philo, *Decal.* 52–81 [esp. 66, 76–78]; cf. *Let. Aris.* 135, 138), these distinctions seem to be presupposed.³⁴ The revelation of God's attributes in the works of creation (Rom 1:19–20) is not nature worship, but this sort of revelation is taken for granted in Wisdom's discussion of the divine works (Wis 13:3–5). Moreover, Rom 1:23 mentions human as well as animal images.³⁵

³² On Wisdom's hermeneutical stance toward the Pentateuch in contrast to that of Ps 106(105), see Lucas, "Unearthing," 82–90.

³³ Similarly, Grabbe (*Wisdom of Solomon* [Guides to Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1997], 53) states: "Knowledge is an important subject to the author [of Wisdom]. Knowledge has salvific value; knowledge of God is the key to immortality (2.13; 15.3)."

³⁴ On Paul's penchant for the kind of rhetorical shorthand that may be at work here, see Hans Dieter Betz, *Galatians: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in Galatia* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), 27–28; Margaret M. Mitchell, "Rhetorical Shorthand in Pauline Argumentation: The Functions of 'the Gospel' in the Corinthian Correspondence," in *Gospel in Paul: Studies on Corinthians, Galatians and Romans for Richard N. Longenecker* (ed. L. Ann Jervis and Peter Richardson; JSNTSup 108; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994), 63–88. My thanks to Clare K. Rothschild for alerting me to these references.

³⁵ I differ from Francis Watson (*Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith* [London: T & T Clark International, 2004], 407) and Linebaugh ("Announcing," 235–37) only in emphasizing that Rom

Second, although Rom 1:24, 26–27, proportionally, has a more pronounced emphasis on same sex acts as an indication of the deviance that arises from idolatry, Wis 14:26 does mention γενέσεως ἐναλλαγὴ (“inversion of generation”).³⁶ Furthermore, a deep structural coherence exists between Wisdom and Romans regarding the outcome of idolatry. Wisdom expresses this in two principles: 14:12, regarding the intention of idol-making as the beginning of “sexual immorality” (πορνεία); and 14:27, regarding the worship of idols as the beginning, cause, and end of every evil – a principle, as noted, that follows a lengthy vice list (14:22–26). Likewise, in the same order, Romans first focuses on sexual immorality in vv. 22–27, before the final giving-over in vv. 28–32 broadens to include societal sins of all kinds, also expressed in a vice list.

Third, Rom 1:18–32 appears to have an eschatological orientation lacking in Wis 13–15. The revelation of God’s wrathful giving-over of idolaters to their sin is portrayed as a present reality. Wis 14:9–11, 30–31, in contrast, depicts the punishment for idolatry as something reserved for God’s future “visitation” (ἐπισκοπή), when both idols and idolaters will come to an end.³⁷ When the broader context of both texts is taken into account, however, this difference appears to be one of emphasis. Paul expects a future divine judgment (Rom 2:16; 14:10–12; 2 Cor 5:10) and the plagues of Wis 11–19 not only manifest the manner in which the present created order is oriented toward the righteous and against the impious but also foreshadow God’s future judgment (cf. Wis 5:17–23; 16:15–29).³⁸

The mention of eschatology leads us to its inverse, protology, which ought to be kept in mind when comparing the knowledge of God theme in Rom 1:18–32 and Wis 13–15, our primary concern. As should be clear from the preceding analyses, Paul’s account of idolatry and immorality begins with *universal, natural human knowledge of God* and proceeds to describe the functional loss of that knowledge through suppression (cf. Rom 1:18b–21, 28, 32), whereas Wis 13:1–9 begins with *universal, natural human ignorance of God* and proceeds to describe how even the most enlightened are led astray by their inordinate focus on the divine handiwork to the exclusion of knowing the divine artisan, a knowledge that is later in Wis 15:2–3 depicted as covenantal and salvific in nature. While both texts hold humans accountable (Rom 1:20; Wis 13:8), only Romans clearly grounds that accountability in knowledge of God. The one complicating factor, however, is protology. Whether one regards Paul as presupposing “a Jewish

1:18–32 presupposes the distinctions delineated in Wis 13–15 and elsewhere. Paul’s abbreviated references, as suggested by both scholars, may, indeed, serve a polemical function.

³⁶ In addition to Rom 1:26, Winston (*Wisdom of Solomon*, 280) also notes as parallels to Wis 14:26: φύσεως ἔργων ἐναλλαγὴ in Philo, *Cher.* 92 and ἐνῆλλαξε τάξιν φύσεως in *T. Naph.* 3:4.

³⁷ For further on this future divine “visitation,” “examination,” or “day of scrutiny,” cf.: Wis 1:9; 2:20; 3:7, 13, 18; 4:15; 6:6; 19:15.

³⁸ See also n. 68 below and the associated discussion.

mythological narrative about the origins of idolatry,”³⁹ and/or the Adamic fall,⁴⁰ it seems that a shift in the immediacy of humanity’s awareness of God accompanies the descent into idolatry and immorality in Rom 1:18–32.⁴¹ The same cannot be said of Wis 13–15. Protological considerations do not play a role. Although Wis 14:15–21 presents an etiology of idolatry, this account, lacking any mention of the knowledge of God, merely illustrates how *universal, natural human ignorance of God* has expressed itself. No explanation for the origin of such ignorance is provided.

The one clear protological passage in Wisdom is 2:23–24: “For God created humanity for incorruptibility, and the image of his own nature he made him; but by the envy of the devil death entered into the cosmos, and those who are of death’s lot experience it.”⁴² Based upon this passage, one could argue that the salvation-historical vantage points of Rom 1:18–32 and Wis 13–15 are not the same. The former text describes the effect of the “Fall,” so to speak, on humanity’s knowledge of God, namely the suppression of that knowledge, while the latter text is cast from a “Post-Fall” perspective. Assuming this difference, one could further argue that Rom 1:18–32 and Wis 13–15 may not be as far apart as they appear. Perhaps, it could be suggested, the author of Wisdom regarded humanity as possessing the knowledge of God prior to death’s cosmic entrance.

³⁹ So e.g., Dale B. Martin, “Heterosexism and the Interpretation of Rom. 1:18–32,” *BibInt* 3 (1995): 332–55[335–36]; repr. idem, “Heterosexism and the Interpretation of Romans 1:18–32,” in *The Boswell Thesis: Essays on Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality* (ed. Matthew Kuefler; Chicago: University of Chicago, 2006), 130–51[132–33]. The attempt of Martin to restrict Rom 1:18–32 to a description of Gentile culture, in particular, as opposed to the universal human condition is unconvincing. Rom 1:18 stresses that God’s heavenly wrath is against “all” human impiety and unrighteousness; Rom 1:23 articulates the foundational idolatrous exchange utilizing language drawn from Ps 106(105):20, a text concerning Israel’s fall into idolatry with the golden calf; and Rom 2:1 ff. then indicts a *Jewish* interlocutor for doing the “same things” as the persons depicted in the preceding chapter, actions that have their origin in the foundational idolatrous exchange of Rom 1:23. Thus, if Paul is drawing upon a Jewish mythological narrative about the origins of idolatry, he has altered it so as to be a universal account.

⁴⁰ See the literature cited in Linebaugh, “Announcing,” 230, n. 58.

⁴¹ As Linebaugh (“Announcing,” 227), referring to “the theological knowledge presupposed in the original relationship between human creature and divine creator,” succinctly states: “what is primal is past (and prologue).”

⁴² A number of manuscripts (e.g. *O L a b d* 46 339 359 543 613 766) read ἰδιότητος rather than ἰδιότητος (Clem. Cant.) in Wis 2:23. See Joseph Ziegler, ed., *Sapientia Salomonis* (Septuaginta 12.1; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 101–2. Although Dodson (*Powers’ of Personification*, 56–61) argues that Wis 1:12–16 is a parallel account emphasizing human, as opposed to satanic, responsibility for death’s origin, the term δικαιοσύνη in v. 15 more likely forms an *inclusio* with its counterpart in v. 1, and v. 16, in turn, provides a literary lens through which to view the actions of the wicked in relation to their murderous trial of the just person, the outcome of their logically suspect approach to life, in Wis 2. Cf. Lucas, review of Dodson, 136–37. Also note that although Wisdom alludes to Adam’s sin (10:1) and the rebellion of the watchers (14:6; cf. *1 En.* 6:1–11:2), neither episode is utilized as an explanation for the origin of evil.

This line of reasoning, however, is unlikely. In contrast to Paul (cf. Rom 5:12; 7:7–12; 8:18–25), Wisdom, apart from the presence of death, gives no indication that creation is corrupt. Creation is rather depicted as “saving” (σωτήριος), as lacking any poisonous taint (1:14), as even serving its maker through “becoming tense” to punish the wicked and “relaxing” to benefit the righteous (16:24). By implication, then, human cognitive faculties would seem to be intact as well. In any case, it remains that Wis 13:1–9 does not affirm, as Rom 1:19–20 does, that knowledge of God is possible apart from special revelation, despite some claims to the contrary.⁴³ Yet, even if these two texts, viewed in isolation, treat the knowledge of God theme quite differently, Romans and Wisdom may once again find common ground if this theme is related to the tension between universalism and particularism. Moreover, approaching this tension through the knowledge of God motif proves illuminating for each book, considered in its own right.

III. Knowledge of God, Universalism, and Particularism

A. Wisdom of Solomon

The tension between universalism and particularism in Wisdom has been the subject of considerable discussion. Some scholars illustrate this tension by appealing to a specific text. Chesnutt, for example, observes that Aaron’s particularist appeal to the covenants and ancestral oaths in 18:22 is balanced by the universalistic depiction of the whole cosmos on his priestly robe in 18:24, a depiction reflective of the “wide-spread Stoic and Cynic idea that the true temple of God is the whole cosmos.”⁴⁴ Other scholars ascribe this tension to differing portions of the book. Thus, while John J. Collins and John M. G. Barclay disagree about whether cultural convergence (i. e., universalism) or cultural antagonism (i. e., particularism) predominates in Wisdom, both scholars regard the middle portion of the book (chapters 6/7–9), with its focus on the nature and gift of *Sapientia*, as universalistic and the final part (chapters 10/11–19), comprising a sustained contrast between Israel and the Egyptians, as particularistic.⁴⁵ Although there have been various attempts to address and even resolve this tension between universalism and particularism, such as a typological interpretation of Wis

⁴³ Cf. n. 2 and the associated discussion.

⁴⁴ “Covenant and Cosmos,” 225. More recently, Ivor H. Jones (“The Finale of the Wisdom of Solomon: Its Context, Translation and Significance,” *JSP* 19 [2009]: 3–43[32–33]), noting that for Wisdom the natural law finds its embodiment in the Mosaic law, cites 18:4 as the point at which particularity and universality meet.

⁴⁵ John M. G. Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE – 117 CE)* (Berkeley: University of California, 1996), 183–84, 189–91; Collins, “Natural Theology,” 8–15; idem, *Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic Diaspora* (2d ed.; Biblical Resource Series; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 201–2.

11–19,⁴⁶ or the adoption of a particular hermeneutical lens, whether the Middle Stoic doctrine of *philanthrōpia*,⁴⁷ justice,⁴⁸ or freedom and determinism,⁴⁹ the knowledge of God theme in Wisdom has not occupied a prominent place in the discussion.⁵⁰ This lack of prominence proves unfortunate as the knowledge of God theme not only exemplifies the widespread tension between universalism and particularism in Wisdom but also reveals implicit particularism in the otherwise universally-oriented middle section of the book.

Wis 13:1–9, as we have seen, depicts ignorance of God as natural to the human condition, while 15:2–3 portrays the knowledge of God as covenantal and salvific. The question is how these two texts relate to the knowledge of God theme throughout the rest of Wisdom. On the one hand, the knowledge of *Sapientia*, synonymous for the knowledge of God (cf. Wis 7:25–26; 8:3–4),⁵¹ is presented as utterly accessible in 6:12–16: those who love *Sapientia* easily behold her; those who seek *Sapientia* find her; and she even makes herself preemptively known to those desiring her. This depiction, in turn, coheres with the beginning of the book, which exhorts rulers to think of the LORD in goodness, seeking him in simplicity of heart “because he is found by those who do not test him, and appears to those who do not disbelieve in him” (1:1–2). On the other hand, the very next verses, viewed through two literary flashbacks, the “short repetition of a significant word or group of words or distinctive idea in two different parts

⁴⁶ According to Reese (*Hellenistic Influence*, 144), “The Sage sees men and events from Israel’s history as types of the salvation of the just and ruin of the wicked.” Reese is following Georg Ziener, *Die theologische Begriffssprache im Buche der Weisheit* (BBB 11; Bonn: Peter Hanstein, 1956), 94–97.

⁴⁷ See e.g., Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 43–46.

⁴⁸ Michael Kolarcik, “Universalism and Justice in the Wisdom of Solomon,” in *Treasures of Wisdom: Studies in Ben Sira and the Book of Wisdom: Festschrift M. Gilbert* (ed. N. Calduch-Benages and J. Vermeylen; BETL 143; Leuven: Leuven University, 1999), 289–301.

⁴⁹ Grabbe (*Wisdom of Solomon*, 60–61) employs the lens of freedom and determinism in the direction of a universalist reading, while David A. deSilva (*Introducing the Apocrypha: Message, Context, and Significance* [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002], 147–48) does so in support of a particularist interpretation.

⁵⁰ Although Collins (“Natural Theology,” 5–8) and Chesnutt (“Covenant and Cosmos,” 244–45) mention this theme in their treatments of universalism and particularism in Wisdom, even recognizing the disparaging assessment of unaided reason in Wis 9:13–17, both scholars stress the theoretical possibility of a natural knowledge of God on the basis of reading Rom 1:19–20 into Wis 13:1–9 and do not pursue this line of inquiry further. The theme of the knowledge of God in Wisdom has been treated extensively by Gilbert (“La connaissance de Dieu,” 191–210) and Ziener (*theologische Begriffssprache*, 22–26, 132–35), yet neither scholar relates this theme to the tension between universalism and particularism.

⁵¹ E.g., Grabbe (*Wisdom of Solomon*, 78) notes that Wis 7:25–26 aligns with the interpretation of *Sapientia* as a hypostasis of God, clarifying this view as follows: “That is, she is both product of God and also a manifestation of him. She represents him and she is him. Thus, many statements about God are interchangeable with statements about wisdom.”

of Wis[dom],”⁵² call into question this accessibility of the knowledge of God/*Sapientia*.

According to Wis 1:3–4, σκολιοί ... λογισμοί (“crooked reasoning”) separates one from God, whose power, when tested, rebukes the foolish; for *Sapientia* will not enter into a κακότεχνον ψυχὴν (“soul [disposed to] evil-art”), nor dwell in a body involved in sin. The term κακότεχνος appears elsewhere in Wisdom only in 15:4. As noted, this text is the precise point at which the author, on the basis of his interpretation of Exod 34, denies Israel’s involvement in the “intention of evil-art,” or idolatry. Commenting on the flashback to Wis 1:3–4 in 15:4, James M. Reese says, “Thanks to divine Wisdom,” or *Sapientia*, “the chosen people were able to resist the allurements of idolatry which seduced the ‘foolish.’”⁵³ Another flashback concerning σκολιός corroborates Reese’s interpretation. Following Wis 1:3, σκολιός first reappears in 13:13, a text in which an idolater ironically selects ξύλον σκολιόν (“crooked wood”), the cast off, useless portion of a tree full of knots, from which to carve a god.⁵⁴ Moreover, Wisdom frequently highlights such faulty reasoning. In addition to τῆς ἐκείνου μερίδος (“of that portion”; 1:16; 2:24), a central inclusion frames the speech in 1:16–2:24, one that focuses on the flawed logic of the wicked: λογισάμενοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς (“those not reasoning rightly”; 2:1) and Ταῦτα ἐλογίσαντο, καὶ ἐπλανήθησαν (“These things they reasoned, but they were deceived”; 2:21).⁵⁵ Similarly, the problem with the Canaanites – the rationale for why they could not take advantage of the place of repentance provided for them, besides their evil nature – was that οὐ μὴ ἀλλαγῇ ὁ λογισμὸς αὐτῶν εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα (“their reasoning would by no means change forever”; 12:10).

The paired anthropological passages of Wis 7:1–6; 8:17–21 and 9:5–6, 13–17a clarify why the reasoning of the Canaanites, or that of any other *embodied* person, would never change apart from divine aid. Both sets of texts parallel one another. Wis 7:1–6 forms the introduction and 8:17–21 the conclusion to Solomon’s discourse on the nature and need for *Sapientia*.⁵⁶ Similarly, Wis 9:5–6 and 13–17a are coordinated sections within Solomon’s subsequent prayer for *Sapientia* in 9:1–18, the center of which is the request for God to send *Sapientia* from his holy heavens and glorious throne (9:10a–b).⁵⁷ We begin with 7:1–6. Two themes

⁵² This definition comes from Reese (*Hellenistic Influence*, 124, material in brackets is mine), who then lists numerous flashbacks in Wisdom to underscore the unity of the book.

⁵³ *Hellenistic Influence*, 133–34. On the connection between Wis 1:1–15 and idolatry, see Hermann Eising, “Der Weisheitslehrer und die Götterbilder,” *Bib* 40 (1959): 393–408.

⁵⁴ The only other occurrence of σκολιός in 16:5, depicting the crooked serpents that were biting the Israelites, may also be related to this line of thought since in 11:15 the unreasoning nature of animals is stressed.

⁵⁵ On these inclusions, see Kolarcik, *Ambiguity of Death in the Book of Wisdom* 1–6, 39.

⁵⁶ On the concentric structure of Wis 7:1–8:21, see Addison G. Wright, “The Structure of the Book of Wisdom,” *Bib* 48 (1967): 165–84.

⁵⁷ On the concentric structure of Wis 9:1–18, see Maurice Gilbert, “La structure de la prière de Salomon (Sg 9),” *Bib* 51 (1970): 301–31.

permeate this text about Solomon's birth: his equality and earthy, or material, constitution. Indications of Solomon's equality span his life cycle, from his entrance and first sound, requiring him to inhale the common air, to the exit that confirms his mortality (vv. 1, 3, 6).⁵⁸ Prior to and in the inception of that life cycle, Solomon's ancestral descent from the "earthborn, first-formed person" (γῆγενοῦς ... πρωτοπλάστου), his "carved" (γλύφειν) flesh and "coagulated" (πηγνύειν) blood underscore his material makeup.⁵⁹ Once outside the womb, Solomon even falls "upon the earth bearing his same nature" (ἐπὶ τὴν ὁμοιοπαθῆ ... γῆν; v. 3). Viewed together, Solomon's equality and earthiness imply that all persons share his clay constitution.

Although Wis 7:1–6 does not mention the human "soul" (ψυχὴ), or "spirit" (πνεῦμα), its counterpart, 8:17–21, does.⁶⁰ Picking up this text in v. 19, Solomon says that as a gifted child, he received a "good soul" (ψυχῆς ... ἀγαθῆς) by lot. Since such a statement could imply that the body, not the soul, initially determines one's identity, Solomon immediately adds in v. 20: "rather, being good, I came into an undefiled body (σῶμα ἀμίαντον)." While scholars debate whether the author of Wisdom endorses here the doctrine of *metempsychosis*,⁶¹ the embrace of more or less Platonic body-soul dualism seems clear.⁶² In v. 21, Solomon prays to receive *Sapientia* because he knows that he would not otherwise possess her unless the LORD gave *Sapientia* to him. In fact, this knowledge is itself "grace" (χάρις). Significantly, even a good soul dwelling in an undefiled body naturally lacks the knowledge of one's need for *Sapientia*, much less *Sapientia* herself.

⁵⁸ The expressions ἴσος ἅπασιν and πάντων ... ἴση in vv. 1, 6 act as an *inclusio* for the passage, with πᾶσιν ἴσα in v. 3 further emphasizing this theme of equality.

⁵⁹ Note that words with the πλασ- root predominate in the section on clay idols (15:7, 8, 9, 11, 16); the term γλύφειν is utilized elsewhere in Wisdom only in 13:13 to describe the craftsman's action in "carving" his wooden idol; and the verb πηγνύειν often appears with σκηνή to mean "to pitch a tent" (cf. e.g., Wis 11:2; Gen 26:25; Exod 33:7; Num 24:6). This last point is important because, as we shall see, Wis 9:15 refers to the body as τὸ γεῶδες σκῆνος.

⁶⁰ The phrases ἐν καρδίᾳ μου and τῆς καρδίας μου (8:17, 21) serve as an *inclusio* for this unit. So Wright, "Structure of the Book of Wisdom," 174.

⁶¹ Cf. e.g., Robert H. Pfeiffer, *History of New Testament Times: With an Introduction to the Apocrypha* (New York: Harper & Row, 1949), 328; Reese, *Hellenistic Influence*, 80–86; Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 25–32, 198–99; Grabbe, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 55; Kolarcik, "Book of Wisdom," 511–12.

⁶² Pace Reese (*Hellenistic Influence*, 81–82), who argues that Wisdom's approach to body-soul relations is Aristotelian. Cf. *Phaedo* 81C vs. Wis 9:13–17a, discussed below, and see also Wis 1:4; 15:8, 11, 16. Note that even if David E. Aune ("Human Nature and Ethics in Hellenistic Philosophical Traditions and Paul: Some Issues and Problems," in *Paul in His Hellenistic Context* [ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995], 291–312[292–293], italics his) rightly cautions against speaking of "the Platonic" understanding of human nature, he himself nonetheless distinguishes the "hylomorphic" stage in Aristotle's thought from the "Platonic" one in which Aristotle "regarded the soul as a separate substance, as in Plato's *Phaedo*."

In Wis 9:5–6 Solomon continues to stress the importance of *Sapientia*. Drawing attention to his own weakness, including temporal and intellectual finitude in terms of judgment/laws, Solomon declares that even a perfect specimen of humanity, without *Sapientia*, would be “reckoned as nothing” (εἰς οὐδὲν λογισθήσεται). The parallel passage of 9:13–17a explains the ground for this reckoning, utilizing vocabulary from 7:1–6; 8:17–21; 9:5–6 to do so.⁶³ In fact, Wis 9:13–17a brings to climactic expression the epistemological implications of the preceding anthropological texts, a significance underscored by its concentric form, even as 9:13–17a participates in the larger structure of chapter 9:

- A For what person shall know (γνώσεται) the counsel of God?
Or who shall ponder (ἐνθυμηθήσεται) what the LORD wills? (v. 13)
- B For the reasonings (λογισμοί) of mortals are worthless,
and our intentions (ἐπίνοια) insecure (v. 14)
- C For the corruptible body (σῶμα) burdens the soul (ψυχὴν),
and the earthen tent (τὸ γεῶδες σκῆνος) weighs down the
thoughtful mind (νοῦν πολυφρόντιδα) (v. 15)
- B' And we scarcely infer (εἰκάζομεν) the things on earth,
and the things in our hands we discover (εὐρίσκομεν) with labor,
but the things in the heavens who has traced out (ἐξιχνίασεν)? (v. 16)
- A' And your counsel who has known (ἔγνω), unless you gave *Sapientia*? (v. 17a)

Congruent with the emphasis on Solomon's equality (and therefore representative status) in Wis 7:1–6, here he speaks in the first person plural, explicitly identifying himself with humanity (“our intentions”; “we scarcely infer”). Also consistent with 8:21 and 9:5–6, Solomon portrays the LORD's counsel and will as unattainable apart from the gift of *Sapientia*. This unattainability is ascribed to the epistemological limitations of the human constitution itself: The body prevents the soul or mind from ascending to heavenly matters. The epistemological anthropology of Wis 9:13–17a, then, coheres precisely with the depiction of ignorance of God as endemic to the human condition in 13:1–9 and correspondingly the knowledge of God as mediated to salvific effect through the covenant in 15:2–3. Moreover, Wis 9:13–17a as well as 8:17–21 further suggest that those who have the insight to seek *Sapientia* as she makes her rounds (cf. Wis 6:12–16) only do so because this insight was first given from above. One could, of course, argue that the implicit particularism of Wisdom's epistemological anthropology does not necessarily undermine its universalism since God could conveniently give the desire for *Sapientia* or knowledge of himself to Gentiles, as he did for Solomon

⁶³ θνητός: 7:1; 9:14; ἄνθρωπος: 7:1; 9:5, 6, 13; γηγενής, γῆ: 7:1, 3; 9:16; φροντίς, πολυφροντίς: 7:4; 8:17; 9:15; λογίζεσθαι, λογισμός: 8:17; 9:6, 14; σοφία: 8:17; 9:17; πόνος: 8:18; 9:16; χεῖρ: 8:18; 9:16; ψυχὴ: 8:19; 9:15; σῶμα: 8:20; 9:15; γινώσκειν: 8:21; 9:13, 17; θεός: 8:21; 9:13; τίς: 8:21; 9:6; 13, 16, 17. See also Gilbert's (“La structure,” 311–12) comments on the similarities between 9:5–6, 13–17a, in particular.

in 8:21. Yet, this would be an attempt to utilize the knowledge of God theme to resolve the tension between universalism and particularism, rather than appreciating the manner in which this theme illustrates one pole of that very tension.⁶⁴

There is, however, one possible exception to the otherwise consistent construal of the knowledge of God in Wisdom. It is that Gentiles are depicted as arriving at this knowledge in judgment. As noted above, Wis 12:27 says that in their punishment the Egyptians θεὸν ἐπέγνωσαν ἀληθῆ (“recognized the true God”; cf. also 11:13; 16:8, 18; 18:13). Although this emphasis appears to conflict with the knowledge of God theme in the rest of the book, three considerations suggest that the conflict is minimal, or even nonexistent. First, the author of Wisdom, while not always beholden to the biblical text,⁶⁵ has nonetheless likely been influenced by the repeated statements in the plague narratives that the LORD would make himself known to Pharaoh and the Egyptians in judgment (Exod 7:5, 17; 8:10, 19, 22; 9:14, 29; 10:2; 11:7; 14:4, 18). Second, adopting this emphasis does not ultimately undermine Wisdom’s theological consistency because the Egyptians, led by the hard-hearted Pharaoh, defy the divine self-disclosures until the Egyptians’ own demise, a fate of which the LORD was not unaware (cf. Exod 7:3–5; 11:9–10; 14:1–4, 16–18; Wis 19:1–5). Third, it may prove significant that the first and final two declarations, καὶ γνώσονται πάντες οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι ὅτι ἐγὼ εἰμι κύριος (“and all the Egyptians shall know that I am the LORD”; 7:5; 14:4, 18), in Exodus relate to the Egyptians’ destruction. Could it be that the anthropology of the author of Wisdom has both influenced and allowed for his adoption of the theme that hostile Gentiles shall come to divine knowledge in death? In other words, approaching such passages as Exod 7:5; 14:4, 18 from the standpoint of Platonic dualism, the author of Wisdom may have reasoned as follows: once the Egyptians’ minds, or souls, have been freed from the burden of their earthly bodies through death, they shall, indeed, know the LORD, although at that point it will be too late. The implication would then be that the texts in Wis 11:13; 12:27; 16:8, 18; 18:13 depict proleptic realizations of the Egyptians’ post-mortem existence.

Two further considerations, in turn, support this last conjecture. The perception (αἰσθάνεσθαι) of the LORD in Wis 11:13 is clearly proleptic, or telescoped, since, as the preceding verse indicates, this perception only came with the groaning remembrance of *Israel’s departure from Egypt*, that is, following the exodus. Although Gilbert connects this perception to the statement in Exod 14:25, “Let us flee from the presence of Israel; for the LORD is fighting the Egyptians on their behalf,”⁶⁶ the other consideration suggests that it may instead have been post-mortem. Wis 5:1–14 presents the introduction to and second speech of

⁶⁴ On the irreducibility of this tension, see Chesnutt, “Covenant and Cosmos,” 245–49.

⁶⁵ Cf. n. 32 above.

⁶⁶ “La connaissance de Dieu,” 200–201.

the wicked ἐν ἐπισκοπῇ ψυχῶν (“at the visitation of souls”; 3:13). Since the just person, whom the wicked earlier tortured and put to death (cf. Wis 2:12–20), now confronts the wicked, we are privy to a meeting of disembodied souls. The wicked’s disembodied state may explain why, in Wis 5:3–7, they are now able to repent as the wicked recognize that the just person has been accounted among the sons of God, in line with his prior claims to knowledge and sonship (Wis 2:13, 16, 18); and, correspondingly, the wicked acknowledge their own deception and ignorance of the way of the LORD, before passing into nothingness, while the just live forever (Wis 5:8–16).⁶⁷ That this scene may provide a hermeneutical lens through which to read Wisdom’s later Egyptian perceptions, or recognitions, of the LORD is corroborated by the depiction of final judgment immediately following in Wis 5:17–23, which is foreshadowed by the plague judgments of Wis 11–19, especially the hail and subsequent reflection on the transformation of creation in 16:15–29.⁶⁸ In the end, then, Wisdom’s epistemological anthropology seems to trend, even if subtly, toward the particularist strain of this text.

B. Romans

As we have seen, Wisdom’s pessimism regarding the human capacity, apart from divine aid, to transcend bodily limitations and arrive at the knowledge of God contrasts with the initial optimism in Rom 1:18b–21, a text which portrays the universal, natural human knowledge of God on account of the “intelligibility” (νοεῖν) of what has been made. Paul’s optimistic assessment, however, occurs within the context of his description of how this knowledge turned to functional ignorance through human suppression, leading to a descent into idolatry and immorality. This functional ignorance, or suppressed knowledge, is then underscored in v. 28: “And just as they did not approve of God as possessing knowledge (οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν τὸν θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει), God gave them over to an unapproved mind (εἰς ἀδόκιμον νοῦν), to do improper things”; and, following a vice list, it is reiterated once more in v. 32 through the neglect of God’s just requirement against immoral conduct, even though it is “known” (ἐπιγινώσκειν).

Looking at Rom 12:1–2, we find that the knowledge of God theme takes a parabolic path, one that begins in universalism but ends in particularism. This text follows Paul’s lengthy exposition of the gospel, including its implications for believers and the promises to Israel, and it marks a turn toward exhortation. Having challenged the Roman Christians to present their bodies in living sacrifice

⁶⁷ As Grabbe (*Wisdom of Solomon*, 55) observes, Wisdom “seems to suggest that immortality was a gift to the righteous, not an inherent condition of the soul itself (3.4; 4.1; 8.13, 17; 15.3).”

⁶⁸ Besides χάλαζα (5:22; 16:16, 22), the only verses in Wisdom where the term “hail” occurs, other vocabulary parallels between 5:17–23 and 16:15–29 include: κτίσις: 5:17; 16:24; ἐχθρός: 5:17; 16:22; κρίσις: 5:18; 16:18; κόσμος: 5:20; 16:17; ὕδωρ: 5:22; 16:17, 19, 29; δύναμις: 5:23; 16:19, 23; πᾶς: 5:23; 16:17, 20, 25; γῆ: 5:23; 16:19.

to God as their “logical” (λογικός) act of worship (v. 1), Paul commands them: “And do not be conformed to this world but be transformed by the renewal of the mind (τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός), so that you may approve (εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς) the will of God, that which is good and pleasing and perfect.” The thematic and terminological parallels with Rom 1, especially vv. 20 and 28 are clear. As Robert Jewett notes, “The original capacity of the human race to recognize and respond to the truth (Rom 1:20), which was distorted as a result of sin (Rom 1:28; 7:23, 25), has now been recovered and restored.”⁶⁹ Accordingly, Paul’s thought in Romans moves from universal natural knowledge of God to universal functional ignorance (1:18–32), an ignorance which is then alleviated by faith in God’s particular act of justification in Jesus Christ (3:21–26). Justifying faith, in turn, leads to restoration of the knowledge of God in an elect few (8:28–30; 12:1–2). Paul, however, commends to this elect few an attitude of hope that the confinement of all to disobedience and its accompanying functional ignorance will, in the depth of God’s own wisdom and knowledge, ultimately lead to mercy for all, especially the hardened among Israel (11:32–36).

Finally, viewed in light of this dynamic between Rom 1:18–32 and 12:1–2, fundamental similarities between Romans and Wisdom concerning the knowledge of God emerge. Both texts characterize the present moment as one of universal natural human ignorance of God, whether through suppression (Rom 1:18b) or earthly unattainability (Wis 9:13–17a; 13:1–9). Yet both texts also allow for the restoration or acquisition of the knowledge of God through particularist means, whether the appropriation of Christ’s atoning death (Rom 3:21–26; 12:1–2), or the gift of *Sapientia* which is uniquely associated with, if not limited to, Israel (Wis 8:13, 17; 9:17; 15:1–3; 18:4, 22). The key to perceiving these fundamental similarities, in the midst of difference, is comparison that takes into account the thematic development in each book.

IV. Conclusion

This essay began by noting that scholarly comparison of Wis 13–15 and Rom 1:18–32, especially in relation to the knowledge of God theme, has sometimes come at the cost of forcing one text into the mold of the other or failing to observe the precise nature of the differing depictions as well as their overarching coherence in light of each book considered as a whole. Prescinding from the issue of literary dependence, I have sought to demonstrate that the distinct portraits of the knowledge of God initially encountered in Rom 1:18–32 and Wis 13–15

⁶⁹ Robert Jewett, *Romans* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007), 733. These parallels between Rom 1:20, 28 and 12:1–2 support the view, advocated above, that Rom 1:18–32 concerns the suppression of the knowledge of God by all humans (including Jews), while problematizing the claim that this text only describes Gentiles. Cf. n. 39.

participate in a parallel development through the interpretive lens of universalism and particularism. Engaging first in separate analysis of Rom 1:18–32 and Wis 13–15 with a view to the knowledge of God theme, I noted that whereas Rom 1:18–32 presents humanity as having initially possessed the knowledge of God, but as having suppressed that knowledge in the descent into idolatry and immorality, Wis 13–15 depicts the knowledge of God as something not even nature worshipers achieved, much less idolaters and theriolaters. This difference, in turn, I argued, provides a neglected window into the tension between universalism and particularism in Wisdom, one that reveals implicit particularism in the epistemological anthropology of Wis 7–9, chapters typically regarded as belonging to the most universal portion of the book. The one possible exception to Wisdom’s epistemological particularism, the portrayal of non-Israelites as arriving at the knowledge of God in judgment (Wis 5:1–14; 11:13; 12:27; 16:8, 18; 18:13), may also be explained in light of Wisdom’s anthropology: The scene of the wicked in Wis 5:1–14, as disembodied and thus no longer burdened souls, coming to a post-mortem knowledge of God and the error of their ways provides a hermeneutical lens to interpret the later perception of the LORD by the Egyptians in judgment. This suggestion is corroborated by the telescopic orientation of Wis 11:13 as well as the depiction in Exod 7:5; 14:4, 18 of the Egyptians coming to know the LORD in death.

Turning next to Romans, I identified the parabolic path between Rom 1:18–32 and 12:1–2 as one of movement from universal knowledge of God to universal ignorance and then to particular restoration of that knowledge through justification in Jesus Christ. In light of this movement of thought, I further proposed that parallel development, in the midst of difference, emerges between Romans and Wisdom, including the characterization of the present moment as one of universal natural ignorance of God, though with the possibility for knowledge through particular means. This approach to the knowledge of God in Romans and Wisdom, I suggest, respects the integrity of each text while at the same time benefiting from bringing them into dialogue with one another.

III. Pauline Literature

A Stoic Concept of the Person in Paul?

From Galatians 5:17 to Romans 7:14–25

Troels Engberg-Pedersen

Introduction: Two Issues

Christian body, Christian self, Christian person: What does Paul have to say about these concepts? There are at least three different, but also partly overlapping, strands in recent thought about Paul and Pauline phenomena that are quite sceptical about the idea that there is much to be found in Paul concerning those concepts, at least the second and the third. One aim of this essay is to show that these strands are wrong. Another is to show that the Pauline ideas of the 'self' and the 'person' are in fact tightly connected with his understanding of the body. The three strands:

(1) Jewish and early Christian 'apocalypticism.' Theologians who emphasize the 'apocalyptic' dimension of Paul's thought often take it to imply that a notion of a Pauline 'self' or even 'person' does not do justice to the all-pervading sense in Paul that human beings are exposed to 'apocalyptic' 'powers' that act *upon* or even *within* them to such a degree that no room is left for a Pauline 'self' or 'person.' Those notions, it is felt, imply some degree of 'autonomy' on the part of the 'self' or 'person.' And the 'powers' leave no room for that.

An excellent representative of this approach is J. Louis Martyn, in whose searching commentary on the letter to the Galatians the 'powers' are given a crucial role that Martyn later explicitly contrasted with the notion of human 'autonomy' of action.¹ Another good, though less explicitly theological, representative is Dale B. Martin, in whose magisterial book on *The Corinthian Body* Paul's Jewish, 'apocalyptic' heritage turns up again and again in contrast to any

¹ For a good example of Martyn's view of Paul's "apocalyptic vision" (105) of "warfare" between "the evil powers" and "the redemptive powers" (100), see his excursus on "Apocalyptic Theology in Galatians" in J. Louis Martyn, *Galatians* (AB 33A; New York: Doubleday, 1997), 97–105. For the issue of "human autonomy," see Martyn's review essay, "De-apocalypticizing Paul: An Essay Focused on *Paul and the Stoics* by Troels Engberg-Pedersen," *JSNT* 86 (2002): 61–102 (esp. 88, 100–2).

notion of a Pauline 'self'.² (In a general way, though, Martin is very good on the role of the body in Paul's thought.)

(2) Mediterranean anthropology. Martin's (but not Martyn's) general approach is anthropological in the modern sense of the term as indicating a scientific discipline. Here, if nowhere else, he is in the company of Bruce Malina and his school.³ And Malina explicitly denies the relevance for Paul of anything like more modern – or even 'Western' – notions of 'self', 'individuality' and the like. Instead, Malina spoke of a 'dyadic personality' in the ancient Mediterranean world, a kind of person who relies intimately on the social others to be what he or she is.⁴ This perspective might – at least initially – find some support from the modern work of Pierre Bourdieu. His sociological notion of the 'habitus' as an alternative to a 'self' is a distinctly social one in the sense that a 'habitus' is by definition shared by a group of people. There is little room here for any notion of an individual 'self' or 'person' independently of the group.⁵ Malina's perspective might also draw support from the fact that Bourdieu formulated his own notion of the 'habitus' as a result of work in Algeria during the 1950s that was more distinctly anthropological than sociological – and furthermore from the fact that Bourdieu ended up tying in his notion of the 'habitus' with 'Mediterranean' culture more generally. All of this fits Malina's view. And so, talk of a Pauline sense of an individual 'self' or even a 'person' will come out as being quite anachronistic.

(3) Greco-Roman philosophy. The two approaches just mentioned have recently received some support from an unexpected angle. In his very impressive book on *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought*,⁶ Christopher Gill attempts to turn the tides against an inherited view, according to which the

² Dale B. Martin, *The Corinthian Body* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). Cf. 172–3 where Martin speaks of an "apocalyptic dualism" (172) in Paul between *sarx* ('flesh') and *pneuma* ('spirit'), claims that Paul "assumes an agency for *sarx* that would have appeared odd and superstitious to medical writers [of the ancient world]" (172) and suggests that "the modern concept of the individual is simply unavailable to Paul" (173).

³ An excellent, though of course also wholly independent, representative of Malina's views in this area is Jerome H. Neyrey. Cf., Bruce Malina and Jerome H. Neyrey, *Portraits of Paul: An Archaeology of Ancient Personality* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1996).

⁴ An early statement of this view was given in chapter 3 ("The First-Century Personality: The Individual and the Group") of Bruce J. Malina, *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1981). E.g., "[T]he first-century Mediterranean person did not share or comprehend our idea of an 'individual' at all" (54). "Instead of individualism, what we find in the first-century Mediterranean world is what might be called 'dyadism' ... [54]. A dyadic personality is one who simply needs another continually in order to know who he or she really is" (55).

⁵ For a brief account of Bourdieu's notion of 'habitus' see Troels Engberg-Pedersen, *Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 141–2, with references to Bourdieu's works.

⁶ Christopher Gill, *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Page references in the present paragraph are to this book.

post-classical, Hellenistic period did see a new awareness of an 'I' or 'self'.⁷ Gill takes as his starting point certain views about "what is new in Hellenistic-Roman thinking about personality" (325) expressed by Charles Kahn, Anthony Long and Michel Foucault (329–30, again 334–5). In all cases there is an emphasis (in different ways) on the individual. Gill basically aims to resist this. He finds that these various interpretations reflect developments in philosophy that have occurred since Descartes in a line that goes from Descartes via Locke, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche and Heidegger to Sartre (331 and 341). Against this he wishes to align himself with those more recent philosophers who have doubts about connecting personhood with "I centred self-consciousness" (e.g., 331) and who think that somebody like Aristotle – in whom one definitely finds no emphasis on an 'I' – had a better view of what goes into being a person. Gill's central claim is that neither the Stoics nor anybody else in Hellenistic-Roman philosophy went fundamentally beyond Aristotle. There is no development in the direction of anything that might look like Descartes. Instead, all these philosophers stayed squarely 'ancient'.⁸

In all three fields, then, the odds have been fairly strongly staked against finding any kind of individual awareness in Paul that might allow us to speak of a Pauline 'self' or 'person.' Nevertheless, while all the thinkers are in important ways right, they are also in important ways wrong. The underlying issue will be the same in all three cases: how to retain what is right in those views while also bringing in sufficiently well-defined notions of 'self' and 'person' in connection with Paul for it to become possible for us to insist that *against* those views there is a clear sense of a 'self' in Paul, and even of a 'person.'

That was the first, most comprehensive issue to be studied. The second is far closer to the Pauline text. And it brings in quite centrally the notion of the body too. It concerns Paul's account in Rom 7:14–25 of the phenomenon of 'weakness of will' – *akrasia* in the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition.⁹ Here the question

⁷ This view is too pervasive to call for referencing.

⁸ It is intriguing to try to correlate this view with Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Whereas Taylor has very little to say about the Hellenistic period proper, which might for all he says continue more or less directly in the Platonic vein, he does find substantial hints of a Cartesian perception in Augustine. See, e.g., chapter 7, which begins as follows: "On the way from Plato to Descartes stands Augustine" (127)!

⁹ Gerd Theissen has, in a convincing manner, situated the two maxims that Paul gives in 7:15 and 7:19 ("for I do not do what I wish, but what I hate, that I do" and "for I do not do the good that I wish, but the bad that I do not wish, that I do") within the ancient Greek and Roman philosophical reflection on the experience of a conflict between reason and desire. See Gerd Theissen, *Psychologische Aspekte paulinischer Theologie* (FRLANT 131; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983), 213–23. Theissen touches on all the main players in the field ranging from Euripides, Socrates, Plato via Chrysippus, Posidonius, Ovid, Seneca and Epictetus to Galen. This is an excellent summary of the 'tradition historical' material into which Paul's account fits. A thorough knowledge of this material should be mandatory for anyone who aims to understand Romans 7. (For a recent disagreeing view, though, see n. 11 below.) In addition, let it be noted

is whether Paul draws upon a Platonic (or Aristotelian) way of understanding *akrasia* as a battle between reason and desire to be understood as two independent – and unfortunately often opposed – moral psychological ‘powers’ or parts of the soul (the ‘desiderative’ and the ‘rational’ one). Or should Paul’s account rather be understood within the framework of a Stoic way of understanding *akrasia*, which also sees it as a battle between reason and desire, but now to be understood as two different forms of a single, basically cognitive, type of soul? Where the former understanding is fundamentally ‘dualistic,’ the latter is fundamentally ‘monistic’ since it provides an *analysis* of reason and desire that operates with a single power only: that of cognition. On the Platonic-Aristotelian view, while any kind of desire of course does have some intentional shape, the desiderative force is in itself entirely non-cognitive. As such, it cannot be immediately *changed* through cognitive means. Change can only be effected over time: by habituation. On the Stoic view, by contrast, any kind of desire is ultimately a form of (normative) *belief* about the world, and hence a cognitive phenomenon. As such it may in principle be immediately changed through cognitive means for a better, more adequate one.

In a previous publication I have argued that one need not choose between a Platonic and a Stoic understanding of Paul’s account in Romans 7 since what matters to him there is precisely what is shared by either: that to a pre-Christian person who is living under the Mosaic law the akratic experience is insoluble.¹⁰ Recently, however, a distinctly Platonic reading has been proposed with much force by Emma Wasserman.¹¹ Against this, I will argue in the present essay that while there is in fact no reason to choose between either understanding within Rom 7:14–25 itself, 8:1–13, where Paul presents his *solution* to the dead end in which he has left the protagonist of 7:14–25, logically presupposes that he had a ‘Stoic,’ cognitive understanding of the problem described in 7:14–25.¹²

The reason why it is important to go into this exegetical and quite technical issue here is that finding the correct answer to the question whether Rom 7:14–25 thinks ‘Platonically’ or ‘Stoically’ will have wide implications for the way we may speak of a ‘person’ in Paul, in particular the way we should see that idea as being related to the Pauline notion of the ‘body’.

that at least since Aristotle’s account in *Nicomachean Ethics* Book 7, the experience of a conflict between reason and desire had a special, technical name in the ancient philosophical reflection: that of *akrasia* (‘weakness of will’).

¹⁰ See Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “The Reception of Graeco-Roman Culture in the New Testament: The Case of Romans 7.7–25,” in *The New Testament as Reception* (ed. M. Müller and H. Tronier; JSNTSup 230; London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002), 32–57 (esp. 54–6).

¹¹ See Emma Wasserman, *The Death of the Soul in Romans 7: Sin, Death, and the Law in Light of Hellenistic Moral Psychology* (WUNT 2/256; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008). A brief, summarizing statement is in Emma Wasserman, “Paul among the Philosophers: The Case of Sin in Romans 6–8,” *JSNT* 30, no. 4 (2008), 387–415. It should be noted that Wasserman sees the problem described by Paul not as that of *akrasia*, but of extreme immorality. On this, see more below.

¹² I had hinted at this view already in Engberg-Pedersen, “Reception,” 55 n. 32.

We shall begin by looking at a few verses in the last chapter of Galatians: 5:16–18. These verses raise in a very acute way the issue of how to understand the relationship in Paul between his ‘apocalypticism’ and his ‘moral exhortation’ (Pauline ‘paraenesis’), where the former brings in the notion of external ‘powers’ operating on and within human beings and the latter seems to presuppose some form of human ‘autonomy’ of action. I shall argue that a specifically Stoic way of understanding the issue that is focused on the notion of cognition removes or solves the apparent contradiction. By developing the logical intertwinement of ‘apocalypticism’ and ‘paraenesis’ in Galatians 5–6, I shall remove the first objection given above to speaking of a ‘self’ and ‘person’ in Paul.

Next we shall turn to Romans 7–8 and consider a number of issues in these chapters. Once again we shall see that Paul is throughout presupposing a cognitive (and hence, I am claiming, fundamentally Stoic) understanding of the issues he is discussing. This will have important consequences for the notion of a ‘person’ that we shall end up ascribing to Paul since this notion will also be seen to bring in – and in a sharpened form – Paul’s notion of the ‘body’.

At the end of the essay I shall attempt to remove the second and third objections given above to speaking of a ‘self’ in Paul. Thus the net result will be that we have something substantial to say about all three notions in Paul: Christian body, Christian self, Christian person.

Interlude: An Earlier Argument


For purposes of exposition it will be advisable to present to the reader two answers that I have myself previously given to the question whether – and if so how – one might operate with a notion of ‘self’ in connection with Paul. The first answer gives the overall shape of the content of a positive answer to that question, showing in what precise sense it does appear appropriate to ascribe to Paul the idea of a ‘self.’ (When I gave that answer, however, I did not bring in the notion of a ‘person.’) The second answer explains the context within Paul’s thought and practice that may have given rise to such an idea. Here I am repeating the two answers in abbreviated form, since they are not to be understood as constituting the basic content of this essay. The aim is merely to indicate that what will be said here will both supplement and deepen what has been said before.

First answer: a Pauline ‘self of conversion.’ Previously I have argued that a passage like Gal 2:19–20 must be analysed in such a way that Paul can be seen to operate there with what are fundamentally two forms of an ‘I’.¹³ His text runs like this:

¹³ See Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Philosophy of the Self in the Apostle Paul,” in *Ancient Philosophy of the Self* (ed. P. Remes and J. Sihvola; The New Synthese Historical Library 64; Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 179–94.

(2:19) I, however, died to the law through the law, so that I might live for God. I have been crucified with Christ; (20) it is no longer I who live: Christ lives in me. And so far as I now live in the flesh I live in the faith(fulness) of the Son of God, who felt love for me and gave himself over for me.¹⁴

I have suggested that Paul's many 'I's in the passage may be brought into a single view in the following model:



Basically, there are two types of an 'I' involved: the old 'I' (I^1) and the new one (I^2 , the one that lives for God, is "crucified together with Christ," etc.), which belong at the same level; and an *underlying* 'I' (I^-) – the one that may, like Aristotelian 'matter,' undergo the substantial change from I^1 to I^2 – to which corresponds a self-reflective 'I' (I^+), which self-reflectively looks 'down upon' the change from above or from the outside.

This model, which – so I claim – does capture the inner logic of the two Pauline verses, also reflects the basic Stoic understanding of a human 'self' as this is articulated in the analysis of the phenomenon of *oikeiôsis* ('association') that is of central importance in Stoic ethics.¹⁵ According to this analysis, directly from birth both animals and infants 'associate' certain things in their immediate surroundings (e. g., food) to themselves as 'belonging' to them, while also rejecting other things as being 'alien' to them. In both cases a 'sense of themselves' is presupposed – Cicero calls it a *sensus sui* – as what provides the criterion for either 'associating' or rejecting the external objects.¹⁶ At a later stage, when human infants grow up and acquire reason, they come to see that what defines themselves is not in fact the bodily structure that served as the criterion for the initial normative division of the world. Instead, what defines them is that they are rational beings, who may precisely apply this second-order view on themselves and their own previous acts. They *were* this and that (entities with a certain

¹⁴ All translations are mine unless otherwise stated.

¹⁵ See my discussion of *oikeiôsis* in Troels Engberg-Pedersen, *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiôsis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy* (Studies in Hellenistic Civilization 2, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1990), in particular chapters 3–4.

¹⁶ *De Finibus* 3.16 (cf. Engberg-Pedersen, *The Stoic Theory*, 66, with the analysis on pgs. 66–71): "But it would be impossible that they should feel desire (*appetere*) at all unless they possessed an awareness of self (*sensus sui*) and as a result of this (*eoque*) loved themselves (*diligere se*)."

bodily structure – I¹); they now *are* this (a special form of a rational being – I²); and they are themselves able to *see* this (from above: I⁺).¹⁷

To the extent that the two verses in Paul are adequately captured in conformity with this Stoic model, we may ascribe to Paul an awareness of a ‘self’ (the ‘I’ that undergoes a substantial change). And we may even go on to ascribe to him also an idea of a distinctly human ‘self’: the one captured in the notion of I⁺. This we may even dignify – and this is my proposal here – by calling it a human ‘person.’ So far we may say that a human person is a being who is able to reflect on him- or herself from a meta-position ‘above’ the self.¹⁸ We may also notice that *if* Paul is thinking in the Galatians passage along such Stoic-like lines, then his concepts of a ‘self’ and a ‘person’ are anchored in cognition. The initial, Stoic ‘self-awareness’ is a *sensus sui*. And the second-order type of ‘person awareness,’ namely, of themselves as people who are able to see their own acts as part of more large-scale patterns in the world, is one of *self-reflection*.¹⁹

Second answer: the context of Paul’s notion of a ‘self of conversion.’ Not only is the extent to which one may speak of a notion of ‘self’ in the ancient world contested, but it is also something of a moot point in contemporary thought whether it is at all legitimate and fruitful to employ the concept. In an earlier publication I have tentatively made use of Michel Foucault’s notion of ‘subjectification’ as a way of pointing to the social contexts within which a notion of a ‘self’ is articulated as a result of a process that makes individuals come to focus on themselves in relation to various social factors. One such factor is that of authority, including the social rules under which human beings regularly live.²⁰

This particular way of looking at the articulation of a ‘self’ is helpful for understanding what is going on in Paul since whenever we find him to be moving in the direction of articulating a ‘self of conversion’ it happens in a quite specific context: that of being freed from living ‘under’ the Mosaic law, which is as good a candidate as any of the kind of ‘authority’ invoked by Foucault. The point here has nothing to do with the genesis of Paul’s thought (that he in some way felt *constrained* by living ‘under’ the law), only with the manner in which he actu-

¹⁷ *De Finibus* 3.21 (cf. Engberg-Pedersen, *The Stoic Theory*, 81, with the analysis on pgs. 81–8): “For man’s first attachment is to the things in accordance with nature. But as soon as he acquires understanding (*intellegentia*) or rather, perhaps, the capacity to form concepts (*notio*), i. e. what the Stoics call *ennoia*, and sees the order (*ordo*) and so to speak harmony (*concordia*) of [his own initial] acts, he values this (viz. order and harmony) far more highly than all those earlier objects of his love, and he concludes by rational argument that in this (viz. order and harmony) lies that something which is praiseworthy and choiceworthy for its own sake – the good for man.”

¹⁸ For a modern elaboration of a similar view, see Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” *Journal of Philosophy* 68 (1971): 5–20.

¹⁹ See further Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Stoic Philosophy and the Concept of the Person,” in *The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy* (ed. C. Gill; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 109–35.

²⁰ See Troels Engberg-Pedersen, *Cosmology and Self*, 145–7, drawing on the two last volumes of Foucault’s *L’Histoire de la sexualité* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984).

ally describes his own experience of a 'self of conversion:' it always happens in a context where that experience is contrasted with the life of others, who live 'under' the Mosaic law.²¹

It therefore seems appropriate to conclude that these two conceptualizations actually go together: living 'under' a collective regulatory principle (the law) and *oneself* undergoing a change *from* that kind of life, a change that has been generated by some third kind of event, which in Paul's case came *literally* from above through God's acts in generating the Christ event and sending the pneuma ('spirit') into Paul. In this conceptual context, then, the notion of a 'self of conversion' was (in effect) created.

Those were the two points for which I have previously argued. It is now time to begin the analysis proper.

Galatians 5:16–18: The Problem

Galatians 5:16–18 is part of the section of paraenesis ('moral exhortation') in Gal 5:13–6:10. I have argued elsewhere that this section is structured in an ABA pattern by Gal 5:1–12 and 6:11–18, moreover, that this whole Galatians pattern is in fact repeated – though of course in a strongly changed form – in Romans 5–8.²² Here are the two passages:

Galatians 5:13–6:10 ('paraenetic') vis-à-vis 5:1–12 and 6:11–18 ('apocalyptic') and
Romans 6:1–8:13 ('paraenetic') vis-à-vis 5:1–11(21) and 8:14–39 ('apocalyptic')

I will not repeat the arguments for this understanding here. What matters in the present context is only that the reader realizes the need for trying to bring out what the point may be of placing 'paraenetic' and 'apocalyptic' passages next to one another in such an intricate pattern.

Let us now try to sort out some issues in Gal 5:16–18. Paul here exhorts the Galatians to walk by the pneuma, telling them that if they do so, then they most certainly will not fulfil the desires of the flesh (5:16).²³ This implies, quite unsurprisingly, that pneuma and flesh are radically opposed to one another, but also

²¹ In addition to Gal 2:15–21, see Phil 3:2–11 and Rom 7:7–8:13.

²² See Troels Engberg-Pedersen, "Galatians in Romans 5–8 and Paul's Construction of the Identity of Christ Believers," in *Texts and Contexts: Biblical Texts in Their Textual and Situational Contexts: Essays in Honor of Lars Hartman* (ed. T. Fornberg and D. Hellholm; Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1995), 477–505. As far as I know, this reading has not made any impact on scholarship. I wonder why.

²³ NRSV translates: "Live by the Spirit, I say, and do not gratify the desires of the flesh." But Martyn, *Galatians*, 492, is surely right to refer to Friedrich Blass, Albert Debrunner, and Robert W. Funk, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961) § 365 for the "construction (aorist subjunctive following the emphatic negative *ou mē*) [as] indicating something that definitely will not happen in the future." (It is difficult to understand how anybody could read the verse otherwise.)

that *if* the Galatians align themselves with the pneuma, then the flesh *will* be vanquished. Already here we may note two points: first, pneuma and flesh are imagined by Paul as independent entities of their own that are opposed to one another in the radical sense that one thing excludes the other; and second, it is up to a third party, the Galatians themselves, whether they will follow either of the two entities (and here, the pneuma) or not. How should these two points in fact be combined? Are the Galatians *themselves* able to decide for one or the other of the two entities *irrespective* of the strength of either power when they are fighting against one another? And if not, exactly how do the Galatians ‘themselves’ and the two powers interact?

The next verse (5:17) provides an explanation of the point about the radical opposition of pneuma and flesh that was implied in the previous verse: “(a) *For* the flesh desires *against* the pneuma, (b) and the pneuma *against* the flesh; (c) *for* these are opposed to one another (d) in order that you may not do whatever you wish (to do)”. This verse makes wholly explicit the earlier point that flesh and pneuma are to be understood as independent powers fighting against one another over their influence on human beings. But it also raises even more seriously the earlier question: if these two powers fight *inconclusively* to prevent human beings from putting their allegiance to the *other* power into practice, then how is this virtual stalemate to be resolved? Is it *entirely* up to the Galatians themselves whether to follow one or the other power? And if so, what kind of ‘powers’ are they?

The verse also suggests, however, that in spite of the fact that it places pneuma and flesh on the same level as being opposed to one another (5:17a–b and 17c), its primary target is in fact the opposition of the flesh against the pneuma. The verse begins with this idea in particular, and its conclusion (5:17d) suggests that the target is that the Galatians do not do what they ‘wish’ to do. Here the term for ‘wish’ (θέλειν) may certainly cover any ‘volitional’ category (including that of ‘desire’ = ἐπιθυμεῖν). Still, the phrasing itself strongly reminds one of the official description in Greco-Roman thought of the phenomenon of *akrasia*.²⁴ And here, of course, what one ‘wishes’ to do, but does not do, is what is enjoined by the ‘good’ ‘power’ that is opposed to the desires of the flesh.

These various facts about 5:17 raise our question even more seriously. If the two powers are radically opposed to and actively work against one another to exert influence on human beings, and, moreover, if the flesh, in particular, does the same so successfully that the result is a stalemate in the power battle, is it then entirely ‘up to’ the Galatians to ‘decide for’ the pneuma, with the result that they will *then* most certainly *not* fulfil the desires of the flesh (as 5:16 had it)? Once again, what kind of relationship is envisaged here between the two powers and the human beings ‘themselves’ who are in one way or the other under their sway?

²⁴ Compare n. 9 above.

Finally, in 5:18 Paul introduces what is in a sense the 'logical apodosis' to verse 5:16: *if* (then) the Galatians 'are in fact led' by the *pneuma* or 'do let themselves be led' by the *pneuma*, then – and here one expects: they will not fulfil the desires of the flesh. What he actually says is: then they are not under the *law* since (as is then shown in 5:19) the law is connected with the 'acts (ἔργα) of the *flesh*.' This extremely condensed claim about an intrinsic connection between the Mosaic law and the flesh is of the greatest importance for a proper understanding of 5:13–16 as a whole. But that is not our concern right now. Instead, we must again ask: how are we to understand that the Galatians may in fact end up walking by the *pneuma* or being led by the *pneuma*? Is it something that is itself *brought about by* the *pneuma* (which might then – *in spite of* 5:17 – after all be the stronger power)? In that case, we should translate the ἄγεσθε in 5:18 as 'are in fact led.' Or is it something that is brought about by the Galatians *themselves* (which might initially fit 5:17 better)? In that case, we should translate the ἄγεσθε of 5:18 as 'do let yourselves be led?'

The issue should by now be sufficiently clear. It may become even clearer if we bring out explicitly that in setting it up I have been relying on the two different ways of thinking about the matter that go with the perspective of Pauline 'apocalypticism' on the one hand and Pauline 'paraenesis' on the other. The powers are regularly – *and no doubt rightly* – taken by scholars to be 'apocalyptic' powers.²⁵ It is often left unclear, though, how exactly they should in that case be understood. Elsewhere I have argued for seeing them as *physical* entities that are present both in the world at large and also within human beings. They are also to be seen (from a Pauline perspective) as *personal* powers. Finally – and most importantly, as we shall see – they are to be understood as *cognitive* powers.²⁶ Still, in the way the powers work within Paul's thought, they are most certainly 'apocalyptic' entities, as this term is regularly used. By contrast, the appeal to the Galatians' decision to walk and let themselves be led by the *pneuma* falls squarely within Pauline 'paraenesis,' which presupposes a philosophical notion of 'agency.' How, then, should we understand the relationship between the external (but also internal) agency of the 'apocalyptic' powers and the human agency presupposed in 'paraenesis' of the Galatians themselves? Or is there in fact no clear relationship here? Are those scholars right who insist so strongly on the 'apocalyptic' side of the equation that they will not accept any solution to the problem we have diagnosed?

²⁵ This point is of huge importance. It is precisely by *accepting* the 'apocalyptic' reading of Paul that one may also come to see the importance of the 'philosophical' one.

²⁶ For these claims see Engberg-Pedersen, *Cosmology and Self*, 76–83.

Galatians 5:16–18: The Solution

No. There is a solution and it lies in seeing and accepting that we are not confronted here with an either-or. Pneuma and flesh are certainly radically opposed. However, external, ‘power’-based (including divine) agency and human agency are not. On the contrary, external agency is operating *within* human agency. However, this does not mean that human agency is no longer ‘real’ agency. It is. Human beings *themselves* act when they decide to follow the promptings of either power. What matters here is to see that the presupposed contrast between external and internal agency must be overcome, set aside and – at least in the case of Paul – rejected.²⁷

But how can that be? The reason is that there is one place where the powers (and behind them God) and human beings actually meet, moreover, meet in such a manner that the distinction between what either part *does to* the other loses its meaning. That place is the field of cognition. Human beings are evidently cognitive beings. They can understand or misunderstand, but they are continuously engaged in the cognitive process of *gaining* understanding. However, the powers are cognitive beings too. They both possess cognition in themselves – whether false or true – and they also aim to instil into human beings the type of understanding that each of them represents.

That such a view was Paul’s comes out very clearly with regard to the pneuma in 1 Cor 2:6–16 where he speaks of God’s having given to human beings the pneuma *so that they may understand* (εἰδέναι) what God has given by grace (2:12, that is, the full meaning of the Christ event). That Paul had the same view with regard to the flesh comes out very clearly, for instance, in a highly relevant passage: Rom 8:6, where he speaks of the ‘mind-set’ or ‘intention’ (φρόνημα) of the flesh – and in fact also of the pneuma.²⁸ Incidentally, it is highly relevant to the present point that Paul may in the next two verses (Rom 8:7–8) go from saying that just as the power itself (of the flesh) ‘cannot’ submit to God’s law (8:7), so ‘those (that is, those *human beings*) who are *in* the flesh cannot please God.’ Here the complete *alignment* of the power and those human beings who belong within that power is explicitly stated.

Well and good. But even if both human beings and the ‘apocalyptic’ powers are (also) cognitive entities, will the result not be that the basic agency in *bringing* human beings to have this or the other understanding belongs one-sidedly to the powers, *and not* to the human beings themselves? How, then, may they themselves be responsible for their doings? And how may one presuppose – as Paul’s

²⁷ I should perhaps warn the reader that the same holds true of ancient Stoicism and that I am in fact drawing on the Stoic development of the point to show that it is also of the greatest relevance to Paul. See further chapter 4 of Engberg-Pedersen, *Cosmology and Self*, on which I am relying here.

²⁸ For this general view of the ‘powers,’ see more in Engberg-Pedersen, *Cosmology and Self*, chapter 3.

'paraenesis' does seem to do – that the human beings may *themselves* decide for one or the other practical option?

The secret here lies in seeing that precisely when the central issue is a matter of cognition and understanding, the contrast between external and internal agency is misleading. In fact, it is even misleading to speak of 'agency' here. Allow me to quote from my recent book on Paul:

Is human knowledge divinely or humanly generated in Paul? The first and obvious answer is that it is divinely generated. ... God has ... done a host of things [including staging the Christ event] in order that human beings may come to know. ... It is when we turn to the other half of the question that we begin to see that *the question itself is misleadingly put*. It would clearly be wrong to say that this kind of human knowledge has been humanly generated. Knowledge in a human being, in the sense of 'oneself coming to see something', is not the kind of thing that *can* be generated by the person who undergoes the experience. ... The idea of 'self-generated coming to see' is meaningless. Still, and this is the point, while not self-generated, any given piece of real understanding, or the kind of knowledge one has when one has come to *see* something, is so intimately tied in with oneself, it is so intimately one's own that this fact in itself suffices to make also the acts that flow from it one's own and hence also more broadly to render one responsible for one's own ways. Thus the kind of knowledge we are talking about may be said both to be divinely generated and also – as a piece of genuine understanding – to be distinctly and intimately one's own, without this requiring that it has also been humanly generated. It is this special feature of knowledge underlying individual action and responsibility that explains why one may in their case speak of [what I call] an overlap between divine and human agency. The human act of understanding [in Paul, that is] is both one's own and also one that meets the God who has brought it about.²⁹

The conclusion to be drawn from this understanding of the phenomenology of knowledge acquisition is that the fundamental contrast that we seemed to come across in Gal 5:16–18 is not there at all. If human beings are being led by the pneuma, then they will *themselves* also *see* that that is the way to behave. When they are being led by the flesh, their *own* understanding will be the same. Conversely, when they themselves choose to walk by the pneuma, they are also being *led by* it. And similarly, were they themselves to try to fulfil the desires of the flesh, they would also be led by the flesh as an independent power.

We should conclude that there is no contrast whatever between the understanding of human behaviour that is implied in 'apocalypticism' and in 'paraenesis.' Rather, as so often, it is our own understanding of the categories that should be changed. The two ways of thinking come together by the fact that they both draw on the cognitive character of the entities that they introduce: worldly powers and human beings.

This analysis of Gal 5:16–18 is intended as a test case. If I am right that a solution to the problem we identified should go along the lines just suggested, including the point that what provides the solution is the realization that the whole

²⁹ Engberg-Pedersen, *Cosmology and Self*, 130.

issue is one of cognition, then we have acquired a premise of enormous power for answering our initial queries, both concerning 'self' and 'person' in Paul and also the superficially more restricted one of the best way of understanding Paul's account of *akrasia* in Romans 7, which will bring in the 'body.' The first conclusion to be drawn is this: the fact that Paul speaks of a battle of 'apocalyptic' powers over human beings does not in the least prevent him from also presupposing (in his 'paraenesis') that human beings *themselves* are fully responsible for their acts. To the extent that this already implies that human beings are 'selves,' and indeed 'persons,' to whom one can precisely appeal in one's paraenesis, we may also conclude that Paul's argument in Gal 5:16–18 presupposes that his addressees *are* 'selves' and 'persons,' that is, people who can understand what Paul is telling them about themselves and *apply* that understanding *to* and *on* themselves. Later we shall address the question of how this understanding of Paul's addressees fits his account of *akrasia* in Romans 7 and how it relates to the 'body.'

The Stoic Context for the Reading of Galatians 5:16–18

It is worth bringing out two specific points where the reading of Gal 5:16–18 just given reflects and makes use of ideas that are specifically Stoic. The first point concerns the claim that there is no opposition whatever between being 'driven from the outside' (namely, by the 'powers') and 'oneself acting from the inside' (namely, in response to paraenesis). This point just reflects the specifically Stoic understanding of the relationship between determinism (fate) and responsibility (freedom of the will), namely, that one does not exclude the other.³⁰ We need not repeat the doctrine here, but may only suggest that as is clear from its reappearance in modern, so-called 'compatibilist' understandings of human freedom, the doctrine is far from obsolete. It may even be correct. In any case, as I have argued extensively elsewhere, its force relies on the idea that the human response to the causally fated train of events is one of *understanding* (once again: cognition).³¹

The second point concerns the claim that Paul is presupposing an understanding of paraenesis that is itself intrinsically cognitive. Pauline paraenesis is not a matter of attempting to change people. The use of the 'imperative' in Gal 5:16 – "Walk by the pneuma" – is not intended to bring the addressees to a place that they have not yet reached. This is shown by the way Paul lets his argument reach its conclusion in 5:25: "If (that is, inasmuch as) we live by the pneuma, then *let us also* (in fact) walk by the pneuma." In Paul's paraenesis, the addressees are

³⁰ Classic analyses are these: Anthony A. Long, "Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action," in *Problems in Stoicism* (ed. A. A. Long; London: Athlone), 173–99; Suzanne Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). For my own attempt, see Engberg-Pedersen, *The Stoic Theory*, chapter 9.

³¹ See the reference in the previous note.

already supposed to be in the place where they are being addressed. Furthermore, Paul's paraenesis always takes the form of appealing to the addressees' *understanding* (e.g. that they do have life by the pneuma), thereby *reminding* them of what they already wish and know. It is when the Galatians *understand what* Paul is telling them (and reminding them of) in Gal 5:16–18 (and elsewhere) that they will actually put that knowledge of theirs into practice. Basically, Pauline paraenesis is an act of reminding those addressed of where and what they already know themselves to be.³² Now, that is exactly how paraenesis was understood by the Stoics when they developed their own understanding of it. They also presupposed that the addressees had already grasped what 'the good' is, only what was now needed was 'advice' on what the good concretely consisted in and 'exhortation' that they put this into practice.³³

In short, not only is the apparent contradiction between speaking of external powers and appealing to an individual freedom and responsibility solved when one realizes that it is all a matter of understanding and cognition: the paraenetic appeal itself is also distinctly directed at the understanding, at the addressees' grasp of their own identity (what they already are).

The point, then, is that if we are to solve the logical problem we have diagnosed in Paul, then we need to claim that Paul was presupposing this distinctly Stoic framework with its central focus on cognition. The supposed tension between an 'apocalyptic' understanding of the situation of human beings (namely, that they are under the influence of external powers) and a 'paraenetic' one (namely, that they are themselves able to decide for either of the two powers) is removed once one understands Paul in a distinctly Stoic light.

Galatians 5:13–6:10 as part of 5:1–6:18

Before moving on to Romans, we must consider a question that is directly relevant to Romans 5–8. What is the textual purpose of the 'paraenetic' passage, Gal 5:13–6:10, within its 'apocalyptic' setting of 5:1–12 and 6:11–18? There are two points to be made here. The first follows immediately from what has just been said about the logic of paraenesis. It is this: *as part of* Paul's look towards the future, 'apocalyptic' consummation he aims to remind his addressees of the implications for their present behaviour *of* that future consummation. *Since*

³² Thus the appropriate formula for the logic of Pauline 'paraenesis' is not 'Become what you (already) are' as reflecting an 'Already, but not yet.' Rather, it is 'Be (and show) what you are.'

³³ See for these claims Troels Engberg-Pedersen, "The Concept of Paraenesis," in *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context* (ed. J. Starr and T. Engberg-Pedersen; BZNW 125, 2004), 47–72. Let me add here the well-known point that Paul himself does not actually speak of 'paraenesis' (παραίνεῖν, παραίνεσις), but rather of 'encouragement' (παρακαλεῖν, παράκλησις). That was his own way of bringing out the logical point about his addressees' being 'already' there that he *shared* with the Stoics.

they – in a way – are *already* at the point towards which Paul is looking, they must also show it at present in their actual practice. Thus what is achieved by the ‘paraenetic’ passage within its ‘apocalyptic’ setting is that the future is in a way brought back into the present or – to put it the other way round – that the present is *aligned with* the future. Seen from the vantage point of the future, the present is described as if it *were* the future. Thus there is no breach between present and future. On the contrary, once again there is a substantial overlap. The present is understood as ‘the-future-in-the-present.’ As within Gal 5:16–18 itself ‘apocalypticism’ and ‘paraenesis’ should not be kept apart, so here in the wider context of Galatians 5–6 as a whole – and now in terms of time – the ‘apocalyptic’ and ‘paraenetic’ perspectives cannot be separated.

The second observation has to do with the role of the paraenetic passage (Gal 5:13–26) in relation to the Mosaic law and the letter to the Galatians as a whole. Here the point is this. Paul at first – for reasons that we need not go into – argues extensively that for the Galatians, who were Gentiles, the law of Moses is completely irrelevant. (Indeed, it would be the worst mistake for them to submit to it by letting themselves be circumcised, etc.) However, once that has been argued through, Paul also insists – in the paraenetic passage itself – that in the new situation (as defined by Christ and the pneuma), the Mosaic law *will in fact be fulfilled*. Thus if we were right in saying that in Gal 2:19–20 Paul articulated his ‘self of conversion’ in a context where the issue was that of the relation to the Mosaic law, we would also be right in saying that the law has not after all been forgotten when Paul comes to articulate his final view of what the life of the newly converted self will consist in. This fact supports the view that Paul’s articulation of the ‘self of conversion’ in the first place revolves – along the lines suggested by Foucault – around the issue of how to handle the authoritative figure of the Mosaic law.

Summary on Galatians

These remarks on Galatians 5:1–6:18 have been intended to show that the relationship between ‘apocalypticism’ (and its talk of the activity of external ‘powers’) and ‘paraenesis’ (and its presupposition of a genuine, internal responsibility for action on the part of human beings themselves) is far more intimate than it is normally taken. Both the way we have been able to solve the apparent contradiction between the ‘apocalyptic’ and ‘paraenetic’ perspectives and also the way we have understood the logic of paraenesis itself point in the direction of seeing Paul as presupposing a notion, not only of a rudimentary ‘self’ (as in animals and infants on the Stoic view), but also of a full-blown Stoic ‘person.’ In Paul this figure is to be understood as someone who by having access to cognition is able *self-reflectively to understand* a number of things about him- or herself: that he or she is in principle exposed to the ‘apocalyptic’ ‘powers’, but also that this situation

has been radically changed in “those who belong to Christ Jesus” and who have therefore “crucified the flesh together with its passions and desires” (5:24), and finally that *by seeing all that* they are able to respond to the Pauline paraenesis by putting their new identity into practice in the present. The key in all this is the Stoic notion of cognition as developed in their account of *oikeiōsis*, a notion which in Stoicism serves to define a human ‘person.’ Paul is presupposing the very same notion all through Galatians 5–6. Otherwise, the questions we have identified concerning 5:16–18 and 5:1–6:18 will have no answer.

From Galatians to Romans: Gal 5:16–18 (or 25) in Rom 7:14–8:13

Elsewhere, as noted, I have argued that Galatians 5–6 constitutes a kind of draft for Romans 5–8.³⁴ Here we may focus on the more specific question whether Gal 5:16–18 is connected with Romans 7–8 in any more precise way.

Why should anybody get the idea that such a connection existed? Nestle-Aland (27th ed.) does refer to Romans 7:15 and 23 in connection with Gal 5:17a. But the nature of the connection is unclear. Similarly, in his commentary, Hans Dieter Betz accepts that there is some form of “relationship between Gal 5: 17 and Rom 7: 15–24.” But he sees it as being fairly loose, reflecting his view that “the theory in v 17 [as a whole] is basically ‘pre-Pauline.’”³⁵ There is one feature of the Galatians passage, however, that points very strongly forward to Romans 7:14–25 and that is the statement in Gal 5:17d that the two powers (and flesh in particular, as I have suggested) work to prevent the Galatians from ‘doing what you wish.’ As we saw, this is almost the official title for the phenomenon of *akrasia* – and Rom 7:14–25 is precisely an extensive attempt at spelling out the terrifying *experience* of that phenomenon.³⁶ Thus one can actually quite well imagine that Gal 5:17 as

³⁴ See the article on “Galatians in Romans” referred to in n. 22 above.

³⁵ See Hans Dieter Betz, *Galatians: A Commentary on Paul’s Letter to the Churches in Galatia* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), 280. I personally find a far more rigorous argument in Gal 5:16–18 (and 13–26 as a whole) than Betz does. Where 5:17 states the general situation in the world of the two opposed powers fighting for supremacy over human beings, 5:18 states the opportunity that the Galatians themselves have – *against the background of* that general situation – to make the battle tip in the direction that will make the consequence stated in 5:16 obtain: that the desire of the flesh will be vanquished. Cf. also n. 39 below. For my own best account of the structure of Paul’s argument in Gal 5:13–26, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Stoicism in the Apostle Paul: A Philosophical Reading,” in *Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations* (ed. S.K. Strange and J. Zupko; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 52–75.

³⁶ For arguments for the reading of Romans 7 presupposed here, see the essay mentioned in n. 9 above. While I agree with Peter Oakes (review of Emma Wasserman, *The Death of the Soul*; *JSNT* 32, no. 5 [2010]: 88–9) that Wasserman’s book “must be the most important work on Rom. 7 to appear in recent years,” I cannot share her combined view that the passage is exclusively about Gentiles and that its theme is extreme immorality. ‘Not doing what one wishes’ is the

a whole, and 5:17d in particular, functioned as the germ that would later develop into Rom 7:14–25 as a whole.³⁷

In that case, it is interesting to note the differences between the two passages. One is particularly noteworthy. Whereas it appears from Gal 5:17 alone that the two powers that are engaged in an apparently inconclusive combat are the flesh and the pneuma, in the Romans passage that is not at all the case. Here the two powers are those of the flesh and *reason* (νοῦς, see Rom 7:23 and 25). When the pneuma is introduced in Romans (8:1–13), it is as the power that does vanquish the flesh. This difference is certainly a major one. However, the Galatians passage also has the idea that the pneuma does vanquish the flesh, as this point is spelled out in 5:18–23 (and in fact indicated already in 5:16). Moreover, in spelling this out Paul also connects the Mosaic law with the flesh (see Gal 5:18–19) as constituting the one side that is then vanquished by the pneuma on the other side – just as he does in the Romans passage, where the combination of the law and flesh takes centre stage in 7:14–25 only to be followed by the takeover of the pneuma from 8:1 onwards.

Read in this way, it seems that Gal 5:16–25 contains *all the seminal ideas* for Rom 7:14–8:13. Only, in the Romans passage Paul has separated out more clearly the (pre-‘Christian’) situation that involves the law (7:14–25) from the (‘Christian’) situation where the law has been superseded by the pneuma (8:1–13). This he did by presenting in the Romans passage the phenomenon of *akrasia* – already hinted at (but no more) in Gal 5:17d – in its wholly official form in Greco-Roman philosophy as a battle between desire (ἐπιθυμία) and *reason* (νοῦς), moreover as a phenomenon that was distinctly characteristic of the phase *before* a person would receive the pneuma.³⁸ With the reception of the pneuma, by contrast and as celebrated in 8:1–13, the risk of *akrasia* as described in Rom 7:14–25 would finally

formula of *akrasia*, and the ‘I’ of Romans 7 must refer to a Jew who – as seen from Paul’s new, ‘Christian’ perspective – to his horror realizes his own inconclusive struggle to fulfil that best of regulations: the (Mosaic) “law of God” (7:22) that he – precisely as a Jew – does wish to fulfil. (For a third overall reading, see Robert Jewett, *Romans: A Commentary* [Hermeneia; Minneapolis, Fortress, 2007], ad loc. Jewett too denies that Paul is speaking of *akrasia*, see *Romans*, 463.)

³⁷ Compare Betz, *Galatians*, 280, on Gal 5:17 (my italics): “In Romans 7–8 we find an even more developed and more complex reworking of the elements which occur also in Galatians 5. This means that Gal 5: 17 is not *simply* an abbreviated and simplified form of what we have in Romans 7.” I agree, including with Betz’s point that “Gal 5: 17 applies to the Christian and Rom 7: 15–24 to the pre-Christian situation” (280). My proposal is, however, (a) that Gal 5:16–18 makes perfect sense in itself (within 5:13–26 as a whole) – and the passage does *not* imply an actual conflict in the Christian (compare nn. 35 and 39) – and (b) that one can nevertheless see Gal 5:17 as prefiguring Paul’s description in Rom 7:14–25 of the pre-Christian situation, which is evidently characterized by radical conflict. One crucial feature in the suggested development is the change from ‘pneuma’ to ‘reason’ that I go on to highlight in the text.

³⁸ Note that on this reading of the relationship between Gal 5:17 and Rom 7:14–25, the former passage is not directly addressing a case of (supposedly ‘Christian’) *akrasia*. Instead, the verse should be understood as stated in notes 35 and 39.

be eliminated. It is not least the implications of this latter clarification of the role of the *pneuma* for the notion of a person that we shall explore in what follows.³⁹

Meanwhile we may conclude that on the suggested understanding the whole of Gal 5:16–25 can be found in Rom 7:14–8:13 (which even goes back, via 7:7–13, to 7:5–6).

'Powers' and a 'Person' in Romans 7:14–25

I have insisted that in Rom 7:14–25 Paul gives his own version – which is clearly a Jewish coloured one – of the classic, Greco-Roman account of *akrasia*. The Jewish (and Christian) colouring comes out in the fact that whereas the 'bad' side that is the object of 'desire' (ἐπιθυμία – just as in the Greco-Roman conceptualization) is connected with 'flesh' and 'sin,' the 'good' side is connected with the Mosaic law. An additional Jewish feature is the fact that Paul ties the 'bad' side more distinctly to the body than was normal in Greco-Roman accounts of *akrasia*. The 'bad' side is described as being made up of the 'flesh' (7:18 and 25) and the 'limbs' (7:23). In addition, Paul speaks of the 'bad' side as if it were a distinctly 'apocalyptic' 'power' when he describes it as "sin that lives in me" (7:17 and 20). So, although Paul several times does employ the language of 'doing what one does not wish to do' (7:15, 16, 19, 20) that signals that his theme is in fact that of *akrasia*, is he not after all describing this experience in a 'non-Greco-Roman' way as a takeover by some 'apocalyptic', external 'power' that invades the body and brushes aside the possibility that the person him- or herself who is undergoing the experience might themselves do anything about it? Is not Paul's worldview here in fact so far from the official, Greco-Roman account of *akrasia* that he must be seen to belong to an entirely different sphere of thought?⁴⁰

No, for two reasons: First, this is one of the places where we can learn from our discussion of Gal 5:16–18. There we saw that there is absolutely no contrast in Paul between describing a given phenomenon in terms of a battle between 'apocalyptic' 'powers' and describing it in the usual moral psychological terms

³⁹ This difference between the two passages pinpoints the need for the understanding of Gal 5:17 suggested above in n. 35. For one might ask: is Paul actually in Gal 5:17 envisaging a *stalemate* between the flesh and the *pneuma*? In that case, he would differ quite strongly from the view of the Romans passage, where the 'problem' (of 7:14–25) is actually *overcome* by the *pneuma* (in 8:1–13). However, as already noted I read Gal 5:17 and the relationship of that verse with 5:18 as follows: *pneuma* and flesh are – as 'apocalyptic' powers and at a general level – engaged in a battle with one another; however, if (more concretely) the Galatians will let themselves be led by the *pneuma*, then they will in fact *neither* do any fleshly acts of the law (meaning: acts prohibited by the law) nor fulfil the desires of the flesh or anything of that kind. Understood in this way, the two verses do provide the kind of backing for the claim made in 5:16 that they seem intended to give.

⁴⁰ Against *this* suggestion, at least, Wasserman's alternative approach is a healthy antidote.

of Greco-Roman philosophy. Thus the fact that Paul does describe the 'bad' side in the Romans passage in 'apocalyptically' sounding terms does not in the least remove what he is saying from *also* being part of a Greco-Roman way of thinking.

Second, Paul's whole aim in Rom 7:14–25 is to work out the experience of *akrasia* in the person who experiences it as strongly as at all possible in such a way that it appears *insoluble* and that *no* solution is in view. That is the purpose of describing the experience in three waves (7:15–16, 7:17–20, 7:21–23) that indicate a growing recognition in the one who is experiencing his or her own sinfulness, a recognition that leads with increasingly overwhelming force to the exasperated cry of 7:24: "Wretched human being that I am! Who will save me from the body of this death?"⁴¹ Paul is virtually celebrating the almost schizophrenic character of the experience, which is precisely the sense that one is oneself (compare the constant use of the 1st person for the 'good' side) not in control – over *oneself* (compare the fact that the one experiencing his or her own sinfulness *realizes* that the 'bad' side is in fact a part of him- or herself: "sin that lives *in* me" and "*I* see another law in *my own* limbs . . .," 7:23). This schizophrenic character of the experience of *akrasia* is of course brought out most strongly when the 'bad' side is described as arising as the result of a complete takeover by an external 'power'.⁴² So far, then, there is no indication that Paul has in fact left behind a Greco-Roman conceptualization of the phenomenon he is describing.

Is there then a 'person' in Rom 7:14–25? As we have defined that concept by emphasizing the feature of self-reflectivity – of the person's being able to look at, describe and relate to him- or herself from a position 'above' the person itself – there most definitely is a 'person' in Rom 7:14–25. In fact, this whole passage is the strongest imaginable example of that kind of self-reflective description of oneself given 'from above.' Thus it is not at all surprising that Paul should end up summarizing his description in 7:25b as follows: "Consequently, *I myself* (αὐτὸς ἐγώ = *autos egô*) am enslaved to God's law with my mind (νοῦς), and to the law of sin with my flesh."⁴³ This description fits exactly the model we drew out of Gal 2:19–20 *if* one removes from that model the line that expresses the movement *from* I¹ to I². For this movement has precisely *not* been undertaken by the person Paul describes here in Romans. Thus there are plenty of reasons for finding a full-blown concept of a 'person' in Rom 7:14–25.

⁴¹ For an argument for dividing up 7:15–23 in this way, see the detailed analysis in Troels Engberg-Pedersen, "Reception," 46–53. The disagreement among scholars on this point is somewhat disconcerting. Jan Lambrecht, "The Line of Thought in Romans 7,15–20," *Biblica* 85: no. 3 (2004): 393–8, argues convincingly for the view adopted here.

⁴² Please remember, however, that the idea of such a takeover does *not* rule out the idea of the person's own responsibility for his or her acts.

⁴³ It is very odd that NRSV appears not even to translate the αὐτὸς ἐγώ: "So then, with my mind I am a slave to the law of God, but with my flesh I am a slave to the law of sin."

Platonism or Stoicism in Romans 7:14–25?

However, what is not at all clear so far is whether this conclusion should be backed up by finding a basically Platonic (or Aristotelian) philosophical anthropology in this passage or rather a Stoic one. Both would fit the notion of the ‘person’ that we have articulated since both work with reason (νοῦς) as a capacity for second-order reflection on the person him- or herself. Yet, in Plato (and Aristotle) the philosophical anthropology operates dualistically with two independent sources of action: reason and desire, whereas in Stoicism there is only one such source: reason. In either case, however, there is plenty of room for operating with a ‘person’ as defined by the ability to engage in rational self-reflection.

However, is it in fact not quite obvious that at least Paul’s account of *akrasia* itself must be indebted to the Platonic-Aristotelian conceptuality and not to the Stoic one? For that account is precisely focused on bringing out the radical and unbridgeable contrast *between* reason *and* desire: that reason is *unable* to control desire. No. This is one place where readers of Paul need to gain a better understanding of Stoicism. The Stoics discussed what is in fact the phenomenon of *akrasia* in connection with their analysis of ‘passions’ (πάθη = *pathê*).⁴⁴ All Stoic passions were understood to be cases of *akrasia*, in which the proper appreciation of the given situation ran out of control. Moreover, the Stoics sometimes described the phenomenon as if the better judgement was actually ‘overcome’ by the passionate impulse.⁴⁵ And they might even identify the weak and false belief by the term ‘desire’ and the strong and correct one by the term ‘reason.’⁴⁶ Thus the Stoics could very well describe the experience of having a passion (and

⁴⁴ For my own account of the Stoic analysis of ‘passions,’ see Engberg-Pedersen, *The Stoic Theory*, 181–200. Other accounts include Tad Brennan, “The Old Stoic Theory of Emotions,” in *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy* (ed. J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen, The New Synthese Historical Library 46, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998), 21–70, and Margaret R. Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

⁴⁵ Compare the official account of passion given by Stobaeus: “They [the Stoics] say that passion is impulse which is excessive and disobedient to the dictates of reason; ... ‘Irrational’ and ‘contrary to nature’ are not used in their ordinary senses: ‘irrational’ is equivalent to ‘disobedient to reason’. For every passion is *overpowering*, since people in states of passion frequently see [NB: the ‘akratic’ element!] that it is not suitable to do this but are *carried away* by the intensity, as though by a disobedient horse, and are induced to do it ... The sense of ‘contrary to nature’ ... is of something that happens contrary to the right and natural reason. Everyone in states of passion turns aside from reason ... [W]hen people are in states of passion, even if they realize [once more the ‘akratic’ element] or are taught to realize that one should not feel distress or fear or have their soul, quite generally, in states of passion, they still do not give these up, but are brought by them to a position of being controlled by their tyranny.” Stobaeus 2.88,8–90,6 quoted from Anthony A. Long and David N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 1:65a.

⁴⁶ In fact, the Stoics distinguished between four basic types of ‘passion,’ of which ‘desire’ was a positive impulse towards something in the future reflecting a (false) belief that it is ‘good,’ ‘pleasure’ a positive impulse towards something present reflecting the same false belief, ‘fear’ a negative impulse away from something supposed to happen in the future in the belief that it is

hence of *akrasia*) in the way that Paul has done – and all others who speak of a battle between reason and desire. Where they differed from the Platonists was in their *analysis* of such a battle. Here they would insist that it was one and the same type of ‘psychic power’ that was involved all through: beliefs, that is, cognition.

Are there any indications, then, in Rom 7:14–25 that Paul operated with or presupposed either of the two possible ways of accounting for the phenomenon of *akrasia*, the one in preference to the other? The important answer is: No. The fact itself that Paul articulates *akrasia* in terms of a battle between reason and desire is no indication – as we have just seen – that he was thinking in Platonic terms. But neither is there any indication that Paul was thinking of the phenomenon he is describing in specifically Stoic terms.⁴⁷ In the passage itself, that is. For this is where the flip side of the coin – that is, Paul’s description in 8:1–13 of those people who have altogether left behind the risk of *akrasia* – becomes of crucial importance.

Romans 8:1–13 or Cognition as the Solution to the Risk of akrasia

Romans 8:1–13 describes the solution to the problem of the risk of *akrasia* that Paul has spelled out with such force in 7:14–25. But it does much more.

The solution is brought about by the reception of the *pneuma* in “those who are in Christ Jesus” (8:1). What is achieved in this way is that the (Mosaic) law is now finally being done (8:3–4).⁴⁸ The constant risk of *akrasia* is done away with. By coming to possess the *pneuma*, those who are in Christ Jesus have been liberated from “the (Mosaic) law of (= that generates) sin and death” (8:2) so as now at long last to become able to fulfil the requirements of the law (8:4).

That is the main point. Two subsidiary points fit with what we have already found in Galatians. The first is that once Paul has done away with the Mosaic law, he immediately lets it in again by the back door. This fact supports the claim that it is precisely in connection with the question of how to handle the authority of the Mosaic law that Paul articulates the notion of a ‘person,’ as we have already seen in relation to 7:14–25 and shall see further.

The second subsidiary point is that Paul’s description in 8:1–11 of what has already happened to the Romans serves as a foil to his *paraenesis* in 8:12–13 to

‘bad,’ and ‘pain’ a negative impulse directed away from something present based on the same false belief. Compare Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 1:65B and E.

⁴⁷ This point is highly relevant to Wasserman’s Platonizing reading. The point is that the character of the surface account does *not* determine which *analysis* of the phenomenon is presupposed. Thus if one grants that Paul is in fact describing the phenomenon of *akrasia*, all the Platonizing material that Wasserman is able to provide to illuminate Paul does not determine whether he is presupposing one *analysis* of the phenomenon or the other.

⁴⁸ For this claim cf. Jewett, *Romans*, 485, together with his earlier forthright statement: “Honesty about the dilemmas of current Christian ethics should not be allowed to override the evidence in Paul’s own letters of an expectation of ethical transformation” (466).

the effect that his addressees should by now put what *has* happened to them into concrete practice.⁴⁹ To the extent that we may see reception of the pneuma as an 'apocalyptic' phenomenon – and this would be entirely appropriate in the light of 8:11, where Paul spells out the role of the same pneuma in the resurrection event that lies in the future – we therefore also find the same intimate relationship in Rom 8:1–13 of 'apocalypticism' and 'paraenesis' that we found in Galatians 5–6.

The latter fact is of immense importance since it allows us to answer the – for our purposes – central question of how Paul understood the role of the pneuma in bringing about the solution to the problem described in 7:14–25. There are two sides to the answer. First, it seems quite clear – and I have argued elsewhere extensively for the point⁵⁰ – that Paul thought of the pneuma as a material force or power that has descended from God and is now present in the bodies of believers. This comes out with much force from his various descriptions in 8:9–11 of the behaviour of the pneuma in relation to the believers' bodies both in the present and in the future. So, should we see the solution to the problem of *akrasia* as having been brought about in a mechanical way (from the perspective of believers) by an invasion of an external power (the pneuma), a complete takeover of believers' bodies?

Definitely, yes. However, and this is the second point, this material takeover also had a cognitive side to it. It was both a matter of a material takeover *and* a cognitive event. Paul himself makes the cognitive character of the 'powers' quite clear in 8:5–8, where he speaks of the *intentions* (φρονεῖν, φρόνημα = *phronein*, *phronêma*) both of "those who are in accordance with the flesh" (8:5) and the flesh itself (8:6) – and correspondingly also of "those who are in accordance with the pneuma" and the pneuma itself. And it is of course the cognitive character, in particular, of the problem-solving event that also explains why Paul may appeal directly in his paraenesis to what has happened to his addressees in that event. Paraenesis is necessarily a cognitive phenomenon. For Paul to be able to appeal in his paraenesis to what has happened to his addressees, that event must *also* be (if only partly) a cognitive one.

This is all in complete agreement with what we found in connection with Galatians 5–6. Only, the point perhaps comes out even more clearly in Rom 8:1–13. What we see here is that Paul presupposes an understanding of the pneuma (and in fact also of the flesh) that is closely similar to the Stoic one in that it has a 'double aspect'. The pneuma is both a material phenomenon (as it definitely is in Stoicism) and also a cognitive one (as it equally definitely is there).⁵¹ And so, the

⁴⁹ I have argued extensively for finding this connection between 8:1–11 and 8:12–13 in Troels Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul and the Stoics* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark/Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2000), 187, 223–5 and 247–53 (with endnotes).

⁵⁰ This is one main claim in Engberg-Pedersen, *Cosmology and Self*. See also Troels Engberg-Pedersen, "The Material Spirit: Cosmology and Ethics in Paul," *NTS* 55 (2009): 179–97.

⁵¹ Julia Annas expresses very well the presence of a 'double aspect' theory in Stoicism: "It is central to the Stoic analysis that when I perceive an object, one and the same item, the appearance, is both a physical alteration of my soul-*pneuma* and an item realizing propositional

solution to the problem of *akrasia* for the Jew imagined by Paul came about not *just* by the invasion of God's pneuma, but *also* by the change of understanding brought about by that event. In other words, the problem of *akrasia* was (also) solved by a change in cognition, in fact, as we shall see, by a conversion.

Stoicism behind Romans 7:14–25

Then we may answer the question we left hanging: does Paul's description of the experience of *akrasia* in 7:14–25 reflect an underlying Platonic or Stoic philosophical anthropology?

The necessary answer is this: a Stoic one. It has to be like that. For Paul's picture of the change from the situation described in 7:14–25 to the one described in 8:1–13 is that this *change* has been brought about *by a sudden event*, something brought about in a direct intervention by God. (Which event? The Christ event itself *or* the event of having been told – with the apostle as mediator – of that event *or* the event of having received the pneuma.) But a *sudden* change of this kind can *only* come about according to the Stoic theory, not the Platonic one. The reason is precisely that the former is focused on cognition: once one *sees* the world in a new way, one changes. This is why only the Stoic theory is adequate for explaining the idea of conversion, which *as an idea* precisely refers to a sudden event. (It is an entirely different matter what actually happens when a person 'converts.') Here the Platonists had nothing to offer. In Plato (and quite explicitly in Aristotle), a change of the relevant kind is a matter of *habituation*.⁵² It therefore requires time. One can understand why: the desiderative 'part of soul,' which is not directly amenable to reasoning, needs to be re-shaped little by little by being repeatedly exposed to those influences that may gradually move it from one form to another. That is why 'ethics' in Aristotle (τὰ ἠθικά, 'character matters') are tied to the phenomenon of habituation (ἔθος = *ethos*): from ἔθος to ἦθος ('character').

But this is very far from Paul's picture in our passage. Here something has happened to Paul's addressees (and himself), and this event is understood to have changed them instantaneously. (At least, there is no hint whatever that they should have been 'habituated' or *educated* into becoming believers.) Only the Stoic theory will deliver that picture.

content, which can be assented to and produces a true or false belief. There have to be items *with both these aspects*." Cf. Julia Anna, *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), 78 (my italics of the last four words).

⁵² This is spelled out by Aristotle in his account at the beginning of *Nicomachean Ethics* Book 2 (1103a14–b25) of the way in which a 'moral virtue' comes into being: by habituation; and also in his account at the end of *Nicomachean Ethics* Book 10 (1179b4–1180a24) of why there is a need for laws: namely, to habituate the young who have not been brought up well through the application of fear. It is important to realize how far this idea is from that of being 'struck' by some insight and then 'converting'.

*Christian Person, Christian Body: A Specifically
Stoic Concept of the Person in Paul*

Back to the 'person.' I said that there is a concept of the 'person' in Rom 7:14–25 no matter whether one posits Platonism or Stoicism beneath that text. Then why spend time on deciding that issue if what we are after is Paul's idea of a 'person'?

The reason is that if our argument thus far has been correct, both with regard to the implications of what Paul says in Galatians 5–6 and also with regard to Rom 7:14–8:13, then the fact that we may now ascribe to Paul a specifically Stoic understanding of the 'person' has wider implications for the question of what exactly a Pauline 'person' looked like – and here also one that includes a Pauline 'Christian' person as described in Rom 8:1–13, not just the not-yet-Christian person of 7:14–25.

Stoicism was a materialist, monistic philosophy. Platonism was immaterialist and dualistic. Taken in the abstract, this fact makes a huge difference with regard to the question of how to understand a human 'person'. To a Stoic, a human 'person' was first of all a body. It was obviously a body of a special kind, but everything that made the body specifically human – and indeed, a human 'person' – would in itself be a *bodily* (but of course *also* a cognitive) feature of the human body. To a Stoic, then, the 'person-making' feature was intimately connected with the body. Not so to a Platonist (or an Aristotelian). Here there was some part – and indeed, precisely the part that made the human being a 'person' – that 'came from the outside' (as Aristotle has it in *De Anima* Book 3 chapter 5): immaterial reason. And the inner relationship of this 'person-making' feature to the human body remains a mystery.

In relation to Paul and the discussion of 'Christian body, Christian self, Christian person' to which this essay contributes, it evidently makes a huge difference whether one understands Paul's notion of the human being (whether 'Christian' or not) along Stoic or Platonic lines. In the former case there is an unbroken continuity between the three entities of body, self and person; in the latter there is not. On a Stoic understanding, even if what constitutes a person is a feature of the human being that was also highlighted by Platonists – namely, the capacity for reasoning and self-reflection, a capacity that is also manifestly presupposed and appealed to by Paul – this feature was itself understood as a feature of the human body; it was not some entity of its own, independently of the body. The Stoic, and if I am right the Pauline, person was a bodily entity. The Platonic person was not, or at least only half-coincidentally: what makes a Platonic person a person is something beyond the human body.

This topic – the bodiliness of Stoic and Pauline thinking on the human being – cannot be pursued here in any detail. However, to clarify the position, we may point to the bodily character of both the 'unredeemed' person, according to Paul, and the 'redeemed' one.

As an example of the former, take the person described in Rom 7:14–25. This person has bodily desires that are connected to his ‘limbs,’ but he also has reason, through which he is enslaved to God’s law. How are we to understand his reason? Not in the manner one finds, for instance, in the Jewish Platonist philosopher Philo of Alexandria, where reason is distinctly understood as being separate from the body.⁵³ On the contrary, when Paul exclaims his “Wretched human being that I am! Who will save me from the body of this death?” his reasoning capacity (*nous*) forms part of the ‘human being’ (*anthrôpos*) which is also characterized as ‘the body (*sôma*) of this death.’ That is, the *nous* is *part of* the body. Moreover, it has to be like that. For the schizophrenic experience described in the passage is precisely that of the ‘I,’ which is tied to the *nous*, seeing desire being operative *within itself*, that is, within the body that it itself is. It is precisely this intimate connection between all the figures involved – the ‘I,’ desire, reason, the body – that makes the experience itself so schizophrenic. And the connection consists in the fact that they are *all* both cognitive *and* bodily phenomena. In comparison with this Stoically informed Pauline picture, the account one finds of similar phenomena in, for instance, Philo of Alexandria comes out as being far less extreme.

Then on the ‘redeemed’ person. Here it can be argued (and indeed has been extensively argued by myself) that Paul’s understanding of the ‘*resurrection body*’ as a ‘pneumatic *body*’ that has come about through a continuous transformation of the earlier, ‘psychic body’ points strongly in the direction of placing Paul on the Stoic rather than the Platonic side of the divide.⁵⁴ The point here lies in the idea (for which see 1 Cor 15:51–54, in particular) of a continuous transformation, which keeps the bodily character of the person intact, but transforms it into an altogether new kind of body. If we then bring the Pauline account of the future ‘*resurrection body*’ as described in 1 Corinthians 15 back into the present, then we immediately find ourselves in the midst of Rom 8:1–13 – where the 1 Corinthians 15 account is actually taken up directly in Rom 8:11 – and the picture given in that passage of the redeemed life in the present. That life is precisely a bodily one, where the Romans will put the activities of the (unredeemed!) body to death, but still live with a body that has been transformed by the (bodily) pneuma.

If we understand Paul along these lines, we should conclude that there is indeed a quite specific, Stoically informed notion of a human ‘person’ in Paul, both with regard to sinners and the saved. What defines a Pauline ‘person’ is the ability to engage in self-reflection by applying a cognitive and bodily based second-order capacity of reasoning upon the other cognitive and bodily features

⁵³ Cf. as a more or less random example *Quis Heres* 68: “Who then shall be the heir [sc. of divine things]? Not that way of thinking (*logismos*) which abides in the prison of the body of its own free will, but that which *released* from its fetters into liberty has *come forth outside* the prison walls, and if we may so say, *left behind* its own self.” (Colson, LCL)

⁵⁴ See Engberg-Pedersen, *Cosmology and Self*, chapter 1.

of the whole human being. This account will cover both the unredeemed 'person,' where the capacity itself is the universal human faculty of *nous*, and the redeemed 'person,' where the capacity is the special, Christian faculty of *pneuma*. But the general structure of the human 'person' is the same in both cases. In Paul, a human 'person' is a being who is self-reflectively capable of turning one's own gaze on one's own body in order to change it. In the unredeemed 'person' the gaze will not always be successful. In the redeemed 'person,' by contrast, it is able genuinely to transform the body.⁵⁵

Implications

It is time to go back to the first, most general problem given in three forms from which we began: whether there is at all any room for the notion of a 'self' in connection with Paul – as we have by now most emphatically come to believe.

I am convinced that we have been able to handle the objections from the side of those scholars who emphasize the 'apocalyptic' dimension of Paul's thought to the detriment of all others. There is no reason to repeat this here. The second objection from a modern anthropological angle that emphasized the differences between the ancient and Mediterranean worlds (far more collective and social) from the modern western world (far more individualistic) may be addressed together with the third objection that made a similar claim from the perspective of the history of philosophy.

A few quotations from the book by Christopher Gill may point to a solution. In three different places of the book (though within the same chapter) Gill makes the same move (my comments in sharp parentheses and underlining, Gill's italics):

The 'subject' signifies, minimally [good!], the (more or less) unified and continuing locus of psychological experience, that is, that which 'underlies', or is the 'subject' of, such experiences. But the term 'subject', in this sense, has been closely associated with consciousness or self-consciousness in post-Cartesian thought ... [/] In recent thought, the ideas of 'subject' and 'subjectivity' are often also linked with that of the 'first-personal' view. The first-personal view idea can be defined in relatively narrow terms [good!], for instance those of 'indexicality', meaning the awareness that 'I' am 'this person here now'. But the scope and importance of the first-personal viewpoint can also be conceived much more broadly. Thomas Nagel and Richard Wollheim, for instance, ... (333).

The use of *subjectivity* as a criterion of selfhood or personhood reflects the influence of Descartes's move of taking the 'I', conceived as a self-conscious, unitary subject, as fundamental to our understanding of reality. In post-Cartesian thought, the 'I' can be under-

⁵⁵ For the notion of a 'genuine' transformation of the body, see Engberg-Pedersen, *Cosmology and Self*, *passim*, and the following article in particular: Troels Engberg-Pedersen, "Complete and Incomplete Transformation in Paul – a Philosophical Reading of Paul on Body and Spirit," in *Metamorphoses: Resurrection, Body and Transformative Practices in Early Christianity* (ed. T.K. Seim and J. Økland; Ekstasis 1; Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2000), 123–46.

stood simply [good!] as the more or less unified centre of psychological experience, such as perception and memory, and of self-consciousness. But the 'I' can also be conceived as the centre of a uniquely 'first-personal' viewpoint. [/] The first-personal viewpoint can be defined narrowly [good!], for instance, in terms of 'indexicality', the awareness that 'I am *this* person *here now*'. But this viewpoint can also be defined more broadly, as one that shapes not only perception and memory but also one's whole psychological and ethical world-view (338).

The idea of *individuality* can be used in a relatively neutral way; the aim may simply [good!] be to distinguish the person considered on her own rather than as a member of a group. However, the idea of individuality becomes more significant [?] when it is coupled with a stronger claim, such as that the individual, rather than the group, plays the key role in grounding morality, and that, in this respect, she expresses most fully her selfhood or personhood (340).

My suggestion is this: Choose the *weaker* forms in all these quotations – and you have something that is both quite important and pretty close to the Stoic view of 'self' and 'subjectivity.' Gill, by contrast, basically chooses the stronger forms – and then says that there is *no* kind of subjectivity (etc.) in Stoicism that makes it differ from Plato and Aristotle.

What is at stake here is something that is directly relevant also to the objection from the modern, anthropological perspective. The point that is made by all these people is that we do not find anything like a modern, 'Sartrean' *individualism* – as an ethical and meta-ethical position – in the ancient world, where people did think more 'socially' in these respects. Here Gill and the other scholars are right on target. And it is of course important to be reminded of this fact. This, in other words, is something that should be retained from that view.

However, it is a rather different question whether 'the ancient world' did or did not have the notions in philosophical anthropology of a 'self' and a 'person.' This has little, if anything, to do with ethics, even though the specifically Stoic notions of a 'self' and a 'person' were in fact developed as part of a naturalistic argument for a specific ethical position. Rather, it might be argued that the two anthropological notions of the 'self' and the 'person' (as developed by the Stoics, who might so far as it goes be correct here) are valid *irrespective* of the ethical position one ends up adopting. Is the phenomenon about animals, infants and, indeed, adult human beings that Cicero identified by speaking of a *sensus sui* (that is, some indistinct form of 'self-awareness') not a fact that we might be prepared to ascribe universally, irrespective of time and culture? And is the further phenomenon about adult human beings that the Stoics described in their account of the capacity for second-order self-reflection, which seems implied by the notion of the 'person,' not similarly a fact that we might be prepared to ascribe universally?⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Note that I am particularly concerned here with the sharpened, Stoic understanding of the 'person' (cognitive and bodily) that I have developed as against the somewhat looser, Platonic understanding of the 'person.' In Stoicism, as we saw, the second-order aspect of self-reflection

By separating in this way between, on the one hand, the notions of 'self' and 'person' – as part of a philosophical anthropology – and, on the other hand, the ethical and culture specific views on collectivism and individualism, we may insist against all the scholars mentioned – but by adopting a specific form of Christopher Gill's weaker position – that the ancient world did have the notion of a 'self' and also of a human 'person' in the way we have explained, even in its sharpened Stoic form. But we may also agree with those scholars that nothing like a 'Sartrean' *ethical* position of 'individualism' was to be found in the ancient world.⁵⁷

To conclude, although Paul was not just a philosopher, there is plenty of material in his letters that enables us to ascribe to him philosophically quite distinctive views about the 'Christian body,' the 'Christian self' and the 'Christian person'. One may wonder where he got it from. But it is all there, waiting to be unearthed and articulated.

is clearer than in Platonism since the 'person' is here seen as reflecting cognitively upon the body and bodily acts of the reflecting 'person' him- or herself. There is in a quite literal sense a 'self-reflecting' turn here that is not to be found in the Platonic conception.

⁵⁷ Or perhaps even in the present Mediterranean world, though I doubt it.

Is Romans 7:7–13 about akrasia?

Stefan Krauter

It happens that a person who knows what is morally good and wants to do it nevertheless does what is bad. This phenomenon, dealt with by modern philosophers as “weakness of will,” was discussed in ancient philosophy under the title of “akrasia” (ἀκρασία). The various philosophical schools developed different models of explaining what was going on within an akratic person such that he or she behaved in this paradoxical way.¹

Early exegetes recognized that in Rom 7:14–24 such an akratic person speaks. They knew that Rom 7:15 and 7:19 resemble the famous saying of Medea *video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor* and discussed the similarities and differences.² In the wake of Rudolf Bultmann’s³ and Werner Georg Kümmel’s⁴ work on Rom 7, it became fashionable to deny any relation between Paul’s text and the ancient philosophical debates about akrasia. Rom 7, so most protestant German exegetes claimed, had nothing to do with “trivial psychological insights” but was rather a “theological” text dealing with “the sinner’s objective situation before God.”⁵ Current exegetical research has widely abandoned such superficial judgements and tries to work out in detail how Rom 7:14–24 relates to the various philosophical models of akrasia.⁶

¹ Cf. J. Müller, *Willensschwäche in Antike und Mittelalter: Eine Problemgeschichte von Sokrates bis Johannes Duns Scotus* (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 40; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2009).

² For the history of interpretation of Rom 7 cf. H. Lichtenberger, *Das Ich Adams und das Ich der Menschheit: Studien zum Menschenbild in Römer 7* (WUNT 164; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 15–105; U. Wilckens, *Der Brief an die Römer*, vol. 2: *Röm 6–11* (EKK VI/2; Zürich: Benziger/Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1980), 110–111; S. Krauter, “Römer 7 in der Auslegung des Pietismus,” *KuD* 52 (2006): 126–150.

³ R. Bultmann, “Das Problem der Ethik bei Paulus,” *ZNW* 23 (1924): 123–140 = idem, *Exegetica: Aufsätze zur Erforschung des Neuen Testaments* (ed. E. Dinkler; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1967), 36–54.

⁴ W. G. Kümmel, *Römer 7 und die Bekehrung des Paulus* (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1929) = idem, *Römer 7 und das Bild des Menschen im Neuen Testament: Zwei Studien* (TB 53; München: Kaiser, 1974), IX–160.

⁵ Cf. O. Hofius, “Der Mensch im Schatten Adams,” in idem, *Paulusstudien II* (WUNT 143; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 104–154, here: 147–149; W. Schmithals, *Der Römerbrief: Ein Kommentar* (Gütersloh: G. Mohn, 1988), 214.

⁶ Cf. R. von Bendemann, “Die kritische Diastase von Wissen, Wollen und Handeln: traditionsgeschichtliche Spurensuche eines hellenistischen Topos in Römer 7,” *ZNW* 95 (2004):

In the most recent monograph on Rom 7 *The Death of the Soul in Romans* 7 Emma Wasserman⁷ shows – in my opinion: convincingly – that the nearest parallels to Rom 7:14–24 can be found in platonic texts about moral psychology from the Hellenistic era.

However, she goes much further. She claims that the *whole* passage (Rom 7:7–24) is about akrasia. This interpretation should be uncontroversial insofar as it means that in the whole passage an akratic person *speaks*.⁸ There is no hint that the “I” speaking in 7:14–24 about its present condition should not be the same as the “I” telling in 7:7–13 an event that happened to it in the past. Wasserman, however, claims that this interpretation holds also true for the “I” that *acts* in 7:7–13. The “I” had already been in the state of akrasia when the event told in 7:7–13 happened.

Following Stanley Stowers,⁹ Wasserman thinks that this “I” should be identified as a Gentile who tries to live according to the norms of the Torah. The Torah does not help him to overcome his weakness of will and do the good. Instead of being a remedy, which it is for Jews, it makes his moral illness even worse and leads him into total distress and frustration.

In contrast to and in conversation with Wasserman’s reading of Rom 7:7–24, I want to propose in the following that Rom 7:7–13 does not deal with the effects of law on a person who *is* already in the state of akrasia, but rather with the problem of how law contributes to the process that a person *becomes* akratic. I want to show this, first, by analyzing the structure of the argument in Rom 7:7–24 and, secondly, by discussing the relation of Rom 7:7–13 to Gen 3. Finally, I will argue that Rom 7:7–13, understood in this way, fits very well into another ancient philosophical debate, namely that about paradoxical effects of prohibitions.

35–63; T. Engberg-Pedersen, “The Reception of Graeco-Roman Culture in the New Testament: The Case of Romans 7.7–25,” in *The New Testament as Reception* (ed. M. Müller and H. Tronier; JSNTSup 230; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002), 32–57.

⁷ E. Wasserman, *The Death of the Soul in Romans 7: Sin, Death, and the Law in Light of Hellenistic Moral Psychology* (WUNT 2/256; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008).

⁸ Some exegetes follow Bultmann and Kümmel and claim that the speaking “I” in Rom 7 should be identified as a person *after* conversion who looks back to his or her past. Only after conversion it is possible to understand one’s true condition under sin and law. Before conversion one is so immersed in sin that one does not even recognize that one is sinning. So, Rom 7 is about the sinner’s objective situation, not about his subjective feelings. The rhetorical structure of the text and its background in ancient debates about akrasia make this interpretation rather artificial and implausible. Cf. already A. Tholuck, *Auslegung des Briefes Pauli an die Römer nebst fortlaufenden Auszügen aus den exegetischen Schriften der Kirchenväter und Reformatoren* (Berlin: Dümmler, 1824), 230, who anticipates Bultmann’s and Kümmel’s position and criticizes it with decisive arguments.

⁹ S. Stowers, *A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), 258–284.

1. The Structure of the Argument in Rom 7:7–24

In his lucid analysis of the structure of Rom 7:7–24 Heikki Räisänen¹⁰ has shown that there are basically two ways of understanding the relation between this passage's two subsections 7:7–13 and 7:14–24.¹¹ Either the incident narrated in 7:7–11 (and commented on in 7:12–13) is the reason for the state of mind described in 7:14–24 or, vice versa, the state of mind described in 7:14–24 is the reason why the incident narrated in 7:7–11 (and commented on in 7:12–13) happened. Either the "I" wants to say "sin used the law to deceive me and therefore I have become akratic," or the sense of the passage is "since I am akratic sin was able to use the law to deceive me and make my situation even worse."

Although the γὰρ in 7:14 might seem to indicate the latter, the former is far more plausible: Verses 7–11 (together with 12–13) narrate an event that happened to the "I" in the past and comment on it, verses 14–23 relate to the present condition of the "I," and verse 24 looks out for the miserable future of the "I." This very clear temporal structure leads a reader's perception of the passage and gives the impression that the past event is the reason for the present state. He or she will do anything but give the γὰρ such a weight as to link it over the comment in 7:12–13 directly to the narrative in 7:7–11, turn round the temporal order, and perceive the state described in 7:14–24 as the reason for the incident narrated in 7:7–11.¹²

Wasserman agrees with this interpretation of the passage and points out that the appeal to the past, present, and future of the speaking person complies with the expectations of ancient readers for the rhetorical structure of a "speech in character" (prosopopoiia).¹³ She claims, nevertheless, that not only the speaking "I" but also the acting "I" is to be perceived as an akratic Gentile right from the beginning and that the incident narrated in 7:7–11, namely the encounter of the "I" with law, makes the situation of this "I" even worse by leading to "soul death."

This interpretation of the passage, however, faces serious difficulties. Romans 7:9–11 is structured around the central metaphor of life and death. Before the coming of the law "I" was alive and sin was dead. But when the law came sin sprang to life and "I" died. So, now "I" am dead and sin is alive. The "I" and sin change places and this exchange has something to do with the coming of the law.

Within this structure it is quite evident that ἐγὼ δὲ ἔζων χωρὶς νόμου ποτὲ cannot just mean in a neutral sense "I lived (i.e., existed) once apart from the

¹⁰ H. Räisänen, *Paul and the Law* (2d ed.; WUNT 29; Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1987), 142–43.

¹¹ Most exegetes divide the text into these two subsections. Strictly speaking, the story of the "I" comprises only 7:7–11. Romans 7:12–13 comment on this story and build a bridge to the following.

¹² A. Reichert, "Literarische Analyse von Römer 7,7–25a," in *The Letter to the Romans* (ed. U. Schnelle; BETL 226; Leuven: Peeters, 2009), 297–325, here: 300.

¹³ Wasserman, *The Death of the Soul*, 81.

law,” but is to be understood in an emphatically positive sense as “I was once alive apart from the law.” Wasserman recognizes this difficulty and attempts to overcome it by pointing to the figure of the so called “living dead,” known from numerous ancient texts about moral philosophy. This “living dead” *thinks* he is alive but then some event causes him to reevaluate his condition and he understands that in reality he is morally dead.¹⁴

Wasserman proposes that also Rom 7:9–11 should be interpreted in this way. That means the claim that “I was once alive apart from the law” is to be read as conveying the speaker’s erroneously positive conception of himself before his encounter with the law. The law causes him to understand his true, miserable condition but does not help to overcome it.¹⁵

However, this interpretation of the text is unconvincing. Wasserman herself concedes that “life and death metaphors function somewhat differently”¹⁶ in 7:9 and 7:10–11. In fact, they would not just “function somewhat differently,” but this interpretation would force one to think that “life” in one verse of the text meant something totally different from “life” in the next verse – and this without any textual marker that could point the reader to this shift in meaning. On the contrary, there is a clear textual marker that precludes this reading. 7:11 states explicitly that sin *deceived* me by the law. And how could causing one to know one’s true condition be a deceit?

So, the most plausible understanding of Rom 7:7–24 is that in 7:7–11 a past event is narrated when the “I” came from a positively valued condition into the present miserable state that is described in detail in 7:14–24.

2. The Relation between Rom 7:7–13 and the Story of Eve in Gen 3

This understanding of the basic structure of the argument in Rom 7:7–13 can be substantiated by drawing one’s attention to the relation between the story of the “I” and the story of Eve in Gen 3.

Wasserman dismisses the opinion – held by many exegetes – that Rom 7 relates to Gen 3.¹⁷ Drawing on the work of J. J. Collins¹⁸ and J. R. Levison,¹⁹ she argues that only a few texts stemming from Second Temple Judaism deal with Adam’s

¹⁴ Wasserman, *The Death of the Soul*, 97.

¹⁵ Wasserman, *The Death of the Soul*, 98.

¹⁶ Wasserman, *The Death of the Soul*, 98.

¹⁷ Wasserman, *The Death of the Soul*, 4–5 and 103–4. She does not even mention Lichtenberger, *Das Ich Adams*. Given that this is the second newest monograph on Rom 7 (published in the same series as Wasserman’s book!) this is rather odd.

¹⁸ J. J. Collins, “The Origins of Evil in Apocalyptic Literature and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in idem, *Seers, Sibyls, and Sages in Hellenistic-Roman Judaism* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 287–300.

¹⁹ J. R. Levison, *Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism: From Sirach to 2 Baruch* (JSPSup 1; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1988).

disobedience as the origin of human evil.²⁰ This is certainly right. Compared to Gen 6:1–4 the story of Adam and Eve in Gen 3 is not very prominent in ancient Jewish reflection on sin and evil. There is no dogma of “Adam’s fall” – let alone “original sin” – in ancient Judaism. Neither is there one in Paul.

Nevertheless, one simply cannot deny that Paul does use motifs from Gen 3 in different contexts for various argumentative aims.²¹ Therefore, although we must neither construct out of these different passages from Paul’s epistles a unified picture of his beliefs about the origin of sin, nor read some supposed “ancient Jewish Adam speculation” into Paul’s texts, we should be aware of possible allusions to Gen 3 in Rom 7 and carefully analyze their meaning.

The most explicit reference to Gen 3 in Rom 7 can be found in 7:11: “The sin deceived me.” This is almost a citation of Gen 3:13: “The snake deceived me.” “The sin deceived me through the commandment” (7:11) and “through the commandment the sin worked every kind of covetousness in me” (7:8)²² may point to the motif in Gen 3:1 that the snake cites God’s commandment – slightly but decisively altered – in order to lure Eve into eating the fruit. “Covetousness” or “desire” (ἐπιθυμία) in Rom 7:7–8 may allude to the “desirable” fruit in Gen 3:6, and both the citation of the tenth commandment “Thou shalt not covet” in Rom 7:7 and the commandment given to Adam and Eve might be understood in some way as the Torah *in nuce*.²³

All these motifs point clearly to Gen 3, or more exactly, to the story of Eve in Gen 3 – and not the story of Adam. Adam’s role, as can be seen in Rom 5:12–21, is that of a transgressor who does not obey God’s commandment. But Eve’s role is that of a victim who is brought into a state of misery and distress by a deceit which has something to do with a prohibition – as is the “I” in Rom 7.²⁴

So, should the “I” in Rom 7:7–11 be *identified* with Eve? I do not think so. Looking back from Rom 8:2 where “you” refers to every potential reader of Paul’s letter, the “I” in 7:14–24 is most plausibly understood as an “everybody”-figure. Every reader should – in Paul’s opinion – somehow agree that the state described in 7:14–24 was his or hers before hearing the good news of salvation in Jesus

²⁰ Wasserman, *The Death of the Soul*, 4.

²¹ Rom 5:12–21; 1 Cor 15:22, 45–49; 2 Cor 11:3.

²² I think that the parallelism between “the sin deceived me through the law” and “the sin killed me through it [scil. the law]” in 7:11 shows that διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς both in 7:8 and 7:11 should be taken with the finite verb and not with the *participium coniunctum* ἀφορμὴν λαβοῦσα. But, of course, both readings are possible, and the Peshitta on the one side and the Vulgate on the other side show that ancient readers could understand the text both ways.

²³ Lichtenberger, *Das Ich Adams*, 205–51; J. Dochhorn, “Röm 7,7 und das zehnte Gebot. Ein Beitrag zur Schriftauslegung und zur jüdischen Vorgeschichte des Paulus,” ZNW 100 (2009): 59–77.

²⁴ Cf. A. Busch, “The Figure of Eve in Romans 7:5–25,” *Biblical Interpretation* 12 (2004): 1–36; S. Krauter, “Eva in Röm 7,” ZNW 99 (2008): 1–17; idem, “Röm 7: Adam oder Eva?” ZNW 101 (2010): 145–147.

Christ. Now, if 7:7–11 were the individual story of Eve (and only Eve)²⁵ there would be a shift in meaning between the narrative in 7:7–11 and the description in 7:14–24 which is almost impossible to understand. Therefore, the most plausible interpretation of the story of the “I” in 7:7–11 is that it is also in some sense the story of everybody, i. e., every potential reader of Paul’s letter should identify himself or herself with this “I.”²⁶ Eve’s story in Gen 3 is the model of how, and also to some extent the reason why,²⁷ “I” came from a state of being alive to a state of moral death when “I” encountered the law.

Against the opinion that Rom 7:7–11 alludes in this way to Gen 3, many exegetes raise the objection that this does not agree with what is said about Adam in Rom 5:12–21. In Rom 5, Paul distinguishes between Adam’s transgression of a commandment that brought the sin into existence, the time when humans sinned, but not in the form of breaking a law, and the coming of the Mosaic law which made sin again a transgression. By contrast, in Rom 7 the sin is already there and uses the opportunity of the coming of the law to incite desire.²⁸

This argument overlooks that Rom 5 and Rom 7 have very different rhetorical contexts. In Rom 5 Paul deals with “salvation history.” He wants to show that the Mosaic law “came between” Adam and Christ. In Rom 7 Paul’s issue is the role of the law in respect to sin in “my” biography. So, we might expect some tension – the story of the “I” in Rom 7 does not exactly fit into the “salvation historical” scheme of Rom 5 – but certainly not radical inconsistency.

So, Rom 7:7–11 alludes to the story of Eve in Gen 3, which substantiates the interpretation that it tells the story of an “I” which comes from a positive state into a state of misery and distress – not so much by his own fault but as the result of a deceit. This deceit has something to do with “my” encounter with the/a law, or more exactly with a prohibition. “If the law had not said ‘Thou shalt not covet’ I would not know covetousness.”²⁹ When we take the debates of ancient moral

²⁵ Cf. E. Käsemann’s famous statement, “Es gibt nichts in unsern Versen, was nicht auf Adam paßt, und alles paßt nur auf Adam.” *An die Römer* (HNT 8a; 4th ed.; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1980), 188.

²⁶ This does, of course, not mean that everybody has actually had such experiences. On the “artificiality” of the “I” in Rom 7 cf. K. Kuula, *The Law, the Covenant and God’s Plan*, vol. 2: *Paul’s Treatment of the Law and Israel in Romans* (Publications of the Finnish Exegetical Society 85; Helsinki and Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), 244–50.

²⁷ It is very difficult to decide whether Eve is primarily thought of as a model for sinning or as the origin of sin in this text; cf. on the one hand Lichtenberger, *Das Ich Adams*, 127–28; on the other hand Busch, “The Figure of Eve,” 16. Romans 5:12–21 is much clearer. There the stress is on Adam being the origin of sin although the aspect of Adam being a model for sinning is not totally absent; cf. M. Theobald, *Der Römerbrief* (EdF 294; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2000), 153–55.

²⁸ Engberg-Pedersen, “The Reception of Graeco-Roman Culture,” 42–43; L. A. Jervis, “The Commandment which is of Life’ (Romans 7.10): Sin’s Use of the Obedience of Faith,” *JSNT* 27 (2004): 193–216, here: 195–96.

²⁹ Commentaries disagree about whether Rom 7:7–8 should be understood as a conditional subjunctive (e.g., C.E.B. Cranfield, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to*

philosophy about paradoxical effects of prohibitions into consideration we can see more precisely what this “something” is.

3. Rom 7:7–13 and the Ancient Debate about Paradoxical Effects of Prohibitions

When discussing the ancient philosophical context of Rom 7:7–8, Wasserman adduces texts from the works of Plato,³⁰ Polybius³¹ und Josephus³² dealing with the fact that counsels, prohibitions, or punishments against bad people sometimes do not prevent them from doing immoral things but rather incite them to behave even worse.³³ Josephus, for example, claims that God’s punishment against Cain did not better him. Ancient authors often use medical metaphors to illustrate this phenomenon: When the surgeon cuts an ulcer it proliferates faster,³⁴ or with a picture taken from nature: a brook blocked with stones becomes a torrent.³⁵

I have however shown in the previous sections of this article that Rom 7:7–13 is not about the effect of prohibitions, let alone punishments, on persons who already are bad, i. e., suffer from akrasia. It is about the contribution of the law in the process of *becoming* akratic.

Many commentaries cite as parallels to Rom 7:7–8 passages from Greek or Roman authors that resemble the saying that “forbidden fruits taste sweet,” especially Ovid’s famous verse *nitimur in vetitum semper cupimusque negata*.³⁶ However, on a close look, these texts are rather different from Rom 7. Ovid tells us about a woman who is neither beautiful nor attractive – but her husband is jealous. It is his jealousy that makes the thought of seducing her thrilling.³⁷ Rom 7:7–8, however, does not say: I did something bad, because I knew it was forbidden and breaking the law seemed to me an exciting experience. The lure of forbidden fruits is not the point of Paul’s remarks.

In Greek and Roman texts we do find remarks about paradoxical effects of prohibitions – or one could also say: about overlegislation – that resemble, in my opinion, Paul’s argument in Rom 7:7–8 very closely.

the Romans [ICC; vol. 1; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1957], 348) or as past tense (e.g., R. Jewett, *Romans: A Commentary* [Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007], 446). There is no way of deciding this question and the actual difference between both understandings is not so big at all.

³⁰ Plato, *Politeia* 8,563d–e; 9,571b–d.

³¹ Polybius 1.81.

³² Josephus, *Antiquitates* 1.60.

³³ Wasserman, *The Death of the Soul*, 103–14.

³⁴ E.g., Polybius 1.81.

³⁵ E.g., Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 3.562–71.

³⁶ Ovid, *Amores* 3.4.17.

³⁷ Ovid, *Amores*, 2.19.1–4; 3.4.25–32.

In Diogenes Laertius we read an anecdote about the Athenian legislator Solon: “When he was asked why he did not frame a law against parricide he said that he did not think this would ever happen.”³⁸ A very similar story is told about Romulus by Plutarch: “It is typical for him that he did not fix a punishment against one who killed his parent but called every murder a parricide because he considered the latter horrible, the former impossible.”³⁹ The point in both texts is that killing a parent is so inconceivable that it is unnecessary to frame a law against parricide. No one will ever commit this crime, so there is no need for a prohibition or a punishment.

In his speech in favour of Sextus Roscius, who was accused of having killed his father, Cicero takes up this argument but adds an important aspect: “When he [scil. Solon] was asked why he did not fix a punishment against the one who killed his parent he answered that he did not think that anyone would ever do this. They think he acted wisely when he did not legislate against a crime that had not been committed before because it could seem that he rather recommended it than prohibited it.”⁴⁰ Legislating against a crime which will never be committed is not only unnecessary it is harmful: The prohibition itself is a sign that one *can* do such a horrible thing. Therefore, it can have the paradoxical effect that it incites people to do what it prohibits.

In two other speeches, Cicero uses the same argument in almost the same words *ne non tam prohibere videretur quam admonere* (“lest it seem that he has not so much forbidden as called attention to it”).⁴¹ These lawsuits, however, had nothing to do with parricide. So, it seems, this figure of thought could be used in different contexts.

Whereas in these two passages, Cicero alludes with approval to the tradition about Solon’s wise avoidance of overlegislation he shows his dissent in his speech for Sextus Roscius: “Much more wisely [scil. than Solon] our ancestors! Since they understood that nothing is so holy that it will not some time be violated by human audaciousness, they invented an extraordinary punishment against parricides.”⁴²

³⁸ Diogenes Laertius 1.59: ἐρωτηθεὶς διὰ τί κατὰ πατροκτόνου νόμον οὐκ ἔθηκε, διὰ τὸ ἀπελπίσαι, εἶπεν. Translations here and in the following are by the author.

³⁹ Plutarch, *Romulus* 22.4: ἴδιον δὲ τὸ μηδεμίαν δίκην κατὰ πατροκτόνων ὀρίσαντα πᾶσαν ἀνδροφονίαν πατροκτονίαν προσεῖπεῖν, ὥς τούτου μὲν ὄντος ἐναγοῦς, ἐκεῖνον δὲ ἀδυνάτου.

⁴⁰ Cicero, *Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino* 69: Is cum interrogaretur cur nullum supplicium constituisset in eum qui parentem necasset, respondit se id neminem facturum putasse. Sapienter fecisse dicitur, cum de eo nihil sanxerit quod antea commissum non erat, ne non tam prohibere quam admonere videretur. Cf. G. Landgraf, *Kommentar zu Ciceros Rede Pro Sex. Roscio Amerino*, (2d ed.; Leipzig: Teubner, 1914), 146.

⁴¹ Cicero, *De domo sua* 127: neque enim id fieri fas erat, neque quisquam fecerat, neque erat causa cur prohibendo non tam detertere videretur quam admonere. Cicero, *Pro M. Tullio* 4: quod enim usu non veniebat, de eo si quis legem aut iudicium constitueret, non tam prohibere videretur quam admonere.

⁴² Cicero, *Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino* 69: Quanto nostri maiores sapientius [scil. quam Solo]! Qui cum intellegerent nihil esse tam sanctum quod non aliquando violaret audacia, supplicium

Seneca, in his turn, disagrees with Cicero's critique against Solon and writes in his tractate *De clementia*: "Besides, you will see that what is often punished is often committed. Your father [scil. emperor Claudius] sewed more people in the sack within five years than are said to have been sewed in for centuries. Children dared much less to commit the most heinous deed when the crime was without law. For the best and most experienced men acted most prudently when they would rather pass over it as if it were an inconceivable crime and beyond audacity than show that it were possible by punishing it. So, parricides came up together with the law and the punishment showed them the crime."⁴³

Within the ancient debate about possible negative effects of prohibitions this passage comes perhaps closest to Paul's argument in Rom 7:7–8. A morally bad deed becomes conceivable by being prohibited and therefore possible – and from time to time it will become real. But Paul goes much further: It has already become real, not only in some people but in everyone without exception since the beginning of humanity.

If we want to assess Paul's position within the ancient discourse correctly we have to see that even Seneca is rather far from the *communis opinio*. This ancient common sense is perhaps best illustrated by a passage in Cicero's *De oratore*: "We see best that we shall strive for honour when true virtue and honourable work receive rewards and glory, but the vices and bad deeds of men are punished with fines, reprimands, chains, strokes, banishments, death. And we learn not through endless controversial debates but through the authority and the nod of the laws to keep our desires in check, to master our covetousness, to protect what is ours and to keep our minds eyes and hands from what belongs to others."⁴⁴ Human

in parricidas singulare excogitaverunt. This extraordinary punishment is sewing the parricide together with wild animals in a sack and drowning him in a river.

⁴³ Seneca, *De clementia* 1.23: Praeterea videbis ea saepe committi, quae saepe vindicantur. Pater tuus plures intra quinquennium culleo insuit, quam omnibus saeculis insutos accepimus. Multo minus audebant liberi nefas ultimum admittere, quamdiu sine lege crimen fuit. Summa enim prudentia altissimi viri et rerum naturae peritissimi maluerunt velut incredibile scelus et ultra audaciam positum praeterire quam, dum vindicant, ostendere posse fieri; itaque parricidae cum lege coeperunt, et illis facinus poena monstravit. Wasserman, *The Death of the Soul*, 112–113, does not note the relation to Cicero (on which cf. S. Braund, *Seneca, De Clementia*, Edited with Translation and Commentary [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009], 363–364; F.-R. Chaumartin, *Sénèque, De la clémence* [BAGB; Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2005], 103; M. Ducos, "La reflexion sur le droit penal dans l'oeuvre de Sénèque," *Helmantica* 44 [1993]: 443–456, here: 451–455) and therefore misinterprets the text.

⁴⁴ Cicero, *De oratore* 194: ex his enim et dignitatem maxime expetendam videmus, cum vera virtus atque honestus labor honoribus, praemiis, splendore decoratur, vitia autem hominum atque fraudes damnis, ignominiiis, vinclis, verberibus, exsiliis, morte multantur; et docemur non infinitis concertationumque plenis disputationibus, sed auctoritate nutque legum domitas habere libidines, coercere omnis cupiditates, nostra tueri, ab alienis mentis, oculos, manus abstinere.

desire needs a therapy.⁴⁵ The internal cure is moral philosophy, the external cure is law, and this one is more effective than that one.

As an example of an ancient Jewish text that even sharpens this opinion one can take 4 Maccabees, whose supposed original title is already programmatic: *περὶ αυτοκράτορος λογισμοῦ*. The author of this book thinks that the fact that the law prohibits desire is in itself a proof that human reason can exert total control about all passions and desires.⁴⁶

Paul, however, presupposes that salvation comes only through Jesus Christ. Therefore, the law simply *cannot* contribute to salvation. Although it is “holy and just and good” because it is given by God it *must* have a negative effect: It gives sin the opportunity to lead humans into the miserable state of *akrasia*. Certainly, from these premises Paul comes to a rather artificial story of an “I” in Rom 7:7–11. However, Paul does not just claim that the law has this effect, but he wants to argue for it. On the one hand, he refers to scripture. He alludes to the story of Eve in Gen 3 in which the snake uses God’s commandment to deceive Eve and to lure her into eating from the tree of knowledge. On the other hand, Paul takes up an argument from ancient moral philosophy:⁴⁷ Prohibitions can have paradoxical effects. They make people think about the prohibited crime and thereby they have the potential to make them commit the prohibited crime. Paul’s use of this argument may seem somewhat exaggerated but his opinion is certainly not more unrealistic than the opposite standpoint of e. g., 4 Maccabees.

⁴⁵ Cf. M. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

⁴⁶ 4 Macc 2.6; cf. P. von Gemünden, “Der Affekt der *ἐπιθυμία* und der *νόμος*: Affektkontrolle und soziale Identitätsbildung im 4. Makkabäerbuch mit einem Ausblick auf den Römerbrief,” in *Das Gesetz im frühen Judentum und im Neuen Testament*: (ed. C. Burchard, D. Sänger, M. Konradt; NTOA 57; Göttingen and Fribourg: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 55–74.

⁴⁷ This argument, in its turn, has its basis in everyday experience. Even modern people – notwithstanding their cultural or even mental differences to ancient people – can comprehend it.

IV. Canonical Gospels and Acts

Anthropologie im Markusevangelium

Martin Meiser

I. Einleitung

Die Themenstellung bedarf einer gewissen Rechtfertigung.¹ Markus schreibt keinen anthropologischen Traktat, und in antiker Christentumskritik war nicht das spezifisch Markinische der Anthropologie strittig und konnte es auch nicht sein.² Auch in moderner Forschung werden anthropologische Aussagen des Markusevangeliums nicht selten in eine Gesamtdarstellung der Anthropologie der Synoptiker bzw. des historischen Jesus integriert.³ Trotzdem ist es sinnvoll, das im ältesten Evangelium zumeist implizit Vorausgesetzte zu erheben: Spezifisch markinische theologische Motive wie das Jüngerunverständnis gerade angesichts des Leidens Jesu stehen mit dem in Wechselwirkung, wie man seine Anthropologie beschreiben kann.

Ein weiteres Bedenken ergibt sich aus der Zielsetzung dieses Bandes, das Neue Testament mit Texten aus der griechisch-römischen Umwelt zu vergleichen: Es ist durchaus fraglich, ob Markus beispielsweise bei Exorzismen auf griechisch-römischer Tradition aufbaut.⁴ Auch werden anthropologische Sachverhalte manchmal gerade zu den biblischen Speise- und Reinheitsgeboten erörtert. Trotzdem kann man fragen, wie seine ersten Hörer, wohl aus griechisch-römischem Kulturkreis stammend, seine Anthropologie wahrgenommen haben mögen.

¹ Ich danke Heike Omerzu herzlich für die ebenso gründliche wie wohlwollend-kritische Lektüre. Für verbleibende Unstimmigkeiten bin selbstverständlich ich verantwortlich.

² Kritik an der schriftstellerischen Leistung des Markus entzündete sich anhand anderer Themen, z. B. an der problematischen Zuweisung des Mischzitates Mk 1,2f. an Jesaja, so Porphyrius, *Frgm.* 9, A. von Harnack (S. 48 f.); mitgeteilt bei Hieronymus, *in Marc.*, CC SL 78, 453.

³ Vgl. U. Schnelle, *Anthropologie. Jesus – Paulus – Johannes* (BThSt 18), Neukirchen 1991, 13–43 (ihm geht es um den historischen Jesus); O. Wischmeyer, *Menschsein – Neues Testament*, in: C. Frevel/O. Wischmeyer, *Menschsein. Perspektiven des Alten und Neuen Testaments* (NEB Themen 11), Würzburg 2003, 61–117, hier 85–88 (ihr geht es um die Anthropologie der synoptischen Jesustradition).

⁴ G. S. Oegema, *Jesus' casting out of demons in the gospel of Mark against its Greco-Roman background*, in: *Die Dämonen. Die Dämonologie der israelitisch-jüdischen und frühchristlichen Literatur im Kontext ihrer Umwelt. Demons. The demonology of Israelite-Jewish and early Christian literature in context of their environment* (hg. v. H. Lichtenberger/A. Lange/K. F. D. Röhmel), Tübingen 2003, 505–518, hier 516.

Die Forschungsgeschichte zur Anthropologie zeigt ein Dreifaches: 1. Nach dem Bild des Menschen wird zunehmend nicht mehr nur hinsichtlich der (gestörten und zu heilenden) Gottesbeziehung des Menschen und dem von ihm geforderten Handeln, sondern auch hinsichtlich seiner psychologisch zu beschreibenden Selbstbeziehung und seiner Sozialbezüge gefragt. Damit verbindet sich 2., dass zugleich immer häufiger Theorien aus anderen Humanwissenschaften für die Darstellung fruchtbar gemacht werden. 3. wird auch nicht mehr in ungeschichtlicher Abstraktion nach zeit- und kulturunabhängigen Konstanten im Menschen gefragt, vielmehr werden historisch konkrete und gesellschaftlich bedingte anthropologische Entwürfe der Antike in ihrem umgebenden kulturellen Horizont gewürdigt.

Thea Vogt⁵ deutet Mk 4, 35–41 mit Hilfe der der kognitiven Emotionstheorie von R. S. Lazarus als Aufforderung zur Hoffnung, die Handlungskompetenz auch unter leidvollen Erfahrungen vermittelt⁶, Mk 5,25–34 mit Hilfe der Stigmatisierungstheorie E. Goffmans als Einladung zur Empathie gegenüber Stigmatisierten und Kranken sowie zur Neubewertung der Stellung der Frau in der Gemeinde⁷, Mk 10,17–31 mit Hilfe der von E. Erikson entwickelten Identitätskategorien und der Angsttypologie F. Riemanns als Aufforderung zum Loslassen innerhalb einer stabilisierenden Solidarität der Jüngergemeinschaft⁸, Mk 14,32–42 mit Hilfe aller drei psychologischer Modelle als Kontrastgeschichte: Während sich in Jesus durch das Gebet eine kognitiven Umstrukturierung vollzieht, die ihn sich gestärkt in das Leiden einwilligen lässt, ist das Verhalten der Jünger letztlich Realitätsflucht⁹. So will das Markusevangelium in einer Krisenzeit jüdisch-christliche Identität ermöglichen und Angstbereitschaft einüben.

Joachim Gnilka¹⁰ zufolge wird im Markusevangelium vor allem die physische Not des Menschen betont, die seine Existenz bestimmt, während demgegenüber die Rede von seiner Sündhaftigkeit eher zurücktritt. Es ist das Anliegen des Markus, „das Interesse seiner Leser auf dieses konkrete Elend (scil. der Bedrohung der menschlichen Existenz durch Krankheit und Not) hinzuweisen“¹¹. Eine mögliche textpragmatische Funktion ergibt sich, wenn man Gnilkas Hinweis auf den Tadel der Jünger in Mk 9,18 f. ernst nimmt, in der Weise, dass man aus der Vielzahl der bei Markus berichteten Exorzismen und Therapien die Notwendigkeit einer Ethik diakonischen Handelns in der Nachfolge Jesu ableitet.

⁵ Th. Vogt, *Angst und Identität im Markusevangelium. Ein textpsychologischer und sozialgeschichtlicher Beitrag* (NTOA 26), Freiburg (Schweiz)/Göttingen 1993.

⁶ A. a. O., 100.

⁷ A. a. O., 135–141.

⁸ A. a. O., 183.

⁹ A. a. O., 223.

¹⁰ J. Gnilka, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (HThK N.T.S. V), Freiburg/Basel/Wien 1994, 167–167.

¹¹ A. a. O., 165.

Nach Eckhart Reinmuth¹² enthält „der Weg des Menschensohnes [...] eine kritische anthropologische Komponente. Er lässt sichtbar werden, wie Menschen sich in Machtausübung (Mk 10,35–45), verweigerter Vergebung (2,1–12), Selbsterhaltung und verbrauchendem, einverleibendem Verstehen [...] definieren“¹³. Die Jesus-Christus-Geschichte hat unmittelbare anthropologische Relevanz¹⁴, indem das Humanum Jesu als „Kontrastentwurf zur Wirklichkeit der Menschen“¹⁵ zu stehen kommt. Das verkennen die Zebedaïden in Mk 10,35–45 gründlich. Dass die Jünger gerade bei der Erkenntnis der Notwendigkeit des Leidens Jesu scheitern, zwingt die Leser dazu, „sich mit ihrem (scil. der Jünger) Weg auseinanderzusetzen und den eigenen zu reflektieren“¹⁶. Dabei helfen einige Randfiguren, der Blinde, der Jesus folgt (10,52), die Frau, die Jesus salbt, weil sie um den Tod weiß (14,7 f.), Simon von Kyrene, der Jesus das Kreuz trägt (das Verbum ist dasselbe wie in 8,34!), oder Joseph von Arimathia, der – statt der Freunde und Verwandten – Jesus begräbt.

Udo Schnelle¹⁷ zufolge ist die „Praxis des Zusammenlebens von Christen jüdischer und griechisch-römischer Religiosität“¹⁸ in der markinischen Gemeinde anthropologisch darin begründet, dass nicht mehr die Ritualvorschriften der Thora, sondern die aus dem „Herzen“ kommenden Gedanken des Menschen das Kriterium der Gottesbeziehung sind. Die Verweise auf den „Glauben“ bei den Hilfesuchenden wie den Jüngern ermuntern die Gemeindeglieder, „den rettenden Glauben zu ergreifen und zu handeln“¹⁹, d. h. den Weg in die Nachfolge zu gehen, wohl wissend, dass dies ein Weg der Leidensnachfolge ist.

Die Arbeit von Carsten Jochum-Bortfeld²⁰ fügt sich in eine heute stärker zum Zuge kommende romkritische Gesamtinterpretation des Markusevangeliums ein. Gegen den realpolitischen wie den ideologischen Machtanspruch des Imperium Romanum setzt Markus dieser Interpretationslinie zufolge²¹ subversive

¹² E. Reinmuth, *Anthropologie im Neuen Testament*, Tübingen/Basel 2006.

¹³ A. a. O., 83.

¹⁴ Dass in der Reihenfolge Tiere – Mensch in Dan 7 ein Rückbezug zu Gen 1 vorliegen und auch der neutestamentliche Menschensohnbegriff „eine Anspielung auf die Erschaffung des Menschen und seine ursprüngliche Bestimmung enthalten“ (a. a. O., 73) soll, ist mir nicht evident geworden.

¹⁵ A. a. O., 78.

¹⁶ A. a. O., 90.

¹⁷ U. Schnelle, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, Göttingen 2007, 391–393.

¹⁸ A. a. O., 88.

¹⁹ A. a. O., 393.

²⁰ C. Jochum-Bortfeld, *Die Verachteten stehen auf: Widersprüche und Gegenentwürfe des Markusevangeliums zu den Menschbildern seiner Zeit* (BWANT 178), Stuttgart 2008.

²¹ Allerdings ist sie nicht die einzige. H. N. Roskam, *The Purpose of the Gospel of Mark in its Historical and Social Context* (NTS 114), Leiden 2004, deutet das Markus als apologetischen Text, der u. a. durch seine Darstellung des politisch ungefährlichen Jesus im Hinblick auf die zu erwartenden oder bereits eingetretenen Verfolgungen, bei denen die jüdischen Autoritäten die Christinnen und Christen den Römern ausliefern, Ermutigung und Mahnung zuteil werden lassen will, in diesen Verfolgungen sich zu bewähren.

Signale, so etwa im Begriff εὐαγγέλιον²², in der Zeichnung von Mk 10,42–45 wie von Mk 10,29f.²³ als Kontrastgesellschaft sowie in der unkonditionierten Zuwendung Jesu an den ὄχλος²⁴, in der Zuweisung des Gottessohntitels an den Gekreuzigten²⁵ wie allgemein in der Christologie²⁶, in der Charakterisierung der Dämonen²⁷, vor allem des Dämons „Legion“ (Mk 5,9)²⁸, und einiger menschlicher Akteure²⁹. Auch Wunder Jesu wie die Heilung eines Gelähmten³⁰ oder die Verfluchung des Feigenbaums³¹ können herrschaftskritisch gedeutet werden; selbst die urchristlichen Rituale Taufe und Abendmahl haben ihre subversive Spitze.³² So gilt das Markusevangelium dieser Auslegungsrichtung zufolge im Gegenüber zur Propaganda für die nicht durch Herkunft legitimierten Flavier manchen als „Anti-Evangelium“.³³ Ausgangspunkt für Jochum-Bortfelds Arbeit ist die Einsicht von Max Weber und Pierre Bourdieu, dass das Menschenbild

²² G. Theißen, Lokalkolorit und Zeitgeschichte in den Evangelien. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition (NTOA 8), Freiburg (Schweiz)/Göttingen ³1992, 270–284; M. Ebner, Evangelium contra Evangelium. Das Markusevangelium und der Aufstieg der Flavier, BN 16 (2003), 28–42; W. Carter, *The Roman Empire and the New Testament. An Essential Guide*, Nashville 2006, 17.

²³ W. Carter, *Roman Empire*, 52 (s. Anm. 22). Unter den Nachfolgern Jesu sollten natürliche wie geschaffene Ressourcen geteilt werden; sie sind nicht das Privateigentum eines einzelnen.

²⁴ V. Küster, Jesus und das Volk im Markusevangelium. Ein Beitrag zum interkulturellen Gespräch in der Exegese (BThSt 28), Neukirchen 1996, 93f.

²⁵ E. Reinmuth, *Anthropologie* (s. Anm. 12), 84f., zuvor schon M. Ebner, *Evangelium* (s. Anm. 22), 34f., der die Tatsache, dass in Mk 15,39 der bestimmte Artikel fehlt, als „ungeheuerer Aufwertung Jesu“ (35) zu würdigen weiß, die noch „in der Phase der schwankenden Anerkennung Vespasians als neuem ‚Sohn Gottes‘“ (a. a. O.) erfolgt.

²⁶ A. Winn, *The Purpose of Mark's Gospel. An Early Christian Response to Roman Imperial Propaganda* (WUNT II/245), Tübingen 2008.

²⁷ H. C. Waetjen, *A Reordering of Power. A Socio-Political Reading of Mark's Gospel*, Minneapolis 1989, xiii. Für Waetjen waren insgesamt eigene Erfahrungen mit Kolonialismus und Postkolonialismus in Kenia, Südafrika und Zimbabwe ausschlaggebend (xiv).

²⁸ W. Carter, *Roman Empire*, 17. Zu Mk 5,13 verweist er darauf, dass das Wappentier der an der Zerstörung Jerusalems beteiligten Legio X Fretensis eben das Schwein war. „The scene shows Jesus' power over Rome and the latter's destruction ... declares God's judgment on Rome's imperial order.“ (17f.).

²⁹ S. Lücking, *Mimesis der Verachteten. Eine Studie zur Erzählweise von Mk 14,1–11* (SBS 152), Stuttgart 1993; H. Kinukawa, *Frauen im Markusevangelium. Eine japanische Lektüre*, Luzern 1995.

³⁰ S. Schroer/T. Staubli, *Die Körpersymbolik der Bibel*, Gütersloh ²2005, 150.

³¹ W. Carter, *Roman Empire*, 50–51: Der Kontext von Mk 11,12–14 legt nahe, den Feigenbaum auf die städtische Elite Jerusalems mit ihrer Kontrolle über den Tempel zu deuten. Dass er zwar Blätter, aber keine Frucht trägt, symbolisiert nach Carter, dass Gottes Leben spendender Segen nicht mehr auf diesem System ruht, das einem Großteil der Bevölkerung so viel Elend bereitet hat.

³² C. Strecker, *Macht – Tod – Leben – Körper. Koordinaten einer Verortung der frühchristlichen Rituale Taufe und Abendmahl*, in: *Erkennen und Erleben. Beiträge zur psychologischen Erforschung des frühen Christentums* (hg. v. G. Theißen/P. von Gemünden), Gütersloh 2007, 133–153, mit eindrucksvoller Kontrastierung von Mk 6,30–44; 14,12–26 mit Mk 6,17–29.

³³ G. Theißen, *Evangelischreibung und Gemeindeleitung. Pragmatische Motive bei der Abfassung des Markusevangeliums*, in: *Antikes Judentum und Frühes Christentum*, FS H.

nicht überzeitlich feststeht, sich vielmehr gesellschaftlicher Konstruktion verdankt und insofern historisch bedingt ist. Ist das gängige Menschenbild griechisch-römischer Anthropologie dadurch charakterisiert, dass faktisch nur der männliche Angehörige der Oberschicht als vollwertiger Mensch gilt, so wird Jochum-Bortfeld zufolge im Markusevangelium gerade denen Subjektsein zugesprochen, die im griechisch-römischen Kulturbereich eher am unteren Ende der sozialen wie der materialen Skala standen: der Frau aus dem fremden Volk (7,24–30), dem blinden Bettler (10,46–52), der Witwe (Mk 12,41–44), der ‚öffentlichen Frau‘ (Mk 14,3–9).³⁴

Der vorstehende Überblick zeigt, dass die Themen „Glauben als Befreiung zum Handeln“ und „die christliche Gemeinde als Kontrastgesellschaft“ in einer Zeit als relevant empfunden werden, in der der einzelne, der nicht zur wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Elite westeuropäischer Gesellschaften zählt, leicht aus dem Blick gerät. Es ist zu begrüßen, dass mit der Betonung der gesellschaftskritischen Relevanz der Bibel implizit die Kirchen aufgerufen werden, das Christentum insgesamt in seiner gesellschaftskritischen Relevanz zur Geltung zu bringen. Der vorliegende Beitrag wird dies aufnehmen und zusätzlich auf die affirmativen Implikationen markinischer Anthropologie aufmerksam machen, die dem Menschen helfen, eine kritische Position überhaupt durchzuhalten.

II. Leiblichkeit und Personalität

Hinsichtlich der anthropologischen Terminologie setzt Markus, dessen religionsgeschichtliche Herkunft heute wieder umstritten ist³⁵, wohl gemeinchristliche Binnensprache voraus³⁶, die ihrerseits vornehmlich auf biblischer Terminologie

Stegemann (hg. v. B. Kollmann/W. Reinbold/A. Steudel, BZNW 97), Berlin/New York 1999, 389–414, hier 397.

³⁴ C. Jochum-Bortfeld (s. Anm. 20), Die Verachteten stehen auf, 172–195. S. Schroer/T. Staubli, Körpersymbolik (s. Anm. 30), 115, deuten Mk 7,32–35 ähnlich.

³⁵ Lange Zeit einflussreich war die Position von K. Niederwimmer, Johannes Markus und die Frage nach dem Verfasser des zweiten Evangeliums, ZNW 58 (1967), 172–188, hier 183 f., der für die heidenchristliche Herkunft des Evangelisten votiert hatte. Für judenchristliche Herkunft plädiert R. Pesch, Das Markusevangelium (HThK 2/1), Freiburg/Basel/Wien 1978, 12, u. a. mit dem bedenkenwerten Argument, dass in früher Zeit ein Heidenchrist kaum als die Jesustradition verantwortende Autorität in Frage kommt; vgl. ferner C. Focant, L'évangile selon Marc (Commentaire biblique: Nouveau Testament 2), Paris 2004, 33; A. Y. Collins, Mark (Hermeneia), Minneapolis 2007, 6; R. H. Stein, Mark (Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament), Grand Rapids 2008, 8 f.; J. Marcus, Mark 1–8, New York 2000, 17–24.

³⁶ Methodisch erarbeiten lässt sich die gemeinchristliche Binnensprache durch Erhebung der unkommentiert eingeführten theologischen, anthropologischen etc. Begrifflichkeit in mehreren zeitnahen literarkritisch voneinander unabhängigen Quellen. In anthropologischer Hinsicht betrifft dies die Begriffe καρδιά und ψυχή (s. u.).

beruht.³⁷ So gewiss Markus Einzeltraditionen aufnimmt, so sehr gilt doch auch, dass er sich wenig Mühe macht, die Terminologie für die Lesenden aus dem griechisch-römischen Kulturkreis verständlich zu machen.³⁸

Das Zentrum menschlichen Denkens, Fühlens und Wollens wird mit καρδιά bezeichnet³⁹, während νοῦς fehlt⁴⁰, πνεῦμα hingegen auch vom menschlichen Geist gebraucht werden kann.⁴¹ Die Verwendung von ψυχή, σάρξ und σῶμα richtet sich meist nach biblischen Vorgaben. Das Wort ψυχή steht meist für **שׁפּחַ** oder bezeichnet einfach das „Ich“⁴²; die Bedeutungsmöglichkeit „Seele“ wird für Mk 12,30 zugestanden⁴³ und für Mk 8,36f. kontrovers diskutiert⁴⁴, kann aber auch in Mk 14,34 anklingen: Autorenenorientiert mag auf Ps 41 [42],6.12 angespielt sein, für griechisch-römisch gebildete Leser späterer Zeit konnten eine Plutarchstelle assoziieren, dergemäß unsere Seele in der Gegenwart von Tyrannen oder von Menschen, die uns eine grausame Strafe zufügen wollen, schwer betrübt ist.⁴⁵ Von den vier Belegen für σάρξ sind drei biblisch (Mk 10,8

³⁷ Vgl. wiederum die Begriffe καρδιά und ψυχή (s. u.). Die Wendung πνεῦμα ἡγεμονικόν in Ps 50 (51),14 hat nicht sprachbildend gewirkt.

³⁸ G. Bornkamm, Das Doppelgebot der Liebe, in: Neutestamentliche Studien für Rudolf Bultmann zu seinem 70. Geburtstag (hg. v. W. Eltester, BZNW 21), Berlin 1957, 85–93, hier 88: Markus setzt die Tendenz der Septuaginta fort, die Perikope in einer lexikalisch dem griechischen Empfinden angenäherten Weise wiederzugeben. Ähnlich D. R. A. Hare, Mark (Westminster Bible Companion), Louisville, KY 1996, 159: Den Zusatz διάνοια hat Markus vielleicht mit Rücksicht auf seine griechischen Leser hinzugefügt, die nicht wussten, dass biblisch die καρδιά auch als Zentrum des Denkens und Wollens begriffen wird. Sachlich ist beides richtig, doch warum fällt Markus das erst am Ende seines Evangeliums bei seinem vorletzten Beleg für καρδιά ein? Mindestens in Mk 4,15 wäre ein entsprechender Hinweis für den Leser doch sinnvoll gewesen, zum Zweck der effizienten Belehrung über christliches Leben. Man wird daher für Mk 12,30 wohl eher auf vormk Tradition schließen dürfen.

³⁹ Charakteristisch ist, dass der Lasterkatalog Mk 7,21f. als aus dem Herzen kommend benennt, was der griechische Leser am ehesten auf das ἐπιθυμητικόν im Sinne Platons zurückführen würde. – Für einen analogen Gebrauch von καρδιά in Q vgl. Lk 6,45; 12,34.

⁴⁰ Immerhin verwendet Markus das Verbum νοέω dreimal (7,18; 8,17; 13,14).

⁴¹ Vom Geist in Jesus Mk 2,8; 8,12, vom Geist im Menschen Mk 14,38; dort ist nicht der göttliche Heilige Geist gemeint (so u. a. M. D. Hooker, The Gospel According to Saint Mark, Peabody MA 1991, 349), sondern der menschliche Geist (R. H. Stein, Mark [s. Anm. 35], 664), wie in Ps 76 (77),4.7.

⁴² Mk 3,4; 8,35; 10,45.

⁴³ R. H. Stein, Mark (s. Anm. 35), 561. Vgl. auch R. Feldmeier, Die Krisis des Gottessohnes (WUNT II 21), Tübingen 1987, 149f., mit Verweis auf Dtn 6,5 bzw. Mk 12,30: „Als Zentrum der Vitalität ist die ψυχή / **שׁפּחַ** auch der Ort der Gemütsbewegungen ... So bezeichnet **שׁפּחַ** dann vor allem die Personen in ihrer Innenseite und nähert sich der Bedeutung des deutschen „Seele“

⁴⁴ A. Y. Collins, Mark (s. Anm. 35), 409 übersetzt mit „soul“; J. Gniska, Das Evangelium nach Markus II (EKK 2/2), Zürich/Neukirchen 1986, 21, übersetzt in Mk 8,36f. mit „Leben“, Hare, Mark, 97 (s. Anm. 38), und R. H. Stein, Mark (s. Anm. 35), 406, übersetzen in Mk 8,36f. einheitlich mit „life“. – Ähnlich oszilliert der Begriff ψυχή semantisch in Q: Auch da steht er überwiegend für „Leben“, aber in Mt 10,28 par. Lk 12,22 spielt der Leib-Seele-Gegensatz mit hinein, ohne dass die Unsterblichkeit der Seele behauptet würde.

⁴⁵ Plutarch, mor. 1101 E: ἡ ψυχή ἡμῶν περιλυπός ... ἐστίν. L. Hartman, Mark for the Nations. A Text- and Reader-Oriented Commentary, Eugene 2010, 567, verweist darauf, das Narcissus

ist Schriftzitat) oder biblisch geprägt (zu Mk 13,20 vgl. Jer 12,12), während für die semantische Opposition σάρξ – πνεῦμα in Mk 14,38 Anklänge an Paulus⁴⁶ oder an Qumrantexte diskutiert werden.⁴⁷ Von den fünf Belegstellen für σῶμα (Mk 5,29; 14,8.22; 15,43.45) weist Mk 14,22 auf aram. ܐܢܝܐ = „Ich“. Als Teil des σῶμα wird in Mk 7,19 die κοιλία benannt, in dem Zusammenhang nämlich, dass die eigentliche Verunreinigung des Menschen nicht durch bestimmte Speisen erfolgt, sondern durch das, was aus seiner καρδιά kommt.⁴⁸ Der Verweis auf die σπλάγχνα als Quelle positiven Handelns (Mk 6,34; 9,22) begegnet in der Septuaginta gelegentlich als Motivation menschlichen (Prov 12,10) wie göttlichen (Weish 10,5) Handelns, erscheint aber auch griechisch-römischen Leserinnen und Leser plausibel.⁴⁹

Dass Krankheiten in der antiken Volksmedizin auf dämonischen Einfluss zurückgeführt werden konnten, ist bekannt⁵⁰; trotzdem ist formgeschichtlich wie hinsichtlich anthropologischer Kategorien zwischen Krankheit und Besessenheit zu unterscheiden: Krankheit ist Verlust der Funktionsfähigkeit des Leibes bei bleibender Exzentrizität i. S. H. Plessners, d. h. bei bleibender Fähigkeit des Menschen zur Selbstreflexion⁵¹; Besessenheit ist (mindestens für die Dauer eines Besessenheitsanfalls) Verlust dieser Exzentrizität – eine „heterodynamische Affektkontrolle“⁵² liegt vor, d. h. eine Beherrschung der Affekte durch eine von der Person des Menschen verschiedene Macht. Ein an magischen Praktiken

laut der Aussage des Lucillus (1. Jhdt. n. Chr.; Anthologia Graeca XI 76 sich selbst bis zum Tode gehasst habe).

⁴⁶ W. Schmithals, Das Evangelium nach Markus, Bd. 2, Kapitel 9–16,18 (ÖTK 2/2) Gütersloh/Würzburg 1979, 639; D. Lührmann, Das Markusevangelium (HNT 3) Tübingen 1987, 244.

⁴⁷ R. Pesch, Das Markusevangelium, II. Teil, Kommentar zu Kap. 8,27–16,20 (HThK 2/2), Freiburg/Basel/Wien 1991, 393. Hartman, Mark (s. Anm. 45), 568, weist auf das für griechische Ohren Befremdliche hin.

⁴⁸ Wie sehr wir uns hinsichtlich der anthropologischen Terminologie auf dem Feld unhinterfragter Voraussetzungen für alle drei Synoptiker bewegen, zeigt ein Vergleich mit Lukas, der ja doch deutlicher den Anspruch erhebt, sich seinen griechischen christlichen Leserinnen und Lesern als gebildeter Autor (und damit das Christentum als eine Sache auch für die Gebildeten) zu präsentieren: Bei ihm steht νοῦς nur in Lk 24,45, und auch er macht sich wenig Mühe, die anthropologische Terminologie an das von ihm avisierte Milieu anzugleichen, wie der Gebrauch von καρδιά in Lk 16,15; Apg 16,14 und die Verwendung von πνεῦμα für den menschlichen Geist in Apg 17,16; 19,21 zeigt. Der Biblizismus τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ in der Einleitung der Areopagszene (!) spricht für sich.

⁴⁹ Vgl. Theocrit, Id. 7,99; Dionys. Hal. 11,35,4.

⁵⁰ Vgl. O. Böcher, Dämonenfurcht und Dämonenabwehr. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte der christlichen Taufe (BWANT 10), Stuttgart 1970, passim.

⁵¹ H. Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch, Berlin 1975, 291 f.; vgl. U. Jäger, Plessner, Körper und Geschlecht. Exzentrische Positionalität im Kontext konstruktivistischer Ansätze, in: Philosophische Anthropologie im 21. Jahrhundert (hg. v. H.-P. Krüger/G. Lindemann), Berlin 2006, 215–234, hier 228.

⁵² P. von Gemünden, Affekte und Affektkontrolle im antiken Judentum und Urchristentum, in: Erkennen und Erleben. Beiträge zur psychologischen Erforschung des frühen Christentums (hg. v. G. Theißen/P. von Gemünden), Gütersloh 2007, 249–269, hier 250.

Interessierter kann für sich selbst das magische Ritual vollziehen⁵³; der oder die Kranke kann für sich selbst den Kontakt zu dem Heiler herzustellen suchen (Mk 1,40; 5,25; 10,47). Dem von einem Dämon Befallenen ist dies – mindestens für die Zeit des akuten Befalls⁵⁴ – nicht mehr möglich⁵⁵. Der Exorzismus wird daher entweder durch die Begegnung des Dämonen mit dem Exorzisten und die Gegenwehr des Dämons veranlasst⁵⁶ oder durch eine Gesandtschaft⁵⁷ oder aber durch das Aufspüren des bisher unerkannt gebliebenen Dämons durch den Exorzisten.⁵⁸

Das Markusevangelium ist jedoch in zweierlei Hinsicht von Texten aus der griechisch-römischen Umwelt unterschieden. Zum einen kennt es keinen positiven⁵⁹, sondern nur einen rein negativen Dämonenbegriff.⁶⁰ Zum anderen setzt sich Markus nicht mit dem Umstand auseinander, dass das in älterer mesopotamischer wie in jüdischer Kultur unbeanstandete Wirken eines Exorzisten in griechisch-römischem Umfeld in die Nähe magischer Praktiken gerückt und

⁵³ Das ist vorausgesetzt bei vielen magischen Papyri, die Ritualanweisungen für verschiedene Fälle magischen Bedarfs bereithalten.

⁵⁴ So z. B. im Fall der Epilepsie; vgl. Aretaeus I 5,7 (Neuer Wettstein. Texte zum Neuen Testament aus Griechentum und Hellenismus, Bd. I/1.1 Texte zum Markusevangelium, hg. v. U. Schnelle unter Mitarbeit von M. Lang und M. Labahn, Berlin/New York 2008 [= NW I/1.1], 446 f.) einerseits, Mk 9,18 (ὅπου ἔσθ) andererseits.

⁵⁵ Bekannt ist das Motiv, dass der Dämon im Kranken redet, während der Kranke schweigt, vgl. Mk 1,24; Lukian, Philopseudes 16; Philostrate II, Vit Ap IV 20. – Mk 13,11 zeigt aber auch, dass an eine positive Außensteuerung des Christen gedacht sein kann. Damit steht Markus nicht allein im Vergleich zu griechisch-römischer wie jüdischer Umwelt.

⁵⁶ Mk 1,24; 5,6–8, vielleicht auch Josephus, Ant VIII 45–49.

⁵⁷ Mk 7,24–30 (zum Begriff „Gesandtschaft“ vgl. G. Theißen, Urchristliche Wundergeschichten. Ein Beitrag zur synoptischen Tradition, Gütersloh 1975, 59); Philostrate II, Vit Ap III 38.

⁵⁸ Philostrate II, Vit Ap IV 10.20.25. Im Neuen Testament ist diese Konstellation nicht realisiert. Sofern Apollonios, den Lukian von Samosata als Scharlatan zeichnet (Lukian, Alex. 5), von Philostrate II als überbietendes Gegenüber zu Jesus stilisiert wird (E. Koskeniemi, Apollonios von Tyana in der neutestamentlichen Exegese. Forschungsbericht und Weiterführung der Diskussion [WUNT II 61], Tübingen 1994, passim), ist das einer der Züge, der die Überlegenheit des Apollonios gegenüber Jesus begründet.

⁵⁹ Lukas hingegen lässt in der komplizierten Wendung πνεῦμα δαμονίου ἀκαθάρτου in Lk 4,33 das Wissen um einen auch möglichen positiven Begriffsgebrauch durchscheinen (H. Schürmann, Das Lukasevangelium I [HThK 3/1], Freiburg 1984, 247).

⁶⁰ Ein differenziertes Dämonenbild ist laut Plutarch offenbar erstmals von Xenokrates (ca. 395–312 v. Chr.), dem dritten Leiter der Akademie nach Platon und Speusipp, vertreten worden, der den Dämonen verschiedene Grade von Tugend und Laster zusprach (Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride 25 = mor. 360 E), und lebt vor allem in mittelpatonischer Tradition weiter, vgl. Apuleius, Plat. I 12,205–206: „Die Dämonen aber, die wir Genien und Laren nennen können, hält Platon für Diener der Götter und Beschützer der Menschen und ihre Dolmetscher, wenn sie etwas von den Göttern wünschen.“ Markus hat kein Interesse an theoretischen Definitionen eines Dämons, wie sie bei Apuleius, de Deo Socratis 13 vorliegen: „Die Dämonen sind der Gattung nach Lebewesen, ihrer Anlage nach vernunftbegabt, ihrer Seele nach beeinflussbar und erregbar, ihrem Körper nach luftartig, ihrer Lebenszeit nach ewig.“ Die ersten drei Eigenschaften haben sie mit den Menschen gemein, die zuletzt genannte mit den Göttern; die Luftartigkeit des Körpers ist nur ihnen eigen (NW I/1.1, 81).

somit stigmatisiert wird.⁶¹ Das könnte im Übrigen ein Indiz für die Herkunft des Markus aus dem Judentum sein.

Die Auswirkungen von Besessenheit und deren Behebung hingegen werden im Markusevangelium ähnlich wie in Texten aus der griechisch-römischen Umwelt beschrieben⁶²: Besessenheit treibt den Menschen in die Einsamkeit⁶³ und veranlasst ihn zu lebensminderndem Verhalten⁶⁴ und selbstzerstörerischem Handeln⁶⁵.

Die Folgen einer Heilung sind, wie unmittelbar einsichtig, die Wiedergewinnung körperlicher Integrität, körperliche Beweglichkeit⁶⁶, Vernünftigkeit⁶⁷, Gesundheit⁶⁸, Wiedererlangung der Kommunikationsfähigkeit⁶⁹, Wiedererlangung der körperlichen wie kultischen Reinheit.⁷⁰ Die Folge eines Exorzismus besteht vor allem in der Wiedererlangung der Selbstkontrolle und Exzentrität.⁷¹

Schwangerschaft und Geburt werden im Markusevangelium nicht thematisiert. Die Terminologie des Sterbens im Markusevangelium in Mk 5,23; 15,37 ist in der Septuaginta nicht belegt, begegnet jedoch gelegentlich in griechisch-römischer Literatur.⁷²

Das Ansinnen der Nachfolge seitens des Geheilten kann abgelehnt (Mk 5,19) oder (implizit) akzeptiert werden.⁷³ Bei den einzelnen Texten lässt sich das jeweils unterschiedlich begründen: In Mk 5,19 liegt möglicherweise eine Gemeindegründungstradition vor; in Mk 1,31 geht es darum, dass Frauen innerhalb

⁶¹ E. Sorensen, *Possession and Exorcism in the New Testament and Early Christianity* (WUNT II 157), Tübingen 2002, 222 f.

⁶² Eine ethische Schädigung des Menschen wird in den Exorzismuserzählungen bei Markus nicht erwähnt. Biblische Wendungen wie πνεῦμα ζηλώσεως (Num 5,14.30) oder πνεῦμα πορνείας (Hos 4,12; 5,4) werden in den synoptischen Evangelien nicht nachgeahmt.

⁶³ Aristophanes, *Lys* 787–794 (NW I/1.1, 227); Aretaeus III 6,10 (NW I/1.1, 224); Philostrate II, *Vit Ap* III 38; vgl. aber schon Dan 4,29 [32]. Speziell vom Aufenthalt der nicht geläuterten Seele an den Gräbern spricht Platon, *Phaidon* 81cd.

⁶⁴ Der Dämon hofft, einen Menschen in Furcht versetzen zu können (Lukian, *Philopseudes* 31).

⁶⁵ Fußfesseln sind im Gefängnis üblich (Platon, *Phaidon* 60c; Horaz, *ep.* I 16,77) und werden in Schilderungen von Gespenstern (z. B. dem Geist von Toten) erwähnt, Plinius, *ep.* VII 27,11.

⁶⁶ Mk 2,12 nach Lähmung; Mk 5,42 nach Tod.

⁶⁷ Mk 5,15.

⁶⁸ Mk 3,5; 5,34; 7,37; Lukian, *Philopseudes* 16.

⁶⁹ Mk 7,35.

⁷⁰ Mk 1,42; 5,34. Die in Mk 5,25–34 genannte Frau war keineswegs sozial völlig isoliert. Der Besuch des Tempels und der Synagoge waren ihr verwehrt, der Geschlechtsverkehr verboten; ansonsten musste sie durchaus ihrer täglichen Arbeit nachgehen; so jedenfalls C. Jochum-Bortfeld, *Die Verachteten stehen auf* (s. Anm. 20), 172 f.

⁷¹ Mk 5,15; 9,27 am Ende zweier Exorzismen; Philostrate II, *Vit Ap* IV 20.

⁷² Für die Wendung ἑσχατῶς ἔχειν in Mk 5,23 vgl. Artemidor 3,60; für ἐκπνεῦω in Mk 15,37 vgl. Sophokles, *Ajax* 1026; Euripides, *Hercules furens* 886; Plutarch, *Mor.* 597 F.

⁷³ Mk 10,52; Philostrate II, *Vit Ap* IV 20 sowie Mk 1,31 in der Auslegung durch L. Schottruff, *Lydias ungeduldige Schwestern. Feministische Sozialgeschichte des frühen Christentums*, Gütersloh 1994, 313.

einer christlichen Gruppe Verantwortung übernehmen; in Mk 10,52 besteht das Interesse des Evangelisten daran, den ehemals Blinden als nachfolgewillig auf dem Weg des Leidens zu bezeichnen; bei Philostrat II, VitAp IV 20 wird die Person des Apollonius literarisch nochmals aufgewertet, indem der Jüngling sein Schüler wird.

Krankheit und Besessenheit gelten im Markusevangelium ebensowenig wie in der griechisch-römischen Umwelt als unabwendbares Schicksal. Spezifisch christlich mit biblischer Grundlage ist, dass der Heilungstätigkeit Jesu eschatologische Dimension zukommt.⁷⁴ Dabei schließt diese eschatologische Dimension eine aktive Haltung der von Krankheit Betroffenen keineswegs aus, wie am Beispiel der in Mk 5,25–34 geschilderten Frau verdeutlicht werden kann: Ihr Leid ist körperlich schwerwiegend; ihr Wille hingegen, eine Heilung herbeizuführen und dazu einen eigenen Beitrag zu leisten⁷⁵, ist ungebrochen. Darüber hinaus haben die Heilungen Jesu in der Auslegungsgeschichte nicht nur die Frage nach der Überwindung von Naturgesetzen aufgeworfen, sondern paränetisch als Mahnung zur Bekräftigung unseres Wortes mit der Tat fungiert.⁷⁶

III. Verstand und Affekte

Das Thema „Verstand und Affekte“ hat im Markusevangelium naheliegenderweise viel mit der Frage nach gelingendem und misslingendem Leben des Menschen zu tun. Die Unterscheidung zwischen rational und affektiv gesteuertem Handeln ist Markus trotz seines unphilosophischen Habitus wichtiger als es der terminologische Befund nahe legen würde.⁷⁷

Manchmal wird nur das nach außen Tretende der Affekte beschrieben, die Anrede an Jesus (Mk 4,38) bzw. der Aufschrei der Jünger (Mk 6,49) statt der Angst,

⁷⁴ Vgl. Mk 1,27 („eine neue Lehre in Vollmacht“ – der Begriff des „Neuen“ meint die eschatologische Neuheit) mit der Endzeitprophetie Sach 13,2^{LXX}: „Und ich werde jeden unreinen Geist austreiben aus dem Lande“ sowie AssMos 10,1: „Und dann wird seine [scil. Gottes] Herrschaft über seine ganze Schöpfung erscheinen, und dann wird der Teufel nicht mehr sein, und die Traurigkeit wird mit ihm hinweggenommen werden“.

⁷⁵ Nicht die Unterordnung der Wunder unter das Kreuzesgeschehen, sondern der eigene Beitrag des Hilfesuchenden, der nicht passiv auf ein Wunder wartet, ist das Wesentliche an der markinischen Wunderkritik; so jedenfalls Th. Vogt, *Angst* (s. Anm. 5), 92. Nach G. Theißen unterscheidet sich christlicher Wunderglaube vom gemeinantiken eben in der Vorstellung, dass der Glaube nicht erst Reaktion auf die Wunder ist, sondern sie vielmehr bewirkt (G. Theißen, *Erleben und Verhalten der ersten Christen. Eine Psychologie des Urchristentums*, Gütersloh 2007, 247; Jesus verweist die Kranken auf eine Kraft in ihnen selbst; hierin „hat ein überragend klar urteilender Wundercharismatiker gesehen, dass ohne Selbstaktivierung von Vertrauen bei den Kranken und ihrer sozialen Umwelt keine Besserung geschehen kann“ [S. 248]).

⁷⁶ Theophylakt, Mc., PG 123, 508 C; Euthymius Zigabenus, Mc., PG 129, 784 B.

⁷⁷ Der Oberbegriff πάθος fehlt ebenso wie der Begriff ἡδονή; ein einziges Mal begegnen die Nomina ἐπιθυμία (Mk 4,19; das zugehörige Verbum fehlt) und φόβος (Mk 4,41), hingegen ist das Verbum φοβέομαι häufiger belegt.

das Gespräch der Jünger statt der Sorge (Mk 8,16), das Schweigen der Jünger statt der Beschämung (Mk 9,34a), das Gespräch der Jünger statt des Geltungsstrebens (Mk 9,34b). Auch in der Zeichnung Jesu ist dies erkennbar, wenn es um die Schelte dieser ungläubigen Generation (Mk 9,19) oder um das Jüngerunverständnis geht (Mk 4,13; 7,18; 8,17). Das kann aus mangelnder Vertrautheit mit abstrakter Terminologie ebenso herrühren (so für Mk 6,49; 8,16; 9,34a), wie es der Abkürzung dient (Mk 9,34b). Diese Technik wird in der Gethsemane-Erzählung gerade nicht angewendet, da werden Affekte durchaus betont (der Alten Kirche hat dies nicht geringe Schwierigkeiten eingetragen; dazu s. u.) – Soll das die Leserinnen und Leser trösten, die in Extremlagen ähnliche psychische Kämpfe durchzustehen haben?⁷⁸ ähnlich wie in griechisch-römischer Literatur?⁷⁹

Die zahlreichen Epiphaniereaktionen⁸⁰ sind, sofern sie von Außenstehenden geäußert werden (zu dieser Einschränkung s. u.), leserorientierte Belehrung über den Glaubensgrund, indem sie die Macht Jesu betonen, ihr Gegenstand ist hingegen nicht der Vollzug christlicher Existenz⁸¹ bzw. gelingendes oder misslingendes Leben. Anthropologisch aussagekräftiger sind die Verhaltensweisen, die sich nicht als Epiphaniereaktionen erklären lassen.

Theologisch unproblematische Affekte Hilfesuchender wie ihrer Angehörigen, so etwa die Angst der Frau vor der Entdeckung (Mk 5,33), die Furcht des Jairus (Mk 5,36) und die Klage im Trauerhaus (Mk 5,38), werden durch Jesu Wort bzw. Hilfeleistung aufgehoben⁸², unterliegen insofern also keiner Kritik.

Affektives Verhalten wird nur bei den Jüngern und bei der Gemeinde durch Belehrung korrigiert oder getadelt. Dabei sind die klassischen Themen des markinischen Jüngerunverständnismotives angesprochen: Neben der Belehrung hinsichtlich der Frage nach der Heilsmöglichkeit angesichts der Gefahr des Reichtums (Mk 10,26) steht vor allem der Tadel, dass die Jünger Jesu helfender

⁷⁸ So jedenfalls Origen, Cels II 25 (SC 132, 354).

⁷⁹ Die Mysterien der Isis, die ihrer Leiden und Irrfahrten gedenken, „spenden Lehren der Frömmigkeit und Trost für Männer und Frauen in ähnlichen Nöten“ (Plutarch, de Iside 27, 361 e).

⁸⁰ Epiphaniereaktionen gelten Jesu Wirken allgemein (Mk 10,32, durch Jünger wie durch „Nachfolgende“; 11,18 durch die Menge), Jesu machtvollen Taten (Mk 1,27; 2,12; 4,41 durch die Jünger; 5,15; 7,37 durch diejenigen, die von dem Geschehen hören), seinem Wort (Mk 1,22 seitens der Menge; 10,24 seitens der Jünger) sowie der Engelsbotschaft und der Entdeckung des leeren Grabes (Mk 16,8). Oder wird in Mk 16,8 das Jüngerunverständnismotiv auf die Frauen angewandt, die bisher positiv als Nachfolgerinnen Jesu geschildert worden waren (Mk 15,40 f.47)?

⁸¹ M. Meiser, Die Reaktion des Volkes auf Jesus. Eine redaktionskritische Untersuchung zu den synoptischen Evangelien (BZNW 96), Berlin, New York 1998, 213–215. – Die zum Ärgernis führende Verwunderung der Nazarener in Mk 6,2f. darf nicht zu einem generellen negativen Urteil über die Reaktionen des Erstaunens, Erschreckens etc. führen.

⁸² Eine implizite auktoriale Negativzensur durch die kompositionelle Integration an der jetzigen Stelle ist nur bezüglich des „und sie verlachten ihn“ gegeben; dieser Spott stellt zusammen mit dem Verhalten der Jünger (Mk 4,38.40) und der Gerasener (Mk 5,17) eine Reaktion des Unglaubens dar und begründet die Klage Jesu Mk 6,4.

Macht nicht vertrauen (Mk 6,52⁸³; 8,14–21), dass sie nicht die Konsequenzen des durch Jesu ἐξουσία legitimierten Sonderwegs ihrer Gruppe erkennen (Mk 7,18), dass sie hinsichtlich des geforderten Leidens nicht den Standpunkt Gottes übernehmen (Mk 8,33), d. h. den Leidensweg nicht gehen wollen⁸⁴ und dass sie nicht mitvollziehen, dass in der christlichen Gemeinde andere Maßstäbe gelten als in der erfahrbaren politischen Welt.⁸⁵ Die Jünger sollen vielmehr verstehen⁸⁶ und daraus Konsequenzen ziehen. Die Terminologie lässt erkennen, was gemeint ist: In Mk 6,52 wird συνίημι, in Mk 7,18; 8,14–21 wird νοέω, in Mk 8,33 φρονέω verwendet, das Verbum οἶδα in Mk 10,42 zeigt ebenfalls an, dass die Unterscheidung des Maßstäbe von einem Erfahrungswissen ausgeht.⁸⁷

Bei Jesus wird als positiver Affekt das Erbarmen mit dem Kranken (Mk 1,41)⁸⁸ und der Volksmenge (Mk 6,34; 8,2) benannt⁸⁹; dieser Affekt ist ein möglicher Affekt des in der Situation Überlegenen.⁹⁰ Ansonsten fällt die Vielzahl negativer Affekte auf: Eine inzwischen geheilte Krankheit erweckt seinen Zorn (Mk 1,43), der Unverstand der Gegner⁹¹ Betrübnis und Zorn (Mk 3,5). Gegenüber den Jüngern kann er Unwillen (Mk 10,14) und Zorn (Mk 8,32) äußern. Das soll weniger Jesus kennzeichnen als das Fehlverhalten der Gegner bzw. der Jünger brandmarken. Der griechisch-römische Leser kann das noch als Reaktionen des

⁸³ Th. Vogt, Angst (s. Anm. 5), 62–69, bietet einen Überblick über das Vokabular der Angst im Markusevangelium.

⁸⁴ Mk 8,31–33. Das lässt für den Leser auch die in Mk 9,32 erwähnte Furcht der Jünger, Jesus zu fragen, in einem negativen Licht erscheinen.

⁸⁵ Mk 10,14.41–45; Jesus macht sich sogar den Unwillen der anderen Jünger über die Zebedaiden zu eigen.

⁸⁶ Insofern ist von ihnen durchaus eine extreme autodynamische Affektkontrolle gefordert, d. h. die Ausrottung der Affekte. Zur Unterscheidung von moderater und extremer autodynamischer Affektkontrolle vgl. P. von Gemünden, Affekte (s. Anm. 52), 250: Moderate Affektkontrolle ist die Eindämmung, extreme Affektkontrolle die Ausrottung der Affekte; autodynamisch heißt, dass das Subjekt selbst die Affektkontrolle leisten muss. In der Antike war es durchaus Gegenstand philosophischer Diskussion, ob man die Affekte nur eindämmen oder aber völlig ausrotten müsse (vgl. Seneca, ep. moral. 116,1).

⁸⁷ Aber auch von den Nichtjüngern werden „Hören“ (Mk 4,23) und „Wissen“ gefordert (Mk 12,24) bzw. wird ihnen verständige Rede bescheinigt (Mk 12,34); bei den Gegnern wird Selbstverweigerung wider besseres Wissen unterstellt (Mk 12,12).

⁸⁸ Von ihm gefordert wird es in Mk 9,22.

⁸⁹ Die Erbarmensreaktion wird (anders als Jesu Weg ans Kreuz in Mk 10,45) paränetisch nicht unmittelbar fruchtbar gemacht – die Auslegungsgeschichte hat hier zu Recht ergänzt.

⁹⁰ Die Überlegenheit kann außerhalb des Markusevangeliums auch den sozialen Status betreffen, vgl. Mt 18,27.

⁹¹ Affektgeleitete Reaktion der Gegner des Täufers (Mk 6,20; 11,32) wie Jesu (Mk 11,18; 12,12) ist die Furcht, die auktorial als Zeichen des Opportunismus gebrandmarkt wird: Nach Mk 12,12 verstehen die Gegner die Botschaft Jesu rational sehr wohl! Auch die Betrübnis des Herodes Antipas angesichts des bevorstehenden Todes des Täufers (Mk 6,26) hat keine positiven Folgen; Herodes Antipas ist in dieser Erzählung alles andere als souverän, während Jesus in Gethsemane (vgl. dasselbe Stichwort περίλυπος in Mk 6,26; 14,34) seine Souveränität durch die Einwilligung in den Willen Gottes erreicht, der ihm das Leiden auferlegt. Herodes Antipas wird dadurch schuld am Tod eines anderen, während Jesus den Tod für sich selbst zu akzeptieren lernt.

unverstanden gebliebenen Lehrers empfinden. Hingegen haben das Erschrecken (Mk 14,33) und die Betrübnis (Mk 14,34) über sein eigenes Todesgeschick nachweisbar den Missmut nichtchristlicher antiker Bibelleser erweckt.⁹² Zwar bearbeitet Jesus diese Negativaffekte durch Einwilligung in den Willen Gottes, trotzdem ist diese Kritik nicht unverständlich: Als der wahre Weise hätte Jesus überhaupt nicht in diese Affekte hineingeraten dürfen!⁹³

Auch die Frage nach den zu erwartenden Verhaltensweisen in der nachösterlichen Zeit wird im Markusevangelium aufgeworfen.

Außenstehende scheinen affektgeleitet: Ihre Freude ist nicht von Dauer und daher nicht positiv zu werten (Mk 4,16); die Sorgen dieses Äons, die Verführung des Reichtums (vgl. schon Mk 10,22⁹⁴) und die übrigen Begierden ersticken das Wort und lassen es nicht Frucht bringen (Mk 4,19). Affektives Verhalten kann aber auch Gemeindeglieder prägen, nämlich die Angst vor Krieg und die Sorge um das rechte Wort vor Gericht (Mk 13,7.11). Die Gemeindeglieder sollen hier autodynamische Affektkontrolle leisten, und zwar, wie die mit μή eingeleiteten Vetitive zeigen, extreme Affektkontrolle, nämlich die Affekte ausrotten.⁹⁵ Sie sollen, ähnlich wie es von den Jüngern gefordert war, nicht erschrecken (13,7 θροεῖν), sondern sehen (Mk 13,5.23.33 βλέπειν), lernen (Mk 13,28 μαθάνειν), erkennen (Mk 13,29 γινώσκειν), wachen (Mk 13,35.37 γρηγορεῖν)⁹⁶, anders als die Jünger in Gethsemane⁹⁷, denn Nachfolge kann leicht scheitern.⁹⁸ Zur Begründung verweist Jesus auf göttliche Notwendigkeit (Mk 13,8) wie göttlichen Beistand (Mk 13,11) – beides soll die Gläubigen dessen vergewissern, dass sie in summa (nicht, was das Einzelschicksal betrifft) nicht aus der Hand Gottes fallen.

Der synoptische Vergleich zeigt, dass Matthäus und Lukas sich in der Behandlung der Affekte von Markus abheben; das ist aber nicht mit Interessen theoretischer Anthropologie, sondern mit der geänderten Konzeption der Erzählfiguren zu begründen.⁹⁹ Bei Matthäus sind, anders als bei Markus, die Jünger diejenigen, denen dank göttlicher Offenbarung¹⁰⁰ eine prinzipielle Ein-

⁹² Celsus, nach Origenes, Cels. II 24 (SC 132, 348). Vor allem nach stoischer Doktrin ist die λύπη als eine der Hauptaffekte unbedingt zu meiden (Diogenes Laertios VII 110; Epiktet, Diss. I 9,7; III 11,2).

⁹³ Diogenes Laertios VII 123.

⁹⁴ Das Verbum λυπέω ist nicht auf die Bedeutung „Schmerz, Kummer, Trauer verursachen“ eingeengt, sondern kann auch die Bedeutung von „ärgern, erzürnen“ annehmen (H. Balz, Art. λυπέω, EWNT II, 21992, 895–899, hier 896).

⁹⁵ Vgl. wiederum P. von Gemünden, Affekte (s. Anm. 52), 250.

⁹⁶ Die in Mk 13 verwendeten Verben begegnen auch bei Matthäus und Lukas (Ausnahme nur: θροεῖν ist in Lk 21,9 durch πτοεῖν ersetzt). Trotzdem kann man sagen: Markus hat diese Terminologie in Mk 13 inauguriert.

⁹⁷ E. Reinmuth, Anthropologie (s. Anm. 12), 89.

⁹⁸ A. a. O., 92.

⁹⁹ Im Folgenden können nur die bemerkenswertesten Veränderungen gegenüber Markus aufgelistet werden.

¹⁰⁰ Mt 11,27; 13,11.16f.; 16,17.

sicht um Jesu Gottessohnschaft und ein Verständnis seiner Worte gegeben ist¹⁰¹; wozu Matthäus mehr als Markus (Mk 3,35) mahnt, ist das Tun des Willens Gottes, vgl. Mt 7,21–23; Mt 12,50; 21,31. Affekte der Jünger beziehen sich auf das Leiden Jesu (Mt 17,23). Negative Affekte Jesu, die er anderen gegenüber äußert, werden bei Matthäus manchmal getilgt¹⁰², allerdings ist Mt 9,30 eine Affektreaktion erwähnt. In der Gethsemaneszene wird Jesu Außersichgeraten zur Trauer abgeschwächt (λυπεῖσθαι statt ἐκθαμβεῖσθαι), was den matthäischen Jesus allerdings, wie die Wirkungsgeschichte zeigt, den griechisch Gebildeten nicht näher bringt. Lukas führt das Motiv des Jüngerunverständnisses hinsichtlich des Leidens Jesu in Lk 9,45; 18,34 vorwiegend mit kognitiven termini durch. Negative Affekte Jesu gegenüber anderen werden ebenfalls getilgt (Mk 3,5; 10,14). In der Gethsemaneszene werden Mk 14,33 f. nicht zitiert; dadurch sind die Affekte Jesu unterdrückt. Der textkritisch unsichere Vers Lk 22,44 bietet stattdessen eine äußere Beschreibung Jesu, aus der sich der innere Kampf nur erahnen lässt.

Dass das rationale Handeln höher gewertet wird als das affektgesteuerte, ist für einen Leser aus dem griechisch-römischen Kulturkreis nicht erstaunlich.¹⁰³ Trotzdem ist das Markusevangelium natürlich alles andere als ein philosophischer Traktat, denn die Inhalte der Erkenntnis sind keineswegs jedermann kraft seiner eigenen Vernunft nachvollziehbar. Aber warum soll sich der Verstand des Christenmenschen gerade an den Wundern Jesu bewähren, wie Mk 8,14–21 sowie Mk 6,53–56 als Kontraparallele zu Mk 6,45–52 nahelegen¹⁰⁴? Die Verlässlichkeit der helfenden Macht Jesu wird herausgestellt¹⁰⁵ – textpragmatisch steht das auch für die Verlässlichkeit dessen, dass man auch bei Ausgrenzung und Verfolgung, auch bei der Verborgenheit des nahen Gottes¹⁰⁶ die Kraft erhält, in der Gewissheit der Gebetserhörung am Glauben an Gott festzuhalten (Mk 11,22–24)

¹⁰¹ Mt 14,33; 16,16 bzw. Mt 16,12; 17,13.

¹⁰² Die entsprechenden Angaben in Mk 1,43; 3,5; 10,14 haben bei Matthäus keine Parallele.

¹⁰³ Freude gilt in der gemäßigten Stoa als einer der erlaubten Affekte (Diogenes Laertios VII 116), ist aber rationalem Handeln immer noch unterlegen. – Ungeachtet ihrer Warnung vor affektgesteuertem Handeln zielen aber gelegentlich auch stoische Philosophen auf den Affekt des Schmerzes, um ihre Leser und Hörer zur Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit der Besserung zu führen. W. Shiner, *Proclaiming the Gospel. First-Century Performance of Mark*, Harrisburg/London/New York 2003, 67 verweist auf Epiktet, Diss. III 23,28–30,37.

¹⁰⁴ M. Meiser, Reaktion (s. Anm. 81), 160 f.

¹⁰⁵ So bereits Origenes, Cels. I 38 (SC 132, 180–182). Der Alexandriner will Jesus von einem μάγος abgrenzen und betont, dass die christliche Lehre Zauberhandlungen verbietet. Doch die Wirklichkeit auch im Christentum sah erheblich anders aus; vgl. nur Did 3,4 u. a. sowie M. Labahn/B. J. Lietaert Peerbolte (Hg.), *A Kind of Magic: Understanding Magic in the New Testament and Its Religious Environment* (European Studies on Christian Origins 306), London/New York 2007 u. a.

¹⁰⁶ W. Fritzen, *Von Gott verlassen? Das Markusevangelium als Kommunikationsangebot für bedrängte Christen*, Stuttgart 2008, 263: Es geht nicht um die Verlassenheit durch Gott, sondern um die Verborgenheit des nahen Gottes.

und das Richtige zu sagen (Mk 13,11) bzw. zu tun.¹⁰⁷ Die in Angstgeschichten wie Mk 4,35–41 symbolisch vermittelte Hoffnung „macht fähig, Angst, die aus Existenzbedrohungen resultiert, zu binden, so daß diese nicht determinant für das Denken und Handeln wird. [...] In der Haltung glaubender Hoffnung partizipieren die LeserInnen an der Macht Gottes. Damit verschaffen sie sich, die Verfolgungen und Denunziationen ausgesetzt waren, eine Kompetenz, die zum Durchhalten und Widerstand befähigt.“¹⁰⁸ Dem griechisch-römischen Leser kann das als modifiziertes Verständnis der Gottheit als des Garanten der *salus privata* verständlich werden¹⁰⁹, ein Motiv, das im griechisch-römischen Kulturkreis ebenfalls der Kontingenzbewältigung dienlich ist. Über die Verwendung in Angst- und Mangelgeschichten hinausgehend kann das von Markus angemahnte Vertrauen dazu helfen, die innergemeindliche Solidarität als Entwurf einer Kontrastgesellschaft durchzuhalten.

In das bisher Gesagte fügt sich auch das im Markusevangelium vorausgesetzte Zeitverständnis ein, das insgesamt jedoch weniger griechisch-römischen als biblisch-jüdischen Mustern folgt. Die Gegenwart des Menschen ist durch die Vergangenheit geprägt und auf die Zukunft bezogen: Die Erinnerung an Jesu Tat und Wort soll Vertrauen (Mk 8,14–21), aber auch Wachsamkeit erwecken (13,21–23; 14,72); Glaube ist Vorgriff auf das, was von Gott her schon innerweltlich als Möglichkeit auf den Menschen zukommt; rechtes christliches Leben ist Leben in Erwartung des göttlichen Gerichtes (Mk 9,42–48; 13,26 f.35). Gerade die Unbestimmtheit des Termins soll die Stetsbereitschaft evozieren (Mk 13,35 f.).

IV. *Der Mensch als Frau bzw. Mann*

Die Arbeitswirklichkeit von Frauen wird im Markusevangelium nur in Ansätzen sichtbar. Genannt werden die Tätigkeit des Aufnähens von Flickern (Mk 2,21 f.) und die Arbeit als Sklavin (Mk 14,66.69); zu vermuten ist ferner, dass Frauen wie die in Mk 15,40 f. genannten auch in der Fischerei gearbeitet haben.¹¹⁰

Frauen empfangen therapeutische (Mk 1,29–31; 5,21–43) wie exorzistische Hilfeleistung (Mk 7,24–30) ebenso wie Männer; ein zahlenmäßiges Ungleich-

¹⁰⁷ Die Forderungen des Vertrauens wie der Leidensnachfolge erscheinen noch deutlicher verknüpft, wenn man mit Th. Söding, Glaube bei Markus. Glaube an das Evangelium, Gebetslaube und Wunderglaube im Kontext der markinischen Basileiathologie und Christologie (SBB 12), Stuttgart 1985, 444, darauf achtet, dass ἀπολλύμι in Mk 3,6; 11,18 das bevorstehende Schicksal Jesu, in Mk 4,38 das befürchtete Schicksal der Jünger benennt.

¹⁰⁸ Th. Vogt, Angst (s. Anm. 5), 100.

¹⁰⁹ Vgl. den Dank des römischen Matrosen Apion an seinen „Herrn Serapis“ für die Rettung aus Seenot (abgedruckt bei A. Deissmann, Licht vom Osten. Das Neue Testament und die neuentdeckten Texte der hellenistisch-römischen Welt, Tübingen 1923, 147) sowie die Bitte des Plinius d. J. für seinen Freund Titius Aristo in Krankheitsnot (Plinius, ep. 1,22,11).

¹¹⁰ L. Schottroff, Lydias ungeduldige Schwestern (s. Anm. 73), 125–129.

gewicht mag dem verfügbaren Traditionsbestand geschuldet sein. Immerhin sind in Mk 5,21–43 zwei Geschichten mit Frauen bewusst ineinander komponiert worden; Markus wollte wohl auch Frauen in seiner Gemeinde damit ein Identifikationsangebot unterbreiten, ähnlich wie für die Attestierung des Glaubens an Frauen (Mk 5,34) und Männer (Mk 10,52) gilt: Menschen beiderlei Geschlechts sollen sich mit Erzählfiguren im Evangelium identifizieren können. Die gelegentliche Zurückhaltung in der Schilderung der Not einer Frau bzw. eines Mädchens (z. B. in Mk 7,24–30) will weniger Frauen benachteiligen¹¹¹ als vielmehr das Interesse des Lesers auf das Wort Jesu führen und hat die Implikation, dass voyeuristische Lektürevorgänge eher vermieden werden.

Ein Zusammenhang zwischen Krankheit und (neuer) Arbeitswelt wird im Falle der Frau nur in Mk 1,31 thematisiert, im Fall des Mannes nur implizit darin, dass die Lähmung des Körpers insgesamt (Mk 2,2), die gelähmte Hand (Mk 3,1), die Taubstummheit (Mk 7,32) und die Blindheit (Mk 8,22) ihn vom normalen Arbeitsleben ausschließen. In Mk 10,46 wird dies mit der Bezeichnung des Bartimäus als Bettler explizit vermerkt.

Frauen gehören nach 3,35 selbstverständlich neben Männern zur familia Dei, deren ekklesiologisches Ideal als „auffallend nicht patriarchalisch“¹¹² bezeichnet werden kann, und werden oft im Gegenüber zu den Zwölf als Vorbilder genannt: Die Schwiegermutter des Petrus verwirklicht Nachfolge, versteht Jesu Heilungstätigkeit besser als die wundersüchtige Menge und die Zwölf, die sich zu deren Fürsprecher machen¹¹³, und sie übernimmt Verantwortung in der Gemeinde¹¹⁴; die kranke Frau wird für Jairus zum Vorbild des Glaubens (Mk 5,34.36); die Syrophönizierin versteht, anders als die Jünger, das Programm der Ausweitung der familia Dei auf die nichtjüdische Welt¹¹⁵ und legt als erster

¹¹¹ So aber G. Guttenberger, *Besessene Frauen in der Antike. Zum Profil von Exorzismuserzählungen an weiblichen Besessenen*, in: *Körper und Kommunikation. Beiträge zur theologischen Genderforschung* (hg. v. K. Greschat/H. Omerzu), Leipzig 2003, 95–123, hier 100.

¹¹² M. Fander, *Die Stellung der Frau im Markusevangelium unter besonderer Berücksichtigung kultur- und religionsgeschichtlicher Hintergründe* (MThA 8), Altenberg 1898, 332; für eine ähnliche Wertung vgl. dies., *Das Evangelium nach Markus*, in: *Kompendium Feministische Bibelauslegung*, (hg. v. L. Schottroff/M.-Th. Wacker), Gütersloh 1998, 499–512, hier 511. Trotzdem ist, so Fander, a. a. O., „die Darstellung von Frauen als Nachfolgende androzentrisch, denn ihr Part wird erst in 15,41 sichtbar.“ Dass der Zwölferkreis nur aus Männern besteht, wird der Tradition geschuldet sein.

¹¹³ M. Fander, *Stellung* (s. Anm. 112), 341–343.

¹¹⁴ L. Schottroff, *Lydias ungeduldige Schwestern* (s. Anm. 73), 313.

¹¹⁵ M. Fander, *Stellung* (s. Anm. 112), 345. Die Syrophönizierin muss sogar eine durch Jesus selbst vorgenommene Stigmatisierung überwinden! Der Vergleich eines Menschen mit einem Hund muss nicht auf die Sinnenebene Juden – Heiden bezogen werden, ist aber in jedem Fall „in höchstem Maße beleidigend“ (S. A. Strube, „Wegen dieses Wortes ...“. *Feministische und nicht-feministische Exegese im Vergleich am Beispiel der Auslegungen zu Mk 7,24–30* [Theologische Frauenforschung in Europa 3], Münster/London/Hamburg 2000, 62).

Mensch ein christologisches Bekenntnis ab, noch vor den Jüngern¹¹⁶; die arme Witwe von Mk 12,44 verwirklicht das Ideal der Spendenbereitschaft; die ungenannt bleibende Frau von Mk 14,3–9 weiß, anders als die Jünger, um Jesu bevorstehendes Leiden¹¹⁷, und „maßt sich eine Männerrolle an“¹¹⁸, wenn sie den ins Leiden gehenden Jesus zum Messias salbt; Frauen bewähren sich, anders als die Jünger, schon in Galiläa in Nachfolge und Dienst¹¹⁹, und sie bewähren sich in der Passion (Mk 15,40 f.47).¹²⁰ Von daher kann man vermuten, dass Frauen in den Gemeinden des Markus führende Positionen einnahmen.¹²¹ Aus feministischer Perspektive können Perikopen wie Mk 5,25–34 unter dem Vorzeichen des Niederreißens patriarchalischer Schranken gelesen werden.¹²² Weniger vorbildlich wird die Frau des Herodes Antipas in Mk 6,17–29 gezeichnet: Sie tritt als intrigante Frau im Gegenüber zu einem schwächlichen Mann vor Augen, obwohl letztlich dieser für den Tod des Täufers verantwortlich ist. Man kann überlegen, ob man diese Darstellung eher als frauenfeindlich¹²³ oder, weil Pilatus letztendlich ebenso schwächlich wider besseres Wissen sich durch die jüdischen Hierarchen umstimmen lässt, als Kritik an einem verbreiteten Opportunismus unter Angehörigen der politischen Eliten auffassen soll.

V. Der Mensch in seiner Gottesbeziehung

Die Gottesbeziehung der ersten christlichen Generationen ist eine Sache des freiwilligen Entschlusses; die Leserinnen und Leser des Markusevangeliums haben insofern den ersten Akt der in Mk 1,15 geforderten Buße bereits durch den Anschluss an die Gemeinde geleistet.¹²⁴

¹¹⁶ M. Fander, Stellung (s. Anm. 112), 344f: Die Anrede κύριε ist nicht nur Höflichkeitsanrede.

¹¹⁷ vgl. grundsätzlich dazu E. Schüssler Fiorenza, „Zu ihrem Gedächtnis ...“ Eine feministisch-theologische Rekonstruktion der christlichen Ursprünge, aus dem amerikanischen Englisch übers. v. C. Schaumberger, München/Mainz 1988.

¹¹⁸ E. Moltmann-Wendel, Ein eigener Mensch werden. Frauen um Jesus (GTB 1006), Gütersloh 1980, 101.

¹¹⁹ E. Moltmann-Wendel, Mensch werden (s. Anm. 118), 114f.: Mk 15,41 (καὶ διηκόνουν αὐτῷ) attestiert den Frauen, das geleistet zu haben, was von den Jüngern in Mk 9,35; 10,44 f. gefordert worden war.

¹²⁰ M. Fander, Stellung (s. Anm. 112), 347f. U.E. Eisen, Amtsträgerinnen im frühen Christentum, Epigraphische und literarische Studien (FKDG 61), Göttingen 1996, 57, verweist darauf, dass Hippolyt von Rom, Cant. XV 3,1–4 (GCS 1, 350–355) die Frauen am Grab als Erstzeugninnen der Auferweckung durchaus als Apostelinnen begreifen konnte: Christus sei am Ostermorgen den Frauen begegnet, „damit auch Frauen Christi Apostel werden“ (Hippolyt, Cant. XV 3,4, GCS 1, 355).

¹²¹ E. Moltmann-Wendel, Mensch werden (s. Anm. 118), 115.

¹²² H. Kinukawa, Frauen im Markusevangelium (s. Anm. 29), 72 u. ö.

¹²³ M. Fander, Markus (s. Anm. 112), 504.

¹²⁴ Für diese Verwendung von μετανοέω gibt es aber kaum traditionsgeschichtliche Vor-

Im zeitlich nahestehenden Epheserbrief wird der Entschluss der werdenden Christen theologisch in der vorauslaufenden göttlichen Erwählung begründet (Eph 1,4), ein Gedanke, der auch in nichtchristlicher Antike möglich ist.¹²⁵ Im Markusevangelium ist das nicht expliziert, weil die vorösterliche Perspektive erzählerisch konsequent durchgehalten wird.

Die Anforderungen, die den markinischen Christinnen und Christen aus der Gottesbeziehung erwachsen, sind in der Eigenart des biblischen Gottesbegriffes begründet: Gott ist der einzige (Mk 12,29) und allein von ihm gilt: er ist gut (Mk 10,18). Er ist Schöpfer (Mk 10,6; 13,19), und er hat die Macht, die Toten aufzuwecken (Mk 12,24). Vor allem aber: Religion und Ethos sind im Christentum wie im Judentum enger verknüpft als dies bei vielen anderen antiken Religionen wenigstens der Theorie nach der Fall ist. So werden die Christen im Markusevangelium gemahnt, den Standpunkt Gottes und nicht den der Menschen zu übernehmen, d. h. leidensbereit zu sein (Mk 8,33), den Willen Gottes zu tun (Mk 3,35), die Gebote zu halten (Mk 7,10; 10,19). Als nähere Spezifikationen des Willens Gottes gelten das Tun des Guten auch am Sabbat (Mk 3,4), die moralische Reinheit (Mk 7,15–23), die Unauflöslichkeit der Ehe (Mk 10,2–12), die Anerkennung seines Anspruchs in ideeller wie materieller Weise (Mk 12,17). Dass radikaler Gehorsam gefordert ist, zeigt Mk 9,43–48, ebenfalls Mk 10,5 f., wo die in der Thora erlaubte Ehescheidung als Konzession verstanden wird, die den ursprünglichen Schöpferwillen verfehlt.¹²⁶ Die Betonung des Willens Gottes, der Gehorsam fordert, ist wohl ein Spezifikum jüdisch-christlicher Religiosität¹²⁷, doch ist allgemein der Nachahmungsgedanke, in Mk 10,45 auf Jesus fokussiert, auch einem griechisch-römischen Leser nicht unverständlich.¹²⁸

Gefährdet ist die Gottesbeziehung in zweierlei Weise. Einmal besteht die Gefahr, grundsätzlich an ihr irre zu werden, z. B. in Zeiten allgemeiner Bedrängnis gegen die Anhänger Jesu (Mk 4,16 f.¹²⁹). Dem sucht Mk 4,30 Abhilfe zu schaffen: Gott wird seine Herrschaft durchsetzen. Diejenigen, die sich der

gaben. Das Verbum μετανοέω bezieht sich in griechisch-römischer Literatur auf den Einzelfall, nicht auf eine generelle Änderung der Lebensrichtung. In LXX steht es für נָחַם, während שׁוּב zumeist mit ἐπιστρέφειν übersetzt wird (H. Merklein, Art. μετάνοια κτλ., EWNT II ¹1992, 1022–1031, hier 1024).

¹²⁵ Dass man das Hineingelangen in eine neue Gottesbeziehung als glückliche Fügung des Schicksals empfinden konnte, dafür vgl. Apuleius, Metam. XI 22,5.

¹²⁶ Keinen Widerspruch dagegen stellt dar, dass in Mk 9,7; 10,45 die Orientierung an dem Wort Jesu wie an seiner Lebenshingabe gefordert sind. Die Mahnung ἀκούετε αὐτοῦ in Mk 9,7 steht nicht umsonst am Anfang, der Verweis auf Jesu Vorbild in Mk 10,45 am Ende der markinischen Gemeinderegel Mk 9–10; vgl. C. Senft, L'évangile selon Marc (Essaies Bibliques 19), Genf 1991, 71 f.

¹²⁷ So jedenfalls K. Mertens, Die Leiblichkeit des Handelns, in: Handbuch der Kulturwissenschaften, Bd. 2, hg. v. F. Jaeger/J. Straub, Stuttgart/Weimar 2004, 327–340, hier 328.

¹²⁸ Vgl. Eph 5,1 mit Musonius, Frg. 8 (ed. O. Hense, 37: der König als ζῆλωτης des Zeus) und Frg. 17 (ed. Hense 90: der Mensch als μίμητα Gottes hinsichtlich der Tugenden).

¹²⁹ Dort ist die in Mk 8,34–38; 13,19.24 gezeichnete Situation angesprochen.

Gemeinde Jesu anschließen, sind auf dem richtigen Weg. Die Textpragmatik von Mk 4,30 ist Vergewisserung. Die Aufforderung „Glaubt an Gott“ und die Betonung der Erhörungsgewissheit (Mk 11,22–24) sind in nachösterliche Zeit hinein formuliert das, was in Mk 8,14–21 als Vertrauen auf die helfende Macht Jesu nahegelegt worden war. Allerdings ist auch die Leidensbereitschaft in der Nachfolge Jesu gefordert (Mk 8,34–38), die Einwilligung in den Willen Gottes, wie sie Jesus geleistet hat (vgl. Mk 14,36). Die andere Gefahr besteht bei intentional aufrechterhaltener Gottesbeziehung in der Sünde. Da wo Sündhaftigkeit nicht spezifiziert ist (Mk 2,5), soll der Leser seine eigene Geschichte des Sündigens eintragen. Deutlicher spezifiziert wird die mögliche Sündhaftigkeit in Mk 4,18 f. Hier wird neben den ängstlichen Sorgen des Lebens und den übrigen Begierden¹³⁰ die Verführung des Reichtums genannt, die auch in Mk 10,17–27 thematisiert ist.¹³¹ Reichtum hindert nicht selten *an* und *behindert in* der Nachfolge Jesu (erstes Mk 10,22; letzteres Mk 4,18 f.). In beiden Fällen steht wohl einerseits die Loslösung vom luxuriösen Lebensstil dahinter, an den der Reiche bisher sich gebunden hatte (vgl. 1 Tim 6,9), andererseits möglicherweise die auch in Apk 3,17–19 wie im *Hirten des Hermas* angesprochene Gefahr¹³², dass gerade reiche Menschen in Interessenskonflikte zwischen der Christusbindung und den mit dem Reichtum einhergehenden Bindungen an diese Welt geraten.

Als Verheißung wie aber auch als Warnung vor Selbstgerechtigkeit ist aber betont, das Gott mächtig ist, eine gestörte Gottesbeziehung zu heilen, bzw. eine verhinderte Beziehung zu ihm doch noch zu ermöglichen (Mk 10,27).

VI. Der Mensch in seinen sozialen Beziehungen

1. Die Wahrnehmung der nichtchristlichen Gesellschaft

Wie ist die nichtchristliche Gesellschaft wahrgenommen worden? Auf Jochum-Bortfelds Arbeit wurde schon verwiesen: Im Markusevangelium wird gerade denen Subjektsein zugesprochen, die im griechisch-römischen Kulturbereich eher am unteren Ende der sozialen wie der materialen Skala standen¹³³, und sie können von den Leserinnen und Lesern des Markusevangeliums als Identifikationsangebot wahrgenommen werden. Anders werden diejenigen dargestellt, die nach den Maßstäben der Geschichtsschreibung der griechisch-römischen Oberschicht zu den verantwortlichen Eliten zählen: Auf die Schwäche des Herodes

¹³⁰ Sie werden auch bei Philo, Leg III 248 mit den Dornen verglichen.

¹³¹ Die Warnung vor den Gefahren des Reichtums ist griechisches (Diodorus Siculus 21,1,4; Dio Chrysostomus, or. 67 [17], 6,7; Plutarch, Cato maior 18,5 u. a.) wie jüdisches (Sir 11,18 f.; Philo, De congressu eruditionis gratia 27) Gemeingut.

¹³² Auf Past vis. III 6,5/14,5 hat J. Gnlika, Das Evangelium nach Markus I (EKK 2/1), Zürich/Neukirchen 1986, 175, verwiesen.

¹³³ C. Jochum-Bortfeld, Die Verachteten stehen auf (s. Anm. 20), 172–195.

Antipas und des Pilatus wurde schon verwiesen; die Hohenpriester sind in der karikierenden Sicht des Markus nichts anders als „dumm, feige und skrupellos“¹³⁴. Der eine positiv gezeichnete Schriftgelehrte von Mk 12,28–34 ist die Ausnahme von der Regel und bestätigt sie somit.¹³⁵ Von Joseph von Arimathia, der ebenfalls der Führungsschicht angehört¹³⁶, heißt es, er habe nicht eingewilligt in den Todesbeschluss, aber beides hat apologetischen Zweck: Die Verstockung der Oberen soll so als schon menschlich nicht einsichtig gezeichnet werden.

Inwieweit sich im Markusevangelium die Situation des besetzten Galiläa widerspiegelt, wird u. a. zu dem Dämonennamen *λεγιών* in Mk 5,9 diskutiert. Sehen einige hierin ein ironisches antirömisches Ressentiment¹³⁷ bzw. sozialgeschichtlich ein subversives indirektes Protestverhalten der unterdrückten Bevölkerung¹³⁸, ist anderen zufolge der Name wie in der Parallele TestSal 11,3–7 lediglich ein Verweis auf die große Zahl.¹³⁹ Mindestens für die Ebene der markinischen Endredaktion wird aufgrund von Mk 15,39 entgegnet, dass der Evangelist dem Imperium Romanum nicht einfach völlig negativ gegenüber gestanden haben wird¹⁴⁰ – allerdings kann Mk 15,39 auch anders verstanden werden: Wenn ein Vertreter der Besatzungsmacht die moralische Überlegenheit des von ihm Hingerichteten mit dem Sohn-Gottes-Titel konzidiert, dann ist damit implizit auch die Relativierung der ideologischen Ansprüche der Staatsmacht verbunden.

Auch Mk 10,42–45 mit seinem Modell einer Kontrastgesellschaft mit seiner Stellungnahme gegen die „Reduplikation von Machtpolitik (innerhalb der christlichen Gemeinde)“¹⁴¹ ist kein Einzelfall markinischer Herrschaftskritik: Mk 6,17–29 wird die Lebenswelt des galiläischen Herrscherhauses insgesamt negativ gezeichnet. Die Blindenheilung Mk 10,46–52 wird als Kontrast zu einer kaiserlichen Audienz gestaltet¹⁴², und ökonomisches Denken kommt im Verhalten der Kritiker an der Salbung Jesu (Mk 14,4f.) zum Zuge¹⁴³, ist aber damit gerade nicht als vorbildhaft für die Gemeinde gewertet.

¹³⁴ S. Lücking, *Mimesis* (s. Anm. 29), 114.

¹³⁵ C. Focant, Marc (s. Anm. 35), 463.

¹³⁶ H. C. Waetjen, *Reordering* (s. Anm. 27), 239 f.

¹³⁷ H. C. Waetjen, *Reordering* (s. Anm. 27), 115–117; D. R. A. Hare, Mark (s. Anm. 38), 65; R. A. Horsley, „My Name is Legion“. Spirit Possession and Exorcism in Roman Palestine, in: *Experientia*, vol. I: Inquiry into Religious Experience in Early Judaism and Christianity, hg. v. F. Flannery et al. (SBL Symposium Series 40), Atlanta 2008, 41–58.

¹³⁸ G. Theißen, *Erleben* (s. Anm. 75), 244, hält für möglich, dass der in Mk 5,1 ff. genannte Mann einmal das Opfer einer Fesselung durch römische Soldaten war „und sich gewaltig gegen sie aufbäumt“.

¹³⁹ R. H. Stein, Mark (s. Anm. 35), 255.

¹⁴⁰ A. Y. Collins, Mark (s. Anm. 35), 269 f.: Das Thema der „himmlischen Armeen“ ist ja auch im Buch Daniel, in der Johannesoffenbarung sowie in Mt 26,53 präsent. Collins gesteht aber zu, dass die ersten Rezipientinnen bzw. Rezipienten wiederum anders denken konnten.

¹⁴¹ M. Ebner, *Evangelium* (s. Anm. 22), 39 (Klammersetzung M. E.).

¹⁴² M. Ebner, *Evangelium* (s. Anm. 22), 39 f.

¹⁴³ M. Fander, Markus (s. Anm. 112), 508.

Andererseits sollen sich Christen, so Mk 13,21–23 in der klassischen Auslegung, nicht zum Anschluss an falsche Messiasprätendenten führen lassen.¹⁴⁴ Beides zusammengenommen ergibt dann wieder die im frühen Christentum auch sonst feststellbare Haltung: Man steht den ideologischen Ansprüchen des Imperium Romanum reserviert gegenüber, leistet aber keinen gewaltsamen Widerstand.

2. Beziehungen innerhalb der Gemeinde

In der neutestamentlichen Briefliteratur spiegelt sich die hierarchische Gliederung der griechisch-römischen Gesellschaft in Teilen auch innerhalb der christlichen Gemeinde (vgl. 1 Kor 1,26–31¹⁴⁵; Jak 2,1–7), und Paulus kämpft energisch dafür, dass daraus keine soziale Spaltung innerhalb der Gemeinschaft wird.¹⁴⁶ Was ist davon im Markusevangelium zu spüren?

Unschwer lässt sich erkennen, dass in Mk 8,27–10,52 neben dem Leiden Jesu zugleich Gemeindeprobleme (Mk 8,34–38; 9,33–50; 10,35–45) wie Regelung längerfristiger Lebensverhältnisse (Mk 10,2–12.17–27) thematisiert werden, wobei Mk 8,34–38 eher im Hinblick auf die Außenkommunikation der Gemeinde zu bedenken ist, die anderen genannten Texte hingegen eher innere Probleme betreffen. Schlagwortartig lassen sich die Forderungen an die Gemeindeglieder¹⁴⁷ innerhalb von Mk 9,33–50 so zusammenfassen: Man soll nicht danach streben, „groß zu sein“ (Mk 9,35)¹⁴⁸, fremde Exorzisten nicht ausgrenzen (Mk 9,38–40), nicht Anlass zum Ärgernis geben (Mk 9,42), eher auf sich selbst achten, dass man nicht versucht wird (Mk 9,43–48), Frieden üben (Mk 9,50).¹⁴⁹ In Mk 10,42–45 wird das Bild der christlichen Jüngergemeinde als Kontrastgesellschaft zur politischen Realität gezeichnet und wie in anderen neutestamentlichen Texten¹⁵⁰ mit dem Vorbild der dienenden Selbsthingabe Jesu begründet.¹⁵¹ Schließlich wird das Anliegen der Vergebungsbereitschaft in Mk 11,25 gefordert – bei den

¹⁴⁴ Die Auslegung ist nicht erst neueren Datums, vgl. Beda Venerabilis, Mc., CC SL 120, 596.

¹⁴⁵ Vgl. G. Theißen, Soziale Schichtung in der korinthischen Gemeinde. Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des hellenistischen Urchristentums, in: ders., Studien zur Soziologie des Urchristentums (WUNT 19), Tübingen ²1983, 231–271.

¹⁴⁶ G. Theißen, Soziale Integration und sakramentales Handeln. Eine Analyse von I Cor. XI 17–34, NT 16 (1974), 179–206.

¹⁴⁷ Dass in 9,35 die Zwölf angeredet werden, heißt nicht, dass nur die führenden Personen avisiert werden; so zu Recht A. Y. Collins, Mark (s. Anm. 35), 444 f.

¹⁴⁸ Der Begriff μέγας für die hier anstehende Thematik begegnet auch in Sir 3,18.

¹⁴⁹ Mk 9,50 bildet zu Mk 9,33 f. eine Inklusion (so auch A. Y. Collins, Mark [s. Anm. 35], 443).

¹⁵⁰ Das Vorbild der Selbsthingabe Jesu wird nicht nur für die allgemeine Ethik (Eph 5,25 ff.; 1 Petr 2,20–24; 3,16–18), sondern auch für die Gestaltung der Beziehungen innerhalb der Gemeinde (Röm 15,2 f.8; Eph 4,32) und zwischen den Gemeinden (2 Kor 8,9) herangezogen.

¹⁵¹ Die Nähe von Mk 9,33 f. zu Mk 9,30–32 ist kaum belanglos (D. Lührmann, Das Markusevangelium [s. Anm. 46], 165), vielmehr kann man gegenüber dem Jüngerunverständnismotiv in Mk 8,31–33 eine Weiterführung erkennen: Dort verstehen die Jünger die Notwendigkeit des Leidens Jesu nicht, hier in Mk 9,33 f. verkennen sie, dass Jesu Leiden auch Konsequenzen für das

damaligen kleinen Gemeinden war das nicht nur eine geforderte nette Geste, sondern schlichtweg überlebensnotwendig.

Es fällt auf, dass Markus und Paulus (vgl. Phil 2,1–11) ähnliche Probleme bearbeiten müssen, die aber auch in antiken Kultvereinen von Bedeutung sind. Die Fragestellung ist spezifisch für eine Kleingruppe, in der die Rolle des einzelnen nicht von vornherein durch Abstammung, Reichtum, politischen Einfluss gekennzeichnet ist. Offensichtlich ist die Dualität von Ehre und Schande auch bei Mitgliedern der jungen christlichen Gemeinde nicht sofort gegenstandslos¹⁵² und auch noch in nachmarkinischen Zeiten präsent.¹⁵³ Ob die Ansprüche einiger, „groß“ zu sein, in ihrer sozialen Stellung in der nichtchristlichen Gesellschaft begründet sind, ist dem Markusevangelium allerdings nicht zu entnehmen.

Dass die Interaktion zwischen Jesus und den Jüngern Vorbild für die Gemeinde sein soll, lässt sich nicht erweisen. Deutlich allerdings ist: Das Handeln Jesu ist Vorbild für das der Jünger, vgl. Mk 10,45. Jesu Weg ist nicht nur normierend für den Weg der Gemeinde als Leidensweg, sondern normiert auch das Verhalten der Gemeindeglieder untereinander.

Mk 14,18–21 zeigt jedoch: Auch der Christ ist vor Fehlverhalten nicht geschützt. Dabei ist nicht nur bewusstes, sondern auch unbewusstes Fehlverhalten anvisiert: Die Frage der Jünger „Bin ich es?“ in Mk 14,19 ist nicht die historische Erinnerung an den letzten Abend vor Jesu Tod, sondern ist die Frage des Christen, der darüber erschrickt, dass möglicherweise sein eigenes Verhalten, auch ungewollt, fatale Folgen für andere nach sich ziehen kann.¹⁵⁴

3. Kontakte nach außen

Mk Gemeinde ist missionierende Gemeinde (Mk 4,13–20; 13,10; 14,9), aber die einzelnen Gemeindeglieder müssen nicht nur mit verständnislosem Desinteresse (Mk 4,10–12), sondern mit explizit negativen Reaktionen ihrer nicht-

eigene Verständnis christlicher Führerschaft hat (M. D. Hooker, Mark, 227 [s. Anm. 41]; R. H. Stein, Mark [s. Anm. 35], 443).

¹⁵² Mk 9,33–37 lässt sich leicht unter diese Thematik fassen, vgl. B. J. Malina, Die Welt des Neuen Testaments. Kulturanthropologische Einsichten, übers. v. W. Stegemann, Stuttgart 1993, 66.

¹⁵³ Die Mahnung an den Gemeindeleiter, gerade angesichts seiner Jugendlichkeit umso mehr auf seine Eignung als Vorbild bedacht zu sein (1 Tim 4,12), setzt voraus, dass ein zu junges Alter leicht als der Autorität abträglich empfunden werden konnte. Auch im Ersten Clemensbrief sind Spannungen thematisiert, die sich auf diesem Hintergrund deuten lassen. In EpPolyk 5,2 wird Christus als διάκονος πάντων („Diener aller“) bezeichnet, nach dessen Wahrheit es zu wandeln gilt. Die Mahnung ergeht speziell für die διάκονοι; so ist noch der ursprüngliche Kontext solcher Paränese im Rahmen der Gemeindesituation erkennbar.

¹⁵⁴ So auch Beda Venerabilis, Mc., CC SL 120, 610, unter Voraussetzung der Historizität: Die Jünger wussten, dass sie selbst nichts Derartiges geplant hatten, aber sie vertrauten eher dem Meister als sich selbst und fürchteten ihre fragilitas; daher fragten sie in Trauer nach einer Sünde, die ihnen nicht bewusst sein könnte.

christlichen¹⁵⁵ Familienangehörigen rechnen (Mk 13,12), mit Lästerungen des in der Gemeinde wirkenden Geistes (Mk 3,28 f.), ebenso mit der Notwendigkeit öffentlichen Bekenntns (Mk 8,38). Deshalb sind in der familia Dei (Mk 3,35) ja auch Kompensationsleistungen wichtig, d. h. in diesem Leben innergemeindliche Solidarität und für das Jenseits das ewige Leben als Ausgleich (Mk 10,29 f.). Im griechisch-römischen Kontext war das Christentum für manche Teile der Gesellschaft attraktiv¹⁵⁶, für andere hingegen unattraktiv, nämlich für diejenigen, die in ihren bisherigen Kulturen bzw. Gesellschaftssegmenten verwurzelt waren, unabhängig davon, ob sie diese Kulte in ihrer Heimat oder in ihrer Fremde praktizieren konnten.¹⁵⁷ Dort, wo das Christentum für die religiös oder ethnisch wenig Gebundenen attraktiv sein konnte, musste es wiederum mit anderen privaten Kultvereinen konkurrieren.

Mk 13,5 f.21 f. zeigt aber noch in anderer Weise, wie Teile der nichtchristlichen Öffentlichkeit den Kontakt zu Christen suchen: Die Anhängerschaft Jesu soll möglicherweise als Parteigänger des antirömischen Aufstandes¹⁵⁸ vereinnahmt werden. Allerdings soll das „Verstehen“ hier zur Ablehnung führen.

Mk 9,38–40 behandelt einen Spezialfall: Es geht um Exorzisten, die in Jesu Namen agieren, aber sich nicht der markinischen Gemeinde anschließen.¹⁵⁹ Ob es andere Christen sind oder Exorzisten mit nichtchristlichem Hintergrund, die sich der exorzistischen Macht des Namens Jesu bedienen, lässt sich nicht mit Sicherheit entscheiden, wenngleich das erstere m. E. wahrscheinlicher ist. Die Gemeinde soll darauf vertrauen: Wer den Namen Jesu zu exorzistischen Zwecken verwendet, wird ihn nicht in Verruf und üble Nachrede bringen.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁵ So J. Gnilka, Markus II (s. Anm. 44), 192; R. Pesch, Das Markusevangelium II [s. Anm. 47], 286 (anders noch ders., Naherwartungen. Tradition und Redaktion in Mk 13 [KBANT], Düsseldorf 1968, 134); D. R. A. Hare, Mark (s. Anm. 38), 172; R. H. Stein, Mark (s. Anm. 35), 601 (als bevorzugte Auslegung).

¹⁵⁶ Vgl. P. Pilhofer, Die ökonomische Attraktivität christlicher Gemeinden, in: ders., Die frühen Christen und ihre Welt. Greifswalder Aufsätze 1996–2001. Mit Beiträgen von J. Börsinghaus und E. Ebel (WUNT 145), Tübingen 2002, 194–211.

¹⁵⁷ Vgl. das Bekenntnis des mittlerweile nach Rom übersiedelten Lucius „eram cultor (sci. Isidis) denique adsiuus, fani quidem advena, religionis autem indigena“ (Apuleius, metam. XI 26,3).

¹⁵⁸ Die Worte „in meinem Namen“ in Mk 13,6 sind am ehesten dann sinnvoll, wenn die „Verführer“ mit dem Hinweis auf ihre beanspruchte Messianität gezielt die Anhängerschaft Jesu umworben haben. Die „Zeichen und Wunder“ dieser Propheten werden aber von Josephus stets als Teil des antirömischen Aufstandes gesehen.

¹⁵⁹ Für die These, dass Mk 9,38–40 ein Vorkommnis aus dem Leben Jesu wiedergibt, wurde der Widerspruch zu Apg 19,13–17 (R. H. Stein, Mark [s. Anm. 35], 445) sowie die Wendung *κακολογήσαι με* (R. Pesch, Markusevangelium II [s. Anm. 47], 109) namhaft gemacht. Aber das Wort *ἡμῖν* in V. 38 lässt wohl doch eher auf Gemeindeprobleme schließen (J. Gnilka, Markusevangelium II [s. Anm. 44], 56; M. D. Hooker, Mark [s. Anm. 41], 229; D. Lührmann, Markusevangelium [s. Anm. 46], 166). Auch ist *ὄντως* verallgemeinernde Ausweisung (D. Lührmann, a. a. O.).

¹⁶⁰ So deutet R. Pesch, Markusevangelium II (s. Anm. 47), 109, zu Recht das Verbum *κακολογήω*. Es geht nicht speziell um eine Verfolgungssituation.

VII. Zusammenfassung

In heutiger anthropologischer Forschung zum Neuen Testament lässt sich eine Ausweitung der Fragestellung wie der Methoden des Erkenntnisgewinns feststellen: Gefragt wird nach dem Menschen nicht nur hinsichtlich seiner Gottesbeziehung, sondern auch u. a. hinsichtlich seiner Verfasstheit als Mann bzw. Frau, hinsichtlich seiner sozialen Bezüge und seinem gesellschaftlichen Eingebundensein. Die Terminologie, in der der Mensch hinsichtlich seines handlungssteuernden Selbst im Markusevangelium beschrieben wird, ist wesentlich biblisch-jüdisch geprägt. Die Wertung des Verstehens im Vergleich zu derjenigen der Affekte ist mit dem speziell markinischen Thema des Jüngerunverständnisses zu koordinieren. Das von den Jüngern geforderte Verstehen (Mk 8,14–21) der helfenden Macht Jesu ist wie die Konstatierung des „Glaubens“ in Mk 5,34 o.ä. textpragmatisch die Aufforderung zum Vertrauen auf Gottes Hilfe auch in Zeiten der Bedrängnis um des Christseins willen, also in Zeiten, in denen Durchhaltevermögen und Leidensbereitschaft gefragt sind. Leserinnen und Leser aus dem griechisch-römischen Kulturkreis können hier eine spezielle und auch modifizierte Anwendung des Verständnisses Gottes als des Garanten der *salus privata* wiederfinden. Dass Frauen wie Männern Glauben attestiert werden kann (Mk 5,34; 10,52), ermöglicht faktisch, dass sich Menschen beiderlei Geschlechts mit Erzählfiguren im Evangelium identifizieren können. Die Gottesbeziehung ist gefährdet durch Sündhaftigkeit in Missachtung des kompromisslosen (Mk 9,43–48) Willens Gottes und wirkt sich u. a. in falscher Sorge und Weltanpassung (Mk 4,18 f.; 10,22) aus. Die Gemeinderegel Mk 9–10 fordert Verhaltensweisen ein, die i. w. den Zusammenhalt und damit das Überleben der kleinen Gemeinden ermöglichen sollen. Die gesellschaftliche Realität wird im Markusevangelium „von unten“ wahrgenommen; Personen mit hohem sozialem Rang sind nur selten als Vorbilder dargestellt (z. B. Joseph von Arimathia), häufiger hingegen Personen, die am unteren Ende der gesellschaftlichen Pyramide zu stehen kommen. Dies ermöglicht eine christliche Selbstidentifikation der Adressatinnen und Adressaten des Markusevangeliums.

V. Extra-canonical Gospels and Acts

The Christian and the Roman Self*

The Lukan Paul and a Roman Reading

Manfred Lang

Andreas Mehl on August 16th 2010

1. Some outlines of what the Self could be

1.1 Modern and classical considerations

The interest in the self stems from modern insights into subject and persona. Initially this interest comes under debate when questions arise about who a person is, what existence for a person means – not only after the time of the Enlightenment – but in every-day life: what makes a person distinct from others, how should he or she reasonably act in social circumstances. Modern scholars tend to make distinctions in this discussion among the meanings of person, the self, and identity.¹ So the following discussion is selectively focused on synthesizing moral reflection and history. Therefore CHARLES TAYLOR's inspiring and monumental book is crucial here: *The Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity*.²

* I am deeply thankful Prof. Dr. Craig Keener and esp. Prof. Dr. Robert Brawley for making my English felicitous.

¹ One may distinguish more than one way of conceiving the self. GALEN STRAWSON, *The Self and the SESMET*, in: *Models of the Self*, ed. by Shaun Gallagher and Jonathan Shear, Exeter: Imprint, 1999, 483–518, esp. 485–516 identifies more than 20 (!) concepts of self. As introduction cf. the overview of the editors: SHAUN GALLAGHER and JONATHAN SHEAR, *Editor's Introduction*, in: *Models of the Self*, ed. by Shaun Gallagher and Jonathan Shear, Exeter: Imprint, 1999, ix–xviii. One might highlight • the Kantian concept whereby the self is transcendental and self-identical point of the identity; • the concept whereby the self is constantly changing because of the process of narrative construction of identity; • the concept whereby the self is constantly implied in any kind of experience. As an introduction: JOHN PERRY, *Self*, in: *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* 8, Detroit, New York etc.: Thomson/Gale, 2006, 708–711. RICHARD SORABJI, *Graeco-Roman Varieties of Self*, in: *Ancient Philosophy of the Self*, *The New Synthese Historical Library* 64, ed. by Pauliina Remes and Juha Sihvola, o. O.: Springer, 2008, 13–34; CHRISTOPHER GILL, *The Ancient Self: Issues and Approaches*, in: *Ancient Philosophy of the Self*, *The New Synthese Historical Library* 64, ed. by Pauliina Remes and Juha Sihvola, o. O.: Springer, 2008, 35–56.

² CHARLES TAYLOR, *The Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity*, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1989 (i. e. corrected print of 1987). Cf. DEREK PARFIT, *Reasons and Persons*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. For introduction and discussion see e. g. the volume ed. by JONATHAN DANCY (Reading Parfit, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), esp. JONATHAN DANCY, *Parfit and Indirectly Self-defeating Theories*, 1–23; FRANK JACKSON, *Which Effects*, 42–53 (on

He begins by narrating the philosophy of Plato whereby appropriate perception of cosmic order allows for self-knowledge and the control of passions.³ We can find this in the pseudo-platonic Alcibiades: “We should first consider the same-in-itself (πρώτων σκεπτέον εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό).”⁴ This link to the control of passions in ancient philosophy leads to the Aristotelian framework of ‘the good life’⁵ as a basic category for that self⁶ and includes as a matter of course the theological dimension. CHARLES TAYLOR calls it the moral and spiritual intuitions: “human beings are creatures of God and made in his image, or that they are immortal souls, or that they are all emanations of divine fire, or that they are all rational agents and thus have a dignity which transcends any other being”.⁷ Therefore, reaching and searching for the self means understanding what the human being

metaphysics); SYDNEY SHOEMAKER, Parfit on Identity, 135–148; SIMON BLACKBURN, Has Kant Refuted Parfit?, 180–201.

³ TAYLOR, Sources (see note 2) esp. 115–126.

⁴ [Plato] Alc. I.130d. – For platonic tradition cf. Plot Enn. 4,7,2,1 and Porphyry Abst. I 29:4.

⁵ TAYLOR, sources (see note 2) 3–24.

⁶ Cf. CHRISTOPHER GILL, The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 [pb. with small editions and variations to 2006] xv: ‘all selves are seen as structured in Stoic-Epicurean thought because they constitute psychophysical wholes or units.’

One might look at the typical phrase αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό of the platonic commentator who is inspired as well by Aristotelian philosophy: Olympiodorus Phil., In Platonis Alcibiadem commentarii, 4 line 8: [1] ὁ γὰρ Μενουκίως θάνατος δίκαιος μὲν, ὡς ὑπὲρ πατρίδος, οὐ συνήνεγκεν δὲ τῷ σώματι φθαρέντι. [2] καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ μετὰ τὸ δεῖξαι ἐν τῷ πέρατι [3] τοῦ διαλόγου ὅτι ψυχὴ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καταπαῦσαι τὸν λόγον, ὡς πάντων [4] τῶν προειλημμένων πρὸς τὴν τούτου κατασκευὴν προλεχθέντων. καὶ ὅτι [5] ὁ Σωκράτης οὐ μόνον ἀνάγειν σπουδάζει τὰ παιδικά, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τῆς [6] αὐτῆς οδοῦ ἧς καὶ αὐτὸς ἀνήχθη· λέγεται δὲ πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν ἐλθεῖν ἐκ τοῦ Πυθικοῦ γράμματος τοῦ ‘γνώθι σαυτὸν’. [7] ἐτι δὲ κάκ τοῦ παραδίδοσθαι ἐνταῦθα ῥησίδιον τοιοῦτον· [8] ‘αὐτό’, αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό. τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλως μὲν ἀκούει ὁ Πρόκλος, ἄλλως δὲ ὁ Δαμάσκιος. – Section 201 line 17: [10] ‘τὸ γνῶθι σαυτὸν ἐν λόγοις οὐδὲν μέγα, [11] ἔργῳ μόνος δὲ Ζεὺς ἐπίσταται θεῶν’. [12] τῷ μὲν γὰρ ὀνόματι ἐδόκει μικρὸν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ πράγματι δυσχερές. ‘Ἀλλ’, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἴτε ῥάδιον [13] τὸ ἀλλαχοῦ λεγόμενον ‘εἴτε [14] ῥάδιον εἴτε μὴ, ταύτη ἰτέον’. εἴτε γὰρ δυσχερές ἐστιν εἴτε [15] ῥάδιον τὸ γνῶναι ἑαυτοῦς, δεῖ πάντως γνῶναι ἑαυτοῦς. [16] Πρᾶξις σὺν θεῷ κδ’ [17] Φέρε δὴ, τίνα τρόπον εὐρεθῇ αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό [18] Τὸ προκείμενόν ἐστιν εὐρεῖν τίς ἡ οὐσία ἡμῶν, ὅτι οὐ τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν [19] ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐ τὸ συναμφοτέρον; cf. Section 203 line 21; 204 lines 3–4; 205 line 3; 209 line 19; etc. For Aristotelian sequences see Eth. eud. 1245a29–30 (the friend as ἄλλος αὐτός: ὁ γὰρ φίλος βούλεται εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία φησὶν, ἄλλος Ἡρακλῆς, ἄλλος αὐτός; cf. Eth. nic. 1166a31–32: πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς αὐτόν ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός; this conception of ‘friend’ is based on 1169b2–1170b19); see the remarks at Senecan reception at A. A. LONG, Seneca on the Self: Why Now?, in: Seneca and the Self, ed. by Shadi Bartsch and David Wray, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 20–36, esp. 29 with note 22. For the platonic Alcibiadean tradition, see CHRISTOPHER GILL, The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 [pb. with small editions and variations to 2006], 344–359, and for some more texts on Aristotelian philosophy his hints on 356 note 104; SORABJI, Varieties (see note 1) 18 with note 8.

⁷ TAYLOR, Sources (see note 2) 5. This includes a broader and wider understanding of what he calls “moral and spiritual” intuitions” (p. 4).

is about and understanding how to act persuasively and coherently. So philosophy seems to be a project of 'self-understanding'.⁸ This self-awareness as a self-knowledge precedes not only correct judgments but includes the behaviour that follows from them. Cicero describes the various steps to form our initial love of self (Fin. 3:5–6):⁹ • the first step is to set oneself in one's natural constitution; • the second step is to retain facts that are in accordance with nature (and repel those facts that are in contrast to what nature demands); • the given choice (or rejection) [#2] has to be rationalized and has to be harmonized with nature; • the Good is now understood in its true nature. This is the way we pursue a plan to form an *ars vivendi* as Cicero himself formulated it (Fin. 1:42):¹⁰ wisdom is to be regarded as an art of living and has to be the goal for everybody because wisdom is an artist. By this you can find a series of exercises and practises for care of the self that leads first to benefit for oneself but does not skip over an altruistic

⁸ Cf. MARYA SCHECHTMAN, *The Constitution of Selves*, Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1996: She tries to combine metaphysical ideas about the self and ideas about the identity of a person: questioning personal identity is understood as questioning historical life. The observed continuity in historical life ascribes our life and forms our identity as a coherent structure. For this 'conception of history' see CHRISTINA ELISABETH SEIDEL, *Persons, Self-Conceptions and Self-Self Relations*, Diss.masch., Rotterdam 2006, 27–77, 117–148 and for the recent discussion 19–22. Against this conception of Schechtman GALEN STRAWSON, *Against Narrativity*, Ratio 17 (2004), 428–452. Cf. also CHRISTOPHER GILL, *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought*, note 6). Compare the discussion of Gill in SORABJI, *Graeco-Roman Varieties of Self* (see note 1) 14–16. See furthermore RICHARD SORABJI, *Self. Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, and the reply of GILL, *The Ancient Self* (see note 1) passim. Cf. also the two studies of A. A. LONG (taken from his volume: *From Epicurus to Epictetus. Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy*, ed. by A. A. Long, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006): *Lucretius on Nature and the Epicurean Self*, 202–220, and: *Stoic Philosophers on Persons, Property-Ownership, and Community*, 335–359.

Modern discussion often relates to MICHEL FOUCAULT, *History of Sexuality II. The Use of Pleasure*, transl. Robert Hurley, New York: Vintage Books (Random House), 1990; *History of Sexuality III. The Care of the Self*, transl. Robert Hurley, New York: Vintage Books (Random House), 1986; *The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Lectures at the Collège de France (1981/82)*, transl. G. Burchell, New York, 2005. Foucault on the philosophy today: "The 'essay' – which should be understood as the essay or test by which, in the game of truth, one undergoes changes, and not as the simplistic appropriation of others for the purpose of communication – is the living substance of philosophy, at least if we assume that philosophy is still what it was in times past, i. e., an 'ascesis,' *askēsis*, an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought." (The Use of Pleasure, 9). – Cf. for reception PIERRE HADOT, *Philosophy as a Way of Life. Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, transl. Michael Chase, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995; EDWARD F. MCGUSHIN, *Foucault's Askēsis. An Introduction to the Philosophical Life, Topics in Historical Philosophy*, Evanston (ILL): Northwestern University Press 2007, esp. 97–174, 282–288; WILHELM SCHMID, *Auf der Suche nach einer neuen Lebenskunst. Die Frage nach dem Grund und die Neubegründung der Ethik bei Foucault*, stw 1487, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2000.

⁹ The basis of these steps is the empirical claim that behaviour "can be observed to have self-preservation as its goal" (PHILIPP MITSIS, *Stoicism*, in: *The Blackwell Guide to Ancient Philosophy*, ed. by Christopher Shields, Malden (MA), Oxford, Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2003, 253–267, esp. 260.

¹⁰ The Latin phrase: *sapientia, quae ars vivendi putanda est, non expeteretur, si nihil efficeret*. Cf. for this topic of '*ars vivendi*' see Cic. Fin. 1:71–72; 3:4; 4:16, 19; 5:18; Tusc. 4:5.

perspective.¹¹ The concept of a balanced life as an *ars vivendi* was pursued by Plutarch (who uses the phrase τέχνη περὶ βίον; Mor. 613b), Seneca (*ars vivendi*) and Philo.¹² The ἄσκησις is prefigured in the table-talk (*quaestionum convivialium*) by Plutarch who allows for the discussion of philosophical problems there (Mor. 613c): “I think, to deprive ourselves of the best conversations at a time when talk abounds, to debate in our schools about what is appropriate for drinking-parties, what makes a good drinking-companion, and how wine ought to be used, but to remove philosophy from the parties themselves, as though it were unable to make good in practice what it teaches in theory”.¹³ Some questions sound serious such as whether a man should be given credit for sitting at the head of a drinking party (Mor. 615c–619a), some are frivolous sounding lectures such as why men become hungrier in autumn (Mor. 635a–d). The aim in every case discussed is “the translating of our judgements into deeds, and not allowing our words to remain mere words, but to make them into actions, is, above all else, a specific mark of progress” (Mor. 84b).¹⁴

Philo does not use this phrase τέχνη περὶ βίον, but the Aristotelian τέλος at Migr. 128–131; human life and divine will have to be harmonized: “He seems here [Dtn 13:4] to be speaking allegorically, intending to represent the way in which the soul follows the divine doctrines, which has a direct reference to the honor due to the great cause of all things.”¹⁵ At Leg. 1.57 there is a close link between ἀρετή as a τέλος and τέχνη and ethos: “But virtue is both theoretical and practical; for it takes in theory, since the road which leads to it is philosophy in three of its parts – the reasoning, and the moral, and the physical part. It also

¹¹ MANFRED LANG, “Mach dich liebenswert allen, solange du lebst” (Sen Ira 3,43,1). Überlegungen zur Semantik “Liebe” bei Seneca, in: “Liebe” im Wandel der Zeiten. Kulturwissenschaftliche Perspektiven, Theologie, Kultur, Hermeneutik 3, ed. by Klaus Tanner, Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt Leipzig, 2005, 35–51, esp. 43–45.

¹² MANFRED LANG, Lebenskunst und Ethos. Beobachtungen zu Plutarch, Seneca, Philo von Alexandrien und im 1. Petrusbrief, in: Jenseits von Indikativ und Imperativ. Kontexte und Normen neutestamentlicher Ethik / Contexts and Norms of New Testament Ethics I, WUNT 238, ed. by Friedrich Wilhelm Horn und Ruben Zimmermann, Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 2009, 57–74, esp. 59–68 (Plutarch, Seneca, Philo; for Seneca see below chapter 2.1). This includes an *ars moriendi*: dying is a very active process; CATHARINE EDWARDS, Death in Ancient Rome, New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2007; cf. for New Testament scholars: MANUEL VOGEL, Commentatio mortis. 2Kor 5,1–10 auf dem Hintergrund antiker ars moriendi, FRLANT 214, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006; HERMUT LÖHR, Paulus und der Wille zur Tat. Beobachtungen zu einer frühchristlichen Theologie als Anweisung zur Lebenskunst, ZNW 98 (2007), 165–188.

¹³ Transl. Plutarch’s *Moralia* VIII (612b–697c), with an English translation by Paul A. Clement, Herbert B. Hoffleit, LCL 424, Cambridge (MA), London: Harvard University Press, 1969, 11, 13.

¹⁴ Transl. Plutarch’s *Moralia* I (1a–86a), with an English translation by Frank Cole Babbitt, LCL 197, Cambridge (MA), London: Harvard University Press, 1986, 447, 449.

¹⁵ Philo. Migr. 131.

includes action; for virtue is art conversant about the whole of life; and in life all actions are exhibited.”¹⁶

What needs to be said about Seneca? Is Seneca’s concept of an *artifex vivendi*, a part of our search of the self? At the beginning there should be two sources mentioned which are a matter of special interest: Cicero Off. 1:112; Seneca Ep. 120:22. Cicero mentions the ‘*persona*’ to describe the character of Cato in comparison to others:¹⁷ “But Cato had been endowed by nature with an austerity beyond belief, and he himself had strengthened it by unswerving consistency and had remained ever true to his purpose und fixed resolve.”¹⁸ ‘Nature’ and the later mentioned ‘*persona*’ (Cicero Off. 1:115) belongs together and are used in a Stoic sense by Seneca at Ep. 120:22:

That is how a foolish mind is most clearly demonstrated: it shows first in this shape and then in that, and is never like itself – which is, in my opinion, the most shameful of qualities. Believe me, it is a great role – to play the role of one man. But nobody can be one person except the wise man; the rest of us often shift our masks. At times you will think us thrifty and serious, at other times wasteful and idle. We continually change our characters and play a part contrary to that which we have discarded. You should therefore force yourself to maintain to the very end of life’s drama the character which you assumed at the beginning. See to it that men be able to praise you; if not, let them at least identify you. Indeed, with regard to the man whom you saw but yesterday, the question may properly be asked: ‘Who is he?’ So great a change has there been!¹⁹

Therefore, only a wise person embodies coherence of the character in contrast to a *stultus* who is incoherent.²⁰ This matter will be discussed below.

¹⁶ See: ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ καὶ θεωρητικὴ ἐστὶ καὶ πρακτικὴ· καὶ γὰρ θεωρίαν ἔχει, ὅποτε καὶ ἡ ἐπ’ αὐτὴν ὁδὸς φιλοσοφία διὰ τῶν τριῶν αὐτῆς μερῶν, τοῦ λογικοῦ, τοῦ ἠθικοῦ, τοῦ φυσικοῦ, καὶ πράξεις· ὅλου γὰρ τοῦ βίου ἐστὶ τέχνη ἡ ἀρετὴ, ἐν ᾧ καὶ αἱ σύμπασαι πράξεις.

¹⁷ LONG, Seneca (see note 6) 24 is of the opinion that with regard to the person in distinction of body to mind there is no ontologically argument but an “ethical and evaluative” one.

¹⁸ Transl.: Cicero, *De Officiis*, with an English translation by Walter Miller, London, New York: Heinemann; G. P. Putnam’s Son, 1928, 115. See the Latin text: *Catonem cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem, eamque ipse perpetua constantia roboravisset semperque in proposito susceptoque consilio permansisset*. For discussion and literature see GILL, *The Ancient Self* (see note 1) 36–45 (p. 42 note 26: literature!); EDWARDS, *Death* (see note 12) 147–159.

¹⁹ Transl.: Seneca in ten vol. VI, *Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales*, with engl. transl. by Richard M. Gummere, LCL 77, Cambridge (MA), London: Harvard University Press, 1989, 395.

²⁰ For detailed analyses of the wise man as an idealistic construction see: MANFRED LANG, *Die Kunst der Wiederholung. Beobachtungen zu Joh 20,24–29 im Anschluss an S. Kierkegaard*, in: *Repetitions and Variations in the Fourth Gospel. Style, Text, Interpretation*, BETL 223, ed. by Gilbert van Belle, Michael Labahn, Petrus Maritz, Leuven, Paris, Walpole (MA): Peeters, 2009, 631–647, esp. 633–636; MAXIMILIAN FORSCHNER, *Das Selbst- und Weltverständnis des Weisen. Über die stoische Begründung des Guten und Wertvollen*, in: *Jenseits von Indikativ und Imperativ. Kontexte und Normen neutestamentlicher Ethik / Contexts and Norms of New Testament Ethics I*, WUNT 238, ed. by Friedrich Wilhelm Horn and Ruben Zimmermann, Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 2009, 19–37; HUBERT CANKI and HILDEGARD CANKI-LINDEMAIER, *Senecas Konstruktion des Sapiens. Zur Sakralisierung der Rolle der Weisen im 1. Jh. n. Chr.*, in:

If there is any kind of ‘structured self’ in the *ars vivendi* it could be worth engaging to see whether ancient Christianity could offer some new perspectives. So, I will consider the Non-Cartesian question of what the self might be and will ask about life and existence in the present.²¹ Thus, my own contribution to the topic of ‘the Roman self’ is modest and can only be understood as a first contribution. I will develop the following thesis: How can a Roman understand the Lukan Paul as part of the concept of an *ars vivendi*? Therefore I will take up the topic in the following order: 1) the necessity to develop an *ars vivendi* (chapter 2); 2) what underlines this necessity theologically (chapter 3, esp. 3.2); 3) which is the basis of this ‘new religion’/‘new *ars vivendi*’ theologically (chapter 4); 4) and how can this ‘new *ars vivendi*’ be proved in the perspective of ethos (chapter 5). Finally some observations should be made how the Reader himself could be part of this process which is all in all a sort of ‘christian structured self’ and a project of ‘self-understanding.’

But first of all there are some short remarks about why a Roman who might read Christian texts esp. the story of Paul in Luke-Acts would be concerned with the ‘Christian self’ as a ‘Christian art of living.’ Therefore the next passage will deal with the framework for reception to illustrate why a Roman could read Christian texts.

1.2 The Framework for Reception

Why should a Roman read Christian texts? Tacitus, for example, illustrated sufficiently what one might think of this Christian group. Also Suetonius’ judgement is not very different and from the start seems to answer the question with “a Roman would *not* read them.” These and other observations have been pointed out to me in conversations with colleagues about this theme. At least two observations, however, open further perspectives: First, the judgement represented by these ancient authors represents that of the senatorial upper class,²² and therefore results in a somewhat distorted picture because in particular the Roman self-

Weisheit, Archäologie der literarischen Kommunikation 3, ed. by Aleida Assmann, München 1991, 205–222; cf. LONG, Seneca (see note 6) 29 (with note 22).

²¹ Cf. LONG, Seneca (see note 6) 20–36.

²² Both, Tacitus and Suetonius, belong to the senatorial upper class. Tacitus (Ann. XV 44:2–5) seems to change the *vulgus* ‘Chrestianoī’ into the right one, Christianoi and does not agree that the Christians are called as “Biedermänner.” It could be an ironical illusion of the senatorial historian on the *vulgus*’ attribution of the Christians. HILDBRECHT HOMMEL, Tacitus und die Christen, in: Sebasmata. Studien zur antiken Religionsgeschichte und zum frühen Christentum II, WUNT 32, ed. by Hildebrecht Hommel, Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck 1984, 174–199, esp. 177–180, 196, votes for itacism Χρηστιανοί into Χριστιανοί; Cornelius Tacitus, Annalen IV, erl. und mit einer Einl. versehen von Erich Koestermann, WKGLS, Heidelberg: Winter 1968, 253–254 votes that the irony is to be found at Tertullian not in Tacitus. It seems to Tacitus as *superstitio*; see GUDRUN GUTTENBERGER, *Superstitio*. Facetten eines antik-religionstheoretischen Diskurses und die Genese des frühen Christentums als *religio*, in: Beiträge zur urchristlichen

image was formed in the context of *memoria*.²³ This socio-historical argument is supplemented by a sociological²⁴ one since in the first Christian century the number of rising provincials drastically increased and resulted in a genuine competition. The former were forced to oppose a social rise with a cultural one. They had to explain why they had recourse to particular forms of the “art of living” in insecure times that were not only oppressive but also innovative. Second, the theme “law” interested a Roman as much as a Christian – in the “New Wettstein” almost 110 texts concerning Matt 5:17 give an impression of the many points of contact between the Roman and Christian concepts of the art of living.²⁵ Or, to mention another theme: The recently published “New Wettstein” on Mark contains more than 40 texts concerning “son of God” (υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ).²⁶ With

Theologiegeschichte, BZNW 163, ed. by Wolfgang Kraus, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter 2009, 183–227, esp. 182–208.

²³ The Senecan *occupati* are loosing their past because they are only dealing with their future. The reason is based upon the character of time: “the present time is short, the future is doubtful, the past is certain.” These *occupati* have lost control of the past. They are unwilling “to direct their thoughts backward to ill-spent hours.” They cannot turn and look behind (*flectere se ac respicere non possunt*; all texts: Sen Brev. 10:2–3, 5; cf. Ep. 124:17; both translations Seneca, Moral Essays II, with an English Translation by John W. Basore, LCL 254, Cambridge [MA], London: Harvard University Press 1990, 317). Life needs this looking behind which is made possible by the *memoria*. That is the way Cicero calls history which “gives life to recollection” (*vita memoria*; De Orat 2:36; Translation: Cicero in 28 volumes III. De Oratore in two Volumes I, with an English Translation by E. W. Sutton, and H. Rackham, LCL 348, London, Cambridge [MA]: Harvard University Press 1967, 225). Seneca seems to read his own time as depraved: Sen Ep. 95:23; Plin Nat. 2.117–118 and before Sallust Cat. 10:1–2. The philosophical basis seems to be Stoic ethics. For analyses see ECKART SCHÜTRUMPF, Die Depravierung Roms nach den Erfolgen des Imperiums bei Sallust, Bellum Catilinae Kap. 10 – philosophische Reminiszenzen, in: Imperium Romanum. Studien zu Geschichte und Rezeption, FS Karl Christ, ed. by Peter Kneissl und Volker Losemann, Stuttgart 1998, 674–689, esp. 678–689 and for the context with *memoria* UWE WALTER, *Memoria und res publica*. Zur Geschichtskultur im republikanischen Rom, Studien zur Alten Geschichte 1, Frankfurt 2004, 321–329.


²⁴ One might add another position taken from the Forschungsgeschichte: Ancient Christianity starts at the lower/lowest class without ‘any contact’ to the upper class. Therefore the Roman *equites* are not interested in this ‘christian way of life.’ ADOLF VON HARNACK disputes this socio-romantic view favored in the 19th century: “Auf die ‘Heiden’ konnte die christliche Predigt niemals den Eindruck einer naiven Religion machen, die sich an die naive Religiosität richte – trotz des geschichtlich=mythologischen Stoffs, den sie mitbrachte. Sie konnte das nicht, weil sie als Monotheismus und spirituelle Moral an sich[,] und zumal für die ‘Heiden’[,] in der Sphäre der Philosophie lag (wie schon das Judentum) und diesen Charakter nie verlieren konnte, mochte ihr mythologischer, pneumatischer, sakramentaler und autoritativer Apparat noch so groß sein. Diese Religion richtete sich keineswegs an das naive religiöse Bewußtsein allein, sondern immer an ein reflektiertes zugleich.” ADOLF HARNACK, Das Urchristentum und die sozialen Fragen, PrJ 131 (1908), 443–459, esp. 451.

²⁵ Neuer Wettstein, Texte zum Neuen Testament aus Griechentum und Hellenismus I/1.2: Texte zum Matthäusevangelium, ed. by Udo Schnelle in collaboration with Manfred Lang and Michael Labahn, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, forthcoming (2011).

²⁶ Neuer Wettstein, Texte zum Neuen Testament aus Griechentum und Hellenismus I/1.1: Texte zum Markusevangelium, ed. by Udo Schnelle in collaboration with Manfred Lang and Michael Labahn, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008, 734–745; cf. the phrase σωτήρ τοῦ

this I want not only to make a contribution to the aesthetic reception but also to Roman anthropology by looking at what “a Roman” was capable of in his or her basic judgement.

With which model should such an understanding be contemplated?²⁷ There is no lack of models that include newer questions and make them fruitful for exegesis. I choose the following model which claims to be especially close to observations about the text themselves. The explanatory outline below will illustrate the paradigm:²⁸



The author – open to his environment – constructs his world by describing that which is to be represented (facts; F) and by making connections (C). The connections themselves first have to be made by him through enrichment and the

κόσμον at John 4:42 at: Neuer Wettstein, *Texte zum Neuen Testament aus Griechenland und Hellenismus I/2: Texte zum Johannesevangelium*, ed. by Udo Schnelle in collaboration with Michael Labahn und Manfred Lang, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001, 239–257 (nearly 50 texts, mostly epigraphical material).

²⁷ More details and arguments are presented in MANFRED LANG, *Die Kunst des christlichen Lebens. Rezeptionsästhetische Studien zum lukanischen Paulusbild*, ABG 29, Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt Leipzig, 2008, 56–89.

²⁸ The figure is inspired by KARL BÜHLER, *Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache*, Mit einer Einführung von Friedrich Kainz, UTB 1159, Stuttgart, New York: Gustav Fischer-Verlag, 1982 (= 1934), 28; WOLFGANG SCHNOTZ, *Aufbau von Wissensstrukturen. Untersuchungen zur Kohärenzbildung bei Wissenserwerb mit Texten*, Fortschritte der psychologischen Forschung 20, Weinheim: Psychologie Verlags Union, 1994, 130; THOMAS DAIBER, *Text/Wiederholung. Das Problem der Paraphrase am Beispiel polnischer Psalmreformulierungen des 16. Jahrhunderts*, Habil. masch., Halle 2002, 406.

creation of inferences (I). He also has to make sure to provide an ending corresponding to the beginning. Sub-topics (S-T) supplement this communication.

The text itself is the result of this process of representing a certain fact as a specific problem solving strategy. It is this authorial structure which is put together in *rhemata*. These *rhemata* can rise toward an improved situation or descend toward a more tragic one, and all together form the theme. Even when the text appears to be closed, this applies only to the beginning and ending. Without doubt it is open to many more forms of re-representation than those presented. Connections, inferences, sub-topics in the given context mark the text in a special way.

The one who is to re-represent the process (recipient) converts the process represented by the author. However, with the help of “extended” pre-knowledge the recipient infers that which the text offers as a possible interpretation. He, too, is open to his environment which continuously provides him with components for his frames. This dynamically corrected “result,” which is open for further interpretations is also represented. The one who re-represents provides an ending appropriate to the beginning as does the author when he thinks he has finished reading the text.

2. *The Recipient as Artifex Vivendi*

2.1 *The Necessity to Develop an Art of Living*

The modern sounding theme of the “art of living” is a well known theme mainly of the first post-Christian century: As mentioned above Philo of Alexandria, Plutarch and Seneca often have recourse to this motif. Special attention should be paid to Seneca because – in addition to his philosophical exertions – he himself had to develop such an art of living in order to make his life secure in difficult times by acting as a *sapiens*.²⁹ This can only be described in some theses:³⁰

²⁹ Some examples to make this “acting in difficult times” more plausible: 1) Seneca's own life in confrontation to Nero leads him to write his letters to Lucilius as introduction in Stoic life (and everybody who is interested in the search of *lux*; see below note 32). 2) Several years later Tacitus' *Agricola* is a fine paradigm acting in difficult times of Domitian by loosing the *libertas*; see DIETER FLACH, *Plinius und Tacitus über die Christen*, in: *Imperium Romanum. Studien zu Geschichte und Rezeption*, FS Karl Christ, ed. by Peter Kneissl and Volker Losemann, Stuttgart 1998, 218–232, esp. 220. P. Cornelius Tacitus, *Die Historien I*, Kommentar von Heinz Heubner, WKGLS, Heidelberg 1963, 13: “*libertas* war in bewußter Verbindung Charakteristikum der republikanischen Geschichtsschreibung” (parts of this in italics) and *Tac Agr.* 1:4–2:3; 40:3; *Hist.* I 1:4. 3. For Stoic opponents of the Senate, such as Cremutius Cordus, see *Sen Marc.* 1:3 and *Quint Inst.* X 1:104. For his death as one result of being an actor in difficult times see MANFRED LANG, *Der bonus dux. Tacitus' Agricola und der lukianische Paulus*, in: *Die Apostelgeschichte im Kontext antiker und frühchristlicher Historiographie*, BZNW 162, ed. by Jörg Frey, Clare K. Rothschild, and Jens Schröter, in collaboration with Bettina Rost, Berlin, New York 2009: Walter de Gruyter, 244–276, esp. 246–253; WERNER SUERBAUM, *Der Historiker und die Freiheit des*

1. The necessity to develop an art of living comes from the fact that human beings live with a wrong attitude that makes them think that their soul is sound (Ep. 53:8). They may have a body bursting with strength, but if they do not also think of their soul, they are like an idiot (Ep. 15:1)! Therefore they are asked to apply the same exercises to their soul: *exerce animum* (Ep. 15:5).
 - 1.1 Philosophy promises health.
 - 1.1.1 The address *si vales bene est, ego valeo* which was changed on purpose in: *si philosopharis bene est* (Ep. 15:1) presents the program.
 - 1.1.2 Philosophy promises happiness because through daily *meditatio* and *exercitatio* (Ep. 33:8) it helps to steer the life ship through dangers (Ep. 16:3; 20:2–4, 9–11). Philosophy therefore has the task to awaken from this wrong attitude (*expergiscamur* Ep. 53:8).
 - 1.1.3 Human beings are constantly subject to attacks from a hostile power, which they must fight back (Ep. 51:6–8). Here philosophy is especially helpful because it protects and teaches how to bear fate.
 - 1.2 Philosophy as an expression of this appropriate life.
 - 1.1.1 Human beings are responsible for their ethical attitude. As a pre-condition they need to aim at freedom, i. e. freedom from all affections (Ep. 17:6).
 - 1.1.2 *Humanitas* is not bound to *natura* or *fortuna* but is everyone's duty: Nobility and slavery do not predispose for *virtus*.
2. Self-salvation happens as an unmasking of the world by differentiating between the necessary and the superfluous.
 - 2.1 Realizing this freedom means unmasking the world.
 - 2.1.1 Things must put on their own face in order to be clear in their real content: What do these things offer? Are they necessary or superfluous?
 - 2.1.2 He who sees through this relation can also help other people (Ben. IV 26:1).

Wortes. Die Rede des Cremutius Cordus bei Tacitus, Ann. 4,34/35, in: Politik und literarische Kunst im Werk des Tacitus, ed. by Gerhard Radke, Stuttgart: Klett 1971, 61–99.

Is there a reason why a writer living in these times uses “Gattungen” like Agricola? “In ihm [Agricola] finden sich Elemente der moralisierenden Biographie, der Leichenrede, der Lobrede und der geographisch-ethnographischen Darstellung zusammen mit solchen der politischen Geschichtsschreibung. (...) Freilich wird hier nicht zueinander Unpassendes zusammengezwungen, sondern es werden Komponenten zusammengefügt, die, welcher Herkunft auch immer, schon seit Jahrhunderten der Geschichtsschreibung nahestanden oder sogar bereits angehört haben.” ANDREAS MEHL, Römische Geschichtsschreibung. Grundlagen und Entwicklung, Eine Einführung, Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln 2001, 119 (ET: Roman Historiography. An Introduction to its Basic Aspects and Development, transl. by Hans-Friedrich Mueller, Chichester, Malden [MA]: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).

³⁰ For further discussion and analyses see LANG, Kunst (see note 27) 148–165, esp. GABRIELE KUEN, Die Philosophie als “dux vitae.” Die Verknüpfung von Gehalt, Intention und Darstellungsweise im philosophischen Werk Senecas am Beispiel des Dialogs “De vita beata.” Einleitung, Wortkommentar und systematische Darstellung, WKGLS, Heidelberg: Winter, 1994, esp. 335–443; JOHN M. RIST, Seneca and Stoic Orthodoxy, ANRW 36.3, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1989, 1993–2012; KARLHANS ABEL, *Recognitio Sui*. Seneca im Spiegel seiner und seines Selbst, Pöner stoische Studien 2, Marburg 1989; PIERRE GRIMAL, Seneca. Macht und Ohnmacht des Geistes, transl. Karlhans Abel, Impulse der Forschung [IdF] 24, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1978; further literature on Roman Stoicism can be found in: ILARIA RAMELLI, Hierocles the Stoic. Elements of Ethics, Fragments, and Excerpts, transl. by David Konstan, SBL Writings from the Greco-Roman World 28, Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2009, xix–xxi note 1.

- 2.2 The only aim is *bonum* which also serves as *honestum* (Ep. 74:10).
 - 2.2.1 For the good person there is no *malum*, only *incommodum* (Ep. 74:17).
 - 2.2.2 *Mala* therefore cannot adversely affect life: An ascetic life therefore, has the aim to aspire to the *bonum*.
- 2.3 A homogeneous aim of life is the sign of the integrity of human beings.
 - 2.3.1 Such a life is led as *praemeditatio malorum* or *praemeditatio mortis*, respectively.
 - 2.3.2 Death is therefore not foreign but *transitus aut finis* to the “eternal birthday” (Ep. 102:26).
 - 2.3.3 The homogeneous aim of life as art of living is life in a new robe (Ep. 4:2–6) which leads the *amor sui* with leniency and strictness (Ep. 14:3), guides to admonition and further development in the circle of friends (Ep. 6:1f) and finds its visible reflection in the treatment of slaves (Ep. 57:11, 13, 18f).

2.2 The Search for an *Artifex Vivendi*

This philosophy from Seneca is first addressed to a person named Lucilius whose interest in Stoic philosophy has been awakened and who is meant to be introduced into such a Stoic philosophy with these letters from Seneca. Coming from a presumably poor family Lucilius had risen to the equestrian rank through hard work and was entitled to one of the 14 coveted theater seats (Seneca Ep. 44:2).³¹ In 63/64 he was procurator in Sicily and was maybe 10 years younger than Seneca. The rise in Seneca’s ‘ordo’ had been an astonishing one and now had to be supplemented by a ‘mental’ rise. As such an argumentative help Seneca considered his letters which he not only intended for publication but also for everybody who, like Lucilius, was searching for the ‘light of knowledge.’³²

How would such a ‘phenomenological Lucilius,’³³ who is only interested in the argumentation concerning the art of living and therefore can also enter foreign territory as a scout (*explorator*; Ep. 2:5), obtain Luke’s writing? Most probably through the usual custom of exchanging via personal contacts what was considered of value for philosophical seekers. Thus we can read in a letter that a Theon from the Egyptian Oxyrhynchus not only sends to his friend a sorted, selected list of books worth reading that he can borrow³⁴ but already classifies these books

³¹ Cf. ULF GREGOR HAMACHER, Senecas 82. Brief an Lucilius. Dialektikkritik illustriert am Beispiel der Bekämpfung des *metus mortis*. Ein Kommentar, BzA 230, München, Leipzig: Saur Verlag, 2006, 42–46.

³² Cf.: Seneca’s *Epistulae morales* as an introduction into philosophy: ERWIN HACHMANN, Die Führung des Lesers in Senecas *Epistulae morales*, Orbis Antiquus 34, Münster: Aschendorff, 1995.

³³ ILSETRAUT HADOT, Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung, QSGP 13, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969, 142–178; HILDEGARD CANKI, Untersuchungen zu Senecas *Epistulae morales*, Spudasmata 18, Hildesheim: Olms, 1967, 66–68, 138–151.

³⁴ A letter from Oxyrhynchus from Theon to Herakleides: “‘Theon an Herakleides, seinen Freund, Wohlergehen. So wie ich allen Eifer aufbringe, brauchbare Bücher zu beschaffen und möglichst nützlich für die Lebensführung, so, denke ich, solltest auch Du dich [sic.] herablas-

as useful for leading one's life. In order to help the friend, who is suffering from lack of time, to find important passages one can even leave book marks in such books – as people also do today (Sen Ep. 6:5).³⁵

3. The Overpowering of the *Theomach* (Acts 5–12)

The question of how to live in this world is based on every individual's underlying attitudes toward life. It is related to decisions and perspectives which show themselves more or less determined by these attitudes.

3.1 Background of a Possible Reception

At first let me summarize the content of that large folio which can be referred to and which can be described by the term θεομάχος and as it is described at Euripides (*Bacchae*):³⁶ the King of Thebes, Pentheus, persecutes the new religion of the Dionysus cult which has entered his realm and caused much confusion. Because it contradicts the usual standards, Pentheus becomes more and more a θεομάχος in his defensive actions. Dionysus himself meets him as the god who demands worship and supports this request with numerous liberation miracles and other proofs. Against both opponents stands the seer Tiresias who knows

sen (und) nicht nachlässig sein im Lesen. Nicht (nur) der gewöhnliche Nutzen wird von ihnen denjenigen zuteil, die ernsthaft sind im Profitieren-Wollen. Das was durch Achilles geschickt ist, ist das (unten) Aufgelistete. (...) Von Boethos »Über Übung/Training«, Von Diogenes »Über Ehe«, Von Diogenes »Über Trauerlosigkeit«, Von Chrysipp »Über den Nutzen von Eltern«, Von Antipatros »Über den Nutzen von Sklaven«, Von Poseidonios »Über Austreibung III«.” Transl. taken from JULIAN KRÜGER, *Oxyrhynchos in der Kaiserzeit. Studien zur Topographie und Literaturrezeption*, EHS.G 441, Frankfurt, Bern, New York, Paris: Peter Lang, 1990, 205–6; cf. Plutarch *Mor.* 612e.

³⁵ For ancient education see: ANDREAS MEHL, *Erziehung zum Hellenen – Erziehung zum Weltbürger. Bemerkungen zum Gymnasium im hellenistischen Osten*, Nikephoros 5 (1992), 43–73; ANDREAS MEHL, *Religiöse Erziehung und Unterweisung in der griechischen Antike*, in: *Religiöse Erziehung und Religionsunterricht*, Schriftenreihe zum bayerischen Schulmuseum Ichenhausen 13, ed. by Max Liedtke, Bad Heilbrunn: Klinkhardt 1994, 67–86; TOR VEGGE, *Paulus und das antike Schulwesen. Schule und Bildung des Paulus*, BZNW 134, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter 2006, 3–340.

³⁶ It is important to note: Euripides is the first who describes the phenomenon of θεομάχος together with the rising of a 'new religion'; Aeschylus *Ag.* 1624 and Pindar *Pyth.* 2:94–97 do not have this link. Cf. J. R. C. COUSLAND, *Dionysus theomachos? Echoes of the Bacchae* in 3 *Mac-cabees*, *Bib* 82 (2001), 539–548. For reception of Euripides in 1st century AD: HERMANN FUNKE, *Euripides*, *JAC* 8/9 (1965/1966), Münster: Aschendorff, 1967, 233–279, esp. 244: "Die allgemeine E[uripides]-Kenntnis bei den Gebildeten der Kaiserzeit (...) ist, wie man den Schriftstellern im einzelnen entnehmen kann, umfangreich: Man kann 'seinen E[uripides]' auswendig wie 'seinen Homer'". Furthermore there are the following texts discussed e. g. 2 *Macc* 3:7–34; 4 *Macc* 4:1–14; *Jos. Asen.* 10:17; 12:1–15; 14:2–15; 15:2–6; Apuleius *Metam.* 11.15.

not only about future fame but also (vainly) warns the King.³⁷ He cannot change the King's mind and neither can the King's mother, Agaue, who already follows the new religion. When she murders her son in ecstatic rapture and thus seals the fate of the one whose opposition against the god led to an impossible and life-endangering protest against the powers as *πρὸς κέντρα λακτίζειν*, she as a disciple shows the difficulties which await the followers of this new religion.

3.2 God Takes the Theomach into Service

3.2.1. The Broader Context

The context as a possible framework of the reception of a text and its units naturally depends upon the communicator's intention. Luke develops his intention in chapters 5 and 7–9 and again in chapter 12 in a way which will now be explored further. Let me focus on ch. 7–9.

3.2.2. The Confrontation (Acts 9:1–30)

3.2.2.1. Blinding and Insight (Acts 9:1–19a)

Following a dramatic and deadly conflict, Luke describes from two perspectives the success of this new religion despite and in the face of threats: The new religion moves south into Ethiopia and north into Samaria. Saul goes in this latter direction with the zeal of a Pentheus against Maenadic victims/sacrifices. The security which appears to have been provided by a juridical writing (the letters from the high priest) breaks suddenly³⁸ and the other world³⁹ descends upon him like the heavenly hosts descended upon the shepherds (Luke 2:13): "No disaster, to be sure, but neither a sweetly comfortable happening, no *gemütliche Weihnachtsabend in der warmen Stube*."⁴⁰ In keeping with Acts 8:1,3,⁴¹ Saul is described as

³⁷ See: GHERARDO UGOLINI, *Untersuchungen zur Figur des Sehers Teiresias*, *Classica Monasterii* 12, Tübingen: Narr Verlag, 1995, 139–149, 202–204.

³⁸ It is a characteristic Lukan phrase: *ἐξαίφνης* cf. Luke 2:13; 9:39; Acts 9:3; 22:6; *ἄφνω* in Acts 2:2; 16:26; 28:6.

³⁹ For visions Xenophon *Cyr.* IV 2:15 and the collected material in: Neuer Wettstein, *Texte zum Neuen Testament aus Griechenland und Hellenismus I/2*, (see note 26) 484–85.451.848 (Philo *Migr.* 69, Lucian *Hermot.* 49; *Tim.* 27; Hesiod *Op.* 281–283); 29–33 (thematic presented: Homer *Il.* 18:101–102; *Od.* 4:539–40.832–33; Sophocles *Phil.* 415–1212; "Licht im Sinne von Rettendem / Heilbringendem"; Homer *Il.* 16:38–9; [Plato] *Alc.* 1:134d; Aeschylus *Pers.* 299–301; Sophocles *Trach.* 203–04); "Licht im Sinne von Glück / Heil / göttlicher Sphäre": Plato *Phaedr.* 250b–c; Aristophanes *Plut.* 640; Ael *Arist. Or.* 5:51; Porphyry *Marc.* 20). See further: BERNHARD HEININGER, *Paulus als Visionär. Eine religionsgeschichtliche Studie*, HBS 9, Freiburg, Basel, Wien, Barcelona, Rom, New York: Herder, 1996, 73–110.

⁴⁰ DAVID DAUBE, *The Sudden in the Scriptures*, Leiden: Brill, 1964, 30 (italics David Daube).

⁴¹ Cf. for *λυμαίνω*: Euripides *Bacch.* 632 (and context: 620–631!). For questions concerning Acts 8:1–3 see RICHARD I. PERVO, *Acts. A Commentary*, Hermeneia, Minneapolis (MN): Augsburg Press, 2009, 199–200, and for composition 201: "The death of Stephen concludes the

the persecutor⁴² who was harassing the followers of the new religion but is now harassed himself as he loses control⁴³ “for hard are the gods to look upon when they appear in manifest presence⁴⁴” (Homer Il. 20:131): with no escape any more, Saul is addressed. The ascended one himself stands in front of his persecuted disciples and thus confronts the persecutor with the sacrilege of Pentheus – see the text critical variant in verses 4 and 6 and the definitive text in 26:14 – he sticks to his plan. In order to make it impossible for Saul to avoid his fate through leveling, his companions can hear what it is all about – only Saul does not have ‘insight’ into the meaning of the event. If Saul wants to come to further insights, he will have to courageously navigate the cliffs of theomachy if he does not want to be smashed by them. In full concentration on this understanding – with temporary asceticism and in total blindness – he now has to “live in accordance with the highest thing in him”⁴⁵ – to quote Aristotle (Eth. nic. 1177b33; see Acts 17:28). Saul reaches the straight path on which not only God is coming, who is the beginning and end and middle of everything that is, but also Ananias in hymn, thanksgiving, entreaty, lament, and prayer. After having regained his ‘sight’ he is now also given ‘sight’ into his own fate:⁴⁶ He will suffer what he himself – watching Stephen from the periphery – witnessed and initiated: martyrdom. In quick

cycle that began at 3:1. It is a story of the rapid and enormous growth of an ideal community that persecution cannot eliminate or even check. Into the furrows of this carefully crafted dramatic narrative, with its alternation of tension and relaxation amidst an increasing crescendo of violence, the narrator has cast the seeds of the future Diaspora and gentile missions.” Similar BRUCE J. MALINA, JOHN J. PILCH, *Social-Science Commentary on the Book of Acts*, Minneapolis (MN): Fortress Press, 2008, 61–2 (composed as a bracket); cf. DAVID G. PETERSON, *Acts of the Apostles*, Grand Rapids (MI): Eerdmans, 2009, 32–6, 237.

⁴² For ἀπειλῆς καὶ φόβου cf. PIETER WILLEM VAN DER HORST, *Drohung und Mord schnaubend* (Act IX 1), *NovT* 12 (1970), 257–269. Describing Acts 8:1,3; 9:1ff in terms of Euripidean Bacchae cf.: LANG, *Kunst* (see note 27) 201–250; DETLEF ZIEGLER, *Dionysos in der Apostelgeschichte – eine intertextuelle Lektüre*, *Religion und Biographie* 18, Münster: Lit Verlag 2008, 150–193 and more recently JAN SCHÄFER, *Zur Funktion der Dionysosmysterien in der Apostelgeschichte. Eine intertextuelle Betrachtung der Berufungs- und Befreiungserzählungen in der Apostelgeschichte und der Bakchen des Euripides*, *TZ* 66 (2010), 199–222: The message of Christ and the cult are “Hilfsmittel für die Darstellung der christlichen Lehre in der hellenistischen Kultur und bieten dem Leser eine *interpretatio Graeca* des Evangeliums.” (p. 220).

⁴³ See the link to chap. 26 (and 12:1–25): Paul is out of control JOHN CLAYTON LENTZ, Jr., *Luke’s Portrait of Paul*, *MSS. NTS* 77, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 84–87: “After Paul’s conversion he has self-control and is sober and therefore has become virtuous.” (p. 87).

⁴⁴ Homer Il. 20:131.

⁴⁵ Transl. H. Rackham, Aristotle. *The Nicomachean Ethics*, LCL, Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 1990 (i.e. 1934), 617.

⁴⁶ Ὁράω κτλ. for ‘understand’ e.g. Sir 2:10; Thuc V 27:2; Plato Resp. 527d–e; Tim. 47a–b; Aristotle *Metaph.* 980a24ff; Sophocles *Phil.* 110; Dio Chrys 3 Regn. 62. Cf. MALINA, PILCH, *Acts* (see note 41) 68, and with interests in physiognomic readings: CHAD HARTSOCK, *Sight and Blindness in Luke-Acts. The Use of Physical Features in Characterization*, *BibInt Series* 94, Leiden: Brill, 2008, 53–124 (context), 184–197 (Acts 9).

succession the laying on of hands, healing and recovery are mentioned.⁴⁷ Now Saul, who becomes Paul, may walk the *ρύμη ἢ εὐθεΐα*.

One cannot appreciate enough the revolutionary importance of these events – to summarize Luke: The theomachus has become a theophilus!

3.2.2.2. *Leading an Insightful Life (Acts 9:19b–30)*

Two episodes (verses 19b–25 and 26–30) which I will mention only briefly describe the effect of the new insight and start with *εὐθέως* which “signals the precipitousness of Saul’s new activity, felt both by his first hearers, and undoubtedly by Luke’s reader as well”.⁴⁸ Now the story no longer deals with *πορθέω* but with *κηρύσσω*. The followers no longer have to worry about their own life. At the most there is the rumor of Saul having turned from a theomachus into a theophilus. This new ‘insight’ also gives Saul a new face because the congregation can look into the eyes of its new preacher in a new manner. The very suitable instrument furthermore brings many talents to the business of ‘preaching,’ having been introduced by Barnabas to *παρηρησία* and knowing how to defend himself in a manner suited to the occasion.⁴⁹ Now the theomach circle which began in 5:39⁵⁰ closes when Saul disputes with the Jews in the same manner in which Stephen did before (6:9): Having seemingly stood at the periphery during the stoning of Stephen, he has now taken his place.⁵¹

4. *The Basis: God in the One Resurrected for All (Acts 17:16–34)*

How should this sort of Christian ‘*ars vivendi*’ be keeping in mind that everything is to be attributed to God (Cic Leg. 2:26). This is the way Roman religion

⁴⁷ Cf. MALINA, PILCH, Acts (see note 41) 70: “Ananias performs the prophetic symbolic action as commanded by the Lord. It consists of laying on of hands. *Three Zones of Personality*. Hand symbolize power, effectiveness. This is shown by Ananias’s words describing the significance of the action: to regain sight and to be filled with the Holy Spirit.” (italics are bold by Malina, Pilch; these are “Reading scenarios for the Acts of the Apostles” at the end of the commentary: 185–237).

⁴⁸ LUKE T. JOHNSON, *The Acts of the Apostles*, SacPag 5, Collegeville (MN): Liturgical Press, 1992, 170.

⁴⁹ The philosophical background of *συζητέω* suggests itself: Philo Det. 1; Legat. 3:131; Op. 54; Plato Crat. 384c; Menex. 90b; Pap. Oxy. 1673:20; cf. also LANG, Kunst (see note 27) 284–85 note 134 for *ζητέω*.

⁵⁰ Cf. LYNN ALLAN KAUPPI, *Foreign but Familiar Gods. Greco-Romans Read Religion in Acts*, LNTS 277, London: T & T Clark 2006, 89–91 (but with reference to Aeschylus Eum. 1003–1047).

⁵¹ Cf. MALINA, PILCH, Acts (see note 41) 73: “As with Stephen previously, Saul too has success in challenging local Judeans with his demonstration of why Jesus is Israel’s forthcoming Messiah. The result is that those challenged feel aggrieved and dishonored, hence plot to kill him. The motive is the same establishment violence that previously motivated Saul. *Establishment Violence*.” (italics are bold in Malina, Pilch).

works.⁵² Therefore, let us have a look at the way Christians attribute things to God. Acts 17:16–34 gives a most momentous answer here and in my context can only be presented very superficially.⁵³

4.1 *The Starting Thesis: V. 16–21,31*

The speech, which on the whole is constructed very artistically and contains many rhetorical subtleties,⁵⁴ first mentions in v. 16–21 the key word which is picked up again in an inclusio in v. 31: The proclamation of Jesus of Nazareth who was raised from the dead is the main point of the speech. While at first one can suspect that Paul wants to talk about two gods, toward the end of the speech it is much clearer that different options in the reception lie precisely in the hearing of this message. Although the Epicureans may see fewer points of contact here than

⁵² Things happened to people were asked whether God is responsible for it: *homines existimare oportere omnia <quae> cernerent deorum esse plena*; Cic Leg. 2:26. To get influence on God see Liv V 21:2–3; VIII 9:5–10:14. For analyses see KURT LATTE, *Römische Religionsgeschichte*, HAW V/4, München: Beck 1960 and esp. 211f: “Echte, schöpferische religiöse Kraft fehlt der römischen Pontifikalreligion. Wie das römische Amtsrecht bemüht sie sich, neu auftretende Fälle einer Tradition einzuordnen, deren ehrwürdiges Alter als empirische Bestätigung für die Richtigkeit des eigenen Handelns empfunden wird. Das Verhältnis zu den unsichtbaren Mächten wird durch ein Netz von Einzelvorschriften geregelt, die verraten, daß ein spontanes Bedürfnis für unmittelbare Beziehungen nicht bestand. Es entwickelt sich eine Technik des Verhaltens zu den Göttern, die in immer neuen Variationen die alten Riten wiederholt. Es geht nicht darum, sich den Göttern zu nähern, sondern ihnen ihr Recht werden zu lassen, ihnen zu geben, was ihnen gebührt.”

⁵³ For broad discussion: PERVO, Acts (see note 41) 423–42; PETERSON, Acts (see note 41) 486–505; LANG, Kunst (see note 27) 251–314; DARRELL L. BOCK, Acts, BECNT, Grand Rapids (MI): Baker Academic, 2007, 560–74; KAUPPI, Gods (see note 50) 83–93; DETLEV DORMEYER, Weisheit und Philosophie in der Apostelgeschichte (Apg 6,1–8,1a und 17,16–34), Die Weisheit – Ursprünge und Rezeption, NTAbh 44, FS Karl Löning, ed. by Martin Fassnacht, Andreas Leinhäupl-Wilke, and Stefan Lücking, Münster: Aschendorff, 2003, 155–184; ANDREAS LINDEMANN, Die Christuspredigt des Paulus in Athen (Act 17,16–33), in: Texts and Contexts. Biblical Texts in Their Textual and Situational Contexts, FS Lars Hartman, ed. by Tord Fornberg and David Hellholm, Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Boston: Scandinavian University Press, 1995, 245–255; DAVID L. BALCH, The Areopagus Speech. An Appeal to the Stoic Historian Posidonius against Later Stoics and the Epicureans, in: Greeks, Romans, and Christians, FS Abraham J. Malherbe, ed. by David L. Balch, Everett Ferguson, Wayne A. Meeks, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990, 52–79; JEROME H. NEYREY, Acts 17, Epicureans, and Theodicy: A Study in Stereotypes, in: Greeks, Romans, and Christians, FS Abraham J. Malherbe, ed. by David L. Balch, Everett Ferguson, Wayne A. Meeks, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990, 118–134. For reception (Wirkungsgeschichte): MICHAEL FIEDROWICZ, Die Rezeption und Interpretation der paulinischen Areopag-Rede in der patristischen Theologie, TTZ 111 (2002), 85–105. Modern scholars attest the wide hellenistic colour of this speech, esp. Stoic philosophy. I keep on focusing on Senecian philosophy.

⁵⁴ See the list in MIKAEL C. PARSONS, Acts, ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑ Commentaries on the New Testament, Grand Rapids (MI): Baker Academic, 2008, 249. Against PERVO, Acts (see note 41) 429–30: “A cultured Greek would dismiss these brief words as a stylistically inadequate and muddled collection of clichés with an unexpected and improbable conclusion, but it has power and vigor that would have eluded such critics, and, as an experiment in missionary theology, it continues to challenge Christian thinkers.”

the Stoics who know the idea of a ‘conditional resurrection’ (Sen Marc. 24:5; 25:3; cf. 19:6 and Ep. 102:26), already here the question arises obliquely whether one is dealing with an *otium* or a *negotium*. Particularly the reaction after what has been reported in v. 31 underlines this fundamental decision with the help of the exemplary reaction of Damaris and the Areopagite Dionysius on the one hand and the negative attitude of others standing by. This also shows that the inscription on the altar is not at all the topic of the speech and that therefore the question after God is at the center. Further, the speech about God is ‘only’ the peg on which to hang the speech about the resurrected Jesus of Nazareth.

4.2 The God who Turns Towards Humanity: V. 22–31

4.2.1. V. 22f

These two verses describe how much the piety of Athens⁵⁵ (and Rome⁵⁶) was praised and had become a by-word. Although altar inscriptions are known which mention several gods, (so far) no inscription with the exact wording of v. 23 has been found. It is remarkable, however, that Strabo describes altars which have to do with an anonymous god (Strab III 14:16; XVII 2:3).⁵⁷ Here gods can be named “ἄνωνυμός” and adoration of these gods plays an important role even though it is reduced to apotropaic rites (cf. Diogenes Laertius 1:110). Whereas the henotheistic perspective⁵⁸ is epigraphically attested, it is exemplified on the philosophical side by Sen Ep. 95. In Seneca’s longest letter a much larger frame is opened which also deals with an appropriate way of living. He picks up mistakes of physiological nutrition and political defects (Ep. 95:13–15, 16–34) and then talks about the realization of the ethical perfection which shows itself in the fact that God “himself does service to mankind, everywhere and to all he is at hand to help” (95:47).⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Paus I 24:3; Ael Var Hist. 5:17.

⁵⁶ Polyb VI 56:6–8; Cic Har. resp. 19; Nat. d. 2:8; Vergil Aen. 121,838–39; cf. Fragments of Greek historians 87 F 59.

⁵⁷ The epigraphical material mentions the plural as in: Inscription found in the Sanctuary of Demeter at Pergamon (θεοῖς ἀγν[ώστοις] Κατίτ[ων] δαδοῦχος; see the photo in MALINA, PILCH, Acts (see note 41) 127; JENS BÖRSTINGHAUS, Unbekannte Götter, in: Die frühen Christen und ihre Welt. Greifswalder Aufsätze 1996–2001. With contributions from Jens Börstinghaus and Eva Ebel, WUNT 145, ed. by Peter Pilhofer, Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 2002, 23–43. Cf. Paus I 1:4; V 14:8 and especially Strab III 14:16 (ἄνωνυμῷ τινὶ θεῷ); XVII 2:3 (θεὸν τὸν δὲ θνητὸν ἄνωνυμόν τινα καὶ οὐ σαφεῖ); Diog Laert 1:110 (βωμοὺς ἄνωνυμους); Max Tyr 2:10a–d (ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεός, ὁ τῶν ὄντων πατὴρ καὶ δημιουργός [...] ἄνωνυμος νομοθέτης, καὶ ἄρρητος φωνῇ, καὶ ἀόρατος ὀφθαλμοῖς) which are discussed in: LANG, Kunst (see note 27) 269–70.

⁵⁸ See HANS-JOSEF KLAUCK, “Pantheisten, Polytheisten, Monotheisten” – eine Reflexion zur griechisch-römischen und biblischen Theologie, in: Religion und Gesellschaft im frühen Christentum. Neutestamentliche Studien, WUNT 152, ed. by Hans-Josef Klauck, Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 2003, 3–53, esp. 9.

⁵⁹ Sen Ep. 95:47.

4.2.2. V. 24–29

The argumentative starting point lies in the idea of God as creator which is documented in Sen Ep. 41:3 and of course in many other places.⁶⁰ In the frame of the cosmological proof of God's existence one also has to refer to Cicero Nat. d. 2:95. The κύριος as creator on the whole equals the idea of the *dominator* as creator (cf. Nat. d. 2:4). Connected with this is the idea according to which the *dominator* needs nothing, which at first makes the temple cult, observance of the law, and servants unnecessary. Here, too, Seneca's 95th letter (95:47) offers important insights which are to be summarized: (1) science, i. e. philosophy, must be practical; (2) defects are to due to erroneous reflection; (3) God does not need a servant because he owns everything and is present to all; (4) human beings can imitate God and put him into a forgiving mood.

Although Luke's statements can be understood by a Roman in view of these connections, it would probably remain incomprehensible how creation can be understood as ἐξ ἐνόου. Although creation through the Logos may be a thought which lets creation come into being 'by/through one,' this myth remains incomprehensible and is not explained. Luke does not refer here to the Old Testament creation myth but leaves the blank point. Similarly, in v. 31 (ἐν ἀνδρί), it is not stated who this person is. This can only be deduced from v. 18.

Even though the concrete story to which the term ἐξ ἐνόου refers may remain unknown to the Roman reader, its content is not quite so foreign. For example, Cicero represents the historical-philosophical idea which describes the *pietas* of mankind as long existing in a nation and growing continuously (Cic Nat. d. 2:5). This theme of a connection within mankind beyond the borders of nations is connected with the creation-theological theme of God's care for these people. Mankind's continued existence is due to God's care for mankind, e. g. in the form of food and all necessities of life, from which the conclusion arises that God is not far from him but close (Sen Const. Sap. 8:2; Ep. 59:14; 92:30).

Precisely these interconnected relationships (creation, true service of God, God's omnipresence) are also themes in Sen Ep. 95:48 and confirm a 'high anthropology' which both Seneca and Luke represent. However, it needs to be remembered that Seneca's special object of thought is the wise man who bears traits almost like the logos and therefore can be addressed as 'God-bearing' in the true sense (cf. Ep. 120:13–15; 79:11–13).

⁶⁰ At 17:28 there is Arator Phaen. 5 cited: τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμὲν. The whole hymn can be found at Neuer Wettstein I/2 (see note 26) for John 1:1–18 nr. 5. For this see recently VADIM WITTKOWSKY, "Pagane" Zitate im Neuen Testament, NovT 51 (2009), 107–126, esp. 109–115, 119–121.

4.2.3. V. 30f

The argument reaches the home stretch and now discusses a forensic perspective through ἐν ἀνδρὶ; 17:31. Could a Roman here generally infer the acts of the Emperor Claudius as the σωτὴρ τοῦ κόσμου (IG² III/1 3273)⁶¹ which is attributed to him when promising material help for people in need for example after an earthquake or other natural catastrophes?! Major irritation is, however, to be expected where the forensic aspect is accompanied by the eschatological one: the idea that in *one* human being the last judgement as well as reconciliation will take place (20:28) cannot be developed from the Roman encyclopedia. The materialistic trait of Stoic anthropology, which understands the body as a chain of the soul and which forbids a human being to return to this chain, offers only two options: acceptance or rejection – *tertium non datur*. This reconciliation of humanity furthermore does not converge with the idea of human sacrifice nor with that of doing God a required service nor with that of the ancient friendship ethic: 1) God himself acts so that Jesus of Nazareth could not remain dead. Human efforts are totally out of place here. 2) God's act of raising Jesus is therefore an eschatological event without parallel. 3) Neither the idea of human sacrifice nor that of the friendship ethic goes beyond ethnic limits like the resurrection and its content (ἐνδὸς ἐκάστου ἡμῶν): What God does in the risen one is for all.

4.2.4. V. 32–34

Especially the last mentioned perspectives explain the stark alternatives: Acceptance or rejection are required – a noble skeptical caution means rejection. Epicurean positions possess almost no possibility of convergence with these observations: Their understanding that gods live in so called '*intermundia*' and do not have any influence on humanity does not allow for them to act in history and with people. Stoic positions are more likely able to place this content in their frames and thus to avoid Pentheus's zeal.

5. The Last Journey and the Christian Art of Living (Acts 27:1–44)

How shall that which has been recognized as a theological basis prove itself?⁶² A Roman would certainly seek exactly this practice which always marked Roman

⁶¹ Cited as number 24 under John 4:42 in Neuer Wettstein I/2 (see note 26).

⁶² For the discussion see: JENS BÖRSTINGHAUS, *Sturmfahrt und Schiffbruch. Zur lukanischen Verwendung eines literarischen Topos in Apostelgeschichte 27,1–28,6*, WUNT 2.274, Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 2010, 347–444; PERVO, *Acts* (see note 41) 644–67; PETERSON, *Acts* (see note 41) 678–697; LANG, *Kunst* (see note 27) 386–401; LOVEDAY C. A. ALEXANDER, "In Journeyings Often": Voyaging in the Acts of the Apostles and in Greek Romance, in: *Acts in its Ancient Literary Context. A Classicist Looks at the Acts of the Apostles*, LNTS 298, London: T & T Clark

thinking and which is probably characteristic of the entire Roman anthropology. The part of the text which can be helpful for the 'phenomenological Lucilius' is the sea journey to Rome (Acts 27:1–44) because here one can see how an *artifex vivendi* acts:⁶³ talking to God (27:23–24); acting philanthropically and in this also 'sustaining' (connection between φιλανθρωπία and σωτηρία); always seeing the situation clearly (v. 10, 21, 31); reacting without panic (v. 33ff).

But first, the story in the passage itself is constructed very homogeneously even if one can see several sequences.⁶⁴ Connections between the different parts create coherence. A contributor to this is also the theme "sea journey," which could later lead to incredulous astonishment for Lucian when passers-by discussed the gigantic dimensions of 'Isis.'⁶⁵ At the same time the desire for exotic things and wanderlust are created. Besides these positive signals one should, however, not forget the dangers and life-threatening situations which meant that not every sea journey was a pleasant one.⁶⁶ Seneca himself reports this and often comes back to this subject,⁶⁷ which coincides with the frequent mentioning of Paul's sea journeys (13:4,13; 14:26; 16:11; 18:18; 20:6.13–16; 21:1–3, 6 f. [17:14?!]).

Two themes are introduced in this chapter which result from the context: freedom despite external bondage (cf. 26:29; 27:1); philanthropy and rescue

2007, 69–96; P. DOMINIC MENDONCA, Shipwreck and Providence. The Mission Programme of Acts 27–28, Diss. masch., München 2004; MICHAEL LABAHN, Paulus – ein homo *honestus et iustus*. Das lukanische Paulusportrait von Act 27–28 im Lichte ausgewählter antiker Parallelen, in: Das Ende des Paulus. Historische, theologische und literaturgeschichtliche Aspekte, BZNW 106, ed. by Friedrich Wilhelm Horn, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001, 75–106; J. M. GILCHRIST, The Historicity of Paul's Shipwreck, JSNT 61 (1996), 29–51, esp. 39–50.

⁶³ Cf. LENTZ, Portrait (see note 43) 94: "(I)n this telling of the shipwreck, the readers/hearers are given an example of how Paul, the man of virtue, responds to adversity. ... Paul is shown to be brave while the ship, and everyone on it, is overtaken by the total chaos of the storm. Paul does not, like the narrator and the other passengers, lose heart (27:21–6). Furthermore, Paul is the paragon of self-control as he assumes command of the foundering craft (27:21). Paul's piety is illustrated not only in that he has a conversation with an angel (27:23) but also in his ministrations and prayers over the bread (27:35)."

⁶⁴ This is observed by MALINA, PILCH, Acts (see note 41) 172–76 (Acts 27:1–8, 9–12, 13–44; 28:1–10) even as part of 21:27–28:31 (pp. 152–3).

⁶⁵ See BÖRSTINGHAUS, Sturmfahrt (see note 62) 126–138.

⁶⁶ BÖRSTINGHAUS, Sturmfahrt (see note 62) 432–44 discusses Acts 28:1 against the exegesis of WARNECKE/SUHL and WEHNERT: esp. HEINZ WARNECKE, Die tatsächliche Romfahrt des Apostels Paulus, SBS 127, Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1989; JÜRGEN WEHNERT, Gestrandet. Zu einer neuen These über den Schiffbruch des Apostels Paulus auf dem Weg nach Rom (Apg 27–28), ZTK 87 (1990), 67–99; ALFRED SUHL, Gestrandet! Bemerkungen zum Streit über die Romfahrt des Paulus, ZTK 88 (1991), 1–21; JÜRGEN WEHNERT, "... und da erfuhren wir, daß die Insel Kephallenia heißt". Zur neuesten Auslegung von Apg 27–28 und ihrer Methode, ZTK 88 (1991), 169–180. BÖRSTINGHAUS votes for the traditional exegesis: Malta is meant here.

⁶⁷ Sen Ep. 53:1–2; Polyb. 9:6; Marc. 22:3; Ep. 91:8; Tranq. 14:3; Helv. 19:4.

(φιλανθρωπία and σωτηρία;⁶⁸ 27:3, 31, 34, 43; 28:2).⁶⁹ The characteristic element here is Paul's ability to manage his nature which is guided by virtue.⁷⁰ Especially in view of his outstanding and extraordinary deeds during the difficult sea journey, his acts can be praised⁷¹ (cf. Cic De or. 2:46) and compared with those of other people (cf. Musonius Diss. 17:29–35). This comparison is possible with the centurion who creates the conditions for such a comparison in a negative way at the beginning of the story by neglecting Paul's suggestion, and in a positive way when he listens to him and completely protects him. Of special relevance is the fundamental determination of the category of φιλανθρωπία (*humanitas*) which is so important for the further development, because since Cicero it has traits of treating the enemy humanely (Dom. 98), of shrinking back from murder (Cic Rosc. Amer. 63), and it also counts as a virtue for the general populace (Cic Leg. man. 13, 36, 42). For the time of the emperors, to which Seneca gives special attention here, one has to clarify that *humanitas* must not be connected with 'compassion' because this appears unseemly as a negative effect of Stoic philosophy (Sen Tranq. 15:6). The objection that such people are 'cold of heart' and cannot

⁶⁸ Cf. ROBERT C. TANNEHILL, *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts. A Literary Interpretation II, The Acts of the Apostles*, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994, 336: "The rapid repetition of the same word [i. e. σωτηρία κτλ.] in 27:43, 44; 28:1 is a particular sign of emphasis."

⁶⁹ How does this fit together with what MALINA, PILCH, *Acts* (see note 41) 173 stresses for the whole passage: Paul is "revealing his role as Israelite holy man"?! The philosophical overtones are completely overlooked by BÖRSTINGHAUS, *Sturmfahrt* (see note 62) 348, when he only notes: "Unser Julius ist nicht irgendein Zenturio, der in der Erzählung nur seinen Dienst erfüllt, wie es von ihm zu erwarten ist, sondern er erweist sich als φιλανθρώπως τῷ Παύλῳ χρησάμενος, als einer, der den Paulus freundlich behandelt, indem er ihn in Sidon 'Freunde' besuchen läßt. Julius rückt damit unmittelbar ins Blickfeld der Leser, von ihm ist für die weitere Entwicklung der Erzählung etwas zu erwarten. ... Wie sich diese Stellung entfalten wird, bleibt für den Leser zunächst unklar." At the end, BÖRSTINGHAUS seems to admit that LABAHN seems to be right, but: "Doch es bleibt dabei: Paulus nimmt seine Funktion wahr und folgt lediglich der Durchsetzung des δέι; er fungiert letztlich als Identifikationsfigur an einem Wendepunkt der Heilsgeschichte." (p. 453 with reference to JÜRGEN ROLOFF, *Die Paulus-Darstellung des Lukas. Ihre geschichtlichen Voraussetzungen und ihr theologisches Ziel*, *EvT* 39 [1979], 510–531, 520, 527–8). Only if someone is not interested in philosophical terms and overtones can connect φιλανθρωπία with "unklar" as if the ancient reader does not know how to understand φιλανθρωπία or the author who wrote a word which is "unklar" in his meaning and authorial intension. BOCK, *Acts* (see note 53) 731–42, also does not mention this link and overtones. To be sure: This does not dispute the theological theme whereby Paul has to go to Rome by God's will (δεῖ)! Rightly PETERSON, *Acts* (see note 41) 683 when he summarizes the passage as follows: "Luke's implicit message is that Christians fulfill the best aspirations of human society in their care for one another (cf. 2:42–47 note)."

⁷⁰ Therefore it seems to me that in 27:9 θεωρέω should have a deeper and broader sense as 'see'; BÖRSTINGHAUS, *Sturmfahrt* (see note 62) 357 judges: "In jedem Fall, also selbst wenn es sich hier nur um ein zwanglos als *urteilen* verstandenes θεωρεῖν handeln sollte, tritt Paulus hier als vorauswissender Warner auf und wird so besonders deutlich herausgehoben."

⁷¹ This includes the speech in vv. 21–26 which is connected coherently which the context: V 21b → V 8–12; V 22b → V 41; V 24b → 25:11f, 21, 25–27 and 26:32; V 24c → V 42–44; V 26 → V 41. Cf. MENDONCA, *Shipwreck* (see note 62) 181, concerning 27:21–26: "These few verses provide a key to our understanding of the voyage narrative in Acts 27–28."

comfort the mourner is easily disarmed by the Stoic: Tears are wiped away – but one does not join in the crying (Sen Clem. II 5:3).

What can be shown with the help of *humanitas* / φιλανθρωπία for the concrete personal attitude can also be traced in the larger area of the ‘way of life’ with the idea that the theme ‘sea journey/sea storm’ is used metaphorically for a ‘threat to life’ especially by Seneca.⁷² Thus he considers a steersman bad when he gets seasick during a storm: “A teacher like that can help me no more than a sea-sick pilot can be efficient in a storm. He must hold the tiller when the waves are tossing him; he must wrestle, as it were, with the sea; he must furl his sails when the storm rages; what good is a frightened and vomiting steersman to *me*?”⁷³ Such a teacher cannot be a model for a student in weathering the ‘storm of life,’ because: “how much greater, think you, is the storm of life than that which tosses any ship! One must steer, not talk.”⁷⁴

6. Final Observations

How do I end my observations which dealt with the middle portion of a writing and the aesthetic reception of which I have described?⁷⁵ I look at the work which has been analyzed in order to be inspired. Now the ending of Acts is surely not something which is clear and understandable to all the world. The bag of questions raised over the few verses is full to overflowing and comprises *historical* questions – Did the scroll come to an end and did Luke notice this too late and just stop? Or did Luke not know Paul’s final fate and covered his ignorance with an open ending? – *theological* questions – Did Luke have a pro-Roman attitude and was silent about a negative fate of Paul because this would have ruined his

⁷² Note that Seneca composed his *brevitate vitae* by outlining this metaphorical sense: Brev. 2:1; 7:10; 18:1–2; furthermore: Ep. 16:3; 95:7, 8; 98:7; Marc. 6:2–3; Polyb. 9:6, Vit. beat. 22:3 etc. This metaphorical sense should be considered as well for σωτηρία κτλ. as PETERSON, Acts (see note 41) 693 remarks: “The focus in each case [i. e. 5:19, 31, 43, 44; 28:1, 4] is on personal safety and well-being. In the context of the divine promise, eating would be a particular expression of confidence in God’s provision for their future as well as an act of self-preservation.” Metaphorically exegesis could be also possible for some other sequences see PARSONS, Acts (see note 54) 360.

⁷³ Sen Ep. 108:37.

⁷⁴ Sen Ep. 108:37.

⁷⁵ For the discussion see PERVO, Acts (see note 41) 688–90, LANG, Kunst (see note 27) 424–426; DAVID P. MOESSNER, ‘Completed End(s)ings’ of Historiographical Narrative: Diodorus Siculus and the End(ing) of Acts, in: Die Apostelgeschichte und die hellenistische Geschichtsschreibung, FS Eckhard Plümacher, AJEC 57, ed. by Cilliers Breytenbach and Jens Schröter, with participation from David S. du Toit, Leiden: Brill, 2004, 193–221; DANIEL MARGUERAT, The Enigma of the Silent Closing of Acts (28:16–31), in: Jesus and the Heritage of Israel. Luke’s Narrative Claim upon Israel’s Legacy, ed. by David P. Moessner, Harrisburg (PA): Trinity Press International, 1999, 284–304.

theological concept? – HEIKE OMERZU has dealt with these and other questions in an insightful manner and one can largely agree with her critique.⁷⁶

However, observations concerning the literary function of an open ending, which conducts the recipient out of the world of the story, in my opinion lead to a far more consequential explanation: When Luke introduces Paul precisely at the moment when the first martyr of the new religion suffers his execution, and when this Paul in the course of the story assumes a completely new attitude to this new religion, then the closing passage of Acts is conceptually presented as a blank which the reader now needs to fill in: The observant reader must be aware that Paul's fate in Rome cannot be a good one as the death presentiments in 20:25,38; 21:11 are enough to enable the reader himself to continue the story after 28:17ff and to actively interpret it. Verse 28 decidedly asks the pagan reader to listen to God's salvation. It is up to the recipient whether he – like Paul – knows himself to be called by God and thus continues the line, or whether he succumbs to the zeal of Pentheus. The line between the dying Stephen → Paul with his acts and the dying Paul → reader with his acts is the subject of the final discussion. The interpretation of Acts 28:30f should be clear: "with all openness, unhindered." Therefore: "Thus the sentiments of all having been discovered and laid bare."⁷⁷

⁷⁶ HEIKE OMERZU, *Das Schweigen des Lukas. Überlegungen zum offenen Ende der Apostelgeschichte*, in: *Das Ende des Paulus. Historische, theologische und literaturgeschichtliche Aspekte*, BZNW 106, ed. by Friedrich Wilhelm Horn, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001, 127–156. Just a question: Is her critique of MARGUERAT convincing given whereas that "die Textbasis, auf der er seine Theorie einer 'convention littéraire' aufbaut, zu schmal [ist]. Sie müsste insbesondere für die zeitgenössische Literatur untermauert werden." (p. 143), if one keeps in mind the general framework of ancient education (see above note 36)?

⁷⁷ Tacitus *Germ.* 22:4.

Clarifying a Curiosity: The Plural *Bloods* (αἱμάτων) in John 1:13

Troy W. Martin

1. The Problem of the Plural

The King James Version translates the description of the children of God in John 1:13 as those “which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.” What is curious about this translation is that the Greek word for blood (αἱμάτων) is clearly plural, and yet the KJV, the RSV, and many other English translations render it as singular. Indeed, almost all modern translations in other languages as well treat the plural αἱμάτων in this verse as though it were singular.¹ In modern thought, the concept of being born from bloods is clearly curious and unusual.

2. Proposed Solutions by Commentators

Commentators note the curiosity of this plural, which occurs only here in the New Testament, and offer several different explanations.² A popular explanation for the plural αἱμάτων in John 1:13 is the plural use of this term in the LXX, which is dependent on the Hebrew plural דמים.³ In 2 Sam 16:7–8, for example, Shimei curses David as a man of bloods (αἱμάτων) and states that the Lord has avenged upon David all the bloods (αἵματα) of the house of Saul. Another example is Psalm 25(26):9 in which the Psalmist prays for his life not to be destroyed with men of bloods (αἱμάτων). This plural usage is common in contexts of slaughter

¹ For example, see the German translation “nicht aus dem Blut” in both the *Revidierte Fassung der Lutherbibel* from 1984 and the *Einheitsübersetzung der Heiligen Schrift* from 1979. For exceptions for the rendering of the plural as singular, see the translations of the NIV and *Die Bibel in heutiger Deutsch* that are discussed below.

² John F. McHugh, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on John 1–4* (ICC; London: T.&T. Clark, 2009), 47 n. 60. McHugh states, “The plural is a *hapax legomenon* in the NT, unless one includes the variant readings in Rev. 16.6 ... and 18.24.”

³ Among others, Marcus Dods, *The Gospel of St. John* (The Expositors Greek Testament; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 688 and Charles K. Barrett, *The Gospel according to St. John: An Introduction with Commentary and Notes on the Greek Text* (London: SPCK, 1955), 137.

and murder not only in the LXX but also in other Greek texts as well.⁴ However, these contexts are quite different from the context of conception and birth in John 1:13. Craig Keener correctly observes that the LXX usage of the plural in the context of death is “wholly removed from the sense here” in John 1:13.⁵

Seeking a more satisfying explanation, commentators frequently cite for example E. C. Hoskyns’ theological explanation for the plural. Hoskyns argues that John could not write the singular because later he writes that children of God are begotten through the blood of Christ (cf. John 19:34).⁶ If John were to say that the children of God are not born from blood (singular) but then later state that they are born from the blood (singular) of Christ, he would contradict himself. Hoskyns’ explanation implies that John should have used the singular but was prohibited by this theological consideration. Hoskyns does not offer substantiation for his explanation but simply assumes that John should have written the singular. Perhaps, John should have written the singular, but perhaps not. Even though the plural may not fit our modern conception of blood, it just may communicate something significant from the ancient understanding, and Hoskyns’ explanation, although popular, is not entirely satisfying.

Bernard Weiss offers an explanation that was widely held in the nineteenth century. He comments, “The plural is not different in meaning from the singular and is only due to the fact that the substance (blood) is conceived as the aggregate of its constituent parts” (translation mine).⁷ Although Weiss’s explanation enjoyed wide support, Marcus Dods finds it doubtful.⁸ This explanation is indeed doubtful because the ancients did not necessarily conceive of blood as an aggregate of component parts but as one of the uniform parts of the body (τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ μέρη) in contrast to the non-uniform parts (τὰ ἀνομοιομερῆ μέρη).⁹ Among the uniform parts, Aristotle (*Part. an.* 647b10) includes bone, blood-vessel, serum, lard, suet, marrow, semen, bile, milk, and flesh along with blood. Among the non-uniform parts, he (*Part. an.* 640b20) lists face, hand, and foot. A. L. Peck explains, “The practical difference between the two classes is that

⁴ For example, see Euripides, *El.* 137 and *Iph. Taur.* 73; Aeschylus, *Ag.* 1293 and *Eum.* 253; and Plato, *Leg.* 872e2.

⁵ Craig S. Keener, *The Gospel of John: A Commentary* (2 vols.; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2003), 1.404–405.

⁶ Edwyn C. Hoskyns, *The Fourth Gospel* (Edited and completed by Francis Noel Davey; 2nd ed.; London: Faber and Faber, 1947), 143. Cited by Barrett, *John*, 137.

⁷ Bernhard Weiss, *Das Johannes-Evangelium* (KEK; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1893), 64. Weiss’s original text reads, “Der Plur. ist im Sinne nicht verschieden vom Singul. und beruht nur darauf, dass der Stoff als der Inbegriff seiner Bestandtheile vorgestellt ist.”

⁸ Dods, *John*, 688.

⁹ See Gotthard Strohmaier, *Galen Über die Verschiedenheit der homoioimeren Körperteile* (CMG III; Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1970), 58–59. Since they are liquid and gaseous respectively, blood and pneuma differ somewhat from the other uniform parts of the body and some thinkers may not include them among the body’s parts. Those who hold this view must nevertheless admit that blood and pneuma are still uniform substances.

each of the uniform parts has its own definite character as a substance ... while each of the non-uniform parts has its own definite character as a *conformation* or organ.”¹⁰ In other words, an amount of blood that is halved is still completely blood whereas a face halved is no longer a complete face. Aristotle (*Part. an.* 646a13–24) does understand the uniform parts to be composed of the primary elements of the hot, the cold, the moist, and the dry or their composites of earth, air, water, and fire.¹¹ Nevertheless, blood as one of the uniform parts is not primarily conceived as an aggregate since each of these elements of which blood is composed is not blood. The plural αἱμάτων in John 1:13, therefore, does not likely refer to the aggregate components of blood as Weiss and other nineteenth century commentators held. Dods concludes, “The reason of John’s preference for the plural in this place is not obvious.”¹²

Although John’s use of the plural is perhaps not obvious, Augustine’s interpretation of the plural bloods as referring to both the man and the woman in procreation is now widely favored by recent commentators such as J. N. Sanders, B. A. Mastin, George R. Beasley-Murray, Ludger Schenke, Andreas J. Köstenberger, John F. McHugh, and Michael Theobald.¹³ For example, Theobald comments that the plural *bloods* refers to the basic stuff out of which life originates. In this stuff, he includes not only the menstrual blood of the mother but also the semen of the father. Consistent with the view of Augustine and these commentators, the NIV translates John 1:13 as “children born not of natural descent” and *Die Bibel in heutigem Deutsch* renders the phrase as “nicht durch natürliche Geburt.”¹⁴ The rationale for this understanding of the plural *bloods* rests on conceptions in

¹⁰ A. L. Peck, *Aristotle: Parts of Animals with an English Translation* (LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 29.

¹¹ Aristotle reasons that the four powers of the hot, the cold, the moist, and the dry precede the four elements of earth, water, air, and fire. Earth is a composite of the cold and dry, water a composite of the cold and moist, air a composite of the warm and moist, but fire is a composite of the warm and dry. As composites, the elements of earth, water, air, and fire must be subsequent to the pure elemental powers of which they are composite. For a discussion of these powers, see Annette Weissenrieder and Troy W. Martin, *Embodying New Testament Anthropology: New Light from Ancient Medical Texts* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, forthcoming).

¹² Dods, *John*, 688.

¹³ Augustine, *Tract. Ev. Jo.*, 2.14. See J. N. Sanders and B. A. Mastin, *A Commentary on the Gospel according to St. John* (HNTC; New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 78; George R. Beasley-Murray, *John* (WBC; Waco: Word Books, 1987), 13; Ludger Schenke, *Johannes Kommentar* (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1998), 30; Andreas J. Köstenberger, *John* (Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2004), 24, 39; Hugh, *John*, 47; and Michael Theobald, *Das Evangelium nach Johannes: Kapitel 1–12* (RNT; Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2009), 125.

¹⁴ I am grateful to the editors for pointing out that the NETBible translates the plural *bloods* in John 1:13 as “not born by human parents.” This translation is accompanied by a note that states, “In John 1:13, the plural αἱμάτων may imply the action of both parents. It may also refer to the ‘genetic’ contribution of both parents, and so be equivalent to ‘human descent’ (see BDAG 26 s. v. αἷμα 1.a).” This note also refers to Wis 7:1 as a parallel to John 1:13, but the word for *blood* in Wisdom is singular, not plural. See the NETBible at www.bible.org.

the ancient medical texts, which show that the plural is neither as curious nor as unusual as the commentary tradition has understood it to be.

3. A Solution Provided by Ancient Medical Texts

3.1. The Main Idea of the Plural in John 1:13

Whatever the explanation for the plural αἱμάτων in John 1:13, Keener notes that the primary point of this verse is a birth “not by natural intercourse” and that this point is commonly accepted among recent commentators.¹⁵ Keener further notes that an explanation more to the point is that “some Greeks thought that the embryo was formed by the father’s seed and the mother’s blood, or by the mingling of male and female seeds.”¹⁶ Keener’s preferred explanation does not demonstrate why the plural *bloods* would be used in reference to the father’s seed and the mother’s blood. Barrett more accurately asserts, “Probably the blood of father and mother is meant.”¹⁷ However, Barrett does not elaborate how the blood of the father and the mother relates to the main point of John 1:13 that natural intercourse leads to a conception from bloods. Although Keener and Barrett correctly perceive the main idea of John 1:13, they fail to give an adequate explanation for the use of the plural *bloods*. The ancient medical texts, however, do provide cogent explanations for the plural αἱμάτων in John 1:13.¹⁸

3.2. The Use of the Plural in Ancient Medical Texts

Several of these texts use the plural *bloods* in reference to flows or streams of blood. Thus, one Hippocratic author notes, “Flows of blood (τὰ αἵματα) from the gums with a watery stool are fatal (*Coa praesagia* 236).”¹⁹ Another Hippocratic author explains that those who become congested from flows of blood (ἐκ τῶν αἱμάτων) upwards are no less likely to survive (*Prorrh.* 2.7). Galen (*De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* VIII 6.6.3) writes that during spring and summer, humans are overtaken with dysentery and that streams of blood (τὰ αἵματα) flow from their nostrils. He states (*De antidotis libri ii*; Kühn XIV 111.9) that a universal remedy is through flows of blood (δι’ αἱμάτων) or blood-letting by which a phy-

¹⁵ Keener, *John*, 1.405 n. 393.

¹⁶ Keener, *John*, 1.405. See also Theobald, *Evangelium nach Johannes*, 125; and Leon Morris, *The Gospel according to John* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971), 100–101.

¹⁷ Barrett, *John*, 137.

¹⁸ Theobald (*Evangelium nach Johannes*, 125) correctly points to Aristotle’s understanding that male semen is a form of blood, and the following discussion builds on Theobald’s observation.

¹⁹ See also Hippocrates, *Coac.* 120 and 299. Except where noted, all English translations from the Greek are mine.

sician draws blood from the patient. Some of these texts use the plural *bloods* especially in reference to the monthly blood flows of menstruating women.²⁰

Considering the way these texts use the plural *bloods*, the best translation of the plural in John 1:13 is *flows of blood*. This verse refers to the children of God as those who are not begotten from flows of blood. The flows of blood mentioned here could certainly be those of the mother as the medical texts demonstrate. However, these texts also demonstrate that the flows of blood could include the father's contribution to the generation of the child as well.

A key insight in these texts is the hematogenetic doctrine of the seed according to which male semen is concocted or frothed blood that possesses the heat to shape and form the blood provided by the female in procreation.²¹ Aristotle conducts a thorough investigation into the nature of semen and concludes that male semen is "blood that has been concocted" (πεπεμμένον αἷμα; *Gen. an.* 727a36). Aristotle (*Gen. an.* 727a2–3) argues that male semen and female menstrual blood are analogous because both first appear at similar stages of life for boys and for girls and that both are some form of blood.²² According to him (*Gen. an.* 728a18–22), the female discharge resembles blood more than male semen because of the female's inability to concoct semen from the blood due to her colder nature.²³ He (*Gen. an.* 726b7–10) observes that even warmer males who engage in excessive intercourse may not fully concoct the blood and that their semen may thus be more bloodlike. For Aristotle, semen is clearly blood that has been concocted.

Similar to the views of Aristotle, Galen provides a detailed description of the hematogenetic production of semen. He writes:

Here is the cause of the generation of this humor [the semen]: The descending part of the vessels ... is coiled very much ... going to the male testes. ... The vein lies on the top and

²⁰ Galen *De theriaca ad Pisonem* (Kühn XIV 274, 2); Anonymi Medici *De generatione et semine* 22.2; Hippiatrica *Hippiatrica Cantabrigiensia* 99.3.8.

²¹ The hematogenetic doctrine of the semen was widespread, but not everyone agreed. Most notably, Diocles understood the origin of semen to be nutriment just as with the other fluids in the body. See Philip J. van der Eijk, *Diocles of Carystus: A Collection of the Fragments with Translation and Commentary* (2 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 2000), 1.76–85. According to Pseudo-Galen (*De definitionibus medicus* 439; Kühn 19.449–450), Plato agreed with Diocles that the origin of semen was the brain and the spinal marrow while Praxagoras, Democritus, and Hippocrates held that it is secreted from the whole body. In contrast to the hematogenetic doctrine of the origin of semen, there were other views in antiquity such as the pangenetic theory and the encephalogenetic-myelogenetic theory. See Eijk, *Diocles*, 1.84–87. For the texts and a discussion of these positions, see Weissenrieder and Martin, *Embodying*.

²² Aristotle (*Gen. an.* 777a 3–4) states, "The same material which nourishes is also the same material from which nature composes the generation. In animals with blood, this material is the blood fluid." See Weissenrieder and Martin, *Embodying*.

²³ For the colder nature of the woman, see Aristotle *Gen. an.* 726 b 30–727 a 30; 765 b 15 f.; *Part. an.* 648 a 12; and Plato *Resp.* 466 b 16. See Troy W. Martin, "Paul's Argument from Nature for the Veil in 1 Corinthians 11:13–15: A Testicle Instead of a Head-Covering," *JBL* 123 (2004): 78. See also Weissenrieder and Martin, *Embodying*.

the artery underneath, and both make the same large number of coils like the tendrils of vines variously interwoven. In this interweaving the blood and pneuma passing to the testes are very greatly concocted, and it is possible to see clearly that the humor contained in the first coils is still like blood and that in the succeeding coils it keeps getting whiter and whiter until in the very last ones, that end in the testes, it has been made absolutely white. The testes in turn, being porous and spongy, receive the humor given a preliminary concoction in the vessels and concoct it thoroughly, the male testes making it perfect for the generation of the animal. (*De usu partium* 14.10)²⁴

Galen (*De semine* I 12.8–9) states specifically that artery and vein concoct semen from blood. For Galen as for Aristotle, therefore, male semen is concocted blood. Galen (*De usu partium* 14.10–11) and Aristotle (*Gen. an.* 728a25–27, 730a28–30) thus articulate a widespread view in the ancient world that male semen and female menses are both forms of blood and that both of these bloods are necessary for conception.

This view provides a key for understanding the plural αἱμάτων in John 1:13 as a reference to natural conception by both a father and a mother. The bloods of both are necessary for conception.²⁵ While this view provides a way of understanding the plural, the use of the plural in this context is rare in medical texts, which prefer to speak of the male contribution to conception as semen or seed rather than blood. Although rare, the plural is not however completely unattested in ancient literature.

3.3. *The Plural in Euripides' Ion*

The passage cited by commentators as the closest parallel to John 1:13 is Euripides' *Ion* 693, where the chorus refers to Ion as a child of others who has been conceived, “curdled,” “congealed,” or “solidified” from the bloods of others (ὁ παῖς ἄλλων τροφεὶς ἐξ αἱμάτων).²⁶ The primary issue in Euripides' play is the parentage of Ion. When the chorus speaks these words and uses the plural *bloods*, the maidservants of Creusa, Queen of Athens and daughter of the deceased King Erechtheus, think that Ion is the offspring of an unknown woman and Xuthus, a foreigner who has married Creusa and is now King of Athens. They think that

²⁴ Translation by Margaret Tallmadge May, *Galen On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body: Περὶ χρείας μορίων De usu partium: Translated from the Greek with an Introduction and Commentary by Margaret Tallmadge May* (Cornell Publications in the History of Science; 2 vols.: Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1968), 2.641–642.

²⁵ Plato (*Symp.* 206 c 5) states, “The combined substance of a man and a woman is an offspring.” See Galen *De semine* II 1.12–13 and Weissenrieder and Martin, *Embodying*.

²⁶ The Greek verb τρέφω means *to make firm or solid, to thicken or congeal*. It is used in reference to the curdling of milk and is an appropriate word to use for the development of an embryo into a solid mass from the fluids of its parents. The meaning of this word extends to include the ideas of *nourishment* and *growth* in the sense of making something solid or firm. The context of its use in *Ion* 693 indicates that the main idea is one of the curdling or congealing of Ion as a fetus from the bloods of his parents. See Weissenrieder and Martin, *Embodying*.

Creusa will be devastated when she learns that her husband Xuthus has a child while she remains childless and her father's royal line ends. In actuality, the opposite is the case. Ion is the son of Creusa and Apollo, who raped her, and Creusa incorrectly thinks the child she bore from this rape is dead. Even though they are mistaken about Ion's parentage, the maidservants of the chorus use the plural *bloods* when referring to both the human father's and the human mother's roles in Ion's conception. Commentators are therefore right to cite this passage as the closest parallel to John 1:13.²⁷

This parallel from Euripides' *Ion* attests the ancient belief that conception of an embryo takes two bloods, the semen-blood of its father and the menses-blood of its mother. John 1:13 thus refers to an embryo's conception from *bloods* (plural), and this plural is neither curious nor strange but consistent with the ancient physiological understanding of conception as occurring from the blood-semen of its father and the menses blood of its mother. Keener, Barrett, and other recent commentators are thus correct in understanding the plural *bloods* as a reference to conception by the natural intercourse of both parents. Although they fail to give an adequate explanation for their understanding, the physiological assumptions in the ancient medical texts that are illustrated in the passage from Euripides' *Ion* provide such an explanation.

3.4. *The Will of the Flesh and the Will of a Husband*

This explanation of the plural *bloods* is also consistent with the following two phrases, "neither from the will of the flesh nor from the will of a husband," if these phrases are understood from an ancient medical perspective and not as commentators typically understand them. Commentators often consider these two phrases as synonymous or the second as simply more particular or specific than the first. The "will of the flesh (θελήμα σαρκός)" is thus usually interpreted primarily in connection with the male impulse for procreation and is considered to be the equivalent of the negative expression "desire(s) of the flesh (ἐπιθυμία τοῦ σαρκός)," used in other early Christian texts (Gal 5:16; Eph 2:3; 1 Pet 2:11; 2 Pet 2:18; 1 John 2:16).²⁸ Keener comments, "That children were conceived in parental passion was an ancient commonplace (hence 'the will of the flesh,' 1:13)."²⁹

²⁷ McHugh (*John*, 47) does not think the parallel between the plural *bloods* in John 1:13 and in Euripides' *Ion* is exact since Ion's father is the god Apollo and not a human father. However, the chorus that uses the plural *bloods* is unaware of that fact and thinks that Ion's father is the human Xuthus. Even though they are mistaken and Ion's conception is from a divine father and a human mother, their use of the plural thus refers in their perspective to Ion's being conceived from a human father and mother. The similarity between John 1:13 and Euripides' *Ion* is thus closer than McHugh thinks.

²⁸ On male desire, see the interesting article by Werner A. Krenkel, "Me tua forma capit," *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Wilhelm-Pieck-Universität Rostock* 33(1984): 50–77.

²⁹ Keener, *John*, 1.404.

The use of *θελημα* in John's phrase rather than *ἐπιθυμία*, however, signals caution in making John's phrase equivalent to this negative expression. Caution is especially signaled because "*σάρξ* in John is not evil in itself."³⁰ Thus, the "will of the flesh" and "the will of a husband" are not negative phrases but simply refer to the participants in conception by natural intercourse. The later certainly refers to the male participant, and many commentators understand the former as also referring to the male. According to Augustine, however, the phrase "the will of the flesh" is not synonymous with the phrase "the will of a husband" but refers rather to the woman. Augustine explains the phrase "nor from the will of the flesh" by writing, "The apostle puts flesh for woman; because, when she was made of his rib, Adam said, 'This is now bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh.' And the apostle saith, 'He that loveth his wife loveth himself; for no one ever hated his own flesh.'"³¹ On the basis of Gen 2:23 and Eph 5:28–29, therefore, Augustine interprets the phrase "nor from the will of the flesh" as referring to the woman's role in procreation.

Several ancient medical texts support Augustine's understanding of the will of the flesh as a reference to the woman's role in conception but for different reasons however. According to these texts, the flesh of the woman is of crucial importance for conception while the flesh of the husband is less so. One Hippocratic text explains:

Whenever the woman engages in intercourse and if she should not intend (*ἥν μὲν μὴ μέλλῃ λήψεσθαι*) to receive the seed in herself, the seed from both male and female must evacuate to the outside in the customary way whenever the woman wills it (*ἐθέλῃσῃ*). If she should intend to receive (*ἥν δὲ μέλλῃ λήψεσθαι*) the seed, however, the seed must not evacuate to the outside but must remain in her wombs. After they receive the seed and close, her wombs hold the seed in themselves in as much as the opening of her wombs is enfolded by the moisture. The seed which comes from the man and the seed which comes from the woman are mixed together. If the woman should be acquainted with the periods of gestation and should notice whenever the seed does not come out but remains, she shall indeed know on which day she received (*ἐλαβεν*) the seed to herself (Hippocrates, *Genit.* 5.1).³²

Several features of this text emphasize the importance of a woman's willingness to receive the seed and the necessity of her flesh's cooperation, if she is to conceive a child. First, of course, is the use of the verb *ἐθέλῃσῃ*.³³ If a woman wills to

³⁰ Barrett, *John*, 137.

³¹ Augustine, *Tract. Ev. Jo.* 2.14 (NPNF¹ 7.18).

³² For the text, see Littré VII 477.12 ff. For text, translation and a discussion see Weissenrieder and Martin, *Embodying*.

³³ Joly (*Hippocrate XI: De la génération, De la nature de l'enfant*, 48) is suspicious of the phrase in which this verb occurs since it contradicts what is said in Chapter 13 of this work, where a doctor must terminate a pregnancy and not the woman. I am grateful to Annette Weissenrieder for this reference, and she correctly points out the distinction between the inexperienced Hetaere woman in Chapter 13 and the experienced woman in Chapter 5. In contrast to the inexperienced woman, the experienced woman determines when she will and will not receive

receive the male seed, she conceives. Otherwise, she does not. Second, the model verb μέλλω with the future infinitive λήψεσθαι expresses what the woman intends to do.³⁴ If she intends to receive the male seed, she will. If she does not, she will not. Finally, the two conditional sentences in the μὲν ... δέ construction are Fifth Class Present General Conditions and express what must happen if the condition of the protasis should be realized.³⁵ If the woman decides not to receive the male seed, his seed must evacuate from her flesh. If she decides to receive his seed, his seed must be retained. She is in control, and her willingness and the willingness of her flesh is determinative for conception to occur.

Soranus discusses the importance of a woman's body for conception.³⁶ Since a male only emits his seed, the condition of his body is not nearly as significant as a woman's body, which must receive and retain his seed if conception is to occur (*Gyn.* 1.33). For a woman who desires intercourse but not pregnancy, Soranus advises her to hold her breath or pull away a little at the moment of the man's ejaculation so that his seed cannot be ejaculated too deeply into her uterus. He also advises her to squat down and sneeze or drink something cold (*Gyn.* 1.61). All of these actions hamper her body's willingness to receive the seed and conceive a child.

Throughout his treatment, Soranus describes not only the physical characteristics of a woman's body but also her mental state. A woman who is of steady mind and cheerful (*Gyn.* 1.33) and who has an urge and appetite for coitus (*Gyn.* 1.36) is more capable of conceiving a child. He discusses instances when some women are forced against their will to have intercourse and nevertheless conceive (*Gyn.* 1.37). He concludes that the desire was present even though it was obscured by their mental resolve.³⁷ Thus, the willingness of these women's flesh to receive the seed trumped even their conscious mental decision. For Soranus, therefore, the willingness and ability of a woman's flesh is crucial for conception to occur, and the optimal time is when both her flesh and soul are well-disposed to receive the male seed (*Gyn.* 1.47).

Galen (*De semine* I 2.6–7) inquires of women who had become pregnant and reports, "They said that they feel a certain movement in the uterus, crawling, as

the male's seed. According to Weissenrieder, therefore, the verb ἐθελήσῃ in Chapter 5 should be considered genuine. See Weissenrieder and Martin, *Embodying*.

³⁴ Herbert Weir Smyth, *Greek Grammar* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), § 1959. For a discussion of the grammar, see Weissenrieder and Martin, *Embodying*.

³⁵ Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, § 2337.

³⁶ For the text, see John Ilberg, *Soranus* (CMG IV; Leipzig: Teubner, 1927). For an English translation of Soranus' work, see Owsei Temkin, *Soranus' Gynecology: Translated with an Introduction* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956).

³⁷ Soranus (*Gyn.* 1.33) discusses the opposite instance when a young girl's reason excites her appetite for coitus even before her body is really ready for intercourse and pregnancy. He advises her to wait until after menstruation begins naturally because menstruation indicates her body's ability to fulfill its proper function. See text, translation, and a discussion in Weissenrieder and Martin, *Embodying*.

it were, and slowly contracting into itself, when they grasp the semen.”³⁸ Galen’s investigation (*De semine* I 2.12) leads him to agree with Plato and conclude, “For the part ‘called uterus and womb,’ as Plato said, seems to be like some ‘animal desirous of procreation (παιδοποιῖας ἐπιθυμητικόν)’ and for this reason to draw the semen to itself and enfold and hold it.”³⁹ Galen (*De semine* I 4,21) explains this process:

For as the stomach, when it desires (ἐπιθυμῇ) food, rises up with its deepest part to the esophagus and uses the esophagus itself as a kind of hand, in the same way the uterus, because of its desire (ἐπιθυμίαν) for the quality of the semen, goes to meet it, the whole uterus hurrying toward the pudendum and using its neck, like the esophagus, as a kind of hand that helps to propel the semen.⁴⁰

Although Galen does not use the Greek word for *will*, his description of the female’s role in conception is aptly expressed by John’s phrase “the will of the flesh.” Her flesh must be willing to receive the male’s seed, draw it up, and conceive a child. If her flesh is unwilling, conception and pregnancy do not occur.⁴¹

Although they do not necessarily exclude the male as a reference of the phrase “the will of the flesh” in John 1:13, some ancient medical texts nevertheless indicate that this phrase may relate more to the female’s role in conception since her flesh in particular must be willing to receive and retain the male seed. The grammatical structure of these two phrases in John 1:13 supports this implication. The construction is not the correlative οὔτε ... οὔτε (neither ... nor), but the construction οὐκ ἐξ αἱμάτων οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος σαρκὸς οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρός. Smyth comments, “Οὐδέ adds a new negative idea ... after any other preceding negative.”⁴² Thus, the phrase “the will of the husband” probably expresses a new idea that is different from the preceding phrase “the will of the flesh.” The distinction between these two phrases is likely the different roles played by the female and the male in procreation. The phrase “the will of the flesh” expresses the female’s role in receiving the male’s seed in her flesh while the phrase “the will of a husband” refers to the decision of the male to eject his seed into her.

Understanding these two phrases against the background of ancient medical texts, therefore, supports the notion that the plural *bloods* in John 1:13 comprises the contributions of both the female and the male in a natural conception. The phrase “not from bloods” describes the substance contributed by both the male

³⁸ Phillip de Lacy, *Galen On Semen: Edition, Translation, and Commentary* (CMG V 3.1; Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1992), 67.

³⁹ De Lacy, *Galen On Semen*, 66–67. See Plato, *Tim.* 91c1.

⁴⁰ De Lacy, *Galen On Semen*, 74–75.

⁴¹ Galen states, “When the semen falls into a suitable place, it becomes the principle of generation of an animal, but when it falls into an unfavorable one, the pneuma quickly escapes from it and there is left the viscous humor which subsides into itself” (*De usu partium* 14.10 [May]). The flesh of the mother is crucial in providing a “suitable place” for the male seed.

⁴² Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, § 2949.

and the female as in the similar use of the plural in Euripides' *Ion*. The next phrase "nor from the will of flesh" expresses the female's role in being willing to receive and retain the male's seed in her flesh. The final phrase "nor from the will of a husband" refers to the male's role in procreation. All three of these phrases thus communicate the idea of a natural conception, which John says does not characterize the children of God. Instead, the children of God are begotten from God in a new birth that is explained more fully in John 3.⁴³

4. Conclusion

Although commentators often describe the plural *bloods* in John 1:13 as curious and unusual, this plural is not so curious when understood against the background of ancient medical conceptions. The plural may refer exclusively to the flows of blood from the mother that provide the material for a fetus or it may refer to the material from both the mother and the father. Only by using the plural could John express the contributions of both the mother and the father in the procreative process, and the plural in 1:13 more likely refers to the contributions of both parents. If the phrase "the will of the flesh" relates to the woman's role in conception and the phrase "the will of a husband" certainly relates to a man's role, then these two phrases together elaborate on the plural use of *bloods* in John 1:13 to refer to the blood-semen contribution of the male and the menses-blood of the female in the natural conception and formation of a fetus. Of course, this natural process is precisely what John wants to exclude as determinative for the children of God, who must be born from God (1:13).

⁴³ Klaus Wengst, *Das Johannesevangelium* (2 vols.; 2nd ed., Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 2000), 1.67. Wengst notes that believers are not produced from natural means but by an act of God. For a discussion of John 3 and how that act occurs, see Clare K. Rothschild, "Embryology, Plant Biology and Divine Generation in the Fourth Gospel," in *Women and Gender in Ancient Religions: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Essays in Honor of Adela Yarbro Collins* (eds., Steve Ahearne-Kroll, Paul A. Holloway, and James A. Kelhoffer; WUNT 263; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 125–51.

Identification Please: Aspects of Identity in Ancient Narrative¹

Richard I. Pervo

Davos, a soliloquizing Terentian slave, says:

And they're now concocting a story between them that the woman is an Athenian citizen. 'Once upon a time there was an elderly merchant. He was shipwrecked off the island of Andros and died. The girl was washed ashore and Chrysis' father took the little orphan in.' What nonsense! It seems pretty improbable to me, but they're pleased with their fiction.²

Davos was wrong. The story is true – which is to say, false, since it belongs to a fictional world where such unlikely circumstances are only slightly less common than sunrises. Some of the most pertinent literary questions are rarely discussed because raising them is, to reach deep into my treasure of similes, like stating that the sun arose this morning. A substantial piece of the ancient narrative pie involves plots in which the true nature of one or more characters remains unknown to, or unaccepted by, others. People do not read learned articles in the hope of receiving such dazzling revelations. More are on the way.

The thesis of this essay is that “identity” is fundamental for much of ancient “popular narrative,” works that are at both the “center” and on the “fringe” of the ancient novel: romantic stories and historical tales, the serious and, by and large, the seriocomic. The range embraces Jewish, Christian, and polytheist writings, gospels and Acts. Identity is always both an individual and a corporate matter. Implicit answers to such basic questions as: what is and/or makes a “genuine” person, what prevents me/us from becoming what I/we ought and wish to be, underlie most, if not all, of these disparate texts and permit broad comparisons that highlight both similarities and differences. Regaining/establishing/maintaining one's identity in the face of adversity drives the plots of most popular narrative. The focus is literary. Important psychological, sociological, and cultural approaches to the questions and issues of identity are given minimal attention here. This should not be taken to imply that they are unimportant.³

¹ An early form of this essay was presented at the Ancient Fiction and Early Christian and Jewish Narrative Section, SBL Annual Meeting in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on November 21, 2005.

² Terence, *Andr.* 220–224 (Barsby, LCL).

³ Simon Swain, *Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World AD 50–250* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Steven D. Smith, *Greek Identity and the*

The normal boundaries of narrative are, metaphorically speaking, “the fall” and “the end.”⁴ One may *describe* the primeval paradise or the heavenly city, but a narrative of life there would be a trifle otiose: “On Monday we ate of the pineapple tree; the dates attracted us on Tuesday. Wednesday displayed the most enticing apples ...” “In January we walked down the streets of gold and plucked from the tree of life the fruit of the month; February saw us ambling along those same avenues to gather that month’s bounty ...” Only narration of what takes place between a decision to try the controlled substance, as it were, and the moment when the faithful are beamed up, can hold our attention. How is that done (other than by excluding perfection)? It is done by – please remember that sun-rises constitute the subject – posing questions and then withholding the answers.

Among those questions are *Causality* (e. g., Whodunnit?), *Temporality* (in the jargon of French literary criticism: What will happen next?), and *Fidelity* (e. g., Will she/he prove worthy, complete the quest, fulfill the mission?).⁵ Brace yourself, dear reader, for another shocking truism: popular narrative usually comprehends some sort of passage from innocence to experience, or, in the language often favored by early Jews and Christians, from ignorance to knowledge.⁶ The subject of such changes may be the reader, instead of or in addition to, characters. That is one fruit of the researches of Karl Kerényi and, to a degree, of Reinhold Merkelbach.⁷

This matter of identity thus applies to both readers and characters. At its base is the issue of characters with whom readers will “identify,” a concept oversimplified when taken to mean that the narrator’s goal is to produce readers who will closely *imitate* characters. One doubts that Nancy Drew has inspired many girls or women to become amateur detectives who solve mysteries free of charge in their spare time, but the seventy-fifth birthday tributes indicated that many

Athenian Past in Chariton: The Romance of Empire (Eelde: Barkhuis; Groningen: Groningen University Library, 2007); Tim Whitmarsh, *Narrative and Identity in the Ancient Greek Novel: Returning Romance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Erich S. Gruen, ed., *Cultural Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean* (Los Angeles: Getty Publications, 2011); Jonathan M. Hall, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Jonathan M. Hall, *Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Judith Perkins, *Roman Imperial Identities in the Early Christian Era* (New York: Routledge, 2009); Judith Lieu, *Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

⁴ One does not expect sophisticated literature to begin with “once upon a time” (although James Joyce’s *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* does), or to reach the “happily ever after,” but the poles are implicitly present, not least when the happily ever after is excluded.

⁵ This repertory corresponds to the solemn and divisible trinity of mystery, adventure, and romance.

⁶ E. g., 3 Macc. 5:27; Jos. Asen. 13:11–13; Acts 3:17, 13:27, 17:30; Eph 4:18; 1 Tim 1:13; 1 Pet 1:14; Ign. Eph. 19:3; Herm. Mand. 4.1.5; Justin, 1 Apol. 61.10 et al.; Athenagoras, Leg. 21.6, 28.7; Melito, Apology. Frag. 1; Pre. Pet. Frag. 4. See R. Bultmann, “ἀγνοία, ἀγνώστια,” *TDNT* 1:116–119, 121.

⁷ See note 48.

have found her a model of independence and strength.⁸ The interaction between reader and text on the question of identity is both simple and profound. In the former sense, it means, for example, that I read the Hardy boys but not Nancy Drew. In the middle, perhaps, of the spectrum, it means that I, unlike many girls who read Nancy Drew, did not read the Hardy boys for inspiration to pursue a professional career.

This example is interesting because data are available to show that the creator of the Nancy Drew series had absolutely no intent of subverting the social order.⁹ He wanted to sell books and came up with the notion of detective stories that would appeal to girls.¹⁰

Identity has been a perennial concern for the superintendents of virtue, who have tended to assume that readers *do* identify with literary characters and that our “betters” are to see to it that we read the right kinds of books or, at least, to guarantee that books are properly interpreted.¹¹ Although popular literature may be defined, with Northrop Frye, as what our betters disparage,¹² it also reflects, in its changing portrayals of heroes and heroines, the evolution of positive and negative role models and other manifestations of social identity. Were such productions “mere entertainment,” moralistic criticism would be much less evident.

Still hewing to the simple side of the road, the basic question is: who am / are I / we / they? One approach is the list, a practice to which vast numbers of epitaphs testify. They typically tabulate, for males, birthplace, parentage, and positions held.

To M. Maenius Agrippa, son of Gaius, of the tribe Cornelia, (also named) Lucius Tusidius Campester, host of the late Emperor Hadrian, father of the Senator, Commandant of Vespasian's Own Second British part-mounted battalion, picked by the Emperor Hadrian for active service in Britain, Tribune in command of the First Spanish part-mounted Battalion, Commandant of the Gallic and Pannonian Cuirassiers, Imperial Commissioner [*Prefect*] in command of the British Fleet, Finance Officer of the Province of Britain, Knight on the Establishment, Patron of this Township, the Villagers of Censorglacium, having through the favour of his mediation obtained by the kindness of His Imperial and Gracious Maj-

⁸ That birthday was celebrated in 2005, while the original form of this essay was in preparation.

⁹ This is quite apparent in the realm of sexual mores. Although Nancy acquired a boyfriend, she did not so much as allow him to kiss her (according to my better-read informants).

¹⁰ For details, see the Wikipedia entry: “Nancy Drew,” n.p. [cited 17 April 2011]. Online: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nancy_Drew. Those who prefer an older teen perspective on this matter may consult Melanie Rehak, *Girl Sleuth: Nancy Drew and the Women Who Created Her* (New York: Harvest, 2006).

¹¹ The release of a new cinematic version of C. S. Lewis' *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*, led to comments upon its presentation of the Christian story in allegorical form. This led one Jewish woman to comment that she was glad that her mother was unaware of this message, as she greatly enjoyed the books as a girl.

¹² Northrop Frye, *The Secular Scripture: A Study of the Structure of Romance* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 23.

esty Antoninus Augustus Pius the privileges in whose enjoyment they are permanently confirmed (dedicate this memorial) on ground given by decree of the Town Council.¹³

This honoree came from an obscure Italian village and rose, through command of auxiliary troops, to acquire a new name, serve as procurator, and achieve Equestrian status. Maenius patronized his hometown; his son became a Senator.

Literary examples are similar:

I am a Jew, born in Tarsus in Cilicia, but brought up in this city at the feet of Gamaliel, educated strictly according to our ancestral law, being zealous for God, just as all of you are today.¹⁴ (Acts 22:3 NRSV)

There was once a man in the land of Uz whose name was Job. That man was blameless and upright, one who feared God and turned away from evil. There were born to him seven sons and three daughters. He had seven thousand sheep, three thousand camels, five hundred yoke of oxen, five hundred donkeys, and very many servants; so that this man was the greatest of all the people of the east. (Job 1:1–3 NRSV)

Comment: Progeny, moral character, and wealth are highlighted.

In the days of King Herod of Judea, there was a priest named Zechariah, who belonged to the priestly order of Abijah. His wife was a descendant of Aaron, and her name was Elizabeth. Both of them were righteous before God, living blamelessly according to all the commandments and regulations of the Lord. But they had no children, because Elizabeth was barren, and both were getting on in years. (Luke 1:5–7 NRSV)

Comment: Features are descent, status, moral character, and lack of progeny.

Among the most influential citizens of Ephesus was a man called Lycomedes. He and his wife, Themisto, who also belonged to the city, had a son Habrocomes; his good looks were phenomenal, and neither in Ionia nor anywhere else had there ever been anything like them. This Habrocomes grew more handsome every day; and his mental qualities developed along with his physical ones. For he acquired culture of all kinds and practiced a variety of arts; he trained in hunting, riding, and fighting under arms.¹⁵ (*An Ephesian Tale* 1.1.1–2)

Comment: Ancestry, status, appearance, and accomplishments are highlighted.

For most of the free (and all of the enslaved) inhabitants of the ancient world, identity had little to do with personal choice. The contrast with classical U.S. society is clear:

George F. Babbitt is making comments to his wife while reading the newspaper. After several denunciations of socialism and a boost for isolationism, he reports: "And it says here a fellow was inaugurated mayor in overalls – a preacher, too! What do you think of that!" The experienced Mrs. Babbitt replies "Humph! Well!" The narrator resumes: "He searched for

¹³ ILS 2735. Andrew R. Burn, trans., *The Romans in Britain: An Anthology of Inscriptions* (2d ed.; Oxford: Basil Blackwell & Mott, 1969), 69.

¹⁴ Compare *Onos* 55, where, toward the close of the work, the governor of Achaia asked the newly restored Lucius for his name, that of his parents, other relatives, and city.

¹⁵ This passage was translated by G. Anderson in Brian P. Reardon, ed., *Collected Ancient Greek Novels* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 128.

an attitude, but neither as a Republican, a Presbyterian, an Elk, nor a real-estate broker did he have any doctrine about preacher-mayors laid down for him, so he grunted and went on.”¹⁶

Comment: Mr. Babbitt’s marks of identity are typically American. They include nothing about his hometown, family, or education. The affiliations identified are those that he has chosen, or affirmed, for himself.

Although, as the epitaph of Maenius Agrippa indicates, upward mobility was a possibility for some, ancient fiction does not showcase “rags to riches” stories. The heroes and heroines of romantic novels usually struggle to regain what was, or should have been, theirs before “once upon a time,” while characters in religious texts may strive for the identity they will have in the happily ever after. This broad generalization draws attention to a difference: religious texts may speak of a new identity or a change in identity, but even this identity is, when all has been said and done, the status all humanity enjoyed prior to “once upon a time.”

Although this distinction applies to Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses*, *Daphnis and Chloe*, and even in good part to *An Ethiopian Story*, when these are evaluated from a religious perspective,¹⁷ only *Aseneth*, of the Jewish novels surveyed by Lawrence Wills,¹⁸ fits this model. It is basically applicable to all early Christian fiction. Jewish novels are, in general, oriented toward the preservation of earthly identity, a subject that includes Jewish identity. The previous generalization about “religious novels” therefore requires correction. Whatever their orientation, the texts tend to exhibit a similar scheme: identity lost or threatened, efforts to maintain or recover that identity, and eventual success. In short, what captures interest between once upon a time and happily ever after is the pursuit of identity. The question “when will they cut to the chase?” arises because all that lies between the two poles is, or should be, the chase scene.

In romantic novels the pattern is rather obvious: the beautiful couple prevented from enduring union by feuding parents or unscrupulous rivals, separated by shipwreck or kidnapping, threatened by villains, and, to cut away from the chase, compelled to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous *Tyche*. Morality is uncomplicated and ambiguity generally deficient, as critics have pointedly observed, but that is precisely why people devour them. Readers long for a world in which the bad guys wear black hats, neglect personal hygiene, and deal with overdue rent by tying beautiful maidens to railroad tracks. Its eschatology is almost entirely and happily future, and its cosmology inclines toward, without attaining, the Manichean.

¹⁶ Sinclair Lewis, *Babbitt* (New York: New American Library, 1922), 20–21.

¹⁷ On the *Metamorphoses*, see the Appendix.

¹⁸ Lawrence M. Wills, *The Jewish Novel in the Ancient World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).

The eschatological nature of this identity is patent in that the principals prefer death to even involuntary infidelity. "Love is strong as death, passion fierce as the grave."¹⁹ One may say that this conviction is no less applicable to the love for and from God than to the love from and for another person. The identity celebrated in ancient popular narrative is transcendent, however worldly and physical the action may appear to be. The tests and trials faced by the leads in apocryphal acts are more or less the same as those occurring in romantic novels, a phenomenon that invites comparison, some of which may be superficial. But, it is valid to observe that these adventures center around challenges to identity and that the repertory of tests and trials reflects cultural and technological factors.²⁰ The western adventures and extraterrestrial invasions that loomed large in my childhood cinematic experience were not options in antiquity – although it might be noted that many of those monsters were after our women.

Observations about the meager quality of characterization in ancient fiction notwithstanding, chief characters reveal, through their often wily and creative responses, identities of considerable strength and resilience. Apart from the sometimes literally crucial issue of loyalty, these people, of whom Callirhoe (the heroine of Chariton's novel) is an outstanding example, can display robust moral flexibility. With them, one may contrast such tragic figures as Electra and Antigone, and that in two ways. In addition to their flexibility,²¹ romantic protagonists are not propelled by concerns for family honor or civic duty. The male leads in New Comedies are obsessed with love for a woman they cannot marry. All ends well when it transpires that she is a long-lost Athenian citizen (cf. the opening quotation from Terence's *Andria*). The order of the civic world is upheld. Daphnis and Chloe are recognized as well situated, but this does no more than create the conditions in which they could enjoy the pastoral life as long as they lived.²²

Both New Comedy and romantic novel attend to the personal goals of individuals, but in the novels, civic issues are secondary. "That deepest individual experience of the voyage of life and its significance to the soul has to take place away from the civic realm where the laws and questions established by the fa-

¹⁹ Song 8:6.

²⁰ Mikhail M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays* (ed. M. Holquist; trans. C. Emerson and M. Holquist; Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981) offers an astute analysis of ancient fiction. He understands the actions of the characters as attempts to retain their identity against the forces of fate and construes this anthropologically: "This *distinctive correspondence of an identity with a particular self* is the *organizing center* of the human image in the Greek romance." (105).

²¹ Gareth Schmeling sagely contrasts the leading characters of (New Comedy and) romance to those of the famous tragedies in terms of elasticity; tragic figures often shatter on the rock of their inflexible commitments or principles. Gareth Schmeling, *Xenophon of Ephesus*, (TWAS 613; Boston: Twayne Publications 1980), 122, based upon an observation of T. R. L. Webster.

²² Longus, *Daph.* 4.39: βίον πομενικόν.

thers know the answers to all questions before they are asked.”²³ This assertion of Margaret Anne Doody lacks nuance. It has been vigorously argued that romantic novels *reinforce* civic values.²⁴ Social status is an element of the identity recovered, but none of the romantic novels dwell on subsequent careers, and the duty of childbearing receives modest attention.²⁵ In romantic novels, the civic realm is little more than a backdrop, neither the object of a vigorous challenge nor a vital component of an ideological program. Romantic novels reinforce civic values in part because they take the social order as it (properly and orderly) is.

Where is true identity to be found? What, amidst the vagaries of fate, constitutes the true self? These questions underlie ancient fiction in general, even if authors may never have framed them. It is tempting to refer these issues to the *Zeitgeist*, better *Zeitgeister*, but I have come to suspect that large numbers of people in every place and age feel rootless. Admirers of the vogue may say that such novels appealed to one’s inner *déraciné*. The properly behaved fictional lead does not wake up one rosy-fingered dawn and declare herself rootless. Rootlessness is thrust upon her, but all that it brings: abduction, enslavement, and every species of wickedness, cannot threaten her identity. Travel is an ideal medium for the explication of rootlessness, whence one reason for its frequency, but it is not essential.

What is essential is an identity that does not depend upon ascribed status and the benefits it confers. From this orientation arise many of the tricks used by narrators: mistaken identity, false assumptions about motivation and behavior, disguise, the difficulty of recognition, and, last, but statistically far from least, apparent death.²⁶ Genuine identity emerges when all of the trappings of surface identity have been swept away. Philosophers had debated the nature of the real

²³ Margaret A. Doody, *The True Story of the Novel* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1996), 61.

²⁴ E. g., Brigitte M. Egger, “Women in the Greek Novel: Constructing the Feminine,” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Irvine, 1990); Judith Perkins, *The Suffering Self* (London: Routledge, 1995); G. van den Heever, “Novel and Mystery: Discourse, Myth, and Society,” in *Ancient Fiction: The Matrix of Early Christian and Jewish Narrative*. (eds. J. A. Brant, et al.; SBLSymS 32; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005), 89–114. Froma Zeitlin, “Religion,” in *The Cambridge Companion to the Greek and Roman Novel* (ed. T. Whitmarsh; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 91–108, sees the gods as engaged in preservation of the social order, of which lawful marriage is the keystone (and, she might have said, a synecdoche). Another view is argued by David Konstan in David Konstan, *Sexual Symmetry: Love in the Ancient Novel and Related Genres* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). See also Susan Stephens, “Cultural Identity,” in *The Cambridge Companion to the Greek and Roman Novel* (ed. T. Whitmarsh; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 56–71.

²⁵ The heroes of *An Ethiopian Tale* assume the sacred priesthood, but the narrator says nothing about their activities, or their offspring. Apollonius ruled over “Antioch and Tyre,” uneventfully, and made his son a king. Rhodanes, hero of *A Babylonian Story*, becomes king of Babylon. Daphnis and Chloe bear a boy and a girl. All of the material concerning what took place after reunion / marriage / restoration would scarcely fill a page.

²⁶ Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 103.

since at least the fourth century B.C.E. The Platonic contrast between apparent and authentic reality equipped Apuleius with a framework for fashioning a novel.²⁷ Platonism also stands behind the *Acts of Andrew*, while the *Acts of Thomas* reflects a dualism of probably different origins.²⁸ *Aseneth* is a magical mystery tour. Heliodorus' characters are destined for a mythical utopia.²⁹ The dualistic viewpoint of the *Acts of John* threatens to swamp its thin grip on the real world.³⁰ The novel could move far from its generally monistic roots in the Hellenistic era,³¹ but identity remains at its center.

Two noteworthy examples from quite distinct parts of the Mediterranean world – the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius,³² which is from Latin North Africa, and the *Acts of Thomas*, which evidently stemmed from the East Syrian region and in the Syriac language³³ – will constitute select examples of changing ideas about identity in narrative fiction. The *Acts of Thomas* is probably about a generation

²⁷ Scholarship debates the nature of the Middle Platonic content in the *Metamorphoses*, but not its presence. See Stephen J. Harrison, *Apuleius: A Latin Sophist* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 210–259. Bakhtin comments aptly on the narrative function of metamorphosis in Apuleius. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 111–115.

²⁸ On the philosophical background of the *Acts of Andrew*, see Jean-Marc Prieur, *Acta Andree* (2 vols.; CCSA 5; Brepols: Turnhout, 1980), 1:372–89 and Dennis R. MacDonald, *Christianizing Homer: The Odyssey, Plato, and the Acts of Andrew* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). For one view of the intellectual background of the *Acts of Thomas*, see H. W. J. Drijvers, “The Acts of Thomas,” in *New Testament Apocrypha* (2 vols.; ed. W. Schneemelcher; trans. R. McL. Wilson; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1991–92), 2:332–39, 327–38.

²⁹ Ancient utopian novels were not, by and large, affirmations of the status quo. For examples, see Niklas Holzberg, “Utopias and Fantastic Travel: Euhemerus, Iambulus,” in *The Novel in the Ancient World* (rev. ed.; ed. G. Schmeling; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 621–28.

³⁰ On *Aseneth* see, e.g., Ross Shepard Kraemer, *When Aseneth Met Joseph: A Late Antique Tale of the Biblical Patriarch and His Egyptian Wife, Reconsidered* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). One exploration of the dualism of the *Acts of John* is Richard I. Pervo, “Johannine Trajectories in the *Acts of John*,” *Apocrypha* 3 (1992): 47–68.

³¹ Greek philosophy in the Hellenistic era was generally monistic.

³² In addition to works cited elsewhere, note Gerald N. Sandy, “Apuleius *Golden Ass*: From Miletus to Egypt,” in *Latin Fiction: The Latin Novel in Context* (ed. Heinz Hofmann; London: Routledge, 1999), 81–102; Nancy Shumate, “Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses* The Inserted Tales,” in *The Latin Novel in Context* (ed. H. Hofmann; London: Routledge, 1999): 113–25; Lara Nicolini, *Apuleio, Le Metamorfosi* (Classici Greci e Latini; Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, 2005); Stauros Frangoulidi, *Witches, Isis and Narrative: Approaches to Magic in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008). The preferred edition is that of Donald S. Robertson, *Apulée. Les Métamorphoses* (2d ed.; 3 vols.; Budé; trans. by Paul Vallette; Paris: Les belles lettres, 1956).

³³ The data are uncertain, but East Syria is almost certainly the original home of the *Acts of Thomas*, and the date is c. 200. Drijvers, “The Acts of Thomas,” 322–411, 323, and A. F. J. Klijn, “The *Acts of Thomas* Revisited,” in *The Apocryphal Acts of Thomas* (ed. J. N. Bremmer; SECA 6; Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 1–10. The original language is still a matter of dispute, although the consensus tends toward Syriac. The Greek edition is very early and, in many respects, preserves a more original form of the Acts than does the Syriac. Klijn has issued a revision of his edition: A. F. J. Klijn, *The Acts of Thomas* (2d ed. Leiden: Brill, 2003). The best edition of the Greek text is still Richard A. Lipsius and Maximilian Bonnet, *Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha* (2 vols.; Leipzig: Hermann Mendelssohn, 1891–1903) 2.2.99–201.

later than the *Metamorphoses*. Both belong to the time between Commodus and Caracalla, a time of substantial change in the Roman world.³⁴ The Severan dynasty (193–235), one might note, included both North African and Syrian elements.

Each of these narratives dissociates identity from the body, exploiting an extant literary opportunity. For the *Acts of Thomas*, it is the tradition that the given name of the disciple Thomas was Judas, and that he was the brother of Jesus.³⁵ From this relationship, comes the possibility for mistaken identity (Jesus in the form of Thomas, and vice-versa³⁶) and the notion of the soul as one's heavenly twin, the other/true self. Apuleius took up a Greek comic novel about a man transformed into a donkey and eventually restored to human form.³⁷ Even in its most comic and vulgar form, the story contained a realistic dimension. The ass's eye view allowed for considerable social criticism. The combination of moral indignation and voyeurism is difficult to surpass.

The origin of the *Act of Thomas's* dualism is uncertain. It does not stem from a developed "Gnostic" philosophy. The body is not absolutely evil. It is fallen. Mortality results in procreation, evidently viewed as an attempt to gain immortality through progeny. Human misery and mortality can be overcome through celibacy, a return to the pristine, asexual state. Genuine existence consists in turning away from the body and its desires. In Act Four (chs. 39–41), the apostle encounters an ass that is gifted with speech and is able to evoke the donkey of Balaam (Num 22) and the animal upon which Jesus rode (Mark 11) in its entreaty to carry the apostle. The request was accepted and the ass bore Thomas to the gate of the city, whereupon it expired, its mission accomplished. The ass is the symbol of the human body, which, if properly controlled, can bear its owner to the gate of the heavenly Jerusalem.

Apuleius utilizes the comic tale to reflect upon the three-fold division of active beings into gods, humans, and beasts (Plato, *Resp.* 571d). Plutarch, his contemporary and another member of the Middle Platonist flock, proposed the location of human beings on a spectrum bounded by the beastly and the divine (Plutarch, *Virt. prof.* 75–76).³⁸ Lucius had been an "animal" prior to his transformation, driven by sexual and ontological lust.³⁹ The latter involved the use of magic and

³⁴ On the date of the *Metamorphoses*, see Harrison, *Apuleius*, 10, who dates it definitely after 160 and preferably in the 170s or 180s.

³⁵ "Thomas" is an Aramaic word meaning *twin* or and is *Didymos* in Greek (John 11:16; 20:24; 21:2). One possible assumption is that *the twin* is a nickname, leading to the introduction of a proper name. Didymos was, in fact, an actual given name, as was *Thomas* in Greek, quite similar to the Aramaic word for *twin*.

³⁶ E. g., *Acts Thom.* 11.

³⁷ On the question of Apuleius' Greek sources, see the Appendix.

³⁸ See Hans Dieter Betz, "Gottmensch II," *RAC* 12 (1982): 234–312, esp. 236–38, and Mikeal C. Parsons and Richard I. Pervo, *Rethinking the Unity of Luke and Acts* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 97.

³⁹ See Andrew Laird, "Fiction, Bewitchment and Story Worlds: The Implications of Claims

was motivated by “curiosity,”⁴⁰ not the healthy pursuit of wisdom, but the desire to transgress boundaries. As for the former type of lust, the pre-asinine Lucius engaged in sexual activities denounced by the priest of Isis who conveyed the roses that brought about his restoration.⁴¹ Celibacy is not a specific requirement, but Lucius’ future sex life will be marked by austerity.⁴² Whereas the theoretical underpinning of the *Acts of Thomas* can receive no more than a general profile, Apuleius’ philosophical learning and interests are readily detectable.⁴³ Both novels deal with the perennial Greek question of the relation of the many to the one, of possible reality underlying the manifold variations of appearance.⁴⁴ In each work the ancient and “primitive” concept of metamorphosis provides illustrations of the issue.⁴⁵ Neither is strongly anti-body, but both see true identity and genuine self in a “soul” for which the body is a mixed blessing.

A final point of coincidental comparison is the role of included texts that provide the larger novel with a hermeneutical key. In the *Metamorphoses*, the story of Cupid and Psyche (4.28–6.24) plays this role.⁴⁶ Although, on the surface, this is no more than an engaging fairy tale told to divert a young captive woman, it serves as an allegory of the history of the soul, from its pristine glory through its fall, and its eventual restoration and exaltation. The story climaxes with the marriage of Cupid and the now deified Psyche (6.24). *Acts Thom.* 6–7 contains a

to Truth in Apuleius,” in *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World* (eds. C. Gill and T. P. Wiseman; Austin: University of Texas, 1993), 147–74, 167.

⁴⁰ See, for example, Joseph DeFilippo, “*Curiositas* and the Platonism of Apuleius’ *Golden Ass*,” in *Oxford Readings in the Roman Novel* (ed. S. J. Harrison; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 269–89.

⁴¹ In 11.15, immediately following his restoration/redemption, the priest speaks of “slavish pleasures” and the “perverse reward of your ill-starred curiosity” (*serviles ... voluptates, curiositatis improsperae sinistrum praemium reportasti*), Apuleius, *Metam.* 2:319 (Hanson, LCL), merging the two species of lust. The daughter of Cupid and Psyche was named Voluptas. Once converted Lucius spends days of ineffable enjoyment (*innexplicabili voluptate*) of the image of the goddess. The Isiac priest may have known his Plato, for that tradition held that socially disreputable pleasures tend to enslave (see Plato, *Resp.* 9 587c; 589e; *Phaed.* 65c). Modern popular psychology agrees, invoking the category of addiction rather than enslavement.

⁴² 11.19 speaks of rigorous directions: *castimoniorum abstinenciam satis arduam*. From other sources it seems that periods of abstinence were required.

⁴³ Harrison, *Apuleius*, 252–59.

⁴⁴ For a literary approach to this understanding, see Paula James, *Unity in Diversity: A Study of Apuleius’ Metamorphoses* (Hildesheim: Olms-Weidmann, 1987).

⁴⁵ In the *Acts of Thomas* metamorphosis is a quality of the redeemer. See David R. Cartlidge, “Transfigurations of Metamorphosis in the Acts of John, Thomas, and Peter,” *Semeia* 38 (1986): 53–66. The Greek gods were able to assume more or less any desired form.

⁴⁶ The bibliography on this story is immense. See the edition of Apuleius, *Cupid & Psyche* (ed. E. J. Kenney; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Gerald N. Sandy, “The Tale of Cupid and Psyche,” *Latin Fiction* (ed. H. Hofmann; New York: Routledge, 1999), 126–38; M. Zimmerman et al., *Apuleius Madaurensis Metamorphoses, Book IV 28–35, V and VI 1–24: The Tale of Cupid and Psyche* (Groningen Commentaries on Apuleius; Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 2004), and Sandy, “Apuleius *Golden Ass*,” 81–102.

hymn, set in the context of a royal wedding that portrays the marriage of Christ and the Church. The author of the *Acts of Thomas* may well have taken this piece from a source and aptly inserted it into his narrative. Located as it is, in the first act, the wedding hymn invites the reader toward a symbolic reading of the text.

A closer parallel to Cupid and Psyche is the justly famous "Hymn of the Pearl" (*Acts Thom.* 108–113). On the surface, this is an engaging fairy-tale in verse, sung to comfort prisoners. At a deeper level, the hymn portrays the theology of the Acts in poetic form. Manuscript evidence indicates that this poem was a later addition to the work, although it belongs to a kindred environment.⁴⁷ All in all, this was one of the more inspired interpolations in the history of literature. The series of coincidental parallels between two novels of about a generation apart, separated more by modern disciplines than by ancient categories, puts on the scoreboard a number of goals for the side of phenomenological analysis, while tilting the emphasis toward the religio-philosophical rather than the political – although this division is equally indebted to the hegemony of modern categories.

To introduce the subject of religion is, borrowing an image from the story of Psyche, to unlatch the basket of clichés: initiation confers identity. One of the most common metaphoric uses of the noun refers to sex or sex education. *Daphnis and Chloe* will come to mind. Merkelbach's concrete and uneven exposition of the intersections between mysteries and novels offered more detail than did Kerényi's earlier monograph, but it lacked the Hungarian's depth of insight.⁴⁸ At a minimum these parallels in structure and incident direct modern readers to understand that ancient people viewed their identities in accordance with patterns derived from explicit myth and ritual.⁴⁹ "Presbyterian" and "Elk" may well have possessed more cogency for most inhabitants of the Greco-Roman world than "Republican" or "real-estate broker" (Babbit). Myth and rite reflect human experience. Understanding ancient fiction requires knowledge of the relevant myths and rituals. M. A. Doody appropriates this observation in the sentence preceding the earlier quote: "These novels insist that individual experience is a religious experience," with references to Reinhold Merkelbach and Walter Burkert.⁵⁰ To expand the initial definition: initiation is an experience that con-

⁴⁷ Drijvers, "The Acts of Thomas," 330.

⁴⁸ Karl Kerényi, *Die griechisch-orientalische Romanliteratur* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1927); Karl Kerényi, *Der antike Roman* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971); Reinhold Merkelbach, *Roman und Mysterium* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1962). See the survey of Roger Beck, "Mystery Religions, Aretalogy and the Ancient Novel," in *The Novel in the Ancient World* (rev. ed.; ed. G. Schmeling; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 131–150, and van den Heever, "Novel and Mystery: Discourse, Myth, and Society," 89–114.

⁴⁹ For a general, "neutral" survey of religion in ancient novels see Zeitlin, "Religion," 91–108.

⁵⁰ Doody, *The True Story of the Novel*, 61.

fers identity and provides a framework for interpreting life.⁵¹ This observation is equally applicable to conversion, an explicit theme in a number of these texts.⁵² For readers, the view of life on display may be a fantasy, but fantasies retail a different and superior world and may inspire action.⁵³ Fear of *that* has inspired the moral arbiters of successive generations to condemn “escapist literature.” These worthies are terrified that prison doors may burst open and shackles deconstruct.

To emit yet another generalization: historical novels tend to focus upon corporate identity, romantic upon the individual, but elements of both are normally present. Stories about couples marooned on a desert island must attend more to biology than to romance. Excited crowds supply even romantic novels with a corporate dimension.⁵⁴ A community of celebrants typically hails the happy resolution. Since the marriage of Chaereas and Callirhoe had been the result of a civic assembly⁵⁵ (Chariton, *Chaer.* 1.11.11), it was entirely appropriate that their return generated a spontaneous civic meeting:

With a single voice the crowd [of *Syracusans*] shouted, “Let us go to the assembly!” for they were eager to look at them [*Chaereas and Callirhoe*] and hear them speak. Sooner than it takes to tell the theater was filled with men and women. But when Chaereas entered by himself, all clamored, women as well as men, “Bring along Callirhoe!” In this too Hermocrates [*father of Callirhoe*] gave in to the people, and brought in his daughter as well. First of all the people lifted their eyes to heaven, and blessed the gods, more thankful for that day than for the one of their victory. Then first they divided, with the men cheering Chaereas and the women Callirhoe, next united again to cheer them both together, and the pleased the couple more.⁵⁶

Crowds play roles quite like their counterparts in miracle stories, affirming what has happened – a miracle in at least some sense of the term – and giving scope for the reader, who will also cheer, to participate. Return and reunion are a victory for all but the wicked. Confirmation of civic values is, at the least, congenial to reader participation.

⁵¹ It is also worth noting that allegorical interpretation of ancient fiction, which is the essence of Merkelbach’s book, would have been unremarkable in antiquity, especially later antiquity. See the apposite remarks of Tomas Hägg, *The Novel in Antiquity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 101–104, esp. 103, and Doody, *The True Story of the Novel*, 160–172.

⁵² Conversions of this type are, in general, intellectual experiences, the best ancient examples of which are found in philosophy. See Richard I. Pervo, *Acts: A Commentary* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2009), 233–34.

⁵³ Cf. van den Heever, “Novel and Mystery: Discourse, Myth, and Society,” 89–114.

⁵⁴ Cf. J. R. C. Cousland, “The Choral Crowds in the Tragedy according to St. Matthew,” in *Ancient Fiction: The Matrix of Early Christian and Jewish Narrative*. (eds. J. A. Brant, et al.; SBLSymS 32; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005), 89–114.

⁵⁵ This is a νόμιμος ἐκκλησία. Cf. Acts 19:39. The text suggests that cheers and cheering sections do not require factionalism. This is a display of civic unity that almost parodies factionalism.

⁵⁶ Chariton, *Chaer.* 8.7.1–2 (Goold, LCL).

The parallel to miracle stories extends beyond the phenomenon of acclamation. In exorcisms and healings the barrier between the patient and full humanity is removed. One function of miracles is to convey identity. Every healing story is an abridged novel. The inverse is also valid: novels may be viewed as long miracle stories, usually reinforced by a number of included tales, a quality they share with gospels. Conventional miracles legitimate the person or movement in question.⁵⁷ They purport to show whose side God or the gods is on. With support from on high, a couple will survive and thrive. Otherwise stated, having Aphrodite, Dionysos, Isis, or the God of Israel on your side establishes your identity by showing to whom you belong. Romantic novels often conclude in a temple or with religious rites.⁵⁸

No particular argument for the identity-creating and -affirming functions of Jewish and Christian popular narrative need be made here.⁵⁹ The argument that has been made here is that the genuine differences among types and instances of ancient popular narrative do not obviate the presence of some kindred impulses. Scholars do well to emphasize the uniqueness and particularity of every text. We can also profit from investigating how various bodies of writings are similar. This probe into the subject of identity has attempted to make a modest contribution to the latter project, not the freshness of a newly risen sun, but perhaps a little light.

Appendix: Interpreting Apuleius' Metamorphoses

Divergent understandings of this novel go back to late antiquity. Macrobius thought that Apuleius had betrayed intellectual standards with a childish tale of amorous fiction (*Somnium Scipionis* 1.2.8). The African writer Fulgentius (ca. 500) is the earliest author known to have viewed the *Metamorphoses* as moral instruction in allegorical dress, a view that dominated into the Renaissance.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Gerd Theissen, *The Miracle Stories of the Early Christian Tradition* (trans. F. McDonagh; ed. J. Riches; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 231–302.

⁵⁸ E. g., *Chaereas and Callirhoe, An Ephesian Tale, An Ethiopian Story, The Ass*. The Gospel of Luke ends in a temple.

⁵⁹ Gregory F. Sterling, *Historiography and Self-Definition: Josephos, Luke-Acts and Apologetic Historiography* (NovTSup 64; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992) surveys a range of literature dealing with corporate identity. For a summary of views about the canonical Acts see Scott Shauf, *Theology as History, History as Theology: Paul in Ephesus in Acts 19* (BZNW 133; Berlin: De Gruyter, 2005), 64–65. John J. Collins subtitles his *Between Athens and Jerusalem*, as “Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic Diaspora.” John J. Collins, *Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic Diaspora* (2d ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000). See also Wills, *The Jewish Novel in the Ancient World*, 213.

⁶⁰ See Elizabeth H. Haight, *Apuleius and His Influence* (New York: Cooper Square, 1963); the relevant essays in Heinz Hofmann, ed., *Groningen Colloquia on the Novel*, vol. 2, (Groningen: Forsten, 1989); Carl C. Schlam, *The Metamorphoses of Apuleius: On Making an Ass of Oneself* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Claudio Moreschini (trans. C.

Thereafter its reputation plunged. In the modern period critical opinion favored a serious understanding, exemplified by P. G. Walsh: "Apuleius seeks simultaneously to entertain and to improve."⁶¹ The basic grounds for this general understanding – which was by no means uniform – have been literary and ideological.

Literary analysis begins with the contrasts between the Latin novel and its Greek sources.⁶² Since the major Greek source is lost, the question cannot be easily resolved. From the abridged material in the Pseudo-Lucianic *Onos*, it is certain that Apuleius is responsible for the ending, in which Isis intervenes, upon request, to redeem the protagonist. That ending is incongruent with a comic novel. Furthermore, Apuleius' novel contains a number of inserted tales. These stories are instructional, and they derive from the author, who added both the tales and the final book.⁶³ The longest and most famous of these stories is that of Cupid and Psyche. The charming story, despite the narrator's attempt to discredit it, recapitulates, as noted above, the adventures of Lucius in a somewhat "allegorical" form highly congenial to Apuleius' philosophy.

Apuleius, like some other rhetors, regarded himself as a philosopher. This is not to say that he merits the title, but Apuleius does have a place in the history of Middle Platonism.⁶⁴ In this regard, he may be contrasted with Aelius Aristides, who regarded rhetoric the victor in the eternal conflict between rhetoric and philosophy. Plutarch, a Platonist of a somewhat earlier period, both revived the Platonic tradition of capping a philosophical discussion by offering a myth (as in *Fac.* 920a–945d), and engaged in the theological and philosophical exposition of myth and cult (as in *Is. Os.* 351c–384c). Apuleius is akin to Plutarch. He was not

Stevenson), "Towards a History of the Exegesis of Apuleius: The Case of the 'Tale of Cupid and Psyche,'" in *Latin Fiction: The Latin Novel in Context* (ed. H. Hofmann; London: Routledge, 1999), 181–192; and Robert H. F. Carver, *The Protean Ass: The Metamorphoses of Apuleius from Antiquity to the Renaissance* (Oxford Classical Monographs; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

⁶¹ Patrick G. Walsh, *The Roman Novel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 224. On the subsequent page he cites Horace's "omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci" (Horace, *Ars Poetica* 343–44), stating that it often appeared in the prefaces to French and Spanish picaresque novels. Walsh's study of Apuleius is found on pages 141–223. Other examples of this viewpoint include Hermann Riefstahl, *Der Roman des Apuleius* (FSRKA 15; Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1938); Antonie Wlosok, "On the Unity of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*," in *Oxford Readings in the Roman Novel* (ed. S. J. Harrison; Oxford: The University Press, 2000), 142–56; James Tatum, "The Tales in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*," in *Oxford Readings in the Roman Novel* (ed. S. J. Harrison; Oxford: The University Press, 2000), 157–94; and Giorgio F. Gianotti, 'Romanzo' e ideologia: studi sulle Metamorfosi di Apuleio (Naples: Liguori, 1986).

⁶² On the source question see Hugh J. Mason, "The *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius and its Greek Sources," in *Latin Fiction: The Latin Novel in Context* (ed. H. Hofmann; London: Routledge, 1999), 103–12.

⁶³ James Tatum, "The Tales in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*," in *Oxford Readings in the Roman Novel* (ed. S. J. Harrison; Oxford: The University Press, 2000), 191.

⁶⁴ See John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London: Duckworth, 1989), 306–38, and Harrison, *Apuleius*, 136–209.

primarily a philosopher, but he took philosophy seriously. On these two grounds, an ending so different from its comic source and the insertion of a lengthy story almost demanding symbolic interpretation, both of which appeared consonant with Apuleius' philosophy, the *Metamorphoses* are considered to have a serious purpose of some sort by the majority of interpreters.

John J. Winkler's *Auctor & Actor: A Narratological Reading of Apuleius' Golden Ass* launched a return to a comic understanding.⁶⁵ For Winkler the text is ambiguous. S. J. Harrison views the novel as a sophistic entertainment, in which the potentially serious material serves to display the author's erudition.⁶⁶ Challenges to a general consensus, particularly challenges so ably stated as these, should always be welcome. Harrison's reading is justifiable, but it raises the suspicion that it is too modern a reading, specifically that it draws its strength from modern anti-religious views, views that are decidedly different, in most instances and respects, from those of antiquity. Modern opposition to religion is based primarily upon scientific cosmologies that have banished Providence from the universe and sharply distinguished miracle from the operation of laws of nature. Ancients fluctuated – divination⁶⁷ is a notable example – but most critiques of miracle focused upon the claims of practitioners associated with questionable sects, if they were not independent operators. Augustine knew of readers who regarded the *Golden Ass*, as he entitles it, autobiographical (a tendency that has by no means disappeared). This novel is no more Apuleius' own account of his conversion into a devotee of Isis than it is a record of his conversion into a donkey. In any case, it is a portrait of the artist as a young man, not a mature reflection upon one's life. The *Metamorphoses* contains religious polemic, most notably against some devotees of the Syrian Goddess (8.24–9.10), but the narrative world is not marked by skepticism. The problem with magic is not that it is a useless waste of time and resources, but that it is bad.

A major pillar of the comic interpretation is the discovery of inconsistencies within the narrative, which, under scrutiny, reveal a subversive intention.⁶⁸ The novel deconstructs. These observations are highly intriguing and challenge those who take the serious route for granted. They are not, however, conclusive. It is too pat to say that everything deconstructs, but modern writers, with searchable files and other technological tools, can still produce inconsistencies. Critics may reasonably charge Winkler and Harrison with asking too much of an author who

⁶⁵ John J. Winkler, *Auctor & Actor: A Narratological Reading of Apuleius' Golden Ass* (Berkeley: University of California 1985).

⁶⁶ Harrison, *Apuleius*, 210–59.

⁶⁷ In general, ancients viewed an attack on divination as an attack on religion, much as exposure of errors in the Bible was viewed in the nineteenth century. Posidonius restored the acceptance of divination to the center of Stoic philosophy, in which it served to illustrate the unity of nature and the beneficence of natural law. Cicero's *De Divinatione* reviews the various views.

⁶⁸ See Harrison, *Apuleius*, 26–52, and his references to Winkler and others.

had to work with intractable rolls in poor light. More than one authorial error has earned the label of *felix culpa*. Critics should consider the possibility of both genuine slip-ups and ingenious inconsistencies. In the balance, these do not outweigh the numerous pertinent parallels identified by generations of readers and critics.

Thirdly, Harrison proposes, for critical purposes, the choice between serious and comic. *Tertium non datur*. The dichotomy is rhetorical. "Pure entertainment" belongs to the realm of polemic. Harrison unjustifiably excludes "profit with delight" from consideration. The combination is what one would expect from a sophistic novel.⁶⁹ Apuleius has a good, mature sense of humor, one that is willing to joke about the serious. Reverence does not demand glumness. Although both the extremes of propaganda for the cult of Isis and the production of a postmodern novel are not utterly without merit, the case for seeing serious intent behind the *Metamorphoses* is a strong one, not to be laid aside lightly.

⁶⁹ See the opening of this appendix. On the theme, see C. O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry: The 'Ars Poetica'* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 352–58. Rhetoric posed *docere*, *moovere*, and *delectare* as goals of discipline. This led to a conflict with "rhetorical historiography," as historians of the traditional type argued the utility alone was sufficient. Any pleasure was that derived from learning. On this debate see Gert Avenarius, *Lukians Schrift zur Geschichtsschreibung* (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1956), 13–29; Elmar Herkommer, "Die Topoi in der Proömien der Römischen Geschichtswerk" (diss., Tübingen, 1968), 128–36; as well as Charles W. Fornara, *The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 120–34. The conflict centered about the use of "thrills and chills" to entice the reader. Such enticement was just what Cicero wished to see in a monograph about his consulship, Cicero, *Fam.* 5.12.4. Lucian (*Quomodo historia conscribenda sit* 9; cf. 63) says that those (i. e., "rhetorical historians") who claim to be able to distinguish between what is pleasant (τὸ τεῤῥνόν) and what is useful (τὸ χρήσιμον) in history are wrong. Usefulness is the one goal (τέλος) of history; its source is the true. Polybius frequently evoked the contrast between pleasure and utility. See F. W. Walbank, Polybius (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 6, 34–40. In the preface to his novel, Longus plays with the historiographical tradition by calling the work a pleasant possession for all (κτῆμα δὲ τεῤῥνόν, cf. Thucydides' famous claim, *Hist.* 1.22.4), but also stresses its educational utility (*Daphnis and Chloe* Pref. 3).

The Anthropology of the *Acts of Thomas*

Janet E. Spittler

Introduction

In two relatively recent articles on the apocryphal *Acts of Andrew*, Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta has taken a narrow view, focusing specifically on the anthropology represented in what is likely the earliest recoverable extended fragment of the text.¹ His studies offer new insights into how the text fits in the theological and philosophical landscape of the second century, including the extent to which its anthropology parallels that of Hermetic and Gnostic texts. Lanzillotta's work is particularly valuable in that his analysis diverges from previous understandings of the primary philosophical and theological outlook of the *Acts of Andrew*. His work demonstrates that careful attention to the anthropology presented in a text can lead to a much clearer understanding of the text's broader theological perspective.

In what follows, I will present an analysis of the anthropology of the *Acts of Thomas*, the only one of the major apocryphal acts extant in its entirety.² At the

¹ L. Roig Lanzillotta, "One Human Being, Three Early Christian Anthropologies: An Assessment of *Acta Andreae's* Tenor on the Basis of Its Anthropological Views," *Vigiliae Christianae* 61 (2007): 414–44; "Devolution and Recollection, Deficiency and Perfection: Human Degradation and the Recovery of his Primal Condition According to some Early Christian Texts," in *The Wisdom of Egypt. Festschrift G. Luttikhuisen* (ed. Anthony Hilhorst and George H. Van Kooten; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 443–59. For Roig Lanzillotta's extended argument concerning the status of Codex Vaticanus Graecus 808 as the best witness for the earliest form of the *Acts of Andrew*, see *Acta Andreae Apocrypha. A New Perspective on the Nature, Intention and Significance of the Primitive Text* (CahO 26; Geneve: Cramer, 2007).

² The *Acts of Thomas* is extant in some 21 Greek manuscripts (most of which do not contain all the major sections of the text), as well as manuscripts in Latin, Armenian, Coptic, Ethiopic, Arabic, Slavonic, Georgian and, most importantly, Syriac. Despite significant discussion, there is no true scholarly consensus as to whether the text was composed in Syriac or Greek. The editor of the best and earliest Syriac manuscript (B.L. Add. 14,645) regarded the Syriac as a translation of Greek text (see William Wright, *Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles* (1871; repr., Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1968) xiii–xvi); in the decades that followed the publication of the Syriac text, however, opinions shifted towards regarding the Syriac as the original language, even if the extant Greek versions occasionally offer readings better than the extant Syriac. The primary arguments for Syriac composition were first laid out by F. C. Burkitt, ("The Original Language of the Acts of Judas Thomas," *JTS* 1 [1900]: 280–90; "Another Indication of the Syriac Origin of the Acts of Thomas," *JTS* 3 [1902]: 94–5), but even Burkitt remarks that "most of the lines of argument which naturally present themselves are double-edged" ("Original Language," 282).

outset, however, I would like to note two general points about the apocryphal acts, which I think this study confirms. First, the apocryphal acts of the apostles are very different texts, each with its distinct theological outlook. On the one hand, this point is well known and acknowledged in contemporary apocryphal acts scholarship; on the other hand, the similarities among the major apocryphal acts (particularly in plot structure and in the emphasis on encratism, specifically a strict celibacy maintained even within marriage) are so prominent that certain differences are frequently glossed over. I will begin with a brief summary of Lanzillotta's conclusions on the *Acts of Andrew*, which, in combination with the analysis of the *Acts of Thomas* that follows, will show that the two texts do indeed have fundamentally different understandings of what makes up a human being.

The second general point is that the prose-narrative genre offers the author opportunities that a philosophical or theological treatise does not. The author of a narrative has different tools in his toolbox, which he can use for various purposes – often in ways that are more subtle and potentially more interesting than what one might find in other more typically philosophical genres. In the case of the *Acts of Thomas*, I will argue that the author uses plot and characters in a way that turns certain aspects of the Platonic anthropology (with which the *Acts of Thomas* otherwise shares a great deal) on their head.

The Anthropology of the Acts of Andrew

Lanzillotta locates the anthropology of the *Acts of Andrew* within a broader group of authors and texts that combine a basic dualism with a more Aristotelian scheme. These texts are perhaps rooted in a Platonic dichotomous anthropology (which could be expressed as body vs. soul, material human vs. essential human, or inner and true human vs. exterior and perceptible human), but also clearly dif-

Harold W. Attridge made a strong argument for the priority of the Syriac text in 1990 ("The Original Language of the Acts of Thomas," in *Of Scribes and Scrolls. Studies on the Hebrew Bible, Intertestamental Judaism, and Christian Origins* [ed. Harold W. Attridge, John J. Collins, and Thomas H. Tobin; New York: University of America Press, 1990], 241–50); in the revised second edition of his text and commentary, A. F. J. Klijn suggests that the *Acts of Thomas* "were written in a bilingual environment in which both the Syriac and Greek versions originated simultaneously" (*The Acts of Thomas. Introduction, Text, and Commentary* [2nd ed.; Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2003], 3), and this position seems to be gaining general acceptance (see, e. g., Hans-Josef Klauck, *Apokryphe Apostelakten* [Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 2005], 153). As to the current situation, it is perhaps fair simply to say that both the Greek and Syriac texts can be improved by comparison to the other. That said, the "*Acts of Thomas*" under consideration in this paper is primarily the Greek edition produced by Maximilian Bonnet (*Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha II.2*, 99–288), with reference to the Syriac text and translation by W. Wright and commentary of A. F. J. Klijn when the Syriac text differs substantially from the Greek. Greek is, after all, (as the term in most modern European languages indicates) the language of "anthropology." All English translations of Greek, unless otherwise noted, are mine.

ferentiate and elevate the intellect (νοῦς) above the soul. A nice example from the second century is found in Plutarch's *De facie in orbe lunae*. In the eschatological myth at the end of the dialogue, Sulla explains as follows:

Most people correctly regard the human being as composite, but incorrectly think it is composed of only two parts. They think that the mind is a portion of the soul, missing the mark no less than those to whom the soul seems to be a portion of the body. For the mind is better and more divine than the soul to the same extent that the soul is [better and more divine] than the body.

τὸν ἄνθρωπον οἱ πολλοὶ σύνθετον μὲν ὀρθῶς, ἐκ δυοῖν δὲ μόνων σύνθετον οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡγοῦνται. μῶριον γὰρ εἶναι πως ψυχῆς οἶονται τὸν νοῦν, οὐδὲν ἤττον ἐκείνων ἀμαρτάνοντες, οἷς ἡ ψυχὴ δοκεῖ μῶριον εἶναι τοῦ σώματος. νοῦς γὰρ ψυχῆς, ὅσω ψυχὴ σώματος, ἄμεινόν ἐστι καὶ θεϊότερον. (*Fac.* 943a).

In the *Acts of Andrew*, Lanzillotta finds a similar scheme: the soul, while clearly of higher rank than the physical body, is nevertheless inferior to the νοῦς. In the *Acts of Andrew*, ψυχὴ, is used to refer either to an intermediary part of the human being, between σώμα and νοῦς, or to the whole person.³ When the *Acts of Andrew* refers to the divine element of the human being – the part that “truly exists” – it refers exclusively to the νοῦς or the νοερός part and regards both soul and body as obstacles to be overcome.⁴

In his farewell discourse, for example, the apostle Andrew addresses the heroine Maximilla, saying, “I beg you, then, wise man (*sic*), that your noble mind endure; I beg you, invisible mind, that you be protected” (δέομαί σου οὖν τοῦ φρονίμου ἀνδρὸς ὅπως διαμείνῃ εὖοψις νοῦς· δέομαί σου τοῦ μὴ φαινομένου νοῦ ὅπως αὐτὸς διαφυλαχθῇ).⁵ Later, addressing Stratocles, another of his disciples, Andrew asks, “do you understand to whom the things spoken were spoken? Did each touch your understanding? Did they reach your rational part?” (μανθάνεις πρὸς τίνας εἶρηται τὰ εἰρημένα; ἥψατό σου ἕκαστον τῆς διανοίας; ἔθιγόν σου τοῦ διανοητικοῦ μέρους;)⁶ In passages like these, Lanzillotta identifies an anthropology closely aligned with that of several Nag Hammadi treatises, particularly the *Treatise on Resurrection*, the *Teachings of Silvanus* and the *Paraphrasis of Shem*, in which the differentiation of soul and mind is particularly sharp, and the superiority of the mind is quite clear.⁷ Based on this shared anthropology (and a few other common elements), Lanzillotta concludes that the *Acts of Andrew* has much closer ties with Valentinian Gnosticism than has previously been suggested.⁸

³ Roig Lanzillotta, “One Human Being,” 425.

⁴ Ibid, “Devolution and Recollection,” 448.

⁵ Cod. Vat. gr. 808, lns. 130–2.

⁶ Cod. Vat. gr. 808, lns. 144–5.

⁷ Roig Lanzillotta, “Devolution and Recollection,” 448–9.

⁸ Ibid, 458–9.

Body and soul in the Acts of Thomas

In attending to the anthropology of the *Acts of Thomas* the first thing we should note is that the intellect plays almost no anthropological role in the text. Neither the nouns νοῦς or διάνοια nor their adjectives (i. e., νοερός or διανοητικός) appear with any frequency. Where they are used, there is no indication that a specific *part* of the human being is referred to, and there is no particular elevation of the “no-etic” quality. The anthropology of the *Acts of Thomas* is instead rooted in the basic dualism of body and soul, σῶμα and ψυχή. These two parts of the human being are clearly distinct, as is evident in their easy separation at death. When a human being dies, the soul departs (ἐξέρχεσθαι) from the body; if that human being is brought back to life the soul then comes back in (ἐπισέρχεσθαι), as is the case with Gad, the brother of the king in sections 22–23 (to be discussed in detail below). When the king’s brother dies, it is reported that “his soul departed” (ἐξῆλθεν ἡ ψυχή) and that “angels took the soul of Gad, brother of the king, and brought it up into heaven” (τὴν ψυχὴν Γὰδ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ βασιλέως ἄγγελοι παραλαβόντες εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνήγαγον) (*Acts Thom.* 22). Notably, Gad’s ψυχή is very much Gad himself: in the remainder of the episode, the name “Gad” and “the soul of Gad” are used interchangeably; moreover, Gad’s soul sees, speaks, and schemes exactly as the embodied Gad does. When Gad returns to life, “the angels released Gad’s soul; and while they were dressing him in the grave clothes, his soul went back into him” (Τότε οἱ ἄγγελοι ἀφῆκαν τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ Γὰδ· καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐνδύειν αὐτοῦς αὐτὸν τὴν ἐντάφιον στολὴν ἐπιστῆλθεν αὐτῷ ἡ ψυχή αὐτοῦ. (*Acts Thom.* 23).⁹

Despite this separation at death, the connection between body and soul during life is extremely close; so close, in fact, that there is no distinction between the

⁹ Gad’s “out-of-body experience” might be compared to reports about Hermotimos of Klazomenai whose soul, according to numerous ancient reports, would frequently depart from his body, travelling to distant locales where he would deliver predictions concerning future events. His body, meanwhile, would lie motionless on the floor of his house, (poorly) guarded by his wife. His strange life came to an end when certain citizens of Klazomenai discovered the body and burned it, thus depriving the soul of a place in which to “dress itself” (εἰσδύεσθαι), according to the version given in Apollonios’ *Historiae Mirabiles* 3. This word (εἰσδύεσθαι) is used as a technical term in philosophical discussion of metempsychosis, a fact which perhaps draws the reader’s attention to the use of ἐνδύειν in the *Acts Thom.* 23. How interesting that Gad’s soul re-enters the body at the exact moment in which they are dressing him in his grave clothes! Just as the body is dressed for death in grave clothes, the soul is “dressed for death,” so to speak, in the body. Ancient sources, along with Apollonios, describing Hermotimos of Klazomenai are: Pliny, *Nat.* 7.174; Plutarch, *Gen. Socr.* 592c–d (where Hermotimos is called “Hermodorus”); Lucian, *Musc. Laud.* 7; Tertullian, *An.* 2.3, 44.1; Origen, *Cels.* 3.32; Proclus, *In Rep.* vol. 2 p. 113 (Wilhelm Kroll’s edition; Hermotimos is again called “Hermodorus”). For discussion of Hermotimos, see Fritz Graf, *Nordionische Kulte. Religionsgeschichtliche und epigraphische Untersuchungen zu den Kulturen von Chios, Erythrai, Klazomenai and Phokaia* (Rom: Schweizeres Institut, 1985) 390–95; for a discussion of Hermotimos and various other wandering souls, see Walter Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 120–65 and Jan Bremmer, *The Early Greek Concept of the Soul* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).

state of the body and the state of the soul. When the soul is troubled, it is represented in bodily illness; likewise the condition of the body – whether healthy or sick – is a direct indicator of the condition of the soul. Being in good physical condition indicates a preparedness to become a Christian, as in section 59, where a group of people that have been healed by Thomas speak:

Then all who were healed by him said together with one voice: ‘Glory to you Jesus, who provides healing impartially through your slave and apostle Thomas. Now that we are healthy and rejoice we beg you that we might become your flock and be numbered among your sheep.’

τότε εἶπον πάντες ὁμοθυμαδὸν οἱ δι’ αὐτοῦ ἰαθέντες μιᾷ φωνῇ· Δόξα σοι Ἰησοῦ τῷ τὴν θεραπείαν ἐξ Ἰσου παρασχόντι διὰ τοῦ σου δούλου καὶ ἀποστόλου Θωμᾶ. καὶ ὑγιαίνοντες καὶ χαίροντες δεόμεθά σου γενέσθαι τῆς σῆς ἀγέλης καὶ ἐναριθμηθῆναι εἰς τὰ σὰ πρόβατα·

On the other hand, a precarious state of health makes one vulnerable to possession by demons. This becomes clear in section 64, where a woman who was attacked by a demon while on the road on her way to a wedding blames her husband, saying “Don’t you know what you’ve done to me? I begged you that I not go to the wedding, since my body was out of sorts” (Οὐκ ἔγνων ἃ διεπράξω ἐν ἐμοί; ἐδεόμην γάρ σου μὴ ἀπιέναι εἰς τὸν γάμον, ἐπεὶ διὰ ἀνωμάλως εἶχον τῷ σώματί μου). The connection between the health of the body and health of the soul is reflected also in the characterization of Jesus sometimes as a physician of souls (ἱατρὸς τῶν ... ψυχῶν) (*Acts Thom.* 95), other times as a physician of bodies (ἱατρὸς τῶν σωμάτων) (*Acts Thom.* 37), and later a physician of both bodies and souls (ἱατρὸς ... σωμάτων καὶ ψυχῶν) (*Acts Thom.* 156).

Despite this close connection, in the *Acts of Thomas* the body is ultimately inferior to the soul, inasmuch as the body grows old, wears out, and at death will be left behind. The leaving behind of the body is described by Thomas positively in section 160, where he says: “But this apparent death is not death, but a liberation and release from the body” (ἀλλ’ οὗτος ὁ φαινόμενος οὐκ ἔστιν θάνατος, ἀπαλλαγὴ δὲ καὶ τοῦ σώματος λύσις), an expression of the body-soul relationship virtually identical to the Platonic notion as expressed by Socrates in the *Phaedo* 67d: “Isn’t this what we call death – a release and separation of the soul from the body?” (Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο γε θάνατος ὀνομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος;).

The superiority of the soul is reflected also in the apostle’s repeated assertion that Jesus cannot be seen with bodily eyes, but only with the eyes of the soul, as in section 53: “who, although not visible to the bodily eyes, is never hidden at all from the [eyes] of our souls” (ὁ οὐχ ὁρώμενος παρὰ τοῖς σωματικοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς, τοῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν οὐδ’ ὅλως ἀποκρυπτόμενος).¹⁰ A particularly interesting passage for understanding the anthropology of the text is found in section 30:

¹⁰ Note that even as the ψυχή is being described as superior to the body, it is nevertheless given very “bodily” attributes – here, eyes.

And [Thomas] began to pray and to say: 'Lord, judge of the living and the dead – of the living that are standing here and the dead that are lying here; and master of all and father – but father not of those souls that are in the body but of those that have gone out; for of those souls that are in pollutions you are master and judge.'

Καὶ ἤρξατο εὐχεσθαι καὶ λέγειν· Κύριε κριτὰ ζώντων καὶ νεκρῶν, ζώντων τῶν παρεστώτων καὶ νεκρῶν τῶν κειμένων, καὶ δέσποτα πάντων καὶ πατήρ· πατήρ δὲ οὐ τῶν ἐν σώμασιν οὐσῶν ψυχῶν ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐξελθουσῶν· τῶν γὰρ ἐν μιάσμασιν οὐσῶν ψυχῶν δεσπότης εἶ καὶ δικαστής·

While the Lord is called upon as “judge of the living and the dead,” he is only “father” – genetically related, so to speak – of the souls that are no longer within the body; of souls that are still in the body, and thus “in pollutions,” he is rather “master and judge.”

Nevertheless, the body is not the problem *per se*. If there is an enemy within the human being, it is the three-headed menace of fornication, greed, and hunger, particularly the “service of the belly” (ἐργασίας τῆς γαστρὸς or ἐργασία τῆς κοιλίας). But both body *and* soul are vulnerable to these, as is clear in section 28: “And the service of the belly throws the soul into cares and worries and grief” (ἡ δὲ ἐργασία τῆς κοιλίας εἰς φροντίδας καὶ μερίμνας καὶ λύπας ἐμβάλλει τὴν ψυχὴν). Although bodies are by nature temporary and prone to deterioration, they have the potential for goodness – even blessedness, as we see in section 94: “Blessed are the bodies of the holy, because they have been counted worthy to be temples of God, so that Christ might dwell in them” (μακάρια τὰ σώματα τῶν ἁγίων, ὅτι κατηξιώθησαν ναοὶ θεοῦ γενέσθαι, ἵνα Χριστὸς ἐνοικήσῃ ἐν αὐτοῖς).

A Third Anthropological Element: The Human-Divine Connection

While the anthropology of the *Acts of Thomas* is essentially a dualism of body and soul, there is (as in the *Acts of Andrew* and much of Middle Platonism)¹¹ a third element. As noted above, it is certainly not intellect (νοῦς or διάνοια), which, though central to the *Acts of Andrew*, plays almost no role in the *Acts of Thomas*. It is also not the spirit (πνεῦμα), which does occur in the *Acts of Thomas* (primarily in formulae involving the Holy Spirit), but does not seem to have any consistent anthropological significance. In fact, the third, vital element of the human being in the *Acts of Thomas* is not represented by a single term; it is, rather, a connection with God and/or Jesus, which is described and developed through three key metaphors. The first of these metaphors involve “dwelling places,” the second involve “weddings” and “marriage,” and the third are metaphors involv-

¹¹ On Middle Platonic anthropology, see, e.g., John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977); Abraham P. Bos, “‘Aristotelian’ and ‘Platonic’ Dualism in Hellenistic and Early Christian Philosophy and in Gnosticism,” *Vigiliae Christianae* 56 (2002): 273–91.

ing “yokes” (as in animals to a carriage). There is some overlap between the metaphors of marriage and yoking inasmuch as “yoke partner” (σύζυγος) is itself a term for spouse. These key metaphors occur throughout the text, turning up, as we will shortly see, particularly in prayers and speeches. But these metaphors also correspond to the plots of major sections of the narrative. In the remainder of the paper, I will demonstrate that it is in these “narrative expositions” of the metaphors that the finer points of the anthropology of the *Acts of Thomas* are developed.¹²

“Dwelling in” as Metaphor for the Human-Divine Connection

In the passage quoted above (“Blessed are the bodies of the holy, because they have been counted worthy to be temples of God, so that Christ might dwell in them”), *Acts Thom.* 94 recalls 1 Cor 3:16–17 and 6:19 (“Don’t you know that you are a temple of god and the spirit of God dwells in you?” and “don’t you know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit in you ...”). An even closer connection might be made with Tatian, who, in *Orat. ad Graec.* 15.2–3, writes:

The soul is a bond of flesh, but the flesh is retentive of the soul; if such a form of constitution is as a temple, God wishes to dwell in it through spirit as his representative; but if there is no such dwelling, then man is better than the beasts in articulate speech alone; as for the rest of his way of life, it is the same as theirs, since he is not a likeness of God.¹³

δεσμός δὲ τῆς σαρκὸς ψυχὴ, σχετικὴ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ σὰρξ. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον τῆς συστάσεως εἶδος εἰ μὲν ὡς ναὸς εἶη, κατοικεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ θεὸς βούλεται διὰ τοῦ πρεσβεύοντος πνεύματος· τοιοῦτου δὲ μὴ ὄντος τοῦ σκηνώματος προὔχει τῶν θηρίων ὁ ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τὴν ἔναρθρον φωνὴν μόνον, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐκείνοις διαίτης ἐστίν, οὐκ ὦν ὁμοίωσις τοῦ θεοῦ.

The notion is expanded in the *Acts of Thomas*. In section 156, the apostle calls on the Holy Spirit (as in 1 Corinthians) to dwell within Christians: “Make them your holy temples and let your holy spirit dwell in them!” (ποιήσον αὐτοὺς ναοὺς ἁγίους σου, καὶ οἰκεῖτω ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ ἅγιόν σου πνεῦμα). In section 48, it is the “peace” of Jesus: “Let your peace come and dwell in them” (ἐλθέτω ἡ εἰρήνη σου καὶ σκηνώσάτω ἐν αὐτοῖς). In section 88, the apostle asks “that the word of God might pitch its tent in everyone and set up shop among them” (ἵνα εἰς πάντας κατασκηνώσῃ ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνσκηνώσῃ). In section 94, certain bodies have become worthy to be the “dwelling places of [God’s] heavenly gift”

¹² For a different take on the anthropology of the *Acts of Thomas* as expressed through narrative devices, see János Bolyki, “Human Nature and Character as Moving Factors of Plot in the *Acts of Thomas*,” in *The Apocryphal Acts of Thomas* (ed. Jan N. Bremmer; Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 91–100.

¹³ English translation first appeared in Janet E. Spittler, *Animals in the Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles: The Wild Kingdom of Early Christian Literature* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 219.

(οἰκητήρια τῆς δωρεᾶς σου τῆς ἐπουρανίου); elsewhere, the light, Jesus, and God directly “dwell” in human beings (sections 148, 98 and 87, respectively). This “dwelling,” moreover, is mutual: if you make yourself – your soul and body – a “dwelling place” (οἰκητήριον) for God (and Jesus, et al.), you will, both in life and in death, have a dwelling place or “refuge” (καταφύγιον) in him (46 and 48).

The vocabulary of “dwelling” and “refuge” is ubiquitous in the *Acts of Thomas*. Even more significant, however, are a pair of narrative expositions of the metaphor – that is, episodes in which the figure is spun out into narratives that imagine what it means to have a *literal* dwelling place either with God or separated from him. In act two (sections 17–29), soon after arriving in India, Thomas – who has been sold by Jesus into slavery as a carpenter – is commissioned to build a vacation palace for the Indian king Gundaphorus.¹⁴ Thomas sketches some plans, with which the king is very pleased, and is given a large series of payments to fund the construction. Thomas, of course, does not use the money to build a palace, but instead uses it to feed and clothe the local poor. When the king discovers that the palace is not being built, he puts Thomas in prison; but as it happens, the king’s brother Gad dies on that day. As mentioned above, Gad’s soul departs from his body and is taken up to heaven, where he is given the tour by an angel (functioning as something like a heavenly real estate agent). There, Gad sees an enormous and beautiful palace, which, the angel explains, has been built by Thomas for Gad’s brother the king. Gad asks to be returned to life, so that he can try to buy the palace from his brother. (Gad tells the angel: “he doesn’t know what he’s got – he’ll sell it to me!”). The episode ends with both Gad and the king believing in Thomas’ god and praying that each might “become a worthy inhabitant (οἰκητόρων) of that house,” that is the heavenly palace constructed by Thomas (24). Throughout the *Acts of Thomas*, the arrangement is clear: if you make yourself – your body and soul – a fitting dwelling place for God, he will provide a dwelling place for you. In this episode the figurative language becomes literal: you will have big, beautiful house in a good neighborhood in heaven.

But the reader should be careful: if you do *not* make yourself a dwelling place for God, you are welcoming in demons; and if you are inhabited by demons in life, they will likewise provide a place for you in death. In act six (sections 51–61), we find the story of a promiscuous woman who has been murdered by her lover (a recently converted and somewhat confused Christian) and resurrected by Thomas.¹⁵ When the woman returns to life, she relates a story that is the inverse

¹⁴ On the heavenly palace in the *Acts of Thomas* see Hans Josef Klauck, “Himmolisches Haus und irdische Bleibe. Eschatologische Metaphorik in Antike und Christentum,” *NTS* 50 (2004): 5–35; A. Hilhorst, “The Heavenly Palace in the Acts of Thomas,” in *The Apocryphal Acts of Thomas* (ed. Jan N. Bremmer; Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 53–64.

¹⁵ On this episode, see also István Czachesz, “The Bride of the Demon. Narrative strategies of self-definition in the *Acts of Thomas*,” in *The Apocryphal Acts of Thomas* (ed. Jan N. Bremmer; Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 36–52.

of Gad's: upon death, she was received by a demon and taken on a tour of hell, where she witnessed souls being punished in various ways.¹⁶ Again, the figurative language of mutual "dwelling in" becomes literal: if a demon dwells in you in life, a demon will provide your dwelling place in death. The way that a human being makes him or herself a fit dwelling place for God is, as is made clear repeatedly throughout the text, to avoid the service of the belly and – in particular – any kind of sexual activity; that is, it is primarily the human being's conduct with respect to their body that allows for God to dwell in them.

"Marriage" as Metaphor for the Human-Divine Connection

The second metaphor used to describe this third element of the human being – the connection that must be made with God – is marriage. Marriage and weddings are clearly important themes in the *Acts of Thomas*, coming up repeatedly and in various contexts. In fact, most of the characters in the narrative are explicitly husbands and wives, and the vocabulary of marriage is ubiquitous (including γάμος, γαμέτης, γαμετή, συζεύγνυμι, ὁ and ἡ σύζυγος). Just like the human being can be a dwelling place for either God or demons, the human being must choose whether to attach him/herself to a temporal, corruptible spouse or to the "true" and "eternal" spouse. In *Acts Thom.* 61, for example, the apostle prays:

'Look upon us, Lord, for because of you we have given up our bodily wives and our earthly fruits, so that we might share in that enduring and true fellowship.'

ἐπιδε ἐφ' ἡμᾶς κύριε, διὰ σὲ γὰρ τὰς συζύγους ἡμῶν τὰς σωματικὰς κατελείψαμεν καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιγείους, ἵνα κοινωνήσωμεν ἐκείνῃ τῇ κοινωνίᾳ τῇ παραμόνῳ καὶ ἀληθινῇ.

The marriage metaphor is given a narrative exposition in the *Acts of Thomas* in the final extended episode, which relates the conversion of Mygdonia and the displeasure of her husband Charisius, but also in the first episode of the text, in which the apostle, upon arrival in the city Andrapolis (which, incidentally, could be etymologized as either "man-city" or "husband-city"), is invited to the wedding feast of the local ruler's daughter. Having demonstrated his prophetic powers at the reception, Thomas is invited by the father of the bride to give a blessing to the young couple, which he does. After Thomas leaves them in the bridal chamber, Jesus appears in the likeness of Thomas and advises the couple to "abandon filthy intercourse" and "become holy temples" (12). When, the next morning, it is discovered that the marriage has not been consummated, the bride explains (14):

¹⁶ Note that, as observed above, souls are here again presented as having very "bodily" characteristics, e. g., the tongues from which the souls of slanderers are hanged (56).

‘That I have scorned this husband and this marriage that passes away from before my eyes – it is because I am bound to a different marriage; that I did not have intercourse with this short-lived husband, which ends with lust and a bitter soul – it is because I am yoked to a true husband.’

καὶ ὅτι ἐξουθένησα τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον καὶ τοὺς γάμους τούτους τοὺς παρερχομένους ἀπ’ ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν μου, ἐπειδὴ ἐτέρῳ γάμῳ ἡρμόσθην· καὶ ὅτι οὐ συνεμίγην ἀνδρὶ προσκαίρῳ, οὐ τὸ τέλος μετὰ λαγνείας καὶ πικρίας ψυχῆς ὑπάρχει, ἐπειδὴ ἀνδρὶ ἀληθινῷ συνεζεύχθην.

Similarly, the groom gives thanks to the Lord, calling on him as “the one who humbled yourself to me and my smallness, so that, setting me beside your greatness, you might unite me with yourself” (ὁ σεαυτὸν κατευτελίσας ἕως ἐμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς σμικρότητος, ἵνα ἐμὲ τῇ μεγαλωσύνῃ παραστήσας ἐνώσης σεαυτῷ) and further, “the one whose love boils up in me” (οὗ ἡ ἀγάπη ἐν ἐμοὶ βράσσει) (15). What one must do to become fit for this marriage with God is made quite clear in Jesus’ advice to “abandon filthy intercourse.”

In act ten (sections 119–133), Mygdonia, wife of Charisius, kinsman of the king, accepts baptism and thus refuses to continue marital relations with her husband. In explaining her decision to Charisius (in section 124), Mygdonia describes her Christian life as a new and better form of marriage:

‘You have seen that transitory marriage, [existing] only here, but this marriage abides forever; that fellowship was of corruption, this is of eternal life; those attendants were short-lived men and women, but these now remain to the end ... that bridal chamber is taken down again, but this one remains through everything; That bed was spread with slackness, this one with love and faith; you are a bridegroom who is transitory and is destroyed, but Jesus is a true bridegroom, remaining immortal forever; that bridal gift was money and robes that grow old, but this is living words that never pass away.

εἶδες ἐκεῖνον τὸν παρελθόντα γάμον ὧδε καὶ μόνον, ὁ δὲ γάμος οὗτος εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα μένει· ἡ κοινωνία ἐκείνη διαφθορᾶς ἦν, αὕτη δὲ ζωῆς αἰωνίου· οἱ παράνυμφοι ἐκεῖνοι ἄνδρες εἰσὶν καὶ γυναῖκες πρόσκαιροι, οἱ δὲ νῦν εἰς τέλος παραμένουσιν· ἐκεῖνος ὁ γάμος ἐπὶ γῆς ἴσθισιν φιλανθρωπίαν δροσίζων· ἐκεῖνος ὁ παστὸς λύεται πάλιν, οὗτος δὲ διὰ παντὸς μένει· ἐκείνη ἡ κλίνη πάρεσιν κατέστρωται, αὕτη δὲ στοργῇ τε καὶ πίστει· σὺ νυμφίος εἶ παριῶν καὶ λυόμενος, ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς νυμφίος ἐστὶν ἀληθινός, εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα παραμένων ἀθάνατος· ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἀνακαλυπτήριον χρήματα ἦν καὶ πέπλα παλαιούμενα, τοῦτο δὲ ζῶντες λόγοι μηδέποτε παρερχόμενοι.

The importance of the marriage metaphor is further underscored by the placement of these episodes at the beginning and end of the text.

“Yoke” as Metaphor for the Human-Divine Connection

While “yoking” terms in the *Acts of Thomas* are used to refer to marriage, there are also many references to regular yokes in the text – in fact, the apostle lists “yoke-making” as one of his carpentry skills when he is first purchased as a slave

(3). Throughout the text, human beings must decide what kind of yoke to take up, that is, what sort of burden they will yoke themselves to. When preaching to a crowd in section 28, Thomas promises that the human being who believes in the gospel will receive a “gentle yoke and a light load” (ζυγὸν πραότητος καὶ φορτίον ἐλαφρόν); in section 86, he preaches that “gentleness enslaves the enemy” and “gentleness is a good yoke” (ἡ πραότης ζυγὸς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὴς πραότης ζυγὸς ἐστὶν ἀγαθός); the devil, however, can put you under a “hard yoke” (ἐν ζυγῷ σκληρότητος ἐν ζυγῷ σκληρότης) (32, cf. 45, 83).

“Yokes” and “yoking” in discussions of anthropology are familiar elsewhere in early Christian literature. Tatian, again, instructs his reader to “yoke your soul to the Holy Spirit and busy yourself with the divine yoking” (ζευγνύναι τε τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ καὶ τὴν κατὰ θεὸν συζυγίαν πραγματεύεσθαι) (*Orat. ad Graec.* 15.1). The notion that the human being needs to be re-connected or re-attached to its better part or divine companion has its *locus classicus* in Plato’s *Timaeus* 41d–42b, where the creation of the human being includes the following passage:

the [demiurge] turned again to the mixing bowl he had used before, the one in which he had blended and mixed the soul of the universe. He began to pour into what remained of the previous ingredients and to mix them in somewhat the same way ... and when he had compounded it all, he divided the mixture into a number of souls equal to the number of the stars and assigned each soul to a star. He mounted each soul in a carriage (ὄχημα), as it were, and showed it the nature of the universe ... And if a person lived a good life throughout the due course of his time, he would at the end return to his dwelling place (οἴκησις) in his companion star, to live a life of happiness that agreed with his character. (trans. Donald J. Zeyl)

καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν πρότερον κρατῆρα, ἐν ᾧ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν κεραννὺς ἔμισγεν, τὰ τῶν πρόσθεν ὑπόλοιπα κατεχεῖτο μίσγων τρόπον μὲν τινα τὸν αὐτόν, ἀκήρατα δὲ οὐκέτι κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως, ἀλλὰ δεῦτερα καὶ τρίτα. συστήσας δὲ τὸ πᾶν διεῖλεν ψυχὰς ἰσαριθμούς τοις ἄστροις, ἐνειμέν θ’ ἐκάστην πρὸς ἕκαστον, καὶ ἐμβιβάσας ὡς ἐς ὄχημα τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξεν ... καὶ ὁ μὲν εὖ τὸν προσήκοντα χρόνον βιούς, πάλιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ συννόμου πορευθεὶς οἴκησιν ἄστρου, βίον εὐδαίμονα καὶ συνήθη ἔξει.

This description of the human soul, along with those in the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*, was particularly influential in the Middle Platonism of the second century CE.¹⁷

The image is of particular interest in reading the *Acts of Thomas*. As we have seen with the metaphors of dwelling and marriage, yoking is also given a narrative exposition. In act eight, Thomas is on the road, on his way to cast demons out of the wife and daughter of a captain. Thomas and the captain are riding in a carriage (ὄχημα) driven by four beasts of burden (ὑποζύγια). After a while, these animals get tired and cannot continue; section 69 reports:

¹⁷ Alcinous, for example, presents a summary of this passage in his *Handbook of Platonism* 16.2.

When they went off down the road, it happened that the beasts of burden were worn out by the great summer heat and were entirely unable to move. The captain, deeply troubled, was disheartened, thinking he would run on foot and get other beasts for the use of the carriage.

ήνικα δὲ ἀπῆσαν κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν, συνέβη ἐκ τοῦ πολλοῦ καύσωνος κεκοπιακέναι τὰ ὑποζύγια καὶ μὴ δυνάμενα ὅλως σαλευθῆναι. ὁ δὲ στρατηλάτης περίλυπος γενόμενος πάννυκτος ἡθύμει, ἐνθυμούμενος τοῖς ἰδίους ποσὶν δρόμῳ χρῆσασθαι καὶ ἕτερα ὑποζύγια ἀγαγεῖν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὀχήματος χρείαν.

By chance, the apostle sees a herd of wild asses grazing along the road; he tells the captain to go to herd and announce that “Judas Thomas, the apostle of Christ” has need of four of you. The captain is afraid, but does as Thomas commands him; as soon as he speaks all the wild asses come running, vying to be yoked to Thomas’ carriage:

When they heard these things, the wild asses with one accord came to him at a run; and when they came they did him reverence. The apostle said to them, ‘Peace be with you. Yoke four [of you] in place of these beasts that stand here.’ And each of them came forth and competed to be yoked. Now there were four stronger ones, and these were yoked.

Ταῦτα ἀκούσαντες οἱ ὄναγροι ὁμοθυμαδὸν δρόμῳ χρῆσάμενοι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἤρχοντο, ἐλθόντες δὲ προσεκύνησαν αὐτόν. εἶπεν δὲ αὐτοῖς ὁ ἀπόστολος· Εἰρήνη ὑμῖν. ὑποζεύξατε τέσσαρας ἀντὶ τῶν κτηνῶν τούτων τῶν ἀποσταθέντων. Καὶ προσήλθον ἕκαστος αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπέθλιβον ὑποζευχθῆναι. ἦσαν οὖν ἐκεῖ τέσσαρες ἰσχυρότεροι, οἳ καὶ ἐζεύχθησαν.

These new animals successfully draw the carriage to the destination, even miraculously knowing the way without being told. When they arrive, one of the wild asses plays a larger role in the narrative, acquiring human voice and acting as envoy between the apostle and the demons he has come to cast out. The wild ass even delivers two speeches, admonishing and encouraging the apostle himself, advocating an encratic life and warning against false apostles (79).

There are many interesting elements in this episode, but the key piece in understanding it is a modicum of ancient natural historical information about the wild ass.¹⁸ The wild ass was no doubt a much more familiar animal in the Roman Empire than it is today. It was thought to have multiple impressive or otherwise notable characteristics, but the most well known report concerned the behavior of the father wild ass with his sons. According to Oppian, Pliny, Solinus and others, the male wild ass is a very jealous creature, keeping a harem of female wild asses all to itself. In order to keep the status quo, when any of the females gives birth to a male, the father castrates his own son with his teeth so that the colt not grow up to be competition. Pliny gives the most succinct version:

¹⁸ This interpretation of the wild ass in the *Acts of Thomas* in light of the ancient natural historians was first presented in Spittler, 199–223.

In this genus, individual males control herds of females. They fear rivals of their libido and consequently they guard their own pregnant females and castrate the male offspring with a bite.¹⁹

*mares in eo genere singuli feminarum gregibus imperitant. timent libidinis aemulos et ideo gravidas custodiunt mursuque natos mares castrant.*²⁰

The same report appears in the Christian “natural history” text, the *Physiologus*, where the wild ass is presented as a figure of the encratism of the apostles:

The *Physiologus* has said concerning the wild ass that he is the leader of a herd, and should any of the roaming females give birth to males, their father cuts all their genitals, so that they not produce seed. For the patriarchs sought to sow bodily seed, but the apostles, [to sow] noetic children, practiced encratism, seeking heavenly seed ... The old is the seed of promise; the new is of encratism. The *Physiologus* spoke well about the wild ass.²¹

ὁ Φυσιολόγος ἔλεξε περὶ τοῦ ὀνάγρου ὅτι ἀγελάρχης ἐστί, καὶ ἐὰν γεννῶσιν αἱ νομάδες ἄρρενας, ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῶν ὅλα τὰ αἰδοῖα αὐτῶν τέμνει, ἵνα μὴ σπερματίζωσιν. Οἱ πατριάρχαι σπέρμα σωματικὸν ἐζήτουν σπεῖραι, οἱ δὲ ἀπόστολοι, τὰ νοερά τέκνα, ἐγκράτειαν ἡσκήσαν, οὐράνιον αἰτησάμενοι σπέρμα, ... ἡ παλαιὰ σπέρμα ἐπαγγελίας, ἡ δὲ νέα ἐγκρατείας. Καλῶς οὖν ὁ Φυσιολόγος ἔλεξε περὶ τοῦ ὀνάγρου (*Physiologus* 9).

Keeping in mind that the wild asses in the *Acts of Thomas* are explicitly young males (colts, πῶλοι), it becomes clear that the apostle has yoked to his carriage four eunuchs – the ascetics of the animal kingdom.

This episode, then, emphasizes that yoking, like dwelling and marriage, is a mutual proposition. While Tatian advises his reader to yoke him- or herself to the Holy Spirit, through the exposition of the metaphor in this wild ass episode, the *Acts of Thomas* makes it clear that not just any animal is fit to be yoked to God’s cart. The ordinary beasts of burden get worn out; it is the wild ass – the ascetic animal – that is able to make the journey. Just as it is primarily the human being’s conduct with respect to the body that makes one a suitable dwelling place for God, and similarly just as it is the rejection of intercourse with a physical spouse that makes one suitable for a divine marriage, here it is ascetic practice – again, the rejection of sexual activity – that makes one suitable to be yoked to God’s carriage.

A Concluding Note: The Platonic Anthropology Turned on its Head

In conclusion, I return to Plato’s ὄχημα. First, we should note that while in Plato the human soul is originally mounted in the carriage (presumably as driver), in the *Acts of Thomas* the human being is yoked to the carriage (as the beast of bur-

¹⁹ This English translation first appeared in Spittler, 214.

²⁰ Pliny, *Nat.* 8.39; cf. Oppian, *Cyn.* 3.191–207; Solinus, *Collectanea rerum memorabilium* 27.27.

²¹ This English translation first appeared in Spittler, 215.

den) – an interesting shift in emphasis. Even more interesting, however, is what follows in the *Timaetus* (as well as in Alcinous' summary of it). In the *Timaetus*, the soul that leads a good life is eventually returned to its dwelling place, its companion star. But a soul that fails to lead a good life, Plato writes, "would be born a second time, now as a woman. And if even he still could not refrain from wickedness, he would be changed once again, this time into some wild animal that resembled the wicked character he had acquired" (trans. Zeyl, 42b–c). Note also that in the *Phaedo* it is suggested that drunks will be reincarnated as asses (81e). This devolution of the human being – from man, to woman to animal, further and further removed from the reunion with the heavenly ὄχημα and astral οἰκησις – is turned on its head in the *Acts of Thomas*. Throughout the narrative, not only are women quicker than men to respond to the apostle's gospel, to give up sexual activity and adopt an ascetic lifestyle, the quickest of all to respond are the animals. The wild ass comes at a run when the apostle calls, competes to be yoked to the apostle's carriage, and is in fact already living the ascetic life.

The anthropology of the *Acts of Thomas* is, compared with that of the *Acts of Andrew* (or, indeed, that of the other major apocryphal acts – the *Acts of John*, in particular comes to mind), fairly straightforward. The human being is composed of body and soul; the "spirit" or "intellect," whether conceived as a distinct third element or as a part of the soul, do not confuse the schema. Moreover, the body is clearly inferior to the soul. The complexity of the anthropology of the *Acts of Thomas* lies, rather, in the fact that the body is simultaneously denigrated and placed in a position of absolutely primary importance.²² This is a dualistic anthropology in which the lesser part is actually the more significant: it is the status of the body – what sort of dwelling place it is, what sort of marriage it participates in, its fitness as beast of burden – that ultimately determines the human being's fate after death.

²² The centrality of one's behavior with respect to the body was recognized by Burkitt, whose observations in 1900 well withstand the tests of time (including the intervening century of discussion on the gnostic characteristics of the text): "[the author's] chief desire is the enforcement of the strictest continence on all the baptized, even between man and wife. This aim is kept steadily in view: other interesting doctrinal statements and allusions appear from time to time, belonging to a school of thought which is commonly called 'Gnostic,' but holiness, i.e. absolute continence, stands at the head of all the virtues. The moral earnestness displayed by the writer places the book in a totally different category from such works as the Gnostic *Acts of John* or the *Pistis Sophia*. In the *Acts of John* spiritual insight and perception of doctrine are the supreme tests of discipleship; in the *Acts of Thomas* they are Purity, Temperance, and Poverty. Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh, and it is surely more rational to look for the fundamental ideals of the writer in these virtues, which are praised and enforced on every page with almost wearisome iteration, than in the casual use of Gnostic phrases that occur only here and there" ("The Original Language," 281).

From *Logos* to *Mythos*

The *Apocalypse of Paul* and Plato's *Phaedo* in Dialogue

Romulus D. Stefanut

I. Introduction and Argument

As the classical historian Jean-Pierre Vernant points out in his work *Les origines de la pensée grecque (Origins of Greek Thought)*,¹ the beginnings of Greek philosophy are associated with the paradigm shift from μῦθος (*mythos*) to λόγος (*logos*). Beginning with Thales of Miletus, philosophy – defined as a rational discourse about the universe – departed from the mythical language of Homer and the other poets by offering a rational comprehensive principle (ἀρχή) that accounted for the whole of existence.

The philosophers perfected their rational repertoire by favoring λόγος (rational explanation) over mythic and poetic language.² However, mythical language was never completely excluded from philosophy. For example, Plato had a love-hate relationship with myth. As Wendy Doniger points out, Plato criticized the myths he did not like as lies and regarded the myths he did like as truths.³ When rational discourse reached its empirical limits, such as was the case of explaining the afterlife, Plato returned to myth. This appears to be an inverted 'history of philosophy' trajectory, λόγος to μῦθος.

I would like to suggest that this same 'history of philosophy' trajectory can be found in Judaism and Christianity.⁴ One can see this pattern beginning with the 'primeval history' of Genesis functioning as a mythical account (Gen 1–11),

¹ "This intellectual revolution appears to have been so sudden and so radical that it has been considered inexplicable in terms of historical causality: we speak of a Greek miracle. All of a sudden from the soil of Ionia, *logos* presumably broke free from myth, as the scales fell from the blind man's eye. And the light of that reason revealed once and for all, has never ceased to guide the progress of the human mind." Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Origins of Greek Thought* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 104.

² The LSJ defines λόγος in contrast to, on the one hand, mere fable (μῦθος), and on the other, to regular history (ἱστορία). See H. G. Liddell, R. Scott and H. S. Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th ed. with revised supplement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 901.

³ Wendy Doniger, *The Implied Spider: Politics and Theology in Myth* (New York: Columbia University, 1998), 3.

⁴ A complementary argument supporting this trajectory could be Philo's understanding of Judaism as a philosophical system (see Philo, *Mos* 2.2).

combining different Near-Eastern motifs into a new, theologically driven, *covenantal nomistic*,⁵ and *monotheistic*⁶ worldview. After the so-called ‘primeval history,’ there is a shift to more rational and less mythical accounts of the Patriarchs (Gen 12–50) and the Exodus narrative itself (Exodus 1–18). With the giving of the Law (Exodus 19–24 and Deuteronomy 5–26), the discourse becomes rather λόγος-oriented. The very name attributed to the principal articles of Moses’ Law – the Decalogue (δέκα + λόγος = ten words) – is, itself, suggestive.

The collective consciousness of the New Testament writers (if one can make such a socio-psychological induction) favors λόγος and is quite dismissive against μῦθος from a rhetorical standpoint: “For we did not follow sophistically devised myths (μύθοις) when we revealed to you the power and advent of our Lord Jesus Christ” (2 Pet 1:16). The λόγος was usually understood literally as rational discourse and doctrine (cf. Luke 4:32; John 4:41; Acts 10:44; 1 Cor 1:17) or figuratively as the personified Word of God – namely, Jesus Christ (cf. John 1:1, 14; 1 John 1:1; Rev 19:13).⁷

More significantly, Paul’s λόγος of the divinely revealed gospel shows itself clearly in 1 Thessalonians. “For our gospel came to you not by means of word only but also by means of power” (ὅτι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐγενήθη εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐν λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν δυνάμει, 1 Thess 1:5). Strengthening this tradition, the deutero-Pauline epistles are full of derogatory remarks against mythical modes of thinking and discourse (1 Tim 1:4; 4:7; 2 Tim 4:4; Titus 1:14), thus praising the “certainty” of the λόγος: πιστὸς ὁ λόγος – “the *logos* is sure” (1 Tim 1:15; cf. also. 1 Tim 3:1; 4:9; 2 Tim 2:11, 17; Titus 2:8).⁸

Likewise, λόγος occupies a central place in the earliest of the Gospels, the Gospel according to Mark. In one of the first summary accounts of Jesus’ ministry, heavily redacted by ‘Mark,’ we learn that Jesus “began to proclaim much and to spread the word” (ἤρξατο κηρύσσειν πολλὰ καὶ διαφημίζειν τὸν λόγον, Mark 1:45). Luke, following Mark, carries on the λόγος proclamation in his own summary report (Luke 5:15). The gospel of John is similarly renowned for its logo-centrism in its famous λόγος hymn (John 1:1–5).

⁵ E. P. Sanders’ expression *covenantal nomism* is well known in NT scholarship for describing Judaism. Cf., E. P. Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977), 75.

⁶ I added a further qualifier to Sanders’ description here in order to emphasize that the covenant was made with one deity. An unequivocal expression of monotheism, most Hebrew Bible scholars would agree, could be found beginning with second Isaiah (Isa 44:6). However, the religion of ancient Israel represents a theological shift from polytheism to monotheism.

⁷ All the translations are mine, unless otherwise indicated.

⁸ A project like Bultmann’s demythologizing of the NT beginning with his 1941 book *Neues Testament und Mythologie* confirms the perceived mythical layer that embellishes some of the literary forms which comprise the synoptic and Pauline traditions. Rudolf Bultmann, *Neues Testament und Mythologie: Das Problem der Entmythologisierung der neutestamentlichen Verkündigung* (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1941).

The question is what happens when “rational” discourse becomes insufficient? Or to put it in narrative critical terms, how does one fill the ‘narrative gaps’ left by revelatory discourse?⁹ This paper will briefly summarize the analogous content of selected portions of the *Apocalypse of Paul* and Plato’s *Phaedo* and then offer a comparison of the two. I will propose that μῦθος is a good candidate for such a task by means of amplification (αὐξησις),¹⁰ an ancient rhetorical device.¹¹

Thus, in the case of the *Apocalypse of Paul*, the imagination of the apocryphal author found fertile ground for his/her amplifications by means of mythical discourse. Even ancient philosophers such as Plato proceeded in a similar fashion when reaching the limits of the logical-empirical discourse. Ultimately, while appealing to myth to accomplish a paraenetic goal,¹² the authors of both texts try to persuade the readers to live their lives virtuously with the consciousness of things to come.

II. Paul’s λόγος (2 Cor 12:1–5)

The text of 2 Cor 12:1–5 elaborates on the topic of Paul’s “visions and revelations” granted by the Lord (ὀπτασίας καὶ ἀποκαλύψεις).¹³ The larger literary context of this pericope within the “tearful letter” (2 Cor 10:1–13:14) is part of the so-called “fool’s speech”¹⁴ (2 Cor 11:1–12:13), prompted by Paul’s necessity to “foolishly” defend his apostolic credentials.¹⁵

⁹ Cf., Robert Alter, *The Art of Biblical Narrative* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 18. Alter writes: “[A]n elaborate system of gaps between what is told and what must be inferred has been artfully contrived to leave us with at least two conflicting, mutually complicated interpretations of the motives and states of knowledge of the principle characters.”

¹⁰ For the use of the amplification device in the expansion of narrative gaps, I am indebted to Hans Josef-Klauck, “With Paul through Heaven and Hell: Two Apocryphal Apocalypses,” *BR* 52 (2007):57–72.

¹¹ Cf. Longinus, *De Sublimitate* 12.1: “Sublimity lies in elevation, amplification (αὐξησις) rather in amount; and so you often find sublimity in a single idea, whereas amplification always goes with quantity and a degree of redundancy” Longinus, *On the Sublime* (translated by W. Hamilton Fyfe; revised by Donald A. Russell; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 207).

¹² By *paraenesis*, I mean a mode of discourse centered around moral exhortation. For a general presentation of paraenesis, see David E. Aune, *The Westminster Dictionary of New Testament & Early Christian Literature and Rhetoric* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 334. For a comprehensive scholarly discussion of *paraenesis*, see James Starr and Troels Engberd-Pedersen, *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004), esp. 13–72.

¹³ The absence of the article combined with the use of the plural instead of singular indicates that Paul is starting a new topic.

¹⁴ This designation is justified by Paul’s own words at the beginning and at the end of the speech. See 2 Cor 11:1: “some little bit of foolishness” (μικρόν τι ἄφοροσύνης) and 2 Cor 12:11: “I have been a fool” (γέγονα ἄφρων).

¹⁵ See 2 Cor 12:1: “I must boast” (καυχᾶσθαι δεῖ), which I take to be a highly ironic remark.

Based upon the first verse, the genre of 2 Cor 12:1–5 should be that of a *little apocalypse* depicting Paul's journey to Paradise. However, as Hans Dieter Betz has pointed out, Paul's report is only a parody of a journey through heaven.¹⁶ In this line of interpretation, Paul makes a caricature of his opponents' achievements just as Lucian of Samosata does in his satires (e.g., *Vera historia* or *Icaromenippus*). Paula Gooder reversed the satirical interpretation, proposing a reading in which Paul's journey turned out to be a failure.¹⁷ Not only did Paul reach the highest heaven (i.e., seventh or tenth according to some Gnostic texts), but he also had to cut it short, returning with a thorn in his flesh. Paul identifies this thorn as a "messenger of Satan" (ἄγγελος σατανᾶ) who tormented him (2 Cor 12:7).

Rather than a literal interpretation, this passage seems to be a parody directed against Paul's enemies with Paul employing the rhetorical *topos* of self-boasting to backfire on and allude to his opponents' ecstatic experiences. As an ironic proof of self-boasting, which functions structurally as an *inclusio* (cf. 2 Cor 12:1, 5), Paul uses the third person to talk about his vision: "I know a man in Christ ..." (οἶδα ἄνθρωπον ἐν Χριστῷ ... 2 Cor 12:2a).¹⁸ At the same time, Paul was self-conscious that one should boast only of the Lord (2 Cor 10:17–18), and, therefore, he adopted the "fool" speech strategy.

The content of Paul's "visions and revelations"¹⁹ is deliberately and ironically vague and repetitive, that the reader may wonder if Paul really knows (οἶδα) or wants to disclose anything about his experience.²⁰ For example, he refers only

¹⁶ See Hans Dieter Betz, *Der Apostel Paulus und die sokratische Tradition: Eine exegetische Untersuchung zu seiner Apologie 2 Korinther, 10–13* (BHT 45; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1972). For a more recent discussion of partition theories of 2 Corinthians and especially on 2 Cor 10–13 see Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul, the Corinthians and the Birth of Christian Hermeneutics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2010) 80–2; 148.

¹⁷ P.R. Gooder, *Only the Third Heaven? 2 Corinthians 12:1–10 and Heavenly Ascent* (Library of New Testament Studies 313; London: T & T Clark Continuum, 2006).

¹⁸ The use of the third person pronoun has prompted many interpretations. While it is largely accepted that Paul referred to himself, the reasons for doing so are debated in scholarship. One suggestion is that Paul is reflecting the rabbinical use of "this man" for "I." Others see that Paul is distinguishing between two men within himself, namely, Paul the visionary and Paul the ordinary man, or between Paul's "natural" and "pneumatic" self. Taken to its logical conclusion, this position would allow for a split personality. But, if Paul had a personality split into two, then it is unlikely he would recall the incident. More likely, Paul uses the third person in order to convey an ironic detachment from self-boasting. Cf., Victor Paul Furnish, *II Corinthians* (AB 32A; New York: Doubleday, 2005), 543–44.

¹⁹ This is likely a phrase taken from his contenders, designating some form of ecstatic experience. Cf., Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 523–24.

²⁰ 2 Cor 12:2–4 seems to present two descriptions of Paul's heavenly journey or two different heavenly journeys. However, the synthetic parallel structure (common to Hebrew poetry) in which the descriptions are fashioned is a strong enough clue that both descriptions refer to the same event.

once to a vision in the third heaven, but he states twice what he does not know,²¹ namely the bodily state he was in during the vision: “whether in the body I do not know, whether outside of the body, I do not know, God knows” (εἴτε ἐν σώματι οὐκ οἶδα, εἴτε ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματος οὐκ οἶδα, ὁ θεὸς οἶδεν, 2 Cor 12:2–3). This puzzlement over the bodily/ non-bodily state of his vision is followed by the prohibition or impossibility of disclosing the content of the vision: “He heard words that cannot be told/ unutterable words” (ἤκουσεν ἄρρητα ῥήματα, 2 Cor 12:4).

The bodily state experienced by Paul during his heavenly voyage invites some anthropological considerations. As 2 Cor 4:16 and other parts of the *Corpus Paulinum* suggest, Paul has a dualistic anthropology.²² A person is comprised of a corporeal part – a body (σῶμα) or the outer man (ὁ ἕξω ἄνθρωπος) – and an incorporeal part – the spirit (πνεῦμα) or the inner man (ὁ ἕσω ἄνθρωπος).²³

Why would Paul maintain the ambiguity about the status of his body during the heavenly ascent? Two options seem possible. First, the “visions and revelations” are of no value for the benefit of the church (cf. 2 Cor 12:1), and thus Paul makes a mockery of the super-apostles’ visions as he implicitly downplays his own ecstatic experiences. The sign of the true apostle consists neither in worldly accomplishments nor in otherworldly experiences, but rather in weakness (ἀσθένεια) (cf. 2 Cor 12:5). Second, possibly as an addition to the first explanation, Paul might have used the ambiguity to allow for both a Jewish and a Greek interpretation of the heavenly journey. For instance, we know from Jewish sources that the famous people who experienced heavenly journeys (Moses, Elijah, Enoch, Abraham, Seth, Baruch),²⁴ were snatched away to heaven in their body (ἐν σώματι). On the contrary, in Greek mythology, heavenly ascents take the form of the flight of the soul without and outside of the body (cf. the myth of Er in the tenth book of Plato’s *Republic*).

²¹ If we assume synthetic parallelism between 1 Cor 12:2 and 1 Cor 12:3–4, the “third heaven” corresponds to “Paradise.”

²² One might disagree with a dualistic anthropological reading on the basis of 1 Thess 5:23, where Paul seems to propose a tripartite structure of the human being: body, soul, and spirit. However, this phrase could be interpreted idiomatically of the whole person. But since Paul is not precise in his anthropological usage and since there is no indication elsewhere in his genuine letters that he believes that the soul is a substantial entity, a component part of the human being, it is justifiable to interpret the phrase in 1 Thess 5:23 as idiomatic. Cf., Abraham J. Malherbe, *The Letters to the Thessalonians* (AB 32B; New York: Doubleday, 2004), 338–9.

²³ For an illuminating development of Pauline anthropology, see Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, vol. 1. (trans. Kendrick Grobel; New York: Scribner, 1951) and Robert H. Gundry, *Soma in Biblical Theology with Emphasis on Pauline Anthropology* (SNTSMS 29; Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1976). Corporality for Paul constitutes the essence of human existence, as Udo Schnelle points out, but need not be augmented to the whole personhood of man as Robert Gundry has demonstrated against Bultmann. Cf. Udo Schnelle, *Apostle Paul: His Life and Theology* (trans. M. Eugene Boring; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 495–6.

²⁴ Cf. *Enoch* 12:1; 14:8; *TABr* VIII[B]; 3 *Apoc Bar* 11:1–2 in James H. Charlesworth, *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, Volume 1: Apocalyptic Literature and Testaments* (ABRL; New Heaven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983).

An anthropological dualism between body and spirit is, therefore, implied by Paul's assertion: "whether in the body I do not know, whether outside of the body, I do not know, God knows" (2 Cor 12:2). When read synchronically with other Pauline texts (e. g., Phil 1:22–26), 2 Cor 12:1–5 seems to allow that the spirit can leave the body even before the physical death. Thus, the spirit would travel to the third heaven and supposedly come back without affecting the state of the bodily existence.

Regardless of how literally or figuratively one interprets Paul's journey, the intentional ambiguity of 2 Cor 12:1–5 opens the door for Christian apocryphal imagination. It took about three centuries for Paul's unutterable vision to be distilled and recorded into utterable fictional narratives such as the *Apocalypse of Paul*.²⁵ This movement corresponds to something of a λόγος to μῦθος 'trajectory' where the λόγος is Paul's revelation presented as a suspect and ambiguous account, while the μῦθος fills the narrative gaps with Platonic and Homeric content.

III. The Apocalypse of Paul²⁶

As previously discussed concerning 2 Cor 12:1–5, Paul is boasting (καυχᾶσθαι) about his experience of being "snatched away to Paradise" (ἡρπάγη εἰς τὸν παράδεισον, 2 Cor 12:4). Although Paul states that his experience was unutterable ("He heard things that cannot be told," ἤκουσεν ἄρρητα ῥήματα, 2 Cor 12:4), some person with apocalyptic propensity seems to have taken the liberty of amplifying the Pauline account with the μῦθος of a Paradisiacal vision. The difficulty of the ineffable utterance was solved by the presumed 'author' of the *Apocalypse* by distinguishing between things which Paul was permitted and not permitted to disclose: "And the angel answered and said to me: behold, the things that I now show to you in this place, and whatever you hear, do not proclaim to them (μὴ ἀναγγείλῃς). And he led me and he showed me: and I heard there words which

²⁵ The manuscript history of the Greek *Apocalypse of Paul* is complex. There are no surviving early Greek textual witnesses. The standard Greek edition, published by Constantine von Tischendorf in 1866, was based on two later manuscripts of a Greek text from the fifth or sixth century. The dating of the Greek archetype is not without contention. The old scholarly consensus was to date the lost Greek archetype around 240 C. E. Pierluigi Piovanelli, however, recently challenged the old consensus. Noting Augustine's knowledge of the text, he rightly suggests a later date of somewhere between 395 C. E. and 416 C. E. The whole argument for the revised dating of the *Apocalypse of Paul* can be found in Pierluigi Piovanelli, "Les origines de l'*Apocalypse de Paul* rereconsidérées," *Apocrypha* 4 (1993): 25–64.

²⁶ A likely date for the *Apocalypse of Paul* according to Schneemelcher is the end of the 4th or the beginning of the 5th century C. E. See Wilhelm Schneemelcher, ed., *New Testament Apocrypha* (trans. R. McL. Wilson; 2 vols.; Cambridge: James Clark & Co., 1992), 713. If the various parts of 2 Cor were written between the 50s and the 60s, as most commentators seem to agree, then we have at least an interval of three hundred years between the two documents.

it is not lawful for a man to utter; and again he said: follow me and I will show you that which you must tell openly" (ch. 21).²⁷

The following summary observations present the fictional narrative fabric of *The Apocalypse of Paul*. This is done by using historical characters of 'recent' narrative time, recycling Hebrew Bible and New Testament places and characters, as well as employing motifs, names, and places known from Greek and Roman history.

In the introduction (chs. 1–2), the author of the *Apocalypse of Paul* tries to 'justify' how it is that these revelations were not disclosed earlier. By appealing to the motif of hiding, the story claims that a certain man during the reign of the consuls Theodosius I and Cynegius or Theodosius II and Constantinus (ca. 388 C. E. or 420 C. E.) was persuaded by an angel, not once but three times, to open the foundation of his home in Tarsus, which, he claims, used to be Paul's house. There, miraculously, he found a marble box containing the manuscript of the *Apocalypse of Paul*.²⁸

After the introduction (placed at the end in the Syriac version) the text presents the account of Paul's rapture to the third heaven (chs. 3–6). There, Paul learns about the "complaint" that creation (including the sun, moon, stars, sea and earth) brought up to God regarding the sins of humankind. The charge was that, while all creation serves God in obedience and reverence, the human race alone sins (ἀμαρτάνει). God responds by delaying the final punishment: "for my eye sees and my ear hears, but my patience (ἡ μακροθυμία μου) bears with them until they repent (ὅπως μετανοήσωσιν)" (ch. 4).

Chapters 7–10 disclose reports about the deeds of men, both good and evil, which the angels give to God every evening and morning. Every person has a corresponding tutelary angel who takes note of every deed that the person does. At the close of the day, the angels go to God, worship him, and give a precise account of what the observed person did: "... at sunset, all the angels go to the Lord to worship him and bring before him all the deeds of men" (ch. 7).

In chapters 11–18, the guiding angel (*angelus interpres*) shows Paul how a righteous person dies and what happens to him / her after death. The soul is lifted up to the third heaven and allowed to enter it through the golden gate, provided that the soul has "goodness and purity of the body," having had its name written on the golden tablets (corresponding to the τῷ βιβλίῳ τῆς ζωῆς or "the book of life" from Rev 13:8). The soul of the wicked who denies his / her sins is confronted with those whom he / she sinned against during the life in the body. They are sent

²⁷ All translations of the *Apoc Paul* are based on by J. K. Elliott, *The Apocryphal New Testament* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 616–643.

²⁸ Anthony Hilhorst calls this "a convenient device to account for the authorship of a figure from ancient times." "Apocalypse of Paul: History and Afterlife," in *The Visio Pauli and the Gnostic Apocalypse of Paul* (eds. Jan Bremmer and István Czachesz; Leuven: Peeters, 2007), 7.

to Tartarus in the abyss of the underworld to be tortured until the day of the judgment by pitiless angels who specialize in punishment (ch. 16).²⁹

Paul is next brought to Paradise in chapters 19–30. The geographical description of Paradise is full of mythical overtones. From the second heaven, he sees the river Oceanus surrounding the earth and the “land of promise” with its river “flowing with milk and honey”³⁰ (ῥέουσα γάλα καὶ μέλι) at whose edge are planted trees bearing fruit twelve times a year.³¹ At the entrance to the City of Christ, Paul sees Lake Acherusia, whiter than milk, in which the archangel Michael baptizes repentant sinners so that they can enter into the City. Paul himself reaches the City by a voyage in a golden ship over Lake Acherusia, accompanied by three thousand angels singing hymns. Among other notable things, the City contains the four rivers of paradise flowing in it: one of honey, one of milk, one of wine, and one of oil (ch. 23).³²

The four rivers symbolize the various groups of righteous people who, having already passed away, are living in “the City of God” (τὴν πόλιν τοῦ θεοῦ). At the first river, the prophets live; at the second river, the children of Bethlehem and those like them; at the third, the patriarchs, Lot, Job, and other saints; and at the fourth river, people rejoicing and singing psalms. In the City, Paul also sees empty thrones awaiting the righteous ones³³ and hears David singing *hallelujah* (ch. 29).

The visit to Hell in chapters 31–44 includes various places of punishment, such deep as the river boiling with fire, very deep pits, the fiery pyramid, the well with seven seals, and the worm that never rests. Among the damned are found presbyters (ch. 34), bishops (ch. 35), deacons, and lectors (ch. 36). This might show a polemical stance by the author of the *Apocalypse of Paul* toward church hierarchy. At the request of Michael and other angels and for the sake of Paul, every Sunday Christ gives to the damned freedom from torture: “On the day on which I rose from the dead, I give to you all who are in punishment a night and a day of refreshment forever” (ch. 44).

Another visit to Paradise follows in chapter 45.³⁴ Here, Paul sees a strange sight: a tree on which the Spirit from Gen 1:2 rested and at whose movement the waters of the four rivers of Paradise flow (ch. 45). Paul again meets the patriarchs (ch. 47), Moses (ch. 48), the prophets, Lot, Job (ch. 49), Noah (ch. 50), Elijah and Elisha (ch. 51). Only the meeting with Mary (ch. 46) was not mentioned in the

²⁹ See 2 Pet 2:4; Homer, *Od.* 11.576ff; Virgil, *Aen.*, 6.539–627.

³⁰ Exod 3:8 contains a reference to the promised land with its rivers flowing with milk and honey.

³¹ Rev 22:2 contains a reference to the tree of life bearing fruit twelve times a year.

³² Gen 2:10–14 contains the Hebrew Bible parallel for the four rivers of Paradise motif.

³³ The thrones will belong to “those who have goodness, innocence, and understanding of heart” after those deserving will depart from the earthly life (*Apoc. Paul* ch. 29).

³⁴ The repeated vision of the Paradise constitutes one of the grounds for doubting the well-ordered composition of the *Apocalypse of Paul*. See Hilhorst, “Apocalypse of Paul: History and Afterlife,” 5.

first visit. The text breaks off suddenly in ch. 51 with the words: "I will send rain on the earth."³⁵

IV. Plato's *Phaedo*³⁶

As in the *Apocalypse of Paul*, so also in Plato's *Phaedo* one can trace a movement from λόγος to μῦθος, a movement pertaining to describing 'things' that escape empirical scrutiny in order to support a particular doctrine. The doctrine in question is that of the immortality of the soul. Here, Plato fills the narrative gaps of the afterlife by appealing to Greek mythology, making the effort – to his credit – to (re)present it in a highly rational way.

The narrative context of *Phaedo*'s reported dialogue is the imminent death of Socrates.³⁷ Its setting is the prison where Socrates awaits his sentence, and the explicit goal of the composition is to show why the philosopher will face death with courage and serenity.³⁸ In order for Socrates to prove that his willingness and eagerness to die are rational, it is necessary for him to explain his *Weltanschauung* (conception about the world, meaning philosophical conception about life and death), which includes important anthropological and epistemological premises. Socrates defends these major premises with various arguments in his witty conversations with his main Theban interlocutors: Cebes and Simmias.³⁹

The epistemological premise has to do with Plato's belief that complete knowledge cannot be attained in the earthly realm of existence due to the constraints that the body exercises over the soul. The main obstacle in attaining knowledge is the inferior state of the body with its impurity of the senses in relation to the superior world of ideas. When the soul is released from the contamination of

³⁵ The Coptic manuscript alone goes on with Paul being carried up again into the third heaven.

³⁶ The Greek text used for Plato's *Phaedo* is the standard Oxford edition by John Burnet, ed., *Platonis opera* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1993).

³⁷ *Phaedo*, the dialogue itself, does not take place in Socrates' prison but reports what happen during Socrates' last days in the Athenian prison. The narrator of the dialogue, *Phaedo*, is probably visiting Echecrates at Phlius when he is asked to share his memories of the last days spent with Socrates.

³⁸ Consider the following explanatory account offered by Socrates to his Theban interlocutors: "But I want now to hand over to you, my judges the reason why it seems that a man who has really spent his life in philosophy is naturally of good courage when he is to die, and has strong hopes that when he is dead he will attain the greatest blessings in that other land. So I will try to tell you Simmias, and Cebes, how this would be" (Plato, *Phaed.* 63e–64a; slightly adapted LCL translation). Also, the anthropological premise is the eternality of the soul, the belief that the soul continues to live after the physical death of the body. Plato sees the soul in a positive light as the essence of the human being while the body is a necessary and temporary evil that imprisons the soul like a bird in a cage.

³⁹ Simmias and Cebes, followers of the Pythagorean Philolaus, offered money to help Socrates escape from prison. See Plato, *Crit.*, 45b.

the body, knowledge becomes fully attainable. Until then, knowledge is possible in part through the process of remembrance.⁴⁰ Given this understanding of the human being and of the process of knowledge, Plato's Socrates concludes that it would be absurd for a philosopher, whose lifelong goal was to free his soul from the prison of the body, to refuse the 'natural' opportunity to die. After all, Socrates suggests that life is but preparation for death: "those who pursue philosophy study nothing but dying and being dead" (οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι, Plato, *Phaed.* 64a).

The fragment of *Phaedo* concerned with the journey of the soul in the afterlife (Plato, *Phaed.* 107c1–115a8) falls under the genre of myth.⁴¹ The character of Socrates himself accepts this designation in the following exchange with Simmias: "By all means, Socrates, said Simmias, we should be glad to hear this myth" (ἡμεῖς γε τούτου τοῦ μύθου ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμεν, Plato, *Phaed.* 110b). As a myth, its "truth value," as Wendy Doniger argues, is beyond truth or falsehood: "myth is not a lie or a false statement to be contrasted with truth or reality or fact or history ... but above all [the myth is] a story that is *believed*, believed to be true."⁴² As we can see in the conclusion of Plato's interpretation, the kernel of the story is believed to be true. But, the details are more or less speculative: "it would not be fitting for a man of sense to maintain that all this is just as I have described it, but this or something like this is true concerning our souls and their abodes, since the soul is shown to be immortal."⁴³ This statement makes it clear that some aspects of myth are meant to be taken metaphorically, while others, including the immortality of the soul, are meant to be taken at face value.

1. The Journey to Hades

The eschatological myth presented by Plato⁴⁴ describes the possible journey of the soul according to the way one has lived his/her life. The story begins with a brief orientation, delineating the multiple paths one can follow in this journey (Plato, *Phaed.* 107c–109a). After that, Plato presents different delineations of the earth's various places or regions (Plato, *Phaed.* 109b–111c). Finally, Plato

⁴⁰ For the theory of recollection (ἀνάμνησις), see Plato, *Phaed.* 66b–d. The body, along with its senses, is considered a source of error. True knowledge can only be regained through the use of our reason, contemplating the pure forms with the soul knew prior to the bodily existence. Thus, knowledge is recollection of what the soul already knew from its preexistence. The process or learning is nothing but bringing back to memory what we had forgotten.

⁴¹ Myth, according to Kenneth Dorter's definition, is "a metaphoric account designed to convey on a pre-rational or popular level truth that can also be given a literal presentation." Kenneth Dorter, *Plato's Phaedo: An Interpretation* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1982), 165.

⁴² Doniger, *The Implied Spider*, 2.

⁴³ Plato, *Phaed.* 114d (Fowler, LCL).

⁴⁴ Technically speaking, it is Socrates who describes these things.

describes the soul's journey in relation to the structure and regions of the earth (Plato, *Phaed.* 111d–118a).

The major premise of the Platonic eschatology is, as we have pointed out above, the immortality of the soul.⁴⁵ This makes Plato's narrative argument a *paraenesis*, using the myth as an exhortation to live a virtuous life, the implication of which is a necessity that one must care for his/her own soul, not only in this life, but at all times, including the afterlife. In the afterlife, the souls go to Hades (αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν Ἅιδου), possessing nothing else but education (παιδεία) and nurture (τροφή). These are believed to be the greatest benefits or hindrances to the soul of the dead at the beginning of their journey there (Plato, *Phaed.* 107a, d).

The *daimon* (tutelary spirit) of each dead person (cf. Plato, *Resp.* 617e1 and 620d6) brings the soul to the place where the dead persons gather and submit themselves to judgment (cf. Plato, *Resp.* 614c; here the meadow of judgment is characterized as a certain *daimonic* region) and then begins the guided journey to Hades. The same idea appears in the last book of *The Odyssey* in which Hermes acts as a guide to bring the souls of the slain suitors to Hades, and perhaps such a conception might have been common in Plato's day: "I fetched him and led him from the house of Hades and Hermes was my guide ..." (cf. Homer, *Od.* bk. XI, lines 624ff).

First, the guide shows that the earth is spherical (περιφερής)⁴⁶ and exists in the center of the heavenly whole (Plato, *Phaed.* 108e). The earth is vast in extent, spreading far beyond what is known to be the inhabited part of the world. In fact, humans dwell around the sea "like ants or frogs in a pond" while other humans dwell in similar places (Plato, *Phaed.* 109b). The earth has many hollows of different size and shape and each is filled with water, mist and air. The earth also lies in the pure ether (heaven) in which the stars exist. The sediment of ether is collected in the earth's hollows (Plato, *Phaed.* 109c).

Even though the people "dwell in their hollows" (οἰκοῦντας ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις αὐτῆς, Plato, *Phaed.* 109c), they have the impression of dwelling upon the earth's surface. According to Socrates' myth, we are like persons who, dwelling in the depths of the ocean, would think we were dwelling upon the sea. And seeing the sun and the heavenly bodies through the water, we take the ocean to be the heavens, not realizing how much purer are the things of the region beyond. If one could fly like a bird, pass somehow through the boundaries of the earth, and have a glimpse of "what is there," like fish rising out of the sea, one would perceive (γινῶναι) the true heaven and light and earth (Plato, *Phaed.* 109e). Our own precious things of the earth are spoiled and corroded compared to the perfection of

⁴⁵ The idea of the immortality of the soul is first introduced in Cebes' account of his objection. See Plato, *Phaed.* 88b6–7.

⁴⁶ It is ironic that the myth begins with what would be considered as a basic 'scientific fact' today: the spherical earth, motionless, is placed at the center of the universe and kept in position without any support.

the things that are there. After all, according to Plato's allegorical interpretation of the 'cave myth,' the world is but an imperfect copy of the world of ideas.

After presenting the account of the earth's shape with its variety of places and regions, Socrates pauses for a moment to tell another mythical story (μῦθος) about "the earth that is under the heavens" (τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα, Plato, *Phaed.* 110b–e). According to Plato's theory of *ideas*, this place is the ideal-type earth. The myth claims that if one could see this earth from above, it would look like a ball made of twelve pieces of leather (a soccer ball, for a modern metaphor!), in which even the hollow regions are showing a certain kind of color (Plato, *Phaed.* 109a and 110b). In the eye of the beholder, this ideal place appears as a beautiful continuous composition much like a multi-colored painting. The things present on "our earth" (such as vegetation, minerals, relief etc.) are also found on the ideal earth, but our finest things are inferior in comparison to the beautiful things of the ideal earth. For example, the ideal earth is adorned with such beautiful gems and gold, silver and the like, which are easy to spot because they are large and ubiquitous (Plato, *Phaed.* 110e). Finally, Socrates presents a corresponding religious picture that implies perfect harmony between people and the gods. On the ideal earth, there are gods actually dwelling in their sanctuaries and temples while human beings hear them directly and receive their prophecies.⁴⁷

After this pause about the life and things of the 'true' earth, Socrates transitions from the account of the nature of the earth and the things around it to an account of its inner regions (Plato, *Phaed.* 111d–112d). The hollows around the earth, claims Socrates, are united to each other under the earth by channels of varying widths. A vast number of overflowing rivers flow under the earth bringing hot or cold water, fire or mud. As these rivers circulate they fill one region then another. This liquid keeps moving up and down because one of the earth's openings, Tartarus, pierces right through the earth and receives all the rivers into itself and lets them flow out again. Because of this channel, there is no bottom to the earth. The water circulates in a cycle up and down, while the accompanying air flows in and out like breathing.

Kenneth Dorter's suggestion that the geography of the underworld is in fact a metaphor for biology is very fitting.⁴⁸ In fact, such a metaphor appears in another Platonic writing where the cyclical pulsation nature of the rivers through the channels resembles perfectly the heart-lung mechanism, and very likely, the geological model is constructed upon the biological one (Plato, *Tim.* 70b–d).

Out of these circulating rivers, four are singled out for their significance (Plato, *Phaed.* 112e–113c). First is Oceanus, the greatest and the outermost of the four

⁴⁷ This image alludes to the twelve divine regions parallel to the twelve gods and their bands found in Phaedrus' myth. See Plato, *Phaedr.* 247a.

⁴⁸ Dorter, *Plato's Phaedo*, 94.

ivers. Second is Acheron, going opposite Oceanus, flowing under the earth and eventually entering the Acherusian Lake. In the Acherusian Lake many souls of the dead go and remain for a definite time until they are sent forth for the births of animals. Third is Pyriphlegethon, which rises between Oceanus and Acheron and forms a fiery lake seething with water and mud, wanders around within the earth and eventually comes close to the Acherusian Lake, without their waters mingling. Fourth is Cocytus, opposite to Pyriphlegethon and which forms Lake Styx.

2. The Journey of the Soul

When the dead come to the place to which the *daimon* has lead them, there is a judgment that separates “those who lived well and piously from those who did not” (οἱ τε καλῶς καὶ ὁσίως βιώσαντες καὶ οἱ μὴ, Plato, *Phaed.* 113d). More precisely, Plato talks about four kinds of souls that fall under the predicaments of pious living (Plato, *Phaed.* 113d–114c). First there are the souls of those people who have lived somewhat indifferently well. They are conveyed to Acheron and then to the Acherusian Lake, where they dwell and purify themselves, pay reparation for injustices, and receive rewards for good deeds. Second are those whose faults are so great that they are not redeemable. These people are thrown into Tartarus, never to re-emerge. Third are those who have great, but curable, faults. These are sent to Tartarus, to be cast forth a year later – some via Cocytus, others via Pyriphlegethon – and carried to where these rivers come near to the Acherusian lake. They cry out and beg to be received by those whom they harmed and, consequently, some are released from their evils. But if they are not released, they return to Tartarus and then go through the purification process again until they are received by those whom they wronged. Fourth are “the philosophers,” or those people who seem superior by having lived piously. They are released from the places in the earth as from a prison. They go up into the pure dwelling-places and dwell upon earth. Of these, those who are sufficiently (ἱκανῶς) purified by the love of wisdom will live without bodies altogether in the succeeding time. And they will go to dwelling places still fairer than these, places which are not easy to describe clearly (Plato, *Phaed.* 114c).

Commentators on Plato’s myth, as Dorter point out, do not always sufficiently consider the details of the story.⁴⁹ This is likely because Plato is believed to hold such views on religious grounds, or possibly he gives free rein to his imagination, and thus the rational interpretation is abandoned. In this case, however, Plato pauses after the myth to analyze his own account, sorting through what is “certain” and what is more or less “plausible” in the myth. He claims, through the voice of Socrates, that “it would not be fitting for a man of sense to maintain

⁴⁹ Dorter, *Plato’s Phaedo*, 18.

that all this is just as I have described it, but this or something like this is true concerning our souls and their abodes, since the soul is shown to be immortal" (Plato, *Phaed.* 114d). Thus, following this line of argument, the certain thing is the immortality of the soul. The descriptive details are more or less plausible. In any case, as Dorter suggests regarding the paraenetic nature of Socrates' myth, "the details of rewards and punishments turn out to be carefully designed metaphors of the characters of the souls."⁵⁰

V. Comparative Analysis

While the Jewish and Christian influences on the *Apocalypse of Paul* have been widely recognized,⁵¹ the Platonic similarities with *Phaedo* have not, as far as I know, been explored.⁵² It is not possible to demonstrate a direct Platonic dependence in the case of the *Apocalypse of Paul*, since myth as an oral type of literature escapes the precision of source and redaction criticism. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore interesting parallels between the two texts. Some Platonic influence cannot be ruled out, given the fact that the dialogues of Plato circulated in Early Christian circles, as the Nag Hammadi discovery suggests.⁵³

It is noteworthy that both accounts contain mythical elements of the ascension of the soul to the regions above the earth (heaven) and below (underworld). Both convey a major premise of the immortality of the soul/spirit as opposed to the mortality of the body. Socrates approaches death with serenity because "the soul is immortal" (ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, Plato, *Phaed.* 107d). Death is not the end of life, but only the end of the body, a flight from the prison of the body. "Paul" from the homonymous *Apocalypse* also believes in the mortality of the body and the immortality of the soul, especially after his experience of witnessing the souls of both sinners and the righteous transcending into immortality: "I watched the soul of an impious man going out of the body" (*Apoc. Paul* ch. 15). With respect to Paul's own bodily anthropology, even if he did not know his bodily state in 1 Cor 12, we learn that in his heavenly journeys from the *Apocalypse of Paul*, he

⁵⁰ Dorter, *Plato's Phaedo*, 166.

⁵¹ See Hilhorst, "Apocalypse of Paul: History and Afterlife," 1–22; Jacques van Ruiten, "The Four Rivers of Eden," in *The Visio Pauli and the Gnostic Apocalypse of Paul* (eds. Jan Bremmer and István Czachesz; Leuven: Peeters, 2007), 50–76; Copeland, "Thinking with Oceans," 77–104.

⁵² One notable exception is Kirsty B. Copeland who rightfully notes Plato's use of *mythos* for philosophical endeavors, with particular reference to *Phaedo's* description of the earth. Cf. Copeland "Thinking with Oceans," 87ff.

⁵³ There is proof that Platonic texts were copied by Christians in late antique Egypt. A Fragment of the Fayum and a Coptic translation of a fragment of the *Republic* was found among the codices at Nag Hammadi. See James M. Robinson, *The Nag Hammadi Library* (San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990), 403–408. See also Copeland, "Thinking with Oceans," 89.

was in full bodily form (ἐν σαρκί): “We get to know you still in your flesh before you too live the world” (*Apoc. Paul* ch. 41).

The ‘fate’ of the soul in the afterlife is to await its due justice. The souls of the deceased, in both texts, fall under similar antithetical moral categories of ‘just’ versus ‘impure’ conduct (Plato, *Phaed.* 108c), ‘good’ versus ‘wicked’ character (*Apoc. Paul* ch. 12). In *Phaedo*, the souls first go to the place where the dead are gathered and after that the judgment follows (Plato, *Phaed.* 107e). In the *Apocalypse of Paul* the souls are judged right away for their virtue or lack of it and thus receive their due reward or punishment. The place of punishment in both accounts is Tartarus: “Let the soul be handed over into the hands of Tartarus, and it must be led down to the underworld” (*Apoc. Paul* ch. 18). In Plato, the souls of the impure are thrown into “one of the hollows of the earth, greater than the others ... which many other poets have called Tartarus” cf. Plato, *Phaed.* 112a).

The quasi “view from above” proposed by both our textual interlocutors is also similar: Socrates offers a three-dimensional description, whereas the *Apocalypse of Paul* offers more of a plain one. The earth is spherical in Plato’s account. And according to the angel’s explanatory account, the earth is round: “What is this river of water? And he said to me: This is Oceanus which surrounds all the Earth” (*Apoc. Paul* ch. 31).

Both texts employ metaphors to suggest the smallness and frailty of the human condition. For Plato, people look like ants or frogs compared to the scale of the universe: “I believe that this earth is immense and that ... we live in a small part of it ... like ants or frogs in a pond (περὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἢ βατράχους)” (Plato, *Phaed.* 109b). Paul was also perplexed at the minuscule size of man when looking from above: “I saw the children of man as if they were nothing and growing weaker ... Is this the size of man?” (*Apoc. Paul* ch. 13).

The mythical geography of the heaven and the underworld is also strikingly similar between *Phaedo* and the *Apocalypse of Paul*. Heaven is irrigated by the same river, Oceanus, and the underworld is called Tartarus. In *Phaedo*, the hero cannot set sail alone from the shore of the inhabited world (οἰκουμένη) and arrive at the banks of Oceanus (Plato, *Phaed.* 114d). Likewise in the *Apocalypse of Paul*, Paul cannot sail across Oceanus as he sails across the Acherusian Lake. To go beyond Oceanus, Paul must follow the route of the deceased soul. He must ascend to the judgment seat of God in heaven, only to be sent back to the land of the dead that exists beyond the river called Oceanus (*Apoc. Paul* ch. 11–21). The lands beyond Oceanus are only accessible through death and revelation, namely the physical death of the person and the granted revelation by an angel.

Paradise and the Promised Land are ideal places of unequal beauty. For Plato’s Socrates, the earth is an imperfect copy of heaven: “for this earth and the stones, and the whole region here is corrupt and corroded ... and far greater is the superiority of the other” (Plato, *Phaed.* 110a). In Paul’s description, Paradise is a perfect copy of Eden and the Promised Land (*Apoc. Paul* ch. 21, 41). At the heart

of Paradise lie the mythical four rivers with their vital function, spreading to all four corners of the earth (Plato, *Phaed.* 112e; *Apoc. Paul* ch. 41).

Both accounts also speak about heavenly temples. When Socrates describes the sacred geography of heaven, he mentions the temples dedicated to the gods: “they have indeed divine groves and temples of the gods (θεῶν ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερὰ) in which the gods dwell” (Plato, *Phaed.* 111b). Paul, the monotheist, sees the third heaven as one whole temple with the twenty-four angels worshipping God (*Apoc. Paul* ch. 29), an image probably borrowed from Isaiah or Revelation (cf. Isa 6:2–4; Rev 4:8–10).

Finally, both texts function as a *paraenesis*, elaborating on a previously held doctrine (λόγος) – the immortality of the soul – and using mythical elements to compel their respective audiences to prepare for the afterlife. The whole point of the *Apocalypse of Paul* was to remind the faithful (especially to those involved in church offices, see *Apoc. Paul* ch. 31) of the actions they can take in this life in order to avoid the torments of the afterlife. Plato’s mythmaking was similarly and admittedly speculation in the service of Philosophy.⁵⁴ The myth itself tried to reinforce Plato’s belief about the immortality of the soul: “all those who have purified themselves sufficiently by means of philosophy live without their bodies altogether in the time thereafter, and will arrive to still more beautiful dwelling places than these, which are not easy to explain, nor do we have sufficient time at hand.” (*Phaed.*, 114c).

VI. Summary and Conclusion

This essay offers a comparative reading of two texts never – as far as I know – brought before into conversation. Drawing on the intentional ambiguity of 2 Cor 12:1–5, the *Apocalypse of Paul* fills the narrative gaps of Paul’s vision with mythical elements. The apocryphal Christian imagination of this text shares with Plato’s *Phaedo* a similar move from λόγος to μῦθος, a move that inverts the typical philosophical trajectory. Without finding a strong literary dependence, an influence of *Phaedo* on the *Apocalypse of Paul* is likely on at least two counts: the striking thematic similarity between the two and the high regard for Plato at the Nag Hammadi texts in the site, a regard which was affirmed by the discovery of Platonic dialogues among the Nag Hammadi Library.

Among the most important thematic parallels, I would like to note the following: 1) the shared assumption of the mortality of the body versus the immortality of the soul, 2) the parallel journeys that the deceased souls make to Tartarus

⁵⁴ See also Copeland, “Thinking with Oceans,” 88. Here, Philosophy is seen in a personified fashion as a goddess.

in both accounts, and 3) the strikingly similarity of the geography of both the heaven and the underworld.

Ultimately, both writings function as a *paraenesis* to motivate (persuade and dissuade) their particular audiences about the implications of virtue in the after-life. For Socrates, life is a preparation for death. The virtuous philosopher gets the best share in the afterlife. In *The Apocalypse of Paul*, however, death towards sin is the preparation for eternal life.

The Resurrection of the Flesh in *Third Corinthians*

Robert Matthew Calhoun

In 1 Corinthians 15, Paul addresses a matter of debate among his addressees, whether believers can look forward to a resurrection of the dead (ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν) like the one Jesus himself experienced. Within this question stand some others, which Paul himself raises in 15:35: “How are the dead being raised? And with what sort of body are they coming?” (πῶς ἐγείρονται οἱ νεκροί; ποίῳ δὲ σώματι ἔρχονται;) Such questions probably underpin the skepticism regarding the notion that believers will experience a future resurrection. Restoring the body of someone dead no more than three days is one thing, but restoring the body of those dead for years is something else entirely. In order to solve the problem, Paul constructs a metaphor of the bodily transformation of a seed in vv. 36–38, in order to establish that each kind of seed has a body particular to it (ἐκάστω τῶν σπερμάτων ἴδιον σῶμα). Likewise, each kind of organism has a distinct flesh (σὰρξ, 15:39). Another division exists, that between “heavenly bodies” (σώματα ἐπουράνια) and “earthly bodies” (σώματα ἐπίγεια), which have a “glory” (δόξα) native to each (15:40–41). Paul then draws all these strands together to answer his questions:

15:42 So also is the resurrection of the dead. One is sown in corruption, one is raised in incorruption; 43 one is sown in dishonor; one is raised in glory; one is sown in weakness, one is raised in strength; 44 a psychic body (σῶμα ψυχικόν) is sown, a spiritual body (σῶμα πνευματικόν) is raised. If there is a psychic body, there is also a spiritual one. 45 Thus also it has been written: the first “human” Adam “became a living psyche” (ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν), the last Adam became a spirit that makes alive. 46 But the first Adam is not the spiritual one, rather the psychic one [comes first], then the spiritual one [follows]. 47 The first human is comprised of dust from the earth, the second human is from heaven. 48 Those comprised of dust are just like the one comprised of dust, and the heavenly ones are just like the heavenly one. 49 And just as we bore the image of the one comprised of dust, we will also bear the image of the heavenly one.¹

¹ 15:42 Οὕτως καὶ ἡ ἀνάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν. σπείρεται ἐν φθορᾷ, ἐγείρεται ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ· 43 σπείρεται ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ, ἐγείρεται ἐν δόξῃ· σπείρεται ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ, ἐγείρεται ἐν δυνάμει· 44 σπείρεται σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἐγείρεται σῶμα πνευματικόν. εἰ ἔστιν σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἔστιν καὶ πνευματικόν. 45 οὕτως καὶ γέγραπται, ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν, ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν. 46 ἀλλ’ οὐ πρῶτον τὸ πνευματικόν ἀλλὰ τὸ ψυχικόν, ἔπειτα τὸ πνευματικόν. 47 ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός, ὁ δεῦτερος ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. 48 οἷος ὁ χοϊκός, τοιοῦτοι καὶ οἱ χοϊκοί, καὶ οἷος ὁ ἐπουράνιος τοιοῦτοι καὶ οἱ

This passage has numerous ambiguities, but one thing about it is sufficiently clear: the mortal body – ψυχικόν, composed of σὰρξ that has its origin in χουός, and terrestrial – passes away at death.² Resurrection does not reconstitute this body, but transforms it into a body of an utterly different sort – πνευματικόν, glorious, strong, and similar to the celestial bodies. Thus, the believer will receive a completely new body, presumably of the same sort that Christ himself has when he appears to his followers (15:5–10). As Paul later says, “flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor does corruption inherit incorruption” (σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα βασιλείαν θεοῦ κληρονομήσαι οὐ δύναται οὐδὲ ἡ φθορὰ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν κληρονομεῖ, 15:50). One should not suppose, however, that this *spiritual* body is less *real*, in the sense of *solid* and *physical*.³ “Spiritual” in this context does not mean “ghostly” or “insubstantial” or “ephemeral,” as we might think from the appearances of spirits in ghost stories, both ancient and modern. The new body is spiritual because πνεῦμα is its constituent substance,⁴ in precisely the way that σὰρξ is the constituent substance of the fleshly body; and just as degeneration and eventual mortality characterize the latter, the former has permanence, ἀφθαρσία, as a defining particularity.

Paul’s statements here are unique in the New Testament, and no reason exists to suppose that other Christians of his generation subscribed to his view of the resurrected body prior to its articulation in 1 Corinthians 15. In fact, the earlier sources do not indicate any awareness of it at all. The accounts of Jesus’ appearances to his disciples in Matthew, Luke and John are in part designed to confirm that he is not a ghost visiting them from beyond the grave, but a real – this is to say, a fleshly – being.⁵ He eats (Luke 24:41–43), he can be touched (Matt 28:9,

ἐπουράνιοι· 49 καὶ καθὼς ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ, φορέσομεν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου.

² Σὰρξ generally refers to the soft tissues of the body (BDAG 914–16, s. v.; LSJ 1585, s. v.), and is thus distinct from the hard, i. e., bone (ὀστέον), and the liquid, i. e., blood (αἷμα). In Paul’s argument here, all of these and any other constituent elements of the body subsume under σὰρξ (but cf. σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα in 15:50), such that it serves as a convenient antithesis to πνεῦμα and a συνεκδοχή for all the body’s mortal components.

³ Troels Engberg-Pedersen rightly emphasizes the materialism of Paul’s perspective here (“Complete and Incomplete Transformation in Paul – A Philosophical Reading of Paul on Body and Spirit,” in *Metamorphoses: Resurrection, Body and Transformative Practices in Early Christianity* [eds. Turid Karlsen Seim and Jurunn Økland; Ekstasis 1; Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007], 123–46). The translation of ψυχικόν, the opposite of πνευματικόν in Paul’s argument here, as “physical” (see BDAG 1100, s. v. 4, citing 1 Cor 15:44) is highly misleading.

⁴ Contra Peter Lampe, who writes: “The word ‘spiritual’ ... does not say anything about the material or energetic structure of the new body. ... For [Paul], the term ‘spiritual’ emphasizes that God’s Spirit is the *only* force that creates the new body. The creation of this new body is truly *beyond* all the possibilities of the present nature and creation” (“Paul’s Concept of a Spiritual Body,” in *Resurrection: Theological and Scientific Assessments* [eds. Ted Peters, Robert John Russett, and Michelle Walker; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002], 103–14, 108–9).

⁵ Note especially Luke 24:36–39: “And while they [the disciples] were discussing these things, he [Jesus] stood in their midst, and he said to them: ‘Peace be with you.’ But they, being terrified and afraid, supposed that they were seeing a spirit. And he said to them: ‘Why are you distressed,

Luke 24:39), he can manipulate physical objects with ease (Luke 24:28, John 21:13), and he even carries the wounds from the injuries that killed him (John 20:24–29).⁶ The flesh in which Jesus was born is the same flesh in which he rose from death and ascended to heaven. We have here clear instances of passages from the Gospels contradicting a passage of Paul. One can easily see the potential for confusion among early Christians who regarded these sources as holding comparable authority.

Starting late in the first century and gaining momentum throughout the second, a different kind of controversy than the one Paul confronted in Corinth arose. This new debate dealt on the one hand with the flesh of Jesus, both before and after his resurrection,⁷ and on the other hand with the flesh of those who believe in him and look forward to a resurrection of their own. Against a variety of Gnostics, and in agreement with both the Gospels and Paul,⁸ the “orthodox” insisted upon the fleshly birth of Jesus.⁹ As for the resurrected body, they ulti-

and for what reason do doubts rise up in your heart? See my hands and my feet, that I am myself; touch me and see, because a spirit does not have flesh and bones, just as you see me having.” Ταῦτα δὲ αὐτῶν λαλούντων αὐτὸς ἔσθη ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν καὶ λέγει αὐτοῖς· εἰρήνῃ ὑμῖν. πτοηθέντες δὲ καὶ ἔμβοφοι γενόμενοι ἐδόκουν πνεῦμα θεωρεῖν. καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· τί τεταραγμένοι ἐστέ καὶ διὰ τί διαλογισμοὶ ἀναβαίνουσιν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὑμῶν; ἴδετε τὰς χεῖράς μου καὶ τοὺς πόδας μου ὅτι ἐγὼ εἰμι αὐτός· ψηλαφήσατέ με καὶ ἴδετε, ὅτι πνεῦμα σάρκα καὶ ὀστέα οὐκ ἔχει καθὼς ἐμε θεωρεῖτε ἔχοντα. Manuscript D replaces the first occurrence of πνεῦμα, in v. 37, with φάντασμα.

⁶ Interestingly, the longer ending of Mark (16:9–20) does not seem concerned to verify the fleshly presence of Jesus in a manner similar to the other canonical Gospels, but rather seems to presuppose it.

⁷ Cf. 1 John 4:2 (πᾶν πνεῦμα ὃ ὁμολογεῖ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστίν), 2 John 2:7 (οἱ μὴ ὁμολογοῦντες Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐρχόμενον ἐν σαρκί), Polycarp, *Phil.* 7.1 (πᾶς γάρ, ὃς ἂν μὴ ὁμολογῇ, Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθέναι, ἀντίχριστός ἐστιν. . . . καὶ ὃς ἂν μεθοδεύῃ τὰ λόγια τοῦ κυρίου πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λέγῃ μῆτε ἀνάστασιν μῆτε κρίσιν, οὗτος πρωτότοκός ἐστι τοῦ σατανᾶ), and *Barn.* 5.10 (εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦλθεν ἐν σαρκί, πῶς ἂν ἐσώθησαν οἱ ἄνθρωποι βλέποντες αὐτόν. . .).

⁸ Paul affirms the fleshly birth of Jesus, most emphatically in Rom 1:3–4 (περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ τοῦ γενομένου ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυὶδ κατὰ σάρκα, τοῦ ὀρισθέντος υἱοῦ θεοῦ ἐν δυνάμει κατὰ πνεῦμα ἀγιωσύνης ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν, Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν); see also Rom 8:3, 9:5; 2 Cor 5:16; cf. Eph 2:14, 5:30 v.l.; Col 1:22; 1 Tim 3:16.

⁹ “Orthodox” and “orthodoxy” are not felicitous terms for a variety of reasons, not least their idiosyncrasy and the fact that they carry a strong valuational note, so I place scare-quotes around them when they (and their antitheses, “heretic” and “heresy”) appear in this essay. Similar problems afflict the use of the generic term “Gnostic,” which, although it is less valuational, obliterates the significant distinctions between various movements, in addition to the fact that such Gnostics often regarded themselves as “orthodox” in their own right, as many have noted (e.g., Michael Allen Williams, *Rethinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996]; cf. however, the defense of the usage of the term by Birger A. Pearson, *Ancient Gnosticism: Traditions and Literature* [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007], 7–24; see further the essays collected in Antti Marjanen, ed., *Was There a Gnostic Religion?* [Publications of the Finnish Exegetical Society 87; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005]). I use the term here for two reasons: first, because, as I shall argue, the author of 3 *Corinthians* is not describing or interacting with a real movement, but picks and chooses from several “orthodox” doctrines which multiple movements specifically deny; and second,

mately came down on the side of the passages of the Gospels cited above. This decision has the advantage of consistency: the body is σάρξ, whether it belongs to Jesus or anyone else, pre- or post-resurrection. It has the disadvantage of leaving Paul's spiritual resurrected body in 1 Corinthians 15 unexplained. A couple of studies have elucidated the contours of this debate as it plays out in patristic and Gnostic sources.¹⁰ However, these studies tend to overlook an important and comparatively early contribution to the debate, the epistolary pseudepigraphon *3 Corinthians*,¹¹ which scholars have dated to the second century.¹² Unlike Irenaeus and Tertullian, who perform exegetical acrobatics in their debates with the "heretics,"¹³ the author of *3 Corinthians* adopts Paul's persona in order to prove his endorsement of the concept of the resurrection of the flesh, and to bring him into line with the Gospels and the emerging "orthodox" consensus.¹⁴ I shall argue

because the author *wants* the Gnostics to be treated *en masse*, as a vague amalgam holding to a mess of contradictory teachings which have demonic origins and which stand in opposition to those held by the "orthodox."

¹⁰ Gunnar af Hällström, *Carnis Resurrectio: The Interpretation of a Creedal Formula* (Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum 86; Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1988); J. G. Davies, "Factors Leading to the Emergence of a Belief in the Resurrection of the Flesh," *JTS* 23 (1972): 448–55; Outi Lehtipuu, "Flesh and Blood Cannot Inherit the Kingdom of God": The Transformation of the Flesh in the Early Christian Debates Concerning Resurrection," in Karlsen Seim and Økland, eds., *Metamorphoses*, 147–68. For a broader discussion of the development of ideas about resurrection and their social significance, see Claudia Setzer, *Resurrection of the Body in Early Judaism and Early Christianity: Doctrine, Community, and Self-Definition* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2004).

¹¹ The bibliography of studies of *3 Corinthians* written since the publication of P. Bodm. X (Michel Testuz, *Papyrus Bodmer X–XII* [Cologne-Genève: Bibliotheca Bodmeriana: 1959]) is very short: Vahan Hovhannessian, *Third Corinthians: Reclaiming Paul for Christian Orthodoxy* (Studies in Biblical Literature 18; New York: Peter Lang, 2000); A. F. J. Klijn, "The Apocryphal Correspondence between Paul and the Corinthians," *VC* 17 (1963): 2–23; Gerard Luttikhuisen, "The Apocryphal Correspondence with the Corinthians and the Acts of Paul," in *The Apocryphal Acts of Paul and Thecla* (ed. Jan N. Bremmer; Studies in the Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles 2; Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1996), 75–91; T. W. Mackay, "Observations on P. Bodmer X (Apocryphal Correspondence between Paul and the Corinthian Saints)," *Papyrologica Bruxellensia* 18 (1979): 119–28; Donald N. Penny, "The Pseudo-Pauline Letters of the First Two Centuries" (Ph.D. Diss., Emory University, 1979); Martin Rist, "III Corinthians as a Pseudepigraphic Refutation of Marcionism," *Iliff Review* 26 [1969]: 49–58; Willy Rordorf, "Hérésie et orthodoxie selon la Correspondance apocryphe entre les Corinthiens et l'apôtre Paul," in idem, *Lex Orandi, Lex Credendi: Gesammelte Aufsätze zum 60. Geburtstag* (Paradosis 36; Freiburg & Schweiz: Universitätsverlag, 1993), 389–431; Michel Testuz, "La Correspondence apocryphe de Saint Paul et des Corinthiens," in *Recherches biblique V: Littérature et Théologie pauliniennes* (Louven: Desclée de Brouwer, 1960), 217–223. For the older bibliography, see the entries in Hovhannessian, *Third Corinthians*, 182–93.

¹² Testuz, *Papyrus Bodmer X–XII*, 23 (ca. 175–200 C.E.); Mackay, "Observations on P. Bodmer X," 127 (ca. 125–150); Rordorf, "Hérésie et Orthodoxie," 425–27 (ca. 100–150).

¹³ For discussion of the acrobatics, see Lehtipuu, "Transformation of the Flesh," 152–61.

¹⁴ Eventually, the resurrection of the flesh (*carnis resurrectio*, σαρκὸς ἀνάστασις) becomes part of the Old Roman Creed and thus finds its way into later creeds. See Hällström, *Carnis Resurrectio*, 9–11; J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds* (3rd ed.; repr. London and New York: Continuum, 2006), 102–3.

in the present essay that the author does not compose his pseudepigraphon to refute specific Gnostic movements or doctrines (as much of the secondary literature on the text supposes), but to eliminate any further controversy among the “orthodox” regarding the resurrected body.¹⁵ Since Paul’s remarks grind against the secure establishment of a coherent doctrine, the author designs 3 *Corinthians* not to *clarify* the argument of 1 Corinthians 15, but to *replace* it.

The text of 3 *Corinthians*, in its oldest available form in the Greek papyrus P.Bodm. X (iii C.E.),¹⁶ has two parts: a letter from the Corinthian elders to Paul (traditionally known as chapter 1), and Paul’s reply (chapter 3; chapter 2 is not part of the original composition).¹⁷ Scholars have dealt with some of the preliminary questions regarding 3 *Corinthians*, dating it with a high degree of probability to the second century, and determining that it existed prior to its inclusion in the *Acts of Paul*. However, the most important requirement for moving research forward – a critical edition, or even a convenient form of the Greek text – remains unavailable. Michel Testuz’s *editio princeps* has minimal punctuation and no accents. He also leaves the scribe’s many spelling errors in the text and places corrections in the apparatus.¹⁸ Willy Rordorf’s text does not indicate where and why he departs from P.Bodm. X, and it has some errors that might confuse readers.¹⁹ Vahan Hovhannessian examines the major text-critical problems, but in the end simply reprints Testuz’s text without corrections in an appendix to his monograph.²⁰ Therefore, as a foundation for my own research here and as an invitation to others to examine 3 *Corinthians*, I set forth below an accented, punctuated and corrected text of P.Bodm. X, followed by an annotated translation. I then turn to its central preoccupation, the resolution of the inconsistency between Paul and the Gospels on the nature of the resurrected body.

¹⁵ Cf. Tertullian, *Res. 2: sicuti enim negata carnis resurrectione, [unio divinitatis] concutitur; ita vindicata, contabulitur* (text per MPL 2.843–44).

¹⁶ This dating is per Testuz, *Papyrus Bodmer X–XII*, 9–11; cf. Mackay, “Observations on P. Bodmer X,” 122: “In dating the hand of P. Bodmer X, we are singularly fortunate to know that it was once part of a single papyrus codex comprising P. Bodmer V, VII–XIII, XX. In 1966, E. G. Turner stated with certitude that P. Bodmer XX was of the fourth century and that in consequence the other hands were also.”

¹⁷ Regarding the literary history of the text, see Klijn, “Apocryphal Correspondence,” 10–16; Rordorf, “Hérésie et orthodoxie,” 392–400; Luttikhuisen, “Apocryphal Correspondence,” 76–81; and Hovhannessian, *Third Corinthians*, 35–76.

¹⁸ Michel Testuz, *Papyrus Bodmer X–XII*, 9–45. T. W. Mackay (“Observations on P. Bodmer X”) offers further corrections based on his own review of the papyrus.

¹⁹ Rordorf, “Hérésie et orthodoxie,” 428–31.

²⁰ Hovhannessian, *Third Corinthians*, 147–51.

Text and Translation of 3 Corinthians according to P.Bodm. X

Chapter 1:²¹ Κορίνθιοι πρὸς Παῦλον.

1 Στεφανᾶς²² καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ πρεσβύτεροι Δάφνος καὶ Εὐβουλος καὶ Θεόφιλος καὶ Ξένων Παῦλῳ τῷ ἐν κυρίῳ²³ χαίρειν. 2 παραγεγόνασιν εἰς Κόρινθον ἄνδρες δύο, Σίμων τις καὶ Κλεόβιος, οἵτινες τὴν τινων πίστιν ἀνατρέπουσιν φθοριμαίοις λόγοις, 3 οὓς σὺ δοκίμασον. 4 οὐ γὰρ σοῦ ἠκούσαμεν ποτε τοιούτους λόγους οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων,²⁴ 5 ἀλλὰ ἃ παρελάβομεν παρὰ τέ σου κακείνων τηροῦμεν. 6 ὥς οὖν ὁ κύριος ἠλέησεν ἡμᾶς, ὄντος ἔτι ἐν σαρκί σου, ἵνα παρὰ σου πάλιν ἀκούσωμεν, 7 ἡ αὐτὸς παραγένου, 8 πιστεύομεν γὰρ ὡς ἀπεκαλύφθη Θεονόη²⁵ ὅτι εἵρυσται σε κύριος ἐκ χειρὸς ἀνόμου, ἡ ἀντίγραφον ἡμῖν.²⁶ 9 ἔστι γὰρ ἃ λέγουσιν καὶ διδάσκουσιν τοιαῦτα· 10 οὐ δεῖν φασιν προφῆταις χρῆσθαι, 11 οὐδ' εἶναι θεὸν παντοκράτορα, 12 οὐδὲ ἀνάστασιν εἶναι σαρκός, 13 οὐδ' εἶναι τὴν πλάσιν τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῦ θεοῦ, 14 οὐδ' ὅτι εἰς σάρκα ἦλθεν ὁ κύριος οὐδ' ὅτι ἐκ Μαρίας ἐγεννήθη, 15 οὐδ' εἶναι τὸν κόσμον θεοῦ ἀλλὰ ἀγγέλων. 16 διό, ἀδελφέ, πᾶσαν εἰσήγησαι σπουδὴν παραγενέσθαι ἐνθάδε, ὅπως ἀσκανδάλιστος²⁷ μείνῃ ἡ Κορινθίων ἐκκλησία καὶ τούτων ἡ ἄνοια ἐκδηλος γένηται. ἔρρωσο ἐν κυρίῳ.

Chapter 3: Παῦλος Κορινθίους περὶ σαρκός.

1 Παῦλος ὁ δέσμιος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ τοῖς ἐν Κορίνθῳ ἀδελφοῖς ἐν πολλοῖς ὦν²⁸ ἀστοχήμασι χαίρειν. 2 οὐ θαυμάζω εἰ οὕτως τάχως τὰ τοῦ πονηροῦ προτρέχει δόγματα, 3 ὅτι ὁ κύριος Χριστὸς²⁹ εἰς ταχεῖαν ποιήσεται τὴν ἔλευσιν ἀθετούμενος ἀπὸ τῶν παραχαρασσόντων τὰ λόγια αὐτοῦ. 4 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ παρέδωκα ὑμῖν ἃ καὶ παρέλαβον ὑπὸ τῶν πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἀποστόλων γενομένων τὸν πάντα χρόνον μετὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ· 5 ὅτι ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν Χριστὸς Ἰησοὺς ἐκ Μαρίας ἐγεννήθη ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυὶδ³⁰ πνεύματος ἁγίου ἀπὸ οὐρανοῦ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποσταλέντος εἰς αὐτήν, 6 ἵνα εἰς κόσμον προέλθῃ καὶ

²¹ The text below is not to be understood as a critical edition, in the sense of a reconstruction of the original text. I do not indicate the scribe's spelling errors or nomina sacra unless they are significant. "Rordorf" refers to Rordorf, "Hérésie et orthodoxie," 428–31, and "Mackay" to Mackay, "Observations on P. Bodmer X." Other English translations may be found at Rist, "III Corinthians," 50–52; Hovhanessian, *Third Corinthians*, 76–79; Wilhelm Schneemelcher, trans., in *New Testament Apocrypha*, volume 2, *Writings Related to the Apostles, Apocalypses, and Related Subjects* (ed. Wilhelm Schneemelcher; rev. ed. by Edgar Hennecke; trans. R. McL. Wilson; Cambridge: James Clarke; Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1992), 255–56.

²² Στεφανᾶς. Rordorf: Στέφανος. Cf. 1 Cor 1:16, 16:15, 17. For discussion, see Hovhanessian, *Third Corinthians*, 62.

²³ Παῦλῳ τῷ ἐν κυρίῳ. Rordorf: Παῦλῳ τῷ ἀδελφῷ ἐν κυρίῳ χαίρειν. Hovhanessian, against his own endorsement of the text of P.Bodm. X here (*Third Corinthians*, 62), has "to Paul, who is in Christ," in his translation (*ibid.* 76).

²⁴ ἄλλων. Rordorf: ἄλλων ἀποστόλων. For discussion, see Klijn, "Apocryphal Correspondence," 7; Hovhanessian, *Third Corinthians*, 62–64.

²⁵ Θεονόη. Rordorf: Θεονοῆ (cf. BDAG 449, s. v.).

²⁶ Verses. 7–8. The peculiar arrangement of the clauses prompted some reorganization by subsequent scribes. See Klijn, "Apocryphal Correspondence," 7–8; Hovhanessian, *Third Corinthians*, 64–66.

²⁷ ἀσκανδάλιστος. Rordorf: ἀσκανδαλιστός (cf. BDAG 143, s. v.). Also, after ἐνθάδε, Rordorf adds πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

²⁸ ὦν. Rordorf: ὦν (evidently an error, cf. nn. 34, 36, 40 below).

²⁹ Χριστός. Rordorf: ὁ κύριός μου Ἰησοὺς Χριστός. Cf. 3:5 below.

³⁰ Δαυίδ. Pap. spells the name thus, but places a stroke over it as it does for nomina sacra. Rordorf: Δαουίδ.

ἐλευθερώσῃ πᾶσαν σάρκα διὰ τῆς ἰδίας σαρκός, καὶ ἵνα ἐκ νεκρῶν ἡμᾶς ἐγείρῃ σαρκικούς ὡς ἑαυτὸν τύπον³¹ ἔδειξε· 7 καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ ἐπλάσθη. 8 διὸ καὶ ἀπολλύμενος ἐζητήθη ἵνα ζωοποιηθῇ³² διὰ τῆς υἰοθεσίας. 9 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ὁ τῶν ὧλων ὁ παντοκράτωρ ὁ ποιήσας τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν ἀπέστειλε πρῶτοις Ἰουδαίοις προφήτας εἰς τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἀποσπασθῆναι. 10 ἐβούλετο γὰρ τὸν οἶκον Ἰσραὴλ σῶσαι· μερίσας οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐπεμψεν εἰς τοὺς προφῆτας οἵτινες τὴν ἀπλανῆ θεοσέβειαν ἐκήρυσσον³³ χρόνοις πολλοῖς. 11 ὁ γὰρ ἄρχων ἄδικος ὧν³⁴ (καὶ) θεός³⁵ θέλων εἶναι διεχειρίζετο αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν πᾶσαν σάρκα ἀνθρώπων πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐδέσμευεν. 12 ὁ θεὸς ὁ παντοκράτωρ δίκαιος ὧν³⁶ καὶ μὴ βουλόμενος ἀκυρώσαι τὸ ἴδιον πλάσμα 13 κατέπεμψε πνεῦμα διὰ πυρὸς εἰς Μαρίαν τὴν Γαλιλαίαν, (14)³⁷ 15 ἵνα δι' ἧς σαρκὸς ἀπολλυμένης³⁸ ἐνεπολιτεύετο ὁ πονηρὸς διὰ ταύτης νικηθεὶς ἐλεγχθῇ³⁹ μὴ ὧν⁴⁰ θεός. 16 τῷ γὰρ ἰδίῳ σώματι Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς πᾶσαν ἔσωσε σάρκα, 17 ἵνα δικαιοσύνης ναόν⁴¹ ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ σώματι ἀναδείξῃ, 18 ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς ἡλευθερώμεθα. 19 οὐκ εἰσιν οὖν τέκνα δικαιοσύνης ἀλλὰ τέκνα ὀργῆς οἵτινες τὴν θεοῦ πρόνοιαν ἀνακόπτουσιν λέγοντες μὴ εἶναι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς ἔργα, 20 κατηραμένην γὰρ τοῦ ὄψεως πίστιν ἔχουσιν. 21 οὐστινας ἀποτρέπεσθε καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς διδασκαλίας αὐτῶν ἀποφεύγετε. (22, 23)⁴² 24 οἱ δὲ ὑμῖν λέγουσιν ἀνάστασις οὐκ ἔστιν σαρκός, ἐκείνοις οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνάστασις, 25 οἵτινες τὸν οὕτως ἀναστάντα ἀπιστοῦσι. 26 οὐ τε γὰρ, ἄνδρες Κορίνθιοι, οἶδασι τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ πυροῦ σπόρον ἢ τῶν ἄλλων σπερμάτων, ὅτι γυνὰ βάλλεται⁴³ εἰς τὴν γῆν καὶ συμφθαρέντα κάτω ἡγέρθη ἐν θελήματι θεοῦ ἔνσωμα⁴⁴ καὶ ἡμφιεσμένα. 27 ὥστε οὐ μόνον τὸ σῶμα ἐγείρεται τὸ βληθὲν ἀλλὰ πολλοστὸν ὀρθὸν ὑψολογμένον.⁴⁵ 28 [εἰ] δὲ δεῖ ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν σπερμά[τ]ων μὴ ποιείσθαι τὴν παραβολὴν, 29 [οἶ]δατε ὅτι Ἰωῆς ὁ Ἀμαθίου υἱός, [ἵνα]⁴⁶ εἰς Νινευὴ⁴⁷ μὴ κηρύξαι εἰς κή[τος] καταπέτοται, 30 καὶ μετὰ τρεῖς ἡμέρας [κ]αὶ τρεῖς νύκτας ἐκ τοῦ κατωτάτου

³¹ τύπον. Pap. adds εν τυπον, but marks it for deletion. Mackay (120) explains: “Testuz suggested that the scribe deleted ENTYPION first with supralinear dots and then by effacing the letters. ... However, there is one more letter-deletion dot ..., and the second letter is clearly α. Hence, the deleted dittography was probably EAYTYPION, from where ... he wrote ε of ἐδειξε, jumped back a line to EAYTONTYPION, omitting ONT.”

³² ζωοποιηθῇ. Rordorf: ζωοποιήθη.

³³ ἐκήρυσσον. Testuz Rordorf: ἐκήρυσσαν.

³⁴ ὧν. Rordorf: ὦν.

³⁵ This is Testuz's restoration; note also Hovhannessian, *Third Corinthians*, 68–69.

³⁶ ὧν. Rordorf: ὦν.

³⁷ Verse 14. For discussion of the variants in vv. 13–14, see Klijn, “Apocryphal Correspondence,” 8–9; Hovhannessian, *Third Corinthians*, 69–71.

³⁸ ἀπολλυμένης. Testuz corrects to απολυμένης; Mackay (120) rightly rejects this correction.

³⁹ ἐλεγχθῇ. Rordorf: ἐλέγχθη (pap.: ἐλεγχθητο)

⁴⁰ ὧν. Rordorf: ὦν.

⁴¹ ναόν. Rordorf: νᾶον (error).

⁴² Verses 22–23. See Klijn, “Apocryphal Correspondence,” 9; Hovhannessian, *Third Corinthians*, 71–72.

⁴³ βάλλεται. Rordorf: βάλεται (pap.: βαλλετε).

⁴⁴ ἔνσωμα. Testuz reads εν σωμα, which could be ἐν σώμα (so Rordorf), or ἔνσωμα, as I take it (LSJ 574, s. v.).

⁴⁵ ὑψολογμένον. So pap.; Rordorf: εὐλογημένον; cf. BDAG, s. v. εὐλογέω, 407–8.

⁴⁶ ἵνα. Rordorf: διὰ (?).

⁴⁷ Νινευή. Rordorf: Νινεύη; cf. BDAG 674, s. v.

[ἄ]δου ἐπήκουσεν ὁ θεὸς προσευχομένου Ἰωνᾶ καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ διεφθάρη, οὔτε θριξ⁴⁸ οὔτε βλέφαρον.⁴⁹ 31 πόσω μᾶλλον ὑμᾶς, ὀλιγόπιστοι, τοὺς πιστεύσαντας εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐξεγείρει⁴⁹ ὡς αὐτὸς ἠγέρθη. 32 εἰ καὶ τὰ Ἑλισαίου ὅστέα⁵⁰ τοῦ προφήτου νεκροῦ βληθέντος ἀπὸ τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραὴλ ἐπ’ αὐτὰ ἀνέστη τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τί καὶ ὑμεῖς, τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ ὅστέα καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ ἐπιρριφέντες,⁵¹ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἀναστήσεσθε ἔχοντες ὑγίη τὴν σάρκα. (33)⁵² 34 εἰ δέ τι ἄλλο παραδέχεσθε κόπους μοι μὴ παρέχετε. 35 ἐγὼ γὰρ τὰ δέσμα εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἔχω, ἵνα Χριστὸν κερδήσ[ω] καὶ τὰ στίγματα ἐν τῷ σώματί μου, ἵνα ἔλθω εἰς τὴν ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀν[ά]στασιν. 36 καὶ εἰ τις ᾧ παρέλαβε κανόνι διὰ τῶν μακαρίων προφητῶν καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου εὐαγγελί[ου] μένει μισθὸν λήμψεται.⁵³ 37 εἴ τις παραβαίνει ταῦτα τὸ πῦρ ἐστί μετ’ αὐτοῦ (καὶ τῶν οὐ)τως προοδ(οι)πορ(ούντων)⁵⁴ [ἄ]θέων ἀνθρώπων, 38 οἵτινες γεν(ν)ήματα⁵⁵ ἐχιδνῶν εἰσίν, 39 οὓς ἀποτρέπεσθε ἐν τῇ τοῦ κυρίου δυνάμει. 40 καὶ ἔστω μεθ’ ὑμῶν εἰρήνη.

Chapter 1: The Corinthians to Paul.

1 Stephan and the elders with him, Daphnus and Euboulus and Theophilus and Xenon,⁵⁶ to Paul who is in the Lord, greetings. 2 Two men have arrived in Corinth, a certain Simon and Cleobius,⁵⁷ who are disturbing the faith of some⁵⁸ with destructive words,⁵⁹ 3 which, [we ask you,] examine!⁶⁰ 4 For we heard such words previously neither from you nor from others, 5 but to the things which we received both from you and from those [others] we

⁴⁸ θριξ. Pap.: ερξ. Mackay (120) observes: “Testuz correctly detects an error, for the scribe has written ΘΡΞ· or ΕΡΞ· for θριξ. The letter, if a θ, is incomplete; if ε, the scribe has left a blurred blot-mark, as though he did not want it to be misread as a θ.”

⁴⁹ ἐξεγείρει. Rordorf: ἐξεγέρει.

⁵⁰ ὅστέα. Pap.: οστα, here and later in the verse. Rordorf: ὀστά here, and αἶμα below.

⁵¹ ἐπιρριφέντες. Pap.: επειρειφεντες; Rordorf: ἐπιρριφέντες.

⁵² Verse 33. On the many variations in vv. 32–33, see Hovhannessian, *Third Corinthians*, 72–75. λήμψεται. Cf. Rordorf: λήψεται ἐν τῇ τῶν νεκρῶν ἀναστάσει.

⁵⁴ (καὶ τῶν οὐ)τως προοδ(οι)πορ(ούντων). This reading follows the correction of Testuz. Cf. Mackay, 121 (Rordorf): τὸ πῦρ ἐστί μετ’ αὐτοῦ (καὶ με)τὰ τῶν οὕτως προοδουροπορ(ούντων)μ (= προοδοιπορούντων).

⁵⁵ γεν(ν)ήματα. I follow here the correction of Mackay, 121.

⁵⁶ Στεφανᾶς ... Ξένων. On Stephan, see n. 22 above. The author appears to have selected the other names at random, unless they, like Stephan, are known by his readers to be associated with Corinth. Some of the names appear elsewhere in early Christian literature (Δάφνος, Ignatius, *Smyr.* 13:2; Εὐβόλος, 2 Tim 4:21; Θεόφιλος, Luke 1:3, Acts 1:1).

⁵⁷ Σίμων τις καὶ Κλεόβιος. The name of Simon needs no introduction; based upon his appearance in Acts 8, he later becomes the “superheretic” of later Christian imagination. Cleobius is not otherwise known from contemporary Christian literature (cf. Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 4.22.5). The author may want his readers to connect Simon and his assistant to Simon Magus, either to imply that he continued to make trouble for the apostles by invading their churches, or, more generally, to draw upon the sinister ἦθος attached to the name for atmospheric effect.

⁵⁸ τὴν τινῶν πίστιν ἀνατρέπουσιν. Cf. 2 Tim 2:17–18, Ὑμέναιος καὶ Φίλητος, οἵτινες περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἡστόχησαν, λέγοντες [τὴν] ἀνάστασιν ἤδη γεγενῆσθαι, καὶ ἀνατρέπουσιν τὴν τινῶν πίστιν.

⁵⁹ φθορμαίοις λόγοις. The adjective φθορμαῖος is rare; LSJ does not list it, and BDAG cites 3 Cor. 1:2 as its only occurrence outside of Eusebius. For further references, see PGL 1475, s. v.

⁶⁰ The imperative δοκίμασον seems very abrupt and out of place in a letter of request, although it might not have seemed so to the author and his audience. The imperative mood here might simply be the equivalent of δεῖ or χρή with the infinitive (see Herbert Weir Smyth, *Greek Grammar* [rev. Gordon W. Messing; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956], 411, § 1843), or its demanding tone might enhance the impression of the senders’ urgency. The author con-

adhere.⁶¹ 6 Therefore, as the Lord showed us mercy⁶² since you are still in your flesh⁶³ in order that we may again hear from you,⁶⁴ 7 either come yourself – 8 for we believe as it was revealed to Theonoe that the Lord has rescued you from the hand of the Lawless One⁶⁵ – or reply to us. 9 For the things which they say and teach are the following.⁶⁶ 10 They say that it is not necessary to make use of the prophets;⁶⁷ 11 and that God is not all-powerful;⁶⁸ 12 and that there is no resurrection of the flesh; 13 and that the formation of human beings is not of God;⁶⁹ 14 and neither that the Lord came into flesh⁷⁰ nor that he was born from Mary;⁷¹ 15 and that world is not of God but of angels.⁷² 16 Therefore,

tinues to use the imperative in the petitions below: v. 7, παραγένου; v. 8, ἀντίγραφον; v. 16, εἰσήγησαι.

⁶¹ Verse 5 contains the first of several adaptations of parts of 1 Corinthians 15 (here 15:3; cf. 11:23) to appear in the text; see also 3:4, 25–27 below.

⁶² ἡλέησεν. Cf. 1 Cor 7:25, γνώμην δὲ δίδωμι ὡς ἡλεημένος ὑπὸ κυρίου πιστὸς εἶναι.

⁶³ ὄντος ἔτι ἐν σαρκὶ σου. Cf. Phil 1:22, εἰ δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἐν σαρκί, τοῦτό μοι καρπὸς ἔργου, καὶ τί αἰρήσομαι οὐ γνωρίζω; 1:24, τὸ δὲ ἐπιμένειν [ἐν] τῇ σαρκὶ ἀναγκαιότερον δι' ὑμᾶς.

⁶⁴ Verse 6. I punctuate the three clauses in this manner because I understand the second and third to explain how the Lord showed mercy: Paul is still “in the flesh,” and is thus available for consultation.

⁶⁵ πιστεύομεν ... ἀνόμου. Cf. 2 Thess 2:3–4 (see n. 91 below). The author inserts this detail presumably to account for how the Corinthians know that Paul remains alive. It also contributes to his own construction of the fictional scenario, insofar as the elders have indirectly received instructions via the revelation to Theonoe to confer with Paul, thus setting in motion the creation of 3 *Corinthians*. The Lord is working behind the scenes to ensure that the text becomes (belatedly) available to the church. Also, ἀνόμου could be agreeing with χειρὸς instead of being a substantive adjective: “from the lawless hand.” Given the rich use of titles for the demonic power opposed to Paul and aligned with Simon and Cleobius in 3 *Corinthians*, it seems better to understand ἀνόμου in like manner here.

⁶⁶ For correlations of the listed denials with known Gnostic movements, see Rordorf, “Hérésie et Orthodoxie,” 403–7; Hovhannessian, *Third Corinthians*, 104–19.

⁶⁷ προφῆταις. Based upon Paul's response to this denial in chapter 3, the author is referring not to Christian prophets like Theonoe, but to the Israelite prophets, i.e., scripture. “Prophets” would presumably include the law as well, but the word focuses attention upon the prophets as conduits of valid information about God on the one hand, and as predictors of Christ and the church on the other.

⁶⁸ παντοκράτωρ. Paul uses this divine epithet in 2 Cor 6:18 (λέγει κύριος παντοκράτωρ) within a concatenated quotation of several LXX texts. The word is also a prominent epithet for God in Revelation (e.g., 1:8, 4:8). The entry in BDAG (755, s.v.) mentions in addition *Did.* 10:3 (δέσποτα παντοκράτωρ), *Mart. Pol.* 14:1 (κύριε ὁ θεὸς ὁ παντοκράτωρ), and 1 *Clem.* 56:6 (νουθέτημα παντοκράτορος).

⁶⁹ Verse 13. Cf. Rom 9:20 (Isa 29:16); 1 Tim 2:8.

⁷⁰ οὐδὲ ... σαρκός. Cf. John 1:14 (καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο); 1 John 4:2 (see n. 7 above).

⁷¹ ὅτι ... ἐγεννήθη. The only reference to Jesus' mother in the *corpus Paulinum* is at Gal 4:4: ὅτε δὲ ἦλθεν τὸ πληῖρωμα τοῦ χρόνου, ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικός, γενόμενον ὑπὸ νόμου.

⁷² Verse 15. The genitives θεοῦ and ἀγγέλων could be of authorship or source (as I take them above), making the point that not God, but angels were responsible for the creation of the world. They could also be genitives of possession, relating whose property or under whose control the world is (cf. Rom 5:12–21, and τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in Gal 4:4). The author may intend the ambiguous construction to capture both ideas. Note that the author asserts God's creation of heaven and earth in 3:9, and the Archon's imprisonment of σὰρξ to ἡδονή because he wanted to be God in 3:11.

brother, propose to come here with all haste, so that the church of the Corinthians may remain un stumbling, and that the folly of these men may become clear.⁷³ Farewell in the Lord.

Chapter 3: Paul to the Corinthians concerning the flesh

1 Paul, who is the prisoner of Jesus Christ among many errors,⁷⁴ to the brothers in Corinth, greetings.⁷⁵ 2 I am not astonished⁷⁶ if the teachings of the Evil One advance⁷⁷ so quickly, 3 because the Lord Christ will cause his arrival⁷⁸ to be swift, since he is rejected by those who counterfeit his sayings.⁷⁹ 4 For I handed over to you in the beginning the things which I also received by the apostles before me, who were with Jesus Christ the whole time.⁸⁰ 5 that our Lord Christ Jesus was born from Mary, from the seed of David, of the Holy Spirit which was sent into her from heaven, from the Father, 6 in order that he might

⁷³ τούτων ... γένηται. Cf. 2 Tim 3:9: ἡ γὰρ ἄνοια αὐτῶν ἐκδηλος ἔσται πᾶσιν.

⁷⁴ ἀστοχήμασι. As Mackay (125) points out, only the verb ἀστοχεῖν appears in the NT (1 Tim 1:5, 6:2; 2 Tim 2:18), not the noun ἀστόχημα.

⁷⁵ Verse 1. The salutation deviates from Paul's (and deuterio-Paul's) normal procedures in some glaringly obvious ways. It is hardly irregular for the apostle to call himself δέσμιος (Phil 1, 9; Eph 3:1, 4:1; 2 Tim 2:8; cf. δοῦλος, Rom 1:1; Phil 1:1; cf. Tit 1:1), and he often adds various phrases and clauses to all three parts of the salutation. Here, however, the identification of the addressees, τοῖς ἐν Κορίνθῳ ἀδελφοῖς (cf. Gal 1:2; Col 1:1–2), atypically precedes a participial phrase that belongs with with the nominative, ἐν πολλοῖς ὧν ἀστοχήμασι. While the position of the phrase might suggest that ὧν is adverbial, it is difficult to construe as conditional or concessive; nor does it seem to express means/manner, time or cause. I therefore conclude that ὁ ... ὧν is attributive, which makes δέσμιος a predicate. Alternatively, one might perceive the author (or scribe) to have omitted a repeated article (ὁ δέσμιος ... ὁ ὧν): "Paul, the prisoner of Christ Jesus, who is among many errors."

The unusual salutation, coupled with the extraordinary letter to Paul in chapter 1, prompts the question of how the author published his text. 3 *Corinthians* would not sit comfortably in the *corpus Paulinum*. The author does not appear to have fashioned it to become part of an existing *corpus*, the method probably used by other "Pauls" to conceal their pseudepigraphic activities. The document stands alone as a complete archive of a single volley of communication between Paul and the Corinthians – precisely as we find it in P.Bodm. X. This fact helps to explain why an editor inserted the archive, with some narrative elaboration, into the *Acts of Paul*, since its inclusion in the longer volume would ensure its preservation and its greater distribution.

⁷⁶ οὐ θαυμάζω. Cf. Gal 1:6 (θαυμάζω ὅτι οὕτως ταχέως μετατίθεσθε ἀπὸ τοῦ καλέσαντος ὑμᾶς ἐν χάριτι [Χριστοῦ] εἰς ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον). For instances of θαυμάζειν in the openings of speeches and letters, see my essay, "The Letter of Mithridates: A Neglected Item of Ancient Epistolary Theory," in *Pseudepigraphie und Verfasserfiktion in frühchristlichen Briefen* (eds. Jörg Frei, Jens Herzer, Martina Janßen, and Clare K. Rothschild; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 295–330, 300, n. 12.

⁷⁷ προτρέχει. The verb literally means to "run ahead" or "outrun" (BDAG 889, s.v.).

⁷⁸ ἔλευσιν. This is not the typical word in the NT to refer to Christ's return to earth from heaven (see the references at BDAG 317, s.v.); παρουσία occurs much more commonly (note esp. 1 Cor 15:23; 1 Thess 2:19, 4:15, 5:23).

⁷⁹ ἁθετούμενος ... αὐτοῦ. The participial phrase clearly states the reason why Christ shall accelerate his return. The preposition ἀπὸ probably expresses personal agency (BDAG 107, s.v. 5εβ; cf. 3:32, ἀπὸ τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραὴλ), although it might express cause ("because of," *ibid.* 106, 5a) or means ("with the help of," *ibid.* 5b). The verb παραχαράσσειν means "to counterfeit," literally, of money (BDAG 773, s.v.), or to debase its value (LSJ 1330, s.v.). The metaphor thus simultaneously captures the ideas of mimicry and adulteration.

⁸⁰ ὑπὸ ... Χριστοῦ. Cf. Gal 1:17, Acts 1:21–22 (see n. 141 below).

come forth into the world⁸¹ and liberate all flesh through his own flesh,⁸² and in order that he might raise us as fleshly ones from the dead, as he displayed himself as a type;⁸³ 7 and that the human being was formed⁸⁴ by the Father himself.⁸⁵ 8 Therefore, because he also was perishing, he was sought,⁸⁶ in order that he might be made alive through adoption.⁸⁷ 9 For, since God is the all-powerful of everything, who made heaven and earth,⁸⁸ he sent prophets to the first Jews, so that they might be torn away⁸⁹ from [their] sins. 10 For he was intending to save the house of Israel. Therefore, after dividing [a portion] from the Spirit of Christ, he sent [it] into the prophets,⁹⁰ who were preaching unerring piety for many eras. 11 <For the Archon, since he was unrighteous> [and] wanted to be <God>,⁹¹

⁸¹ ἵνα ... προέλθῃ. Cf. John 1:9 (τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν, ... ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον).

⁸² ἐλευθερώσει ... σάρκός. The theme of liberation appears in Paul's writings, but he never refers to the liberation of the *flesh*. It seems probable that the author is reworking Rom 6:12–23 in a manner that reinforces his main objective (to confirm the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh) by conflating σῶμα and σὰρξ. Cf. also John 8:36 (ἐὰν οὖν ὁ υἱὸς ὑμᾶς ἐλευθερώσῃ, ὄντως ἐλεύθεροι ἔσεσθε).

⁸³ τύπος. Cf. Rom 5:14 (Ἀδὰμ ὃς ἐστὶν τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος).

⁸⁴ ἐπλάσθη. Cf. Gen 2:7 LXX (καὶ ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς).

⁸⁵ ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ. I understand αὐτοῦ, in agreement with Luttikhuisen ("Apocryphal Correspondence," 87, n. 29), as intensive, not possessive ("his father").

⁸⁶ ἐζητήθη. The subject of this verb is ὁ ἄνθρωπος from v. 7, not Christ from vv. 5–6, as it is very unlikely that the author is advancing an adoptionist christology. The present participle ἀπολλύμενος could be understood as a substantive ("the one who was perishing"), or adverbial with a few possible meanings: temporal ("while he was perishing"), concessive ("although he was perishing"), and causative ("because he was perishing"). I select the last, because it seems to me that the author is explaining in vv. 7–8 *why* God wants to intervene: mortality is a feature of human beings and their flesh (see 3:15, and n. 94 below). This is the problem that requires resolution, and indeed it has been resolved through the revivication of Christ's flesh.

⁸⁷ ἵνα ... υἰοθεσίας. Paul uses the verb ζωοποιεῖν at several points (Rom 4:17, 8:11; 2 Cor 3:6; Gal 3:21), and it notably occurs several times in 1 Corinthians 15 (vv. 22, 36, 45). (Cf. John 5:21, 6:23.) The concept of adoption is also recognizably Pauline (Rom 8:15, 23; Gal 4:5; cf. Eph 1:5). The author entwines ideas that do not necessarily derive from Paul (ἀπολλύμενος ἐζητήθη) with those that certainly do (ἵνα ζωοποιηθῇ διὰ τῆς υἰοθεσίας).

⁸⁸ ὁ ποιήσας ... τὴν γῆν. Regarding the use of relative clauses and attributive participial phrases as divine epithets, see my study, *Paul's Definitions of the Gospel in Romans 1* (WUNT 2; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, forthcoming), § 4.4.2.

⁸⁹ ἀποσπασθῆναι. The image of "tearing away" or "dragging away" (BDAG 120, s.v.; LSJ 218, s.v.) might imply the notion that the "first Jews" were not cooperating with God's plans for their salvation.

⁹⁰ μερίσας ... προφήτας. This explanation of the inspiration of the prophets is peculiar, insofar as the author stresses that God divided and sent parts of the Spirit of *Christ* to them. He implies that the necessity of the prophets does not derive solely from their proclamation of θεοσεβεία, but also from their transmission of predictions about Christ and the church. The prophets can make such predictions because Christ himself is their source of information. The author of the *Ascension of Isaiah* makes a similar argument: Beliar wants to kill Isaiah because the latter received a vision of Christ's descent from heaven (3:13, 5:1–16). Within the narrative, there is nothing vague or partial about Isaiah's knowledge of the future.

⁹¹ ὁ γὰρ ἄρχων ... θέλων. Cf. 2 Thess 2:3–4: ὅτι ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ἡ ἀποστασία πρῶτον καὶ ἀποκαλυφθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἀνομίας, ὁ υἱὸς τῆς ἀπωλείας, ὁ ἀντικείμενος καὶ υπεραιρόμενος ἐπὶ πάντα λεγόμενον θεὸν ἢ σέβασμα, ὥστε αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν ναὸν τοῦ θεοῦ καθίσαι ἀποδεικνύντα ἑαυτὸν ὅτι ἐστὶν θεός; Eph 2:2: κατὰ τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ ἀέρος, τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ νῦν ἐνεργούντος ἐν τοῖς υἱοῖς τῆς ἀπειθείας.

was seizing them, and was imprisoning all flesh of human beings to pleasure.⁹² 12 God the all-powerful, since he was righteous and did not want to reject his own formed thing, 13 sent the Spirit through fire⁹³ into Mary the Galilean, (14) 15 in order that the Evil One, by being conquered through the perishing flesh⁹⁴ through which he was operating,⁹⁵ might be proven to be the one who is not God. 16 For, with his own body, Christ Jesus saved all flesh, 17 in order that he might display a temple of righteousness in his own body,⁹⁶ 18 by which we were being liberated. 19 Therefore, they [Simon and Cleobius] are not children of righteousness but children of wrath,⁹⁷ who obstruct the forethought of God by saying that heaven and earth and all things in them are not works of the Father, 20 for they have the accursed faith of the Serpent.⁹⁸ 21 From such people you must turn away; flee from their instruction! (22, 23) 24 But the ones who say to you that resurrection is not of the flesh, for those people there is no resurrection, 25 they who do not believe the one who rose in this manner. 26 For, Corinthians, they do not know about the sowing⁹⁹ in the case of wheat or other seeds, that they are cast naked into the earth, and after decomposing¹⁰⁰

⁹² τὴν πᾶσαν σάρκα ... ἐδέσμευεν. The author here recasts ideas that Paul puts forward in Rom 5:12–21, although he replaces ἀμαρτία and θάνατος with the Archon, and he identifies σὰρξ as the object of imprisonment. Paul does not use the word ἡδονή in his authentic letters, but cf. Tit 3:3 (δουλεύοντες ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἡδοναῖς). On πᾶσα σὰρξ, see Rom 3:20, 1 Cor 15:39.

⁹³ διὰ πυρός. It is unclear why the author mentions fire here. Fire shows up again in v. 37 as a punitive method. The *Gospel of Philip* (trans. Wesley W. Isenberg, in *The Nag Hammadi Library in English* [ed. James M. Robinson; 3rd rev. ed.; San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1990], 139–160) mentions fire in connection with conception at a couple of points. At 65.2–5, we read: “It is from water and fire that the soul and the spirit come into being. It is from water and fire and light that the son of the bridal chamber (came into being).” Also, at 71.3–11, we learn a “mystery”: “The father of everything united with the virgin who came down, and a fire shown for him on that day. He appeared in the great bridal chamber. Therefore his body came into being on that very day. It left the bridal chamber as one who came into being from the bridegroom and the bride.”

⁹⁴ σαρκὸς ἀπολλυμένης. The σὰρξ here does not belong to Christ; and ἀπολλυμένης does not mark a point in time at which the Evil One is conquered, but is simply an attribute of the flesh. The author, in other words, is not asserting that the *death* of the flesh is the method of conquest, but that the *flesh itself* is that method, through the sending of the Spirit into Mary as the first of the salvific chain of events.

⁹⁵ ἐνεπολιτεύετο. BDAG (324, s.v.) recommends the translations “take control” or “carry out one’s designs.” LSJ (347, s.v.) indicates that it means to “be a citizen” or to “hold civil rights in a place.” The idea seems to be that the Evil One’s control over the σὰρξ supports his illusory self-perception that he has usurped God’s position; it gives him rights and powers in the metaphorical polis of the cosmos. I thus translate the verb as “to operate,” adapting BDAG’s second suggestion.

⁹⁶ ἵνα ... ἀποδείξῃ. The author borrows the concept of the body being a ναός from 1 Cor 6:19 (ἢ οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι τὸ σῶμα ὑμῶν ναὸς τοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν ἁγίου πνεύματος ἐστίν οὐ ἔχετε ἀπὸ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐκ ἐστὲ ἐαυτῶν;), although he applies it solely to Christ’s own body.

⁹⁷ τέκνα δικαιοσύνης ... τέκνα ὀργῆς. Cf. Eph 2:3 (ἤμεθα τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς). On the use of τέκνον with abstract nouns, see BDAG 999, s.v. 5.

⁹⁸ Verse 20. The genitive τοῦ ὄφεως probably expresses source or possession (note ἔχουσιν), not object (“faith in the Serpent”), and certainly not subject (“what the Serpent believes” or “the faithfulness of the Serpent”). The author is declaring where Simon and Cleobius get their false doctrines, which together constitute a πίστις (BDAG 820, s.v. 3).

⁹⁹ σπόρον. Cf. Luke 8:5 (ὁ σπείρων τοῦ σπείραι τὸν σπόρον) and 11 (ὁ σπόρος ἐστίν ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ), and esp. Mark 4:26–29.

¹⁰⁰ συμφθαρέντα. I follow here the rendering suggested by BDAG (960, s.v.).

below they were raised by the will of God,¹⁰¹ embodied and dressed.¹⁰² 27 Thus, not only is the body which was cast [into the earth] raised, but [it is raised] abundant,¹⁰³ upright, blessed. 28 But if we should not fashion the parable from the seeds,¹⁰⁴ 29 you know that Jonah the son of Amathius, in order not to preach in Nineveh,¹⁰⁵ had been swallowed into the sea-monster, 30 and after three days and three nights¹⁰⁶ from the furthest depth of Hades God heeded Jonah as he prayed,¹⁰⁷ and nothing of him was corrupted, neither a hair nor an eyelid.¹⁰⁸ 31 How much more¹⁰⁹ is he raising you, you of little faith, who believed in Christ Jesus, in the same manner as he was raised. 32 If also, regarding the bones of Elisha the prophet,¹¹⁰ when a corpse was cast by the children of Israel upon them, the body of the man rose up,¹¹¹ how¹¹² too shall you, who were thrown upon the body, the bones, and the Spirit of Christ,¹¹³ stand up on that day having the flesh intact!¹¹⁴ (33) 34 But if you accept something else, do not cause me troubles.¹¹⁵ 35 For I have fetters on my

¹⁰¹ ἐν θελήματι θεοῦ. Cf. Mark 4:27: καὶ καθεύδῃ καὶ ἐγείρηται νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν, καὶ ὁ σπόρος βλαστᾷ καὶ μῆκύνεται ὥς οὐκ οἶδεν αὐτός.

¹⁰² Verse 26. Cf. 1 Cor 15:36–38: ἄφρων, σὺ ὁ σπείρεις, οὐ ζοποιοεῖται ἐὰν μὴ ἀποθάνῃ· καὶ ὁ σπείρεις, οὐ τὸ σῶμα τὸ γενησόμενον σπείρεις ἀλλὰ γυμνὸν κόκκον εἰ τύχοι σίτου ἢ τίνος τῶν λοιπῶν· ὁ δὲ θεὸς δίδωσιν αὐτῷ σῶμα καθὼς ἠθέλησεν, καὶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν σπερμάτων ἴδιον σῶμα. Ὁν ἡμφιεσμένα, cf. Matt 6:28–30.

¹⁰³ πολλοστόν. Cf. Mark 4:8: καὶ ἄλλα ἔπενεν εἰς τὴν γῆν τὴν καλὴν καὶ ἐδίδου καρπὸν ἀναβαίνοντα καὶ αὐξανόμενα καὶ ἔφερον ἐν τριάκοντα καὶ ἐν ἐξήκοντα καὶ ἐν ἑκατόν.

¹⁰⁴ Verse 28. Cf. Mark 4:13: οὐκ οἰδάτε τὴν παραβολὴν ταύτην, καὶ πῶς πάσας τὰς παραβολὰς γνώσεσθε; Note also that 3 Cor. 3:26 begins similarly, with οὐ τε ... οἶδασι.

¹⁰⁵ ἵνα ... κηρύξαι. Cf. Jonah 1:2 LXX, where God says to the prophet: ἀνάστηθι καὶ πορεύθητι εἰς Νινευη ... καὶ κήρυξον ἐν αὐτῇ.

¹⁰⁶ εἰς κῆτος ... νύκτας. Cf. Jonah 2:1 LXX: καὶ προσέταξεν κύριος κῆτει μεγάλῳ καταπιεῖν τὸν Ἰωάν· καὶ ἦν Ἰωάν ἐν τῇ κοιλίᾳ τοῦ κήτους τρεῖς ἡμέρας καὶ τρεῖς νύκτας.

¹⁰⁷ ἐκ τοῦ κατωτάτου ... Ἰωνᾶ. Cf. Jonah 2:3: ἐβόησα ἐν θλίψει μου πρὸς κύριον τὸν θεόν μου, καὶ εἰσήκουσέν μου· ἐκ κοιλίας ἔδον κραυγῆς μου ἤκουσας φωνῆς μου.

¹⁰⁸ Verses 29–30. Cf. Matt 12:40: ὥσπερ γὰρ Ἰωάνᾶς ἐν τῇ κοιλίᾳ τοῦ κήτους τρεῖς ἡμέρας καὶ τρεῖς νύκτας, οὕτως ἔσται ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τῆς γῆς τρεῖς ἡμέρας καὶ τρεῖς νύκτας. Also, regarding the conclusion of v. 30, the author significantly embellishes the simple statement in Jonah 2:1 LXX: καὶ προσετάγη τῷ κήτει, καὶ ἐξέβαλεν τὸν Ἰωάν ἐπὶ τὴν ξηράν.

¹⁰⁹ πόσῳ μᾶλλον. This type of construction occurs at points in the *corpus Paulinum* (e.g., Phlm 16; Rom 5:9–10, 15, 17), but the formulation here probably owes more to the Gospels, i.e. Matt 6:30 (οὐ πόλλῳ μᾶλλον ὑμᾶς, ὀλιγόπιστοι) *par.* Luke 12:28 (πόσῳ μᾶλλον ὑμᾶς, ὀλιγόπιστοι); cf. also Matt 7:11 *par.* Luke 11:13.

¹¹⁰ τὰ Ἐλισαίου ὅστέα τοῦ προφήτου. I am taking this phrase as an accusative of respect (see Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, 360–61).

¹¹¹ εἰ καὶ ... τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. This incident is narrated briefly in 2 Kings 13:20–21. After Elisha dies and is buried, Moabite raids become a problem even around graveyards: καὶ ἐγένετο αὐτῶν θαπτόντων τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ ἰδοὺ εἶδον τὸν μονόζωνον καὶ ἔρριψαν τὸν ἄνδρα ἐν τῷ τάφῳ Ἐλισαίῃ, καὶ ἐπορεύθη καὶ ἦψατο τῶν ὀστέων Ἐλισαίῃ καὶ ἔζησεν καὶ ἀνέστη ἐπὶ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ. Cf. also 2 Kings 4:32–37.

¹¹² τί. On this usage of τίς, τί, see BDAG 1007, s.v. 3.

¹¹³ τὸ σῶμα ... ἐπιριφέντες. Cf. Rist, “III Corinthians,” 52: “upon whom the body, the bones, and the Spirit of Christ have been let down”; Hovhannessian, *Third Corinthians*, 78: “upon whom the body and bones and the spirit of Christ have been thrown.” Apparently, they perceive the three nouns to be the subject of the participle ἐπιριφέντες, instead of ὑμεῖς.

¹¹⁴ ὑγιῇ. The normal meaning of ὑγιής is “healthy,” but here it seems to mean “undamaged” (see BDAG 1023, s.v. 1b), so I render it “intact.”

¹¹⁵ κόπους ... παρέχετε. Cf. Gal 6:17: τοῦ λοιποῦ κόπους μοί μηδεὶς παρεχέτω.

hands,¹¹⁶ in order that I may gain Christ,¹¹⁷ and [his?] scars on my body,¹¹⁸ in order that I may come to the resurrection of the dead. 36 And if someone remains in the rule¹¹⁹ which he received through the blessed prophets and the holy gospel, he will receive the reward.¹²⁰ 37 If someone transgresses these, the fire is with him and with the godless persons who travelled ahead of him in such manner, who are a brood of vipers,¹²¹ 39 from whom you must turn away with the power of the Lord. 40 And, peace be with you.¹²²

The Style and Structure of 3 Corinthians

The author does not take much trouble to imitate Paul's diction and style in chapter 3, beyond obvious allusions to passages from the *corpus Paulinum*.¹²³ However, he closely adheres to epistolary conventions as attested both in the theoretical discussions and actual instances of the letters' types. Chapter 1 is a letter of request (τύπος ἀξιωματικός);¹²⁴ like many others of this type, it relays brief narrative accounts of the circumstances that prompt the solicitation of assistance. Chapter 3, Paul's reply (ἀντιγραφὴ), has the form of a letter of advice (τύπος συμβουλευτικός), a species of deliberative discourse.¹²⁵ The reply also readily divides into sections known from ancient rhetorical theory: introduction (προοίμιον), narrative (διήγησις), thesis (πρόθεσις), proof (πίστις), and conclusion (ἐπίλογος). Thus, one may analyze the structure of the two letters as follows:

¹¹⁶ ἐγὼ ... ἔχω. Cf. Phil 1:7 (ἐν τε τοῖς δεσμοῖς μου), 13 (ὥστε τοὺς δεσμούς μου φανεροὺς ἐν Χριστῷ γενέσθαι), 14–17; Phlm 10, 13.

¹¹⁷ ἵνα ... κερδήσω. Cf. Phil 3:8, ἵνα Χριστὸν κερδήσω.

¹¹⁸ καὶ ... σώματί μου. Cf. Gal 6:17: ἐγὼ γὰρ τὰ στίγματα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματί μου βαστάζω.

¹¹⁹ κανόνι. Cf. Gal 6:16: καὶ ὅσοι τῷ κανόνι τούτῳ στοιχήσουσιν, εἰρήνην ἐπ' αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰσραὴλ τοῦ θεοῦ.

¹²⁰ μισθὸν λήμψεται. Cf. 1 Cor 3:8 ἕκαστος δὲ τὸν ἴδιον μισθὸν λήμψεται κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον κόπον; 14 εἴ τις τὸ ἔργον μενεῖ ὁ ἐποικοδόμησεν, μισθὸν λήμψεται. Note also 10:41–42.

¹²¹ γεννήματα ἐχιδνῶν. For this expression, see Matt 3:7 *par.* Luke 3:7; Matt 12:34.

¹²² καὶ ἔστω μεθ' ὑμῶν εἰρήνη. Paul and his imitators in the *corpus Paulinum* always conclude their letters with a blessing, although εἰρήνη appears only once (Rom 15:33, ὁ δὲ θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης μετὰ πάντων ὑμῶν, ἀμήν). Cf. 1 Peter 5:14 (εἰρήνη ὑμῖν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ).

¹²³ Rist ("III Corinthians," 55) inexplicably asserts: "... it appears to be unlikely that [the author's] indistinct echoes of Paul's words were designed to give his composition an appearance of authenticity. If he used them for this purpose he was not very convincing."

¹²⁴ For the ancient theory, see [Demetrius], *Typ. Epist.* 12 (Abraham J. Malherbe, ed. and trans., *Ancient Epistolary Theorists* [SBLBS 19; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988], 36–37), and [Libanius], *Epist. Char.* 7, 54 (χαρακτήρ παρακλητική, *ibid.*, 68–69, 74–75). John L. White's collection of ancient documentary letters (*Light from Ancient Letters* [FF; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986]) contains several samples of letters of request, notably §§ 10, 15, 34 and 37.

¹²⁵ See [Demetrius], *Typ. Epist.* 11 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 36–37); [Libanius], *Epist. Char.* 5, 32 (χαρακτήρ παραινετική, *ibid.*, 68–69, 74–75). For examples of the form, see the list compiled by Margaret M. Mitchell (*Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians* [Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1991], 22–23).

Chapter 1, the Corinthian elders to Paul

I. Salutation, 1:1

II. Narrative background and petitions, 1:2–16a

A. First narrative part and petition, 1:2–3

1. The arrival of Simon and Cleobius, 1:2a
2. The impact of their arrival: disturbance because of their “destructive words,” 1:2b
3. First petition: examine them, 1:3

B. Second narrative part and petition, 1:4–8

1. The strangeness of the interlopers’ words, 1:4
2. The fidelity of the elders to the tradition, 1:5
3. Second petition: either come here, or reply, 1:6–8

C. Third narrative part and petition, 1:9–16

1. Summary of the teachings as a series of denials, 1:9–15
 - a. “For the things which they say and teach are the following,” 1:9
 - b. There is no need for the prophets, 1:10
 - c. God is not all-powerful (or, the All-powerful), 1:11
 - d. There is no resurrection of the flesh, 1:12
 - e. God did not form the human, 1:13
 - f. The Lord did not come εἰς σάρκα and was not born ἐκ Μαρίας, 1:14
 - g. The world is not of God but of angels, 1:15
2. Third petition: come quickly, and set the matter straight, 1:16a

III. Farewell, 1:16b.

Chapter 3, Paul to the Corinthians

I. Introduction (προοίμιον), 3:1–3¹²⁶

A. Salutation, 3:1

B. Thematic introduction, 3:2–3

II. Brief narrative (διήγησις), 3:4¹²⁷III. Theses (προθέσεις), 3:5–8¹²⁸

A. Christology, 3:5–6

1. The birth of Christ from Mary
2. Soteriological objectives: the liberation and resurrection of the flesh

¹²⁶ The purpose of a προοίμιον is to secure the audience’s favorable opinion, attention, and receptivity (see, e.g., [Aristotle], *Rhet. Alex.* 25.1, 1436a). The author achieves this objective by indirectly affirming the Corinthian elders’ good judgment in detecting the falsehoods of Simon and Cleobius. Also, one should note that Paul addresses his reply to the entire Corinthian community, not just the elders. He is giving them precisely what they asked: a clear and authoritative rejection of the new teachings.

¹²⁷ 3 Cor. 3:4 may seem much too brief to fill the role of the διήγησις. According to the ancient rhetorical theorists, it should concisely, clearly, and plausibly set forth the background facts relevant for the πρόθεσις and πίστις ([Aristotle], *Rhet. Alex.* 30.4–5, 1438a; Cicero, *Part. or.* 31–32; [Cicero], *Rhet. Her.* 1.8.14; Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.31–33). In this situation, only one fact matters: the addressees already have received the necessary information from Paul, who himself received it from his predecessors. As in 1 Cor 15:3, all the parties know the narrative of events, so a detailed review is unneeded.

¹²⁸ Luttikhuisen (“Apocryphal Correspondence,” 86–88), the only other interpreter of whom I am aware that attempts to analyze the rhetorical structure of 3 *Corinthians*, perceives the διήγησις to include vv. 5–8. As I shall explain below, the two ὅτι-clauses in vv. 5–8 have the force of propositions which the πίστεις set out to demonstrate, not in their content, but in the inter-relatedness of the individual doctrines through their connection to σάρξ.

- B. Anthropology, 3:7–8
 - 1. The formation of the human by the Father
 - 2. Soteriological objective: adoption
- IV. Proofs (πίστεις), 3:9–32
 - A. Abbreviated historical survey, 3:9–18
 - 1. The creation of the world and the inspiration of the prophets, 3:9–10
 - 2. The interference of ὁ ἄρχων, 3:11
 - 3. The birth of Christ, 3:12–15
 - 4. Salvation through Christ's body, 3:16–18
 - B. The bad character of Simon and Cleobius, 3:19–21
 - C. Refutation of the denial of fleshly resurrection, 3:24–32
 - 1. The denial of resurrection to those who deny that it is fleshly, 3:24–25
 - 2. The example of the seed, 3:26–27
 - 3. The example of Jonah, 3:28–31
 - 4. The example of Eliseus, 32
- V. Conclusion (ἐπίλογος), 3:34–40
 - A. Paul's circumstances, 3:34–35
 - B. Blessing and threat, 3:36–39
 - C. Concluding salutation, 3:40

The Resurrection of the Flesh

The handful of scholars who have studied 3 *Corinthians* have offered several proposals regarding the identities of the real author's Gnostic opponents: the followers of Bardaisan,¹²⁹ Marcionites,¹³⁰ Ophites,¹³¹ the followers of Saturninus,¹³² or even the followers of Simon Magus.¹³³ These proposals depend upon an erroneous assumption, that the fictional scenario and the author's and his readers' real scenario closely align, such that the fictional and actual points to be adjudicated (τὰ κρινόμενα) are identical. The author certainly views the Gnostics as an intractable problem for the "orthodox," and he casts Simon and Cleobius in that mold. It does not follow from this observation, however, that the Gnostics constitute the precise problem with which he wants to deal in 3 *Corinthians*.

¹²⁹ This is the proposal of Ephraem of Syria in his commentary on the letter.

¹³⁰ So Martin Rist, "III Corinthians," 57–58.

¹³¹ So Hovhannessian, *Third Corinthians*, 126–31, perceiving the Ophites and Naassenes to be "gnostic groups within the larger Valentinian family" (ibid., 130), and basing his identification on τοῦ ὁφews πίστις in 3:20 and γεννήματα ἐχιδνῶν in 3:38 (cf. Testuz, *Papyrus Bodmer X–XII*, 39, n. 3).

¹³² So Rordorf, "Hérésie et Orthodoxie," 409–12, based upon a summary of Saturninus' teachings in Irenaeus, *Haer.* 1.24.1–2.

¹³³ Klijn ("Apocryphal Correspondence," 22–23) finds the "opinion that the correspondence was directed against Simon Magus" to be "attractive." He continues: "Nevertheless it is hazardous to think that the correspondence was written against his ideas only. ¶ This means that we are not able to say that the correspondence was written against one particular kind of heresy."

Chapter 1, which sets up the fictional scenario, narrates the arrival of Simon and Cleobius with their strange teachings. The elders of the Corinthian community plead for Paul to intervene in person, although they recognize that he might need to send a letter. They make it clear that they have decided against the new teachings, and that they know Paul would agree. What they require is that he throw the full weight of his authority behind their push to maintain fidelity to the tradition as they had previously received it. The point to be adjudicated (τὸ κρινόμενον) for the fictional Corinthian community as a whole is therefore: shall we follow our elders and the apostle and the teachings which they received and faithfully transmitted to us, or shall we follow the new teachings of Simon and Cleobius? Should we welcome the latter, or show them the door? The author dresses this fictional scenario with some details in order to enhance its impression of authenticity. The most transparent occurs in 1:8, the revelation to Theonoe that Paul is still “in the flesh,” and thus available for consultation. Also, at least one of the senders, Stephan, has a known association with the Christian community at Corinth. Simon, of course, recalls Simon Magus from Acts 8. The general circumstances would furthermore hold a great deal of plausibility to an “orthodox” reader of the second century, since such attempts to infiltrate and poach congregations from rival movements were no doubt common. Paul himself deals with a similar problem in his letter to the Galatians. Finally, the author’s studious observance of the conventions for letters of request and advice – even to the point of having Paul use χαίρειν in 3:1 instead of his typical greeting, χάρις καὶ εἰρήνη – gives a hard edge of realism to the letters and implicitly recommends them as authentic communiqués.

The error of previous scholarship in assuming a close alignment between the fictional and actual scenarios is understandable, because the author has done his job well. The first indication that the circumstances might not actually be as they appear emerges from the vagueness of the summary of Simon’s and Cleobius’ teachings. Any Gnostic group(s) which the author could potentially have in mind would have had more sophisticated ideas and arguments than the given summary of teachings can adequately capture. Simon and Cleobius have nothing affirmative to say. They reject the usage of the Israelite prophets, but we do not learn why. God is not all-powerful, he did not fashion humans, and he did not create the world; but no theology, anthropogeny or cosmogony replaces what is denied. The flesh will not rise, but what, if anything, will take its place? Jesus was not fleshly, nor was Mary his mother, but how then did he conduct his earthly operations? The author gives us very little to work with in order to identify the “heresy,” suggesting either that he does not have a specific one in mind, or that the Gnostic affiliation of the “heretics” is unimportant for the overall project. The second and more significant indication of a disjunction between the actual and fictional scenarios occurs in the argument in chapter 3. The only item that the author refutes at length in the proofs is the denial of the resurrection of the

flesh. He merely contradicts the other denials. It thus seems that the real point to be adjudicated hinges upon ἀνάστασις σαρκός, particularly whether Paul agrees with the Gospels and the “orthodox” consensus. This problem derives, of course, from 1 Corinthians 15, which, aside from Gnostic exegesis of it, unambiguously endorses the premise of a spiritual resurrected body. Since Paul creates the problem, the author recruits him from beyond the grave to fix it.

The list of denied doctrines in chapter 1 furnish the raw materials for the author’s strategy of argumentation. The items may not at first glance appear to have much to do with one another:

- 1:10 οὐ δεῖν φασιν προφήταις χρῆσθαι,
 11 οὐδ’ εἶναι θεὸν παντοκράτορα,
 12 οὐδὲ ἀνάστασιν εἶναι σαρκός,
 13 οὐδ’ εἶναι τὴν πλάσιν τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῦ θεοῦ,
 14 οὐδ’ ὅτι εἰς σάρκα ἦλθεν ὁ κύριος οὐδ’ ὅτι ἐκ Μαρίας ἐγεννήθη,
 15 οὐδ’ εἶναι τὸν κόσμον θεοῦ ἀλλὰ ἀγγέλων.

Anyone familiar with the *corpus Paulinum* will recognize immediately that Paul and his early imitators would certainly endorse all but one of the doctrines in their affirmative form. The letters rely everywhere upon the Israelite prophets and presuppose God’s creation of the world. In 2 Cor 6:18, a quotation of 2 Sam 7:8, God is παντοκράτωρ. Paul’s arguments in 1 Cor 15:45–49 and Rom 9:19–22 depend upon God’s formation of the human being. He asserts Jesus’ fleshly birth in Rom 1:3, and in Gal 4:4 he mentions his mother. While “orthodox” exegetes of the second century might wish Paul to have confirmed more clearly his knowledge of stories of Jesus’ birth, including the identities of his parents, he certainly supports the doctrines that the nativity stories were also designed to establish. The only item that Paul does not endorse is the resurrection of the flesh in v. 12. Therefore, this doctrine borrows credibility, antiquity, and authentic Paulinism from the others. The embedding of the resurrection of the flesh within other, more secure doctrines constitutes the first major strategy of the author’s argument in 3 *Corinthians*.

The second tactic emerges in the theses (προθέσεις) in 3:5–8. These have the form of two tightly compacted statements that fill out what Paul “received” and “handed over” to the Corinthian Christians. The first relates to christology. The main clause declares that Christ was born from Mary: he was a real human being with an actual mother. The remaining phrases address his lineage (ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβὶδ) and paternity (πνεύματος ἁγίου ἀπὸ οὐρανοῦ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποσταλέντος εἰς αὐτήν), concisely summarizing the narratives of Jesus’ conception and birth in Matthew 1–2 and Luke 1–2. The author borrows ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβὶδ from Rom 1:3, but he omits κατὰ σάρκα from that verse to treat the flesh further in the purpose clauses of v. 6: he was born from Mary in order to “come into the world,” to “liberate all flesh through his own flesh,” and to “raise us as fleshly ones” – that is, in fleshly form – “from the dead, as he displayed

himself as a type” (ἵνα εἰς κόσμον προέλθῃ καὶ ἐλευθερώσῃ πᾶσαν σάρκα διὰ τῆς ἰδίας σαρκός, καὶ ἵνα ἐκ νεκρῶν ἡμᾶς ἐγείρῃ σαρκικούς ὡς ἑαυτὸν τύπον ἔδειξε). The author draws a straight line from Jesus’ birth through his resurrection to the resurrection of believers, with the flesh present at every point. He furthermore discloses his presupposition that σὰρξ is conceptually coextensive with σῶμα, if not with the entire human self. *There can be no self to rise without flesh = body.*¹³⁴ The second thesis statement in vv. 7–8 carries this presupposition forward into the domain of anthropology. God himself made the human being. He personally manipulated the substances that comprise ὁ ἄνθρωπος. He wanted to save his creation as he made it (i. e., with flesh), pursuing him beyond death, restoring him to life, and adopting him as his own child. So, whereas the first tactic of the author’s argument has the resurrection of the flesh borrow authority, antiquity and authentic Paulinism from the other doctrines, the second establishes the *necessity* of the resurrection of the flesh based upon the role of the flesh in the other doctrines.¹³⁵

With the first proof in 3:9–18 the author continues his program of binding together all of the δόγματα by means of σὰρξ. He begins with the most secure premises: God’s identity as all-powerful creator of the world and humanity, the inspiration of the prophets, and God’s intention to save Israel (3:9–10a). He then selects aspects of these premises for further elaboration, and along the way attributes ideas to Paul that appear nowhere in the *corpus*. First, he explains how the prophets became inspired: God split off a piece of Christ’s Spirit so that they could teach ἀπλανὴς θεοσέβεια. Indeed, they continue to do so in the records of their proclamation, hence their necessity (cf. δεῖν, 1:10). Next, the Archon enters the scene as the villain behind the murders of the prophets. The author also assigns to him a motive, an unjust desire to usurp the position of God, and a means, the imprisonment of “all flesh” to pleasure. The reasoning here requires that flesh, as God created it, was initially good (or at least neutral), but it became a tool of the Archon’s domination. Divine intervention is therefore required for its liberation. Vv. 12–13 closely follow the structure of v. 11 (nominative + participial phrases with ὢν and θέλων/βουλόμενος + main clause), again assigning a motive (God’s righteousness and a desire not to reject his own creation), and

¹³⁴ On this presupposition, see further the arguments of Irenaeus, *Haer.* 5.7.1; Tertullian, *Res.* 18 (ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν = ἀνάστασις σαρκός), 35; [Justin Martyr], *Res.* 8 (ὁ ἄνθρωπος = ψυχὴ + σῶμα; therefore σὰρξ must be raised if God is to save ὁ ἄνθρωπος), 10 (elaborating a tripartite division of the human wherein the body houses the soul, and the soul houses the spirit; God will resurrect all parts, so σὰρξ is necessarily raised as the most basic part).

¹³⁵ The intercalation of the resurrection of the flesh within other fundamental doctrines is a standard argumentative procedure among the earlier patristic authors. The author of *3 Corinthians* confines himself to a much less discursive format, so the tactics are more starkly apparent. A full comparison of the methods of Irenaeus and Tertullian with those of *3 Corinthians* stand beyond the scope of the present essay, but a cursory review of the former authors’ arguments on the resurrection quickly reveals the similarity.

means (the impregnation of Mary and all that followed from it). As a result, God converted flesh, the method of the Evil One's empowerment, into the means of his humiliation. Although the author does not mention σάρξ until v. 11, one can see, once he has concluded the logical progression, that it is present at every step. God's creation of heaven and earth necessarily includes human beings and their flesh; this material subsequently suffers bondage; the prophets (essential as their proclamation of θεοσέβεια was and remains) receive the Spirit of Christ, but do not furnish a solution; God intervenes by sending the Spirit to Mary to give birth to Jesus Christ as a fleshly creature; finally his σῶμα saves πᾶσα σάρξ and becomes a δικαιοσύνης ναός.¹³⁶ Flesh holds the entire sequence together, such that the logical progression can now become the foundation of the argument for ἀνάστασις σαρκός.¹³⁷

The author devotes the third proof in vv. 24–32 to the nature of the resurrected body. The passage has four parts, beginning with a transitional remark that indicates a turn to the sole remaining doctrine under consideration: οἱ δὲ ὑμῖν λέγουσιν ἀνάστασις οὐκ ἔστιν σαρκός, ἐκείνοις οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνάστασις, οἵτινες τὸν οὕτως ἀναστάντα ἀπιστοῦσι. The author does not say that such people reject resurrection altogether, but that they specifically deny the resurrection of the flesh. Since 1 Corinthians 15 gives rise to the problem, the author's first sub-proof in vv. 26–27 revises a section of it, 15:36–38, infusing it with language from the Gospels (σπόρος, Luke 8:5, 11; Mark 4:26–29; ἡμιφεισμένα, Matt 6:30)¹³⁸ in order to enhance the authority of the revision. On the surface, the objective here is to establish an analogy between σπέρμα and σῶμα: both are thrown into the earth to rise anew, such that the former is a παραβολή of the latter (v. 28).¹³⁹ The argument again relies upon the unstated premise that a

¹³⁶ The final stage of the logic further affirms the conceptual coextension of σῶμα and σάρξ; the flesh in v. 6 becomes the body in vv. 16–17.

¹³⁷ Strikingly absent from the first proof is any reference to the cross. Christ's birth, his acquisition of a body/flesh, eclipses his intercessory death in a radical revision of Paul's own soteriology. The rest of chapter 3 omits the cross as the means of salvation as well, such that Christ's death seems to become merely a prelude to his fleshly resurrection. Also, the author asserts Christ's pre-existence, since it is his Spirit that God divides for delivery to the prophets. Perhaps he understands the incarnation – the transformation of πνεῦμα to σάρξ – to have the ability to save others because the Archon could not imprison Christ's σάρξ to ἡδονή; initiation into and participation in the rites of the church enable his followers likewise to get free of the Archon's control. The author does not fully set forth his soteriological reasoning here; the incarnation at any rate achieves one of God's objectives as articulated in the theses: Christ has "liberated all flesh through his own flesh."

¹³⁸ See nn. 99–102 above.

¹³⁹ Irenaeus (*Haer.* 5.2.3) uses a very similar argument, with adaptations that render it amenable to the proof of the resurrection of the flesh from the Eucharist: "And in like manner the wood of the vine, after it reclined to the earth, bore fruit in its own time; and the grain of wheat, after it fell to the earth and decayed, was raised abundant through the Spirit of God which holds all things together. But then, through the wisdom of God, after coming to human use and additionally taking to themselves the word of God, they become the Eucharist, the thing which is the

body must have flesh. In v. 26, the seeds rise ἔνσωμα καὶ ἡμφιεσμένα; likewise, in v. 27, the body rises πολλοστὸν ὀρθὸν ἡύλογημένον; the analogy does not confirm ἀνάστασις σαρκός unless σῶμα and σὰρξ essentially equate. Below the surface, however, the author has a larger project in view, to assert that Paul's teachings in 3 *Corinthians* supercede what he earlier wrote – or, perhaps better, what he *appears* to have written – in 1 Corinthians 15. In addition to ensuring that ἀνάστασις σαρκός finds its proper place among the παραδόσεις of the original apostles, the author has Paul return to his original discussion to refute the ideas of those who “misunderstood” him to support a spiritual resurrection. The author next in vv. 29–31 summons additional confirmation from the experience of Jonah, who emerged from his sojourn in Hades with his flesh completely uncorrupted (καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ διεφθάρη, οὔτε θριξ οὔτε βλέφαρον) – in precisely the same way as Jesus emerged, and those who believe in him shall emerge, from the grave (πόσω μᾶλλον ὑμᾶς, ὀλιγόπιστοι, τοὺς πιστεύσαντας εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐξεγειρεῖ ὡς αὐτὸς ἡγήρηθ).¹⁴⁰ The author is obviously expanding the remarks regarding Jonah in Matt 12:40, such that the argument acquires additional authority from Jesus himself. Finally, in v. 32, he invokes an instance of resurrection attested in 2 Kings 13:20–21, the revival of someone thrown upon the bones of Elisha. These three sub-proofs depend upon the readers' recognition of the multiple textual sources from which they come, and, although the author does not label Paul's letters and the Gospels as “scripture,” his procedure here strongly implies that he regarded them as such.

The first proof in 3:9–18 and the third proof in 3:24–32 thus pursue the two strategies of argumentation, (1) of lending authority, antiquity, and authentic Paulinism to ἀνάστασις σαρκός from the other, less disputable doctrines; and (2) of demonstrating the necessity of ἀνάστασις σαρκός based upon the role of σὰρξ in the other doctrines. The author directs 3:9–18 to the second strategy,

body and blood of Christ. So also our own bodies, being nourished from it and deposited into the earth and decomposing within, shall arise in their own time, when the Word of God grants to them the resurrection to the glory of the God and Father, who truly holds secure immortality for the mortal, and who grants in advance incorruption for the corrupt.” Καὶ ὄνπερ τρόπον τὸ ξύλον τῆς ἀμπέλου κλιθὲν εἰς τὴν γῆν τῷ ἰδίῳ καιρῷ ἐκαρποφόρησε, καὶ ὁ κόκκος τοῦ σίτου πεσὼν εἰς τὴν γῆν καὶ διαλυθεὶς, πολλοστὸς ἐγένεθ' διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ θεοῦ, τοῦ συνέχοντος τὰ πάντα· ἔπειτα δὲ διὰ τῆς σοφίας τοῦ θεοῦ εἰς χρήσιν ἐλθόντα ἀνθρώπων, καὶ προσλαμβανόμενα τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ, εὐχαριστία γίνεται, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα καὶ αἷμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ· οὕτως καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα σώματα ἐξ αὐτῆς τρεφόμενα, καὶ τεθέντα εἰς τὴν γῆν, καὶ διαλυθέντα ἐν αὐτῇ, ἀναστήσεται ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ καιρῷ, τοῦ λόγου τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ἔργεσιν αὐτοῖς χαριζομένου εἰς δόξαν θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς· ὃς ὄντως τῷ θνητῷ τὴν ἀθανασίαν περιποιεῖ, καὶ τῷ φθαρτῷ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν προχαρίζεται (text per W. Wigan Harvey, ed., *Sancti Irenaei episcopi Lugdunensis libros quinque adversus haeresis* [2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1857; repr. Ridgewood, NJ: Gregg Press, 1965], 2.322–23). Cf. also *ibid.*, 5.7.2).

¹⁴⁰ The example of Jonah appears briefly in Irenaeus, *Haer.* 5.5.2; see also Tertullian, *Res.* 32 (*puto autem huius quoque divinae potestatis documentum idoneum Ionam, cum incorruptus utraque substantia, carne atque anime, de alvo piscis evolvitur*, MPL 2.887).

while 3:24–32 draws upon 1 Corinthians 15, the Gospels, and the Septuagint to show that the concept of fleshly resurrection conforms with the oldest and most secure tradition.

The author has a third strategy, however, one which explains why he decides to construct the fictional scenario as he does: he associates any denial of the resurrection of the flesh with the Gnostics, and the Gnostics with the Evil One (who bears several titles in the text, perhaps in order to refer sarcastically to the Gnostic penchant for cosmogonies with numerous divine actors). He implements this strategy at several points in the text: the elders' description of Simon and Cleobius (chapter 1), the προοίμιον (3:1–3), the brief διήγησις (3:4), the second proof (3:19–21), and the ἐπίλογος (3:34–40). The author in essence posits two parallel chains of tradition. On one side stands that which the Corinthians received from Paul, which he himself received “from the apostles before me who were with Christ the whole time” (3:4), blending οἱ πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἀπόστολοι from Gal 1:17 with the criteria of admission to the Twelve from Acts 1:21–22.¹⁴¹ The διήγησις modifies 1 Cor 11:23 and 15:3 in some other significant ways. According to Paul, the source of the tradition is the Lord; in 3 Cor. 3:4 it becomes the apostles, the eyewitnesses of the entire ministry of Jesus. The author makes Paul aware of the narratives in the Gospels, and he passes that information to his own churches as part of the παράδοσις. Also, ἐν ἀρχῇ replaces ἐν πρώτοις in 1 Cor 15:3, in order to stress the continuity and security of the tradition from its origin to the present. The singular relative pronoun ὃ in both 1 Cor 11:23 and 15:3 converts to the plural ἃ; each δόγμα carries equal weight and has the same authoritative pedigree. The author therefore traces “orthodox” tradition back to its sources, and ensures its integrity – without further supplementation or revision – in the form embraced by the elders (and, by extension, by the author and the real readers of 3 Corinthians). On the other side stand Simon and Cleobius. The initial impression of them in chapter 1 is decidedly negative. They teach “destructive words” and are causing a disturbance in the Corinthian community. Furthermore, what they say does not conform to what the elders have hitherto heard from Paul or the “others” (i.e., the apostles). By the time the elders have concluded their summary of the strange teachings, no doubt exists that Simon and Cleobius are promoting an amalgam of doctrines associated with the Gnostics. Paul's reply escalates the negative portrait from the very start: the teachings are “errors” (ἀστοχήματα, 3:1) and belong to the Evil One (τὰ τοῦ πονηροῦ δόγματα, 3:2). Their promulgators will suffer punishment for counterfeiting the Lord's sayings (ἀπὸ τῶν παραχαρασσόντων τὰ λόγια, 3:3), and they are the “children of wrath”

¹⁴¹ Gal 1:17: οὐδὲ ἀνῆλθον εἰς Ἱερουσόλυμα πρὸς τοὺς πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἀποστόλους, ἀλλὰ ἀπῆλθον εἰς Ἀραβίαν καὶ πάλιν ὑπέστρεψα εἰς Δαμασκόν. Acts 1:21–22: δεῖ οὖν τῶν συνεληθόντων ἡμῖν ἀνδρῶν ἐν παντὶ χρόνῳ ὧς εἰσῆλθεν καὶ ἐξῆλθεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς, ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ βαπτίσματος Ἰωάννου ἕως τῆς ἡμέρας ἣς ἀνελήμφθη ἀφ' ἡμῶν, μάρτυρα τῆς ἀναστάσεως αὐτοῦ σὺν ἡμῖν γενέσθαι ἓνα τούτων.

(τέκνα ὀργῆς, 3:19), who “have the accursed faith of the serpent” (κατηραμένην γὰρ τοῦ ὄφεως πίστιν ἔχουσιν, 3:20). Most importantly, they claim that “the resurrection is not of the flesh” (ἀνάστασις οὐκ ἔστιν σαρκός, 3:24). The exposition of the Evil One’s behavior in the first proof reinforces this strategy, such that the agent behind the murder of the prophets and the imprisonment of the flesh becomes the source of the new teachings, creating a chain of tradition that rivals that of the “orthodox.” The centerpiece of this evil παράδοσις is indeed the denial of the resurrection of the flesh. Anyone who questions the “orthodox” consensus henceforth carries the brand of a Gnostic, and merits immediate expulsion from the community (3:21, 39). One either stands on the side of the apostles or on the side of those who act as proxies for the demonic power; it is *us* versus *them*. And Paul’s concept of a spiritual resurrected body now firmly belongs in the latter camp. Finally, in the ἐπίλογος, the author enforces the embrace of the κανὼν with a blessing, and the rejection of it with a curse (3:36–37).¹⁴²

Conclusion

3 Corinthians might initially appear to modern eyes to be a clumsy, if not sloppy, forgery. A closer examination of the text reveals a carefully considered and executed rhetorical-epistolary product. The problem that stimulates the author to adopt Paul’s persona does not derive from historical persons for whom Simon and Cleobius function as stand-ins within the text. The objective is not to combat a specific “heresy,” but to ensure Paul’s endorsement of the “orthodox” consensus regarding ἀνάστασις σαρκός – in spite of his statements in 1 Corinthians 15 – and to discourage anyone from insisting upon a spiritual resurrected body on that basis, unless he or she wants to be immediately labeled a “heretic” and thrown out of the community. The author constructs a plausible fictional scenario to embed the denial of the resurrection of the flesh among ideas associated with the Gnostics. His argument ensures the antiquity, authority and authentic Paulinism of fleshly resurrection on the one hand, and its necessity on the other. For those whom he manages to deceive with his pseudepigraphic craftsmanship, *3 Corinthians* supercedes 1 Corinthians 15, and becomes the authoritative text for Paul’s teaching on resurrection.

¹⁴² See the conditional curses in Gal 1:8–9, and note esp. Hans Dieter Betz, *Galatians: A Commentary on Paul’s Letter to the Churches in Galatia* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), 25, 50–54.

VI. Later Witnesses

“Epitomizing Virtue: Clothing the Christian Woman’s Body”

Annette Bourland Huizenga

[A woman] must train the body to a natural measure of provision in regard to clothing and bathing and anointing and hairstyles and such things for adornment as gold and precious stones. For the women who eat and drink and cover themselves in every expensive thing, and wear the things that women wear, are prepared for error of every dishonor related to marriage beds and for other unjust acts. ... Therefore she will not wear gold or precious stone from India or from another country, nor will she braid her hair very artfully, or anoint herself with oil laden with Arabian scent, nor will she color her face, making it white or red or her eyebrows and eyes black, or work on her gray hair with dyes, or bathe frequently. For the woman seeking these things, seeks admirers of womanly lack of self-control.¹

This moralizing advice for proper feminine adornment comes from an ancient text entitled *On the Harmony of a Woman* (Περὶ γυναικὸς ἀρμονίας). Like several other Greek philosophical sources, *On the Harmony* constructs a conceptual link between a woman’s external appearance and her internal uprightness: how she dresses her body to be seen in the presence of others is defined as a direct expression of the virtue (or vice) of her inner self. The truly “harmonious” woman, whom the author says must be full of “prudence and moderation” (φρονήσιός τε καὶ σωφροσύνης), will be easily recognized by the simplicity of her adornment. The text then advises that this feminine soul also will be “just and brave” (δικαίη

¹ σκῆνος δὲ ἄγειν χρὴ πρὸς μέτρα φύσιος τροφῆς τε πέρι καὶ ἱματίων καὶ λουτρῶν καὶ ἀλειψίων καὶ τριχῶν θέσιος καὶ τῶν ὁκόσα ἐς κόσμον ἐστὶ χρυσοῦ καὶ λίθων. ὁκόσαι γὰρ πολυτελέα πάντα ἐσθίουσι καὶ πίνουσι καὶ ἀμπέχονται καὶ φορέουσι τὰ φορέουσι γυναῖκες, ἐς ἀμαρτίην ἔτοιμαι κακίης συμπάσης ἐς τε λέχεια καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα ἀδικοπρηγέες ... ὥστ’ οὔτε χρυσὸν ἀμφιθῆσεται ἢ λίθον Ἰνδικὸν ἢ χώρης ἐόντα ἄλλης, οὔδε πλέζεται πολυτεχνίησι τρίχας, οὔδ’ ἀλείψεται Ἀραβίης ὀσμῆς ἐμπνέοντα, οὔδ’ ἐχρίσεται πρόσωπον λευκαίνουσα ἢ ἐρυθραίνουσα τοῦτο ἢ μελαίνουσα ὀφρῦας τε καὶ ὀφθαλμούς καὶ τὴν πολὴν τρίχα βαφαῖσι τεχνωμένην, οὔδε λούσεται θαμνίνῃ. ἢ γὰρ ταῦτα ζητούσα θητηῖρα ζητεῖ ἀκρασίης γυναικίης.

Periktione, *On the Harmony of a Woman*, Stob., *Anth.* 4.28.19 (W.-H. 689.14–690.18); all translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. Found in the *Anthologium* under the heading of Οἰκονομικός, this treatise is attributed to a female Pythagorean philosopher named Periktione (Περικτιόνης Πυθαγορείας). An English translation of the entire text and other writings attributed to female Pythagoreans is provided by I. M. Plant, ed., *Women Writers of Ancient Greece and Rome: An Anthology* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004).

καὶ ἀνδρηίῃ), completing the set of four cardinal virtues.² All such good qualities will be outwardly manifested in the woman's manner of dress.

The author of the early Christian letter 1 Timothy formulates the same kind of correspondence between women's inner and outer conditions:

Likewise also [I wish] women to adorn themselves in decorous bearing with modesty and moderation [*sōphrosynē*], not in braided hair and gold or pearls or expensive clothing, but what is proper for women who profess godly-piety, through good works. Let a woman learn in silence in all subordination; but I do not permit a woman to teach, nor to have authority over a man, but to remain silent. For Adam was formed first, then Eve; and Adam was not deceived, but the woman, having been thoroughly deceived, has been in transgression; but she will be saved through child-bearing, if they remain in faith and in love and in holiness with moderation. Faithful is the saying.³

While this text does not devote as much space to women's adornment, still female apparel functions as an observable exhibition of an internal virtuous character. Thus, adornment provides one standard by which the believing community, perhaps especially its male leaders, might determine a woman's moral state.⁴

This essay compares such paraenesis from 1 Tim 2 to that found in other moral-philosophical texts (generally excluding references to legislation, drama, fiction, satire, poetry, and histories⁵): the letter *Melissa to Kleareta*,⁶ the treatises

² The first two sentences of the source read: "One must presume that the harmonious woman is full of prudence and moderation. Yes, her life must send forth virtue, so that she will be both just and brave, and being prudent and beautifying herself by self-sufficiency and hating empty glory," Τὴν ἀρμονίην γυναῖκα νώσασθαι δεῖ φρονήσιός τε καὶ σωφροσύνης πλείων· κάρτα γὰρ ψυχὴν πεπνυσθαι δεῖ ἐξ (not εἰς) ἀρετὴν, ὥστ' ἔσται καὶ δικαίη καὶ ἀνδρηίη καὶ φρονέουσα καὶ αὐταρκείη καλλυνομένη καὶ κενὴν δόξην μισέουσα (Stob., *Anth.* 4.28.19 [W.-H. 688.11–14]).

³ ὥσαύτως καὶ γυναῖκας ἐν καταστολῇ κοσμίῳ μετὰ αἰδοῦς καὶ σωφροσύνης κοσμεῖν ἑαυτάς, μὴ ἐν πλέγμασιν καὶ χρυσῷ ἢ μαργαρίτας ἢ ἱματισμῷ πολυτελεῖ ἀλλ' ὃ πρέπει γυναῖξιν ἐπαγγελλομέναις θεοσεβείαν, δι' ἔργων ἀγαθῶν. γυνὴ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ μανθανέτω ἐν πάσῃ ὑποταγῇ. διδάσκειν δὲ γυναῖκι οὐκ ἐπιτρέπω, οὐδὲ αὐθεντεῖν ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ. Ἀδὰμ γὰρ πρῶτος ἐπλάσθη, εἶτα Εὔα. καὶ Ἀδὰμ οὐκ ἡπατήθη, ἡ δὲ γυνὴ ἐξαπατηθεῖσα ἐν παραβάσει γέγονεν. σωθήσεται δὲ διὰ τῆς τεκνογονίας, ἐὰν μείνωσιν ἐν πίστει καὶ ἀγάπῃ καὶ ἀγιασμῷ μετὰ σωφροσύνης. Πιστὸς ὁ λόγος, 1 Tim 2:9–3:1a.

⁴ In 1 Tim a woman's inner virtue is also displayed through her demeanor as a learner: she is to be silent and subordinate to men. Other activities that exhibit female uprightness found elsewhere in the Pastoral Letters include: sexual faithfulness to one's husband, proper childrearing, good household management, the avoidance of extravagant consumption, slander and drunkenness (1 Tim 3:11; 5:3–16; Titus 2:3–5), along with specifically Christian duties (1 Tim 5:10; 2 Tim 1:5).

⁵ One example of a Roman opinion on the topic is Cato's speech to the Senate in favor of the Lex Oppia: "Let the women, then, be adorned not with gold nor precious stones, nor with bright-colored and purple clothing, but with modesty, with love of their husbands and children, with obedience, moderation, with the established laws, with our arms, our victories, and our trophies" (preserved in Zonaras 9.17; trans. Eve D'Ambra, *Roman Women* [Cambridge Introduction to Roman Civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)], 32).

⁶ Found in the edition by Alfons Städele, *Die Briefe des Pythagoras und der Pythagoreer* (Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie 115; Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1980). This letter and the two treatises listed next all emerge from a (neo-)Pythagorean context. Along with four

by Periktione, *On the Harmony of a Woman*, and by Phintys, *On the Moderation of a Woman*;⁷ Plutarch's *Advice to the Bride and Groom*;⁸ and Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*.⁹ Another short New Testament parallel to 1 Tim 2 will also be taken into account: 1 Pet 3:1–6. The basic questions to be considered are: which elements of female adornment do these sources address? What moral qualities are such items of apparel thought to represent? What perceptions of gender-differentiation, of femininity and masculinity, lie beneath the philosophical judgments expressed in this literature? Finally, when 1 Timothy promotes such cultural assessments, what distinctive concepts do its theological justifications introduce?

My investigation shows that three issues stand behind the references to specific items of adornment: (1) a noteworthy uneasiness over the display of wealth; (2) a gender perspective that views a woman's nature as weaker than a man's, and more likely to act out her sexual desires; and, (3) the presumption that adornment itself is gendered as feminine, and therefore corresponds to the gender of the female physical body. These suppositions about wealth, the female disposition, and feminine adornment prompt various allegations that women are more likely to be attracted to showy objects and to want to display these on their bodies. Therefore, the sources counsel that if a woman seeks after virtue, she will strive for a discreet deportment rather than draw attention to her body by adorning it with extraordinary stuff. Her body ought to be clothed in such a way that its femaleness will be unremarkable, except for its "conspicuous" modesty. Moreover, the ways in which a physical female body is ornamented will illustrate explicitly the internal moral character of that woman: her clothed (feminine) body signifies

other letters from Pythagorean women, this literature is unique in antiquity because all seven texts are attributed to female authors and address topics of women's moral behavior. Additionally, the five letters all have female recipients. I examine these inherently "feminine" qualities of the texts as well as the didactic functions of the letters in my dissertation, "Philosophers of the Household: Moral Training for Women in the Pastoral and Pythagorean Letters," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2010. For an in-depth analysis of the text history of the five letters as a collection see also my "Advice to the Bride: Moral Advice for Young Wives in Two Ancient Letter Collections," in *Jewish and Christian Scripture as Artifact and Canon* (eds. Craig A. Evans and H. Daniel Zacharias; London; New York: T & T Clark, 2009, 232–47).

⁷ Stob., *Anth.* 4.28.19 (W.-H. 689.14–690.19) and 4.23.61a (W.-H. 591.15–592.14) respectively.

⁸ Sarah B. Pomeroy, ed., *Plutarch's Advice to the Bride and Groom and A Consolation to His Wife: English Translations, Commentary, Interpretive Essays, and Bibliography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Although Plutarch claims to address his *Advice* to both bride and groom, more of his exhortations concern the behavior of the wife than that of the groom, as Pomeroy notes (40). His edifying purposes and the text's contents are strikingly similar to those of the Pythagorean letters and treatises.

⁹ Sarah B. Pomeroy, ed., Xenophon, *Oeconomicus: A Social and Historical Commentary, with a New English translation* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994). Although the *Oeconomicus* is primarily directed toward the role of a male estate-owner, it contains a long section on the functions of that man's wife, including how she ought to conduct herself appropriately toward him and toward their property, including the household slaves.

her inner (feminine) essence. The author of 1 Timothy agrees with the traditional advice given by the rest of the literature, supports this argument with additional reasons that would appeal to those in the Paulinist communities, and thus furthers the development of a gender-differentiated moral standard for male and female believers.

Material Elements of Female Adornment

In the Greek paraenetic texts which treat the topic of women's apparel, there are several recurring elements at issue, which are presented in Chart One below: (1) *hairstyle* (braiding, dyeing); (2) *clothing* (its color, design, expense, foreign provenance, transparency); (3) *jewelry* (gold, pearls, emeralds, precious stones, foreign provenance); (4) *cosmetics* (foundation, rouge, eye coloring); (5) *perfumes/oils* (foreign provenance); (6) *food/drink* (expense, foreign provenance); and (7) bathing.¹⁰ Clothing and jewelry are the two elements mentioned in each source.

Chart One: Texts and Topics

Text	Clothing	Jewelry	Cosmetics	Hairstyle	Oils	Bathing	Food/Drink
<i>On the Harmony</i>	×	×	×	×	×	×	×
<i>On the Moderation</i>	×	×	×			×	
<i>Melissa to Kleareta</i>	×	×	×				
<i>Advice to Bride/ Groom</i>	×	×	×		×		
<i>Oeconomicus</i>	×	×	×				
1 Timothy 2	×	×		×			
1 Peter 3	×	×		×			

¹⁰ Relevant investigations of women's clothing, make-up, and hairstyles in Greece and Rome include: Judith Lynn Sebasta, "Symbolism in the Costume of the Roman Woman," in *The World of Roman Costume* (eds. Judith Lynn Sebasta and Larissa Bonfante; Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994), 46–53; Ann M. Stout, "Jewelry as a Symbol of Status in the Roman Empire," in *The World of Roman Costume*, 77–100; Maria Wyke, "Woman in the Mirror: The Rhetoric of Adornment in the Roman World," in *Women in Ancient Societies: An Illusion of the Night* (eds. Léonie J. Archer, Susan Fischler, and Maria Wyke; New York: Routledge, 1994), 134–51; Alexandra T. Croom, *Roman Clothing and Fashion* (Charleston, SC: Tempus, 2000); Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones, ed., *Women's Dress in the Ancient Greek World* (London: Duckworth and Classical Press of Wales, 2002); Kelly Olson, "Matrona and Whore: The Clothing of Women in Roman Antiquity," *Fashion Theory* 6, no. 4 (2002): 387–420; Liza Cleland, Mary Harlow, and Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones, eds., *The Clothed Body in the Ancient World* (Oxford: Oxbow, 2005); Iris Young, "Women Recovering Our Clothes," in *Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005): 176–88; Eve D'Ambra, *Roman Women*; J. C. Edmondson and Alison Keith, eds., *Roman Dress and the Fabrics of Roman Culture* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008); Kelly Olson, *Dress and The Roman Woman: Self-Presentation and Society* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

Although the short excerpt from *On the Harmony of a Woman* cited above deals with all seven, it is more typical for the sources to address just three or four specific things. Besides *On the Harmony*, the longest treatment of women's adornment surfaces in *On the Moderation of a Woman*, ascribed to another Pythagorean woman named Phintys. This text takes up clothing, jewelry, makeup, and bathing. *Melissa to Kleareta* talks about clothing, jewelry, and cosmetics, while Plutarch discusses clothing, oils and perfumes, makeup, and jewelry, and Xenophon advises on clothing, makeup, and jewelry. Similarly, the verses from 1 Timothy address only three items: in a few words, the author rejects *elaborate* hairstyles, *expensive* jewelry, and *extravagant* clothing as forms of adornment that are contrary to pious living.¹¹ The same elements are condemned in 1 Pet 3:3, and in the same order: "[Women], let your external adornment not come from braiding your hair, and putting on gold jewelry or wearing robes."¹² When read alongside the other treatments, these three tangible items of women's apparel stand as an *epitomē* (ἐπιτομή) of the entire panoply of female dress, in which each element signifies the moral state of the woman who makes use of it.

¹¹ Bruce W. Winter also has investigated "dress codes" for women in 1 Tim 2, and cites significant parallels and secondary literature, including references to three of the Pythagorean texts (*Roman Wives, Roman Widows: The Appearance of New Women and the Pauline Communities* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003], 97–109). One shortcoming of Winter's work is that he accepts the ancient sources at face value, often supposing that their critique of women's conduct is an accurate reflection of a (regrettable) historical reality. From this reading, he discerns a "new woman," "... one whose social life was reported to have been pursued at the expense of family responsibilities that included the complex running of household. Life beyond their household could involve illicit liaisons that defied the previously accepted norms of marriage fidelity and chastity" (5). Winter then wonders: "What gave rise to such a change in the traditional behavior of married women that was to result, in some cases, in flagrant sexual unfaithfulness to their husbands and which occurred, at time, with immunity?" (ibid., 6). Certainly more suspicion of the sources must be brought to bear when investigating the broad Roman discourse about women, their apparel, and their presumed morality or lack thereof. Furthermore, research on women in antiquity, whether investigating their activities, family relationships, and/or moral virtue, needs to be grounded in the larger context of ancient views of femininity and masculinity. The present study looks at moral-philosophical sources in particular in order to bring a tighter focus on the gender issues inherent in these ancient debates about women's adornment.

¹² ὧν ἔστω οὐχ ὁ ἔξωθεν ἐμπλοκῆς τριχῶν καὶ περιθέσεως χρυσίων ἢ ἐνδύσεως ἱματίων κόσμος. For the possible literary relationships between these two NT passages, see Ulrike Wagner, *Die Ordnung des "Hauses Gottes": Der Ort von Frauen in der Ekklesiologie und Ethik der Pastoralbriefe* WUNT 2.65; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1994), 78–89; also, Annette Merz, *Die fiktive Selbstausslegung des Paulus: Intertextuelle Studien zur Intention und Rezeption der Pastoralbriefe* (NTOA/SUNT 52; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; Fribourg: Academic Press, 2004), 276, with n. 29. On the passage from 1 Pet 3, see David L. Balch, *Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter* (SBLMS; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1981), esp. ch. 6.

Hairstyle

Braided hair is specifically proscribed in *On the Harmony* as well as in both early Christian texts (1 Tim 2:9 and 1 Pet 3:3), and yet some braiding was evidently customary for a proper married woman. According to Charles H. Cosgrove, “The typical women’s style throughout many centuries was to wear their hair long but to bind it in some way so that it did not hang down loosely. Often this involved plaiting or braiding. Cloth bands, pins, and combs were used to restrain the hair in a chaste and often ornamental way.”¹³ Such a change of hairstyle (and clothing) marked the transition from single girl to married woman, and thus the presumed shift from sexual virginity to proper marital sex. Kelly Olson describes these expected changes in a matron’s appearance:

A married woman’s rank, status, and morality were ... supposed to be indicated by her dress: long tunic, *stola*, and *palla* or mantle, drawn over the head when the woman was out of doors, and hair bound with fillets [which are woolen hair bands].¹⁴

Having one’s hair tied up and “restrained” thus reveals a wife’s sexual self-restraint, and serves as a marker that she was bound in marriage to her husband alone.¹⁵

¹³ “A Woman’s Unbound Hair in the Greco-Roman World, with Special Reference to the Story of the ‘Sinful Woman’ in Luke 7:36–50,” *JBL* 124, no. 4 (2005): 675–92; here: 678. The social symbolism of women’s loosened hair arises in connection with interpreting the Lucan story of the woman who washes Jesus’ feet with her hair. Cosgrove concludes that a range of meanings for the act in Luke 7 can be drawn from the evidence: “When a woman wears her hair unbound/unbinds her hair, this can be a sexually suggestive act, an expression of religious devotion, a hairstyle for unmarried girls, a sign of mourning, a symbolic expression of distress or proleptic grief in the face of impending danger (and a way of pleading with or currying the favor of those in power, whether gods or men), a hairstyle associated with conjury, a means of presenting oneself in a natural state in religious initiations, and a precaution against carrying demons or foreign objects into the waters of baptism” (ibid., 691). The issue of proper women’s hairstyle appears in Paul’s discussion of veiling the female head in 1 Cor 11:2–16. In that section, he presumes that it is “natural” and to her glory for a woman to have long hair (γυνὴ δὲ ἐὰν κομᾷ δόξα αὐτῇ ἐστίν; ὅτι ἡ κόμη ἀντὶ περιβολαίου δέδοται αὐτῇ, 11:15), while the honorable hairstyle for a man is short hair (11:14).

¹⁴ Olson, *Dress and the Roman Woman*, 25. Olson’s work draws on both literary and artistic evidence from Roman Italy; while this cannot be assumed to represent fashions in the provinces, still Roman culture was spreading throughout the Empire (2). Olson presents fascinating information on hairbands and styles (36–40) and on dyes, curling, hairpieces, and ornaments (70–76). Cosgrove also notes that “Marriage required a change of hairstyle for women (not for men). Married women did up their hair with headbands, symbolizing the sexual unavailability of the matron to any man but her husband” (“A Woman’s Unbound Hair,” 682).

¹⁵ Sebasta describes the symbolic meaning of the woolen hairbands: “Just as the sacrificial woolen bands indicated that an animal was dedicated to the gods and was pure, so the matron’s bands both protected her from impurity and indicated her modesty” (“Symbolism in the Costume of the Roman Woman,” 49). However, in a more recent essay, Elaine Fantham examines the evidence for two kinds of women’s headbands (*vittae* and *infulae*) and determines that these items are not found on artistic representations of famous women like Livia (“Covering the Head at Rome: Ritual and Gender,” in *Roman Dress and the Fabrics of Roman Culture*, 166–67). Fantham suggests that most women of lower status “looked to Livia as an example, and took

Since all these texts already assume that every adult woman ought to be married, this type of "braiding"¹⁶ must signify more than the simple hair-binding expected for matrons, and should be read as in a parallel construction with the expensive clothing and jewelry that is also critiqued. Such a reading accords with social reality, since in order to exhibit elaborate hairstyles, a woman would require for a certain amount of time, money, and slave attendants. As Olson explains:

The complex hairdressing of the late first and second centuries ... would have been accessible only to the upper classes. The long commitment of time and the skilled *ornatrix* needed to produce such an ornate hairstyle would have marked the woman as a lady of standing, and was a sign of social rank and power By contrast, marble reliefs of lower-class women show far simpler hairstyles, usually with the hair drawn back and knotted into a simple bun¹⁷

In the texts under consideration, the critique of braided hair correlates with negative appraisals of displays of wealth by means of other consumer goods (e. g., costly jewelry, fashionable food and drink, flashy clothing, cosmetics that come from afar). Certainly, such disapproval of the hairstyles of rich women sustains the instructions about the correct management of one's treasures that are so prominent in 1 Timothy.¹⁸

Jewelry

Certain types of feminine jewelry crop up repeatedly in this literature, and almost always the first reference is to "gold" (χρυσόν) followed by one other item.

- *On the Harmony*: gold and precious stones from India or somewhere else;¹⁹
- *On the Moderation*: gold and emeralds;
- *Melissa to Kleareta*: gold and emerald;
- *Advice to the Bride and Groom*: gold, emerald, and scarlet;²⁰ also, pearls;
- *Oeconomicus*: necklaces of gilded wood (not necessarily gold);
- 1 Timothy 2: gold and pearls; and
- 1 Peter 3: gold ornaments (the plural χρυσίων).²¹

her practice as an excuse to avoid the inconvenient headbands that would cramp or spoil their hairstyles" (ibid., 168). Winter comments briefly on statue and coin representations of hairstyles on women in the imperial families (*Roman Wives*, 104).

¹⁶ Πλέξεται πολυτεχνίησι in *On the Harmony*; πλέγμασιν in 1 Tim 2:9; ἐμπλοκῆς in 1 Pet 3:3.

¹⁷ Olson, *Dress and the Roman Woman*, 71.

¹⁸ In addition to this reference in 2:9, see 3:3, 8; 5:3–4, 6, 8, 16, 17–18; 6:5–10, 17–19. See also Reggie M. Kidd, *Wealth and Beneficence in the Pastoral Epistles: A "Bourgeois" Form of Early Christianity?* (SBLDS 122. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990).

¹⁹ Olson observes: "The jewels and precious stones used in Roman jewelry came largely from India, Egypt, and Arabia ..." (*Dress and the Roman Woman*, 54).

²⁰ Unusually, Plutarch adds a third element which seems to refer to a berry used to produce a scarlet dye for clothing rather than an item of jewelry, οὔτε χρυσὸς οὔτε σμάραγδος οὔτε κόκκος (*Adv.* 141E).

²¹ The queen of Sheba arrived in Jerusalem with "very much gold and precious stones" (χρυσὸν πολὺν σφόδρα καὶ λίθον τίμιον, 1 Kgdms 10:2 LXX). The woman of Babylon wears

Plutarch twice disparages women who adorn themselves with pearls: "With most women, if you take away their gilded shoes and bracelets and anklets, their purple dresses and their pearls, they too will stay at home" (142C); and, "This rich woman's pearls, this foreigner's silks, cannot be acquired or worn save at a great price ..." (145E).²² His remarks on pearls corroborate the conclusion of Alexandra T. Croom that "Roman jewellery on the whole depended on colour rather than glitter for effect, so the most sought after and expensive jewellery was made from pearls rather than diamonds."²³ The allusions to pearls in *Advice*, 1 Timothy, and 1 Peter also signal the value assigned to these particular objects.

Plutarch expresses the cultural consensus that a woman who wore jewelry of any kind was interested in showing off her wealth. In 1 Timothy, a similar condemnation is directed at the wealthy widow: "the [widow] who lives luxuriously, although living, has already died" (ἡ δὲ σπαταλώσα ζῶσα τέθνηκεν, 5:6). This association of a woman's virtue with her riches supposedly bears moral implications not only for herself but also for her relationships to others. Roman women had the legal right to possess personal property, as evidenced in extant marriage contracts and divorce documents that list the wife's gold jewelry, along with valuable clothing, and silver drachmae.²⁴ Yet, as Olson observes:

similar jewelry: "gold and precious stones and pearls" (χρυσὴ καὶ λίθω τιμίω καὶ μαργαρίταις, Rev 17:4).

²² τῶν δὲ πλείστων γυναικῶν ἂν ὑποδήματα διάχρυσα περιέλις καὶ ψέλλια καὶ περισκελίδας καὶ πορφύραν καὶ μαργαρίτας, ἔνδον μένουσιν, and τοὺς μὲν γὰρ τῆσδε τῆς πλουσίας μαργαρίτας καὶ τὰ τῆσδε τῆς ξένης σηρικὰ λαβεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ περιθέσθαι μὴ πολλοῦ πριαμένην, (trans. Pomeroy, in *Plutarch's "Advice to the Bride and Groom" and "A Consolation to His Wife"*).

²³ *Roman Clothing*, 113 (with sources cited on 144). Pearls are also discussed briefly in Olson, *Dress and the Roman Woman*, 54–55. Ann M. Stout cites Pliny the Elder's description of the elaborate jewelry of Lollia Paulina (a wife of Caligula): she was "covered with emeralds and pearls which shone in alternate layers upon her head, in her hair, in her wreaths, in her ears, upon her neck, in her bracelets, and on her fingers" (*H. N.* 9.58; trans. Ann M. Stout, "Jewelry as a Symbol of Status in the Roman Empire," 77). Andrew Wallace-Hadrill describes how the fashion for pearls in particular, along with the trade in other "foreign" novelties, was decried by some, yet the appeal of such items continued (*Rome's Cultural Revolution* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008], 345–49). According to Pliny, luxury items were sought after as status symbols by persons of all ranks: "Now even poor women desire them, saying that a pearl is a woman's lector in public" (cited in *ibid.*, 349). Several sources are also cited in Winter, *Roman Wives*, 105–106.

²⁴ See these papyrus documents: *B. G. U.* 1052 and *B. G. U.* 1103 (both 13 B. C. E.); *P. Ryl.* 154 (66 C. E.); *P. Oxy.* 266 (96 C. E.); and *P. Oxy.* 1273 (260 C. E.). Texts in *Select Papyri: Private Affairs* (trans. Arthur S. Hunt and Campbell C. Edgar, vol 1, LCL; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932). See also *P. Eleph.* 1 (310 B. C. E.); *B. G. U.* 1050 (12–11 B. C. E.); and *P. Lips.* 27 (123 C. E.). Texts in P. W. Pestman, *The New Papyrological Primer*, (2nd ed.; Leiden; New York; Köln: E. J. Brill, 1994). Olson cites some bequests of jewelry made by women (*Dress and the Roman Woman*, 146, n. 6). D. Instone-Brewer has provided a collection of all published Greek, Roman and Jewish marriage and divorce contracts at his website: www.Instone-Brewer.com, and has analyzed these with reference to the New Testament in: "1 Corinthians 7 in Light of the Graeco-Roman Marriage and Divorce Papyri," *TynBul*, 52, no. 1 (2001): 101–116; and "1 Corinthians 7

Wealthy women, like wealthy freedmen, were an uncomfortable and daily reminder that wealth, status, and gender were not always in accord. Because of the fact that her social and economic power was immediately apparent, the bejeweled woman was sometimes derided in written sources as a locus of frivolity, greed, and unnatural femininity²⁵

A comparable attitude exists in the treatise *On the Moderation*, which articulates a direct social consequence of women wearing "gold and emeralds": this practice exhibits "much wealth and high arrogance towards the many ordinary women."²⁶ Simple adornment, on the other hand, is to be preferred because it "will not produce miserable jealousy in other women."²⁷

When a woman decorates her body with jewelry (among other items) she also arouses suspicions about her sexual behavior. *On the Harmony* bluntly states that such women "are prepared for error of every dishonor related to marriage beds and for other unjust acts." The woman who uses such things "seeks [masculine] admirers of womanly lack of self-control." The shine and glitter of jewelry was then, as it is now, a way of displaying the female body to its advantage.

Clothing

The sources describe certain kinds of extravagance in female clothing²⁸ which ought to be avoided:

in Light of the Jewish Greek and Aramaic Marriage and Divorce Papyri," *TynBul* 52, no. 2 [2001]: 225–43, which are linked to the website.

²⁵ Olson, *Dress and the Roman Woman*, 99.

²⁶ Πολυχρήματων καὶ ὑπεραφανίαν ἐμφαίνον ποττὰς δαμοτικές (Stob., *Anth.* 4.23.61a [W. H. 591]). The text continues with the paraenesis that "the well-legislated city ... must prohibit from the city even the artisans who craft such things," δεῖ δὲ τὴν εὐνομούμεναν πόλιν ... ἀπερύκεν δὲ καὶ δαμιοεργῶς ἐκ τὰς πόλιος τὼς ἐργαζομένως τὰ τοιαῦτα (ibid.). Wagener also briefly remarks on the Pythagorean sources treatment of the broader social implications of women's luxurious consumption (*Die Ordnung*, 89).

²⁷ ζᾶλον οὐκ ἐμποίησει μοχθηρὸν ταῖς ἄλλαις.

²⁸ This attire is usually called ἱματίων, a general term also used for male clothing. Only *Melissa to Kleareta* mentions a particular item of dress, the στολή: "But the adornment proper to the woman who is well pleasing to her very own [husband] is her way of life, and not her robes," τὰς δὲ ποθ' ἔνα τὸν ἴδιον εὐαρεστούσας γυναικὸς κόσμος ὁ τρόπος πέλει καὶ οὐχ αἱ στολαί. According to Sebastia among others, the "stola was the distinctive dress of the Roman wife ..." ("Symbolism in the Costume of the Roman Woman," 46), so it seems unusual that these sources do not otherwise mention it. Perhaps Olson's suggestion is relevant here: that the stola was viewed as the "ideal" apparel for a matron, perhaps used more prescriptively and ceremonially than in actuality (*Dress and the Roman Woman*, 40–41). The suggestion that the stola was not an everyday costume receives support from Wallace-Hadrill's comment on the *toga* as a national costume for Roman men: "... in practice Romans might wear different types of clothing for different occasions ..." (*Rome's Cultural Revolution*, 42). He also notes that *himation* is an all-purpose Greek word for a garment which the Romans equate with the Latin *pallium* (51). Romans contrasted the wearing of the Greek *himation* / *pallium* with wearing the *toga* as a way for a man to establish his authentically Roman identity (41–51; see also below, my discussion of the gendering of clothing).

- fabrics: transparent, embroidered, silken (*On the Moderation, Melissa to Kleareta, Advice*);
- colors: dyed with kochlos shells (*On the Harmony*); scarlet (*Advice*); purple (*Advice, Oeconomicus*); gold (*Melissa to Kleareta*);²⁹
- styles: “excessive” (*On the Moderation*); and
- cost: “expensive” (*On the Harmony, Melissa to Kleareta, Advice, 1 Timothy, 1 Peter*).³⁰

The careful reader will note a relative paucity of detail within the sources about the exact clothing styles that are prohibited. For example, we find nothing about neckline shapes, or pinching, layering, and pleating of fabrics, or decorations with beads and ribbons. Even morally-decent clothes are not carefully described. As *Melissa to Kleareta* states it: “So then, the *sōphrōn* and married woman must belong to her lawful husband, adorning herself with silence,³¹ and dressed in clothing that is whitened, clean and simple, but not very expensive or excessive.”³² Rather than defining proper clothing, the verses in 1 Timothy offer advice about metaphorical clothing, saying that women ought “to adorn themselves with modesty and moderation” (μετὰ αἰδοῦς καὶ σωφροσύνης κοσμεῖν ἑαυτάς, 2:9) and with “good works” (ἔργων ἀγαθῶν, 2:10). In addition, the external appearance of a woman in the ἐκκλησία should conform to the standard of learning in “silence and all subordination” (ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ ... ἐν πάσῃ ὑποταγῇ, 2:11).

²⁹ Olson discusses colors for women’s clothing, observing: “although women had a wide range of hues for their clothing, some authors did not consider purple seemly for women, probably because of the strong status implications involved ...” (*Dress and the Roman Woman*, 12).

³⁰ Similarly, Musonius Rufus describes a virtuous woman as one who practices philosophy and thus is “not lavish in expense, nor extravagant in dress,” μὴ πολυτελῆ, μὴ καλλωπίστριαν, *Fr. 3*, Cora Lutz, “Musonius Rufus: The Roman Socrates,” *Yale Classical Studies* 10 (1947): 3–147.

³¹ Note the parallel here with 1 Tim 2:11: “Let a woman learn in silence in all subordination.”

³² Χρῆ ὧν τὰν σώφρονα καὶ ἐλευθέραν τῷ κατὰ νόμον ἀνδρὶ ποτῆμεν ἀσυχίᾳ κεκαλλωπισμέναν, ἡμεν δὲ τῷ ἑσθᾶτι λευκοέιμονα καὶ καθάριον καὶ ἀφελῆ, ἀλλὰ μὴ πολυτελῆ καὶ περισσάν. The paraenesis for a wife’s clothing to be “whitened and clean and simple” is similar to the instruction given in *On the Moderation*: “It is necessary for [her clothing] to be whitened and uncomplicated and without excess,” δεῖ λευχείμονα εἶναι καὶ ἀπλοικὰν καὶ ἀπερίσσευτον, *Stob., Anth.* 4.23.61a (W.-H. 591.16); and further on she advises women to wrap their bodies in clothes, “that are moderate and white in color,” μετρίοις καὶ λευκοχρωμάτοις, *Stob., Anth.* 4.23.61a (W.-H. 592.3). Städele notes that λευκοέιμονα is a variant of λευχείμονα which is found in Pythagorean-Orphic texts (*Die Briefe*, 259), but white clothing in and of itself was not restricted to Pythagoreans or to women. Joan E. Taylor points to the significance of white clothing for festival and ritual occasions generally, and refers to Philo’s *Therapeutae*: “... white is the color of purity because it usually indicates that clothing was indeed newly laundered as well as bleached. ... While undyed wool and linen were common as clothing in antiquity, they were not generally considered ‘white’ unless they were specially treated and clean. It would mean also that you smelt good. ... Philo himself writes of the benefits of linen and associates it, ‘when carefully cleaned’, with a ‘very bright and luminous colour’ (*Somn.* 217). This would indicate that Philo had cleanness in mind also when he wrote of the Mareotic group wearing white” (*Jewish Women Philosophers of First-Century Alexandria: Philo’s “Therapeutae” Reconsidered* [New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003], 296–302).

The literature reveals a certain predictable consistency: the common denominator is to reject whatever is designed to draw attention to itself (and therefore, also to the woman's body). *On the Harmony* explicitly warns: "And to wear garments that *are very different* and that are embroidered from marine dye from kochlos shells, or some other very expensive color is great foolishness."³³ A few of the sources give an explicit reason why wives should eliminate such apparel: only sexually suspect women dress this way. *Melissa to Kleareta* opines, "for this stuff is useful for *hetairai* in their hunt for more men."³⁴ The texts warn that the very real consequence of wearing highly conspicuous clothes is that a woman's social reputation will be negatively affected. The outcome is that she will incite jealousy in other women, exhibit her own lack of self-control, and be mistaken as someone other than a faithful and modest wife. By means of such generalizations, each source conveys, in a tone of timeless, universal applicability, that feminine fashions may come and go, but the ideal of modest simplicity remains the same.

Gender and Personal Adornment

In this moral-philosophical literature, suitable adornment is considered almost exclusively as a female, and not a male, concern, which explains one curious aspect of this particular material on women's adornment: there are no corresponding paraenetic treatments for men.³⁵ This absence validates the impression that for both Greeks and Romans, clothing is essentially "feminine." Since, as Sue Blundell emphasizes "... the Greeks ... saw clothing as expressing some fundamental truths about women," adornment itself takes on a feminine quali-

³³ ἡμφιάσθαι δ'εἴματα ἀπεικότα λίην καὶ ποικίλα ἀπὸ θαλασσίης βάψιος τοῦ κόχλου ἢ ἄλλης χροῆς πολυτελέος μωρή πολλή, Stob., *Anth.* 4.27.19 (W.-H. 690). The participle ἀπεικότα comes from ἀπέοικα, meaning "different," "unnatural," "unreasonable," and "unfitted for," all with negative connotations; s. v. LSJ, ἀπέοικα.

³⁴ ταῖς ἐταῖραις γὰρ τάδε χρήσιμα ποττὰν τῶν πλεόνων θήραν, *Melissa to Kleareta*. See also the section of *On the Harmony* given at the beginning of the essay: "For the woman seeking these things, seeks admirers of womanly lack of self-control." What *hetairai* actually wore is not known. Olson discusses the evidence of the clothing of prostitutes and adulteresses, and summarizes: "Ancient authors from all periods and genres are adamant that whores and matrons were sartorially distinct and immediately distinguishable from one another ... [But] perhaps the visual markers of whores and matrons were not quite as clear-cut as most literary sources suggest" (*Dress and the Roman Woman*, 50–51). See also, Andrew Dalby, "Levels of Concealment: The Dress of *Hetairai* and *Pornai* in Greek Texts" in *Women's Dress in the Ancient Greek World*, 111–24; and Hans Herter (trans. by Linwood DeLong), "The Sociology of Prostitution in Antiquity in the Context of Pagan and Christian Writings," in *Sex and Difference in Ancient Greece and Rome* (eds. Mark Golden and Peter Toohey; Edinburgh Readings on the Ancient World; Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 57–113.

³⁵ In other sources, Romans in the late Republic and early Empire express concerns about male citizens wearing the toga properly when engaged in public speaking, so that they do not appear to be dressed in the Greek *pallium* (Wallace-Hadrill, *Rome's Cultural Revolution*, 41–51).

ty.³⁶ Therefore, the gender of the external female body corresponds to the gender of the clothing and, furthermore, signifies the internal moral condition of the female person. Thus, it is considered essentially “feminine” to attend to the adorning of one’s body, but there are both decent and indecent ways for women to perform this activity. As has already been shown, items of feminine apparel serve as indicators of a woman’s moral self-control primarily toward her wealth and her sexuality.

Because she has female gender, a woman’s moral nature is thought to be generally inferior to that of a man.³⁷ Therefore, the standards for feminine moral excellence are different from those for masculine virtue. For example, *On the Harmony* opines, “Some [virtues] are more proper for a man to train in and to possess, and some more for a woman. For brave deeds and practical wisdom are more proper for a man, both on account of the state of his body and on account

³⁶ “Clutching at Clothes,” in *Women’s Dress in the Ancient Greek World*, 143–69; here: 145–46. Blundell observes further: “... few people would have difficulty in agreeing that, as a generic item, clothing is much more associated with females than males, both in Greek literature and in Greek art; not the least because a high proportion of the men depicted in Greek art are nude. Most of us have grown up in cultures where concern with dress and appearance has been viewed as a quintessentially feminine trait ...” (145). She remarks too on the vivid imagery of the gift-giving of clothes and jewelry to the first woman Pandora (163, n. 9). From her examination of women’s adornment on Roman funerary art Leslie Shumka makes the interesting argument that “... self-presentation was an integral part of the literal and metaphorical construction of a feminine identity, and that the capacity to design and maintain a look, whether stylish or conservative, was one of the few ways in a patriarchal society which women had available to them of expressing themselves as women” (“Designing Women: The Representation of Women’s Toiletries on Funerary Monuments in Roman Italy,” in *Roman Dress and the Fabrics*, 173).

³⁷ Most ancient philosophers perceive a sex-based distinction between male and female moral capacity. For reasons of space, I cite only Aristotle: “All must participate in [the ethical virtues], but not in the same way, but as far as each has a particular employment. ... So that it is apparent that there is an ethical virtue for all who have been mentioned, and that the *sôphrosynê* of a woman is not the same as for a man, neither bravery or justice, as Socrates supposed, but there is the bravery of ruler and [courage of] subordinate, and it is likewise with the other [virtues]” (δεῖν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ’ ὅσον ἰκανὸν ἐκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον ... ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἔστιν ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς, οὐδ’ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρεία ἢ δ’ ὑπηρετική, ὁμοίως δ’ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας, *Pol.* 1.1260a). Thus, women can and must exhibit moral virtue, but in a different manner than men do, because of their subordinated position in social relationships. This conclusion is not uncommon in a wide range of philosophical texts. This opinion continues to be affirmed by Clement of Alexandria: “Then we do not say that the nature of the female is the same as the male, insofar as it is female; for at any rate it is proper for there to exist some difference between each of them ... if there were no difference between man and woman, each of them would do and experience the same things. ... but since there is a difference, according to the distinctive property of the body, she is [destined] for pregnancy and housekeeping,” τὸ μὲν τοίνυν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φύσιν τοῦ θήλεος πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν, καθὼ θηλυ ἔστιν, οὐ φαμέν. πάντως γὰρ τινα καὶ διαφορὰν ὑπάρχειν προσήκειν ἐκατέρῳ τούτων, ... εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἦν τὸ διάφορον ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν ἔδρα τε καὶ ἔπασχεν ... ἥ δὲ διάφορον, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ιδιότητα, ἐπὶ τὰς κυήσεις καὶ τὴν οἰκουρίαν, *Strom.* 4.8.59–60.

of the power of his soul, but moderation is more [proper] for the woman."³⁸ In fact, a woman is not expected to train herself to virtue as a man would; there are different obligations for the female sex. In addition to the appropriate fulfillment of women's domestic roles (wife, mother, and household manager), she must pay careful attention to the ways she adorns her body to be seen by others.

The view of the philosophical sources is that the weaker female self desires a variety of stuffs, being attracted to diverse colors, extraordinary styles, unusual provenance, and tending toward the flaunting of these items upon the body. In *On the Harmony*, these are summed up as "the things that women wear" (τὰ φορέουσι γυναῖκες). It is thought to be typical that any immature female would at first crave such consumer goods. Yet this fundamental state of the female is at odds with what "Nature" itself approves. *On the Harmony* asserts that a woman "must train her body to a *natural* [φύσιος] measure of provision." Such gender-specific moral training for a woman entails exercising self-discipline over her fashion choices, since her internal character is exhibited by her external appearance. Therefore, a woman ought to be virtuous from the inside out: her core inner female self wears a physically female body, which is itself dressed in morally-appropriate *feminine* clothing.

Moreover, because the female body is sexually attractive, it must be covered up in some fashion in order to camouflage its allure. *Melissa to Kleareta* comments on the bodily appearance of a good wife: "For the fair form of the wife ought to be seen by her own husband, but not by her neighbors."³⁹ The way a woman dresses demonstrates her awareness of how her body might be construed as a sexual object. Flashy clothes and jewels, elaborate hairstyles and cosmetics, and aromatic perfumes convey a message of sexual availability and even a passionate disposition, while plain white fabrics, a natural complexion, and simple hair connote marital fidelity and moderation of desires.⁴⁰

Although features of the physical body of a Roman male (vocal quality, gestures, gait and physical demeanor) likewise exhibit his honorable manliness,

³⁸ *On the Moderation*, Stob., *Anth.* 4.23.61 (W.H. 589–590). The differences between male and female attainment of virtues are also discussed in the *Oeconomicus* 7.10–43, and *Fr.* 3 of Musonius Rufus.

³⁹ εὐμορφον γὰρ ἐλευθέραν ἰδέσθαι τῷ αὐτῶς ἀνδρί, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς πλασίον.

⁴⁰ Mireille Lee's description of a woman's *peplos* in artistic representations suggests similar ideas: "The *peplos* is usually depicted as made of a heavy material, presumably wool, that obstructs the contours of the body, especially the sexual organs. ... The heavy drapery envelops and conceals the 'lustful, irrational, immoderate' female body, effectively negating feminine sexuality" ("Constru(ct)ing Gender in the Feminine Greek *Peplos*," in *The Clothed Body in the Ancient World*, 60–62). However, studies of attitudes toward women's clothing also suggest that "clothing in general ... is more sexually alluring than nakedness, because in concealing the body it excites curiosity and a desire to remove the wrappings which shield the body from view. If the clothing is diaphanous or very close-fitting these acts of covering and revealing are performed simultaneously, and the sexual content of the message becomes all the more explicit" (Blundell, "Clutching at Clothes," 143).

the sources under investigation are by and large silent about the proper adornment for men.⁴¹ Plutarch briefly advises the husband to abstain from the use of perfumes,⁴² but the rest of his instructions on clothing are directed to the wife. In the New Testament, while 1 Timothy and 1 Peter specify apparel for women, their advice to men avoids that topic.⁴³ In the field of physiognomics, the focus is not on what is *put on* the male body, but rather more often on masculine *deportment*, what Maud Gleason calls “the smooth-flowing cultural reproduction of the patterns of speech, thought, and movement appropriate to a gentleman.”⁴⁴ Perhaps this concentration on demeanor reflects a more Roman perspective on men’s clothing, in which much attention is paid to the *toga* and its particular draping,⁴⁵ but not to other elements of masculine apparel.

⁴¹ Several later Christian authors take up the topic of male adornment (e.g., Tertullian, Clement, Jerome, and John Chrysostom) who are mentioned below.

⁴² “Cats, we are told, are disturbed and maddened by the smell of perfume. Now if it were the case that women were made wild and distraught in the same way, if would be a dreadful thing if men did not abstain from using perfume, but let their wives suffer for the sake of their own momentary pleasure,” εἰ καθάπερ τὸν αἴλουρον ὁσμὴ μύρων ἐκταράττεσθαι καὶ μαίνεσθαι λέγουσιν, οὕτω τὰς γυναῖκας ἀγριαίνειν καὶ παραφρονεῖν ὑπὸ μύρων συνέβαινε, δεινὸν ἦν μὴ ἀπέχεσθαι μύρου τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἀλλὰ διήδονήν αὐτῶν βραχεῖαν οὕτω κακοιμένης περιορᾶν (*Adv.* 144C-D; trans. Pomeroy). Plutarch has already made a direct link between the man’s approach to his body and the wife’s tendency toward adornments: “a husband who loves the body produces a wife who adorns her person,” ἀνὴρ φιλοσώματος καλλωπίστριαν γυναῖκα ποιεῖ (*Adv.* 140C; trans. Pomeroy).

⁴³ One prescription for male deportment is given in 1 Tim: “Therefore I wish that in every place the men should pray, lifting up holy hands without anger or argument” (βούλομαι οὖν προσεύχεσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ, ἐπαίροντας ὁσίους χεῖρας χωρὶς ὀργῆς καὶ διαλογισμοῦ, 2:8). Men’s ritual headcoverings are addressed by Paul in 1 Cor: “Every man who prays or prophesies with something on his head disgraces his head” (πᾶς ἀνὴρ προσευχόμενος ἢ προφητεύων κατὰ κεφαλῆς ἔχων καταισχύνει τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ, 11:4) along with male hairstyle: “Does not nature itself teach you that if a man wears long hair, it is degrading to him ...” (οὐδὲ ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ διδάσκει ὑμᾶς ὅτι ἀνὴρ μὲν ἐὰν κομᾷ ἀτιμία αὐτῷ ἐστίν, 11:14). Much more detailed instructions about adornment for Christian men are given by Clement of Alexandria (*Paid.* 2.8 [ointments]; 2.11 [expensive clothes]; 3.3 [various embellishments]; 3.11 [hair]) and Tertullian (*De Pallio* and *De Cultu Feminarum* 2.8).

⁴⁴ *Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), xxiv. Gleason summarizes: “among the educated upper classes of the empire, a masculine identity was an achieved state. It took years of training to perfect one’s public demeanor” (159).

⁴⁵ As Wallace-Hadrill notes, “The *toga* has an intimate symbolic link with the sense of Roman identity because of its explicit use as a marker of Roman citizenship” (*Rome’s Cultural Revolution*, 41; see also the rest of his argument in ch. 2 “Dress, language and identity”). Thus, many of Quintilian’s instructions about dressing in a *toga* are intended to distinguish Roman customs from Greek practices, he also states that draping a *toga* improperly could make one appear too womanly; a rhetor needs to avoid “the foppish and effeminate gesture of throwing the bottom fold over your tight shoulder” (47). He continues: “The mirror image of the idea that Roman citizens ought to wear the *toga* is the enforcement of the rule that those who were not citizens were banned from wearing it” (42). Needless to say, Roman citizenship, and thus the wearing of the *toga*, was not extended to women of any status, so that *toga* propriety is known to be a masculine endeavor. Although Wallace-Hadrill does not draw much explicit attention to the

One central way that Roman culture delineates masculinity is by deliberating on "what it is not ... rather than on what it actually is. ..." which means that "[this] *subject* of anthropological description [i.e., masculinity] constructs itself by way of its *objects* (deviant males, women, barbarians, or animals)."⁴⁶ The following almost-circular logic sets out why ideal men should not be obsessed with the dressing of their bodies:

- a man is masculine if he is not feminine (the masculine subject is defined as *not* like the feminine object);
- a man who is overly concerned with "women's things" such as dress is effeminate;
- therefore, a masculine man will not to be interested in feminine pursuits like bodily adornment.

Accordingly, men "... were not supposed to take much of an interest in their clothing; so that those who were noted for wearing fine garments were liable to gain reputations for being both womanizers and womanized."⁴⁷ As an unex-

role of gender in demonstrating who is a true Roman, the attempts of Quintilian and others to differentiate Roman male citizens from both Greeks and women supports the argument that both social groups were used as contrary examples to authentic Roman men. Emma Dench also examines Roman physiognomic theories of how clothing and "culture" (one's ethnic heritage) reveal one's real (masculine) identity; feminine adornment is not much addressed by Dench, who focuses instead on the *toga* (*Romulus' Asylum: Roman Identities from the Age of Alexander to the Age of Hadrian* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005], 264–79).

⁴⁶ Maria Michela Sassi, *The Science of Man in Ancient Greece* (trans. Paul Tucker; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), xiii; her italics). She provides analyses of the perceptions of women and femininity in ancient medical and physiognomic texts in that same volume (esp. ch. 3, "Reality and its Classifications: Women and Barbarians").

The perceived gender difference does not necessarily mean that man and woman were thought of as truly "opposite," although the Pythagorean series of pairs of opposites did include "male and female" (ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ, Aristotle, *Metaph.* I.986a). Other sources viewed the female person as a "defective male." Diana M. Swancutt asserts: "Pre-modern Westerners ranked bodies on a hierarchical gender spectrum of relative physical perfection (masculinity); relegated females, as the most imperfect male-bodies, to the bottom of that spectrum; and recognized the existence of 'middling' androgynous bodies that possessed masculine and less-perfectly masculine (that is, feminine) physical attributes" ("*Still Before Sexuality: 'Greek' Androgyny, the Roman Imperial Politics of Masculinity and the Roman Invention of the Tribas*," in *Mapping Gender in Ancient Religious Discourses* [eds. Todd Penner and Caroline Vander Stichele; Boston: Brill, 2007], 18–19).

⁴⁷ Blundell, "Clutching at Clothes," 145–46. In archaic Greece, men were of course obliged to dress appropriately for rituals, for military exploits, and for physical exertions. Karen Bassi's study concludes that "Military dress (like male nudity) is a principle signifier of Greek masculinity and the model against which all male attire is judged" (*Acting Like Men: Gender, Drama, and Nostalgia in Ancient Greece* [Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999], 104–105). Bassi continues: "Ostentatious clothing, with its attendant gender-, ethnic-, and class-specific connotations, distinguishes men lacking in martial valor from men whose bravery and toughness mark them as ideal males. To put the matter more succinctly, men who do not conform to the Greek ideal dress like *women* or foreigners" (105; my italics). This position on men's relationship to adornment persists into the period of the Roman Republic and Empire. Julia Heskell analyzes Cicero's criticism of several men, including (1) the Greek clothing (and poor behavior) of C. Verres; (2) the lower-status clothing of M. Antonius; and (3) the cross-dressing of

pected result, with ideal masculinity being defined over and against ideal femininity, the moral teachings about women's apparel also double as a message to the male audience.⁴⁸ Adornment which is deemed unsuitable for women is even more unseemly for men, and males who adopt these fashions run the risk of being branded as effeminate.⁴⁹ While a woman's virtue might be questioned with regard to her adornment, a man's very masculinity is at stake if he expresses a fascination with such feminine things. Thus, the man who attends to the advice for women will not only be able to instruct the women in his sphere of influence about their clothing; he will also recognize that, if he wants to be seen as truly masculine, he absolutely cannot spend excessive time, energy, and money on adorning his own body.

The Perspective of 1 Timothy

The post-Pauline author of 1 Timothy makes use of three material feminine adornments, and, like several of the other sources, allows these to stand as an ἐπιτομή of the topos, evoking the remaining elements in absentia. Furthermore, as has already been shown, he is in agreement with the notion that when a woman embellishes her body with braided hair, jewelry, and exceptional clothing she is indecently displaying her possessions. However, near the end of the letter the

Publius Clodius ("Cicero as Evidence for Attitudes to Dress in the Late Republic," in *The World of Roman Costume*, 133–45). Clodius is accused of effeminacy: "Only you indeed are merry, elegant, and urbane, for whom womanly clothing and the gait of a lutist is suitable, you who can make yourself look like a woman, make your voice higher, and make your body smoother" (cited in *ibid.*, 140). Of course, emperors and other males of high status needed to preserve their reputations by dressing appropriately: "Ideally, emperors should practice restraint in all areas of life, including dress, personal appearance and behavior" (Mary Harlow, "Dress in the *Historia Augusta*," in *The Clothed Body in the Ancient World*, 145).

⁴⁸ It is helpful to remember that "audience" can be taken literally as "auditors" given the ancient practice of reading texts aloud. See my discussion of the composition of the audience for the Pythagorean and Pastoral letters in my dissertation "Philosophers of the Household," 59–64 and 306–310, respectively.

I recently discovered that this very point about a "co-educational" audience has also been made by Aideen M. Hartney in her study of John Chrysostom's preaching on women's adornment. She observes: "... words ostensibly addressed to women could in fact contain oblique messages directed at a male audience or readership. Thus, attending to the words of Christian leaders and learning what behavior was unacceptable from women, the male inhabitants of late antique society were made aware of the standards of behavior expected of them, and which they dare not sink below lest they be accused of effeminacy or emasculation" ("Dedicated Followers of Fashion: John Chrysostom on Female Dress," in *Women's Dress in the Ancient Greek World*, 244).

⁴⁹ This judgment is made explicitly by Tertullian (*De Pallio* 4) and Clement of Alexandria. The latter strongly warns that "inclining to voluptuousness, [such men] become effeminate, cutting their hair in an ungentlemanlike and vulgar way, clothed in fine and transparent garments, chewing mastic, smelling of perfume. What can one say on seeing them? ... he will divine them to be adulterers and effeminate" (*Paid.* 3.3).

author's teachings about wealth are not phrased in a gender-differentiated fashion. He warns of the negative consequences that will result for all – apparently for both men and women – who seek riches: they will “fall into temptation and traps and many senseless and harmful desires which plunge people into ruin and destruction.”⁵⁰ He perceives the desire for extravagant apparel as a way for any person to seek to acquire wealth, status, recognition, and security. And yet, avoiding fineries is a particular instruction directed to the women in his audience, and one that is justified by appeals to their faithful service to God: they should adorn themselves instead “with good works, as is fitting for women who profess godly piety.”⁵¹ The types of feminine “good works” are probably explicated further in 5:10, where the enrollment requirements for widows state: “[she ought to be] attested in good works, if she raised children, if she showed hospitality, if she washed the feet of the saints, if she helped the afflicted, if she devoted herself to every good work.”⁵² The linking of a woman's adornment to her manifestation of religious piety is 1 Timothy's permutation of the moral virtue trope. While the treatises *On the Harmony* and *On the Moderation* along with Plutarch's *Advice* advise a woman how to properly worship the gods, they do not associate this directly with her adornment.

This emphasis on “good works” as an identifiable category of adornment is distinct from the moral advice in the non-Christian literature. Certainly, the other texts impose particular duties which are gender-appropriate for women, especially activities within the household, but these are not described as articles of apparel. There might even seem to be a parallel with *On the Harmony*, which uses the term “good works” (ἔργματα καλά). But in the latter source, the “good works” are the promised rewards resulting from a woman's harmonious deportment, and not the instruments by which a woman might metaphorically clothe herself: “For from these things [i. e., the four cardinal virtues and her self-sufficiency] *good works come to a woman*, to herself and her husband and children and household, and perhaps to her city, that is, if such a woman governs cities or peoples as we see with kingdoms.”⁵³ The Paulinist author of 1 Timothy expands the concept of physical adornment beyond tangible items, even beyond the “silence” that *Melissa to Kleareta* proposes as an appropriate feminine adornment, to include other behaviors that the female body might “wear” as its moral attire.

The author's idea of indecent adornment has a sexual connotation, as may be found in his twice-repeated recommendation for a woman to acquire “mod-

⁵⁰ ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς πειρασμὸν καὶ παγίδα καὶ ἐπιθυμίας πολλὰς ἀνοήτους καὶ βλαβεράς, αἵτινες βυθίζουσιν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰς ὄλεθρον καὶ ἀπώλειαν, 1 Tim 6:9. See also 6:3–5, 17.

⁵¹ ὁ πρέπει γυναῖξιν ἐπαγγελλομέναις θεοσεβείαν, δι' ἔργων ἀγαθῶν, 2:10.

⁵² ἐν ἔργοις καλοῖς μαρτυρουμένη, εἰ ἐτεκνοτρόφησεν, εἰ ἐξενοδόχησεν, εἰ ἀγίων πόδας ἐνίψεν, εἰ θλιβομένοις ἐπήκεσεν, εἰ παντὶ ἔργῳ ἀγαθῷ ἐπηκολούθησεν.

⁵³ ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἔργματα καλά γίνεται γυναικὶ ἐς αὐτὴν τε καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ τέκεια καὶ οἶκον· πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πόλει, εἴ γε πόλις ἢ ἔθνεα ἢ τοίηδε κρατύνει, ὥς ἐπὶ βασιλείᾳ ὀρέομεν, Stob., *Anth.* 4.27.19 (W.-H. 689.1–4).

eration" (σωφροσύνη, 2:9, 15). Since the word *sōphrosynē* forms an *inclusio* for the instructions contained in this passage, the conduct prescribed for believing women serves to exhibit this peculiarly feminine virtue.⁵⁴ This would be consistent with the thesis of *On the Moderation*, which links a woman's *sōphrosynē* inseparably to both her marital fidelity and modest adornment:

Therefore, a woman who is being educated must gain knowledge about *sōphrosynē*: from how many and what kinds of things does this good come to [maturity in] a woman. So then I say [it comes] from these five [practices]: first, from the sanctity and piety with respect to the marriage bed; second, from the adornment of her body ...⁵⁵

Here and in *Melissa to Kleareta*, *sōphrosynē* for a woman is a sexualized virtue, referring to her ability to maintain self-control of her bodily desires by practicing faithfulness within marriage, and to demonstrate that characteristic by means of her choice of apparel. So too in 1 Tim 2:9–15, this moral quality comes into view – quite literally – in a woman's modest adornment of her body.

Moreover, the author reveals his opinion that women especially need sexual restraint when he employs the powerful immoral example of Eve (2:13–14). First, he contends that Eve is a secondary creature, and therefore “naturally” inferior and subordinate to the man. It is this gender-based weakness that leads to long distress for the whole human race, for in the author's opinion “Adam was not deceived, but the woman, having been thoroughly deceived, has been in transgression” (2:14). Not only was “the woman,” as he calls her in that verse,

⁵⁴ As early as 1966, Helen North traced the varied demonstrations and discussions of *sōphrosynē* through Greek (and some Latin) literature. Yet in a footnote on her first page she shares a conclusion which supports a gender-specific perspective on this virtue: “*Feminine sophrosyne* (chastity, modesty, obedience, inconspicuous behavior) remains the same throughout Greek history” (North, *Sophrosyne*, 1, n. 2; my italics). I would observe that although North claims that women's *sōphrosynē* supposedly “remains the same,” she nonetheless has offered four different definitions to delineate its boundaries. I have investigated the indissoluble link between *sōphrosynē* and marital fidelity at greater length in both my dissertation and in an essay, “*Sōphrosynē* for Women in Pythagorean Texts,” in *Women and Gender in Ancient Religions: Interdisciplinary Approaches* (eds., Stephen P. Ahearne-Kroll, Paul A. Holloway and James A. Kelhoffer; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 368–88.

In the Pastorals overall, *sōphrosynē* for men does connote sexual self-control, but also has other meanings of mental health and moderate living. The author may show some vague concern about men's “lust” in three vice lists: the “sexually immoral,” πόρνοις, 1 Tim 1:9–10; “lovers of pleasure,” φιλήδονοι, 2 Tim 4:4; and those “enslaved to various desires and pleasures,” δουλεύοντες ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἡδοναῖς ποικίλαις, Titus 3:3. (Of course, any of these Greek terms might refer to both men and women.) There is also a hint of a connection between false teaching and corrupting seduction in 2 Tim 3:6. But the author most often identifies masculine immorality as improper speech-acts, and his opponents as those who are involved not in sexual immorality, but in sins of speaking and/or teaching wrongly (1 Tim 1:3–7, 18–20; 4:1–3; 6:3–5; 2 Tim 2:14, 16–18, 23–26; 3:6–7, 13; 4:3–4; Titus 1:10–14; 3:9–11). In fact, some (male?) opponents evidently advocate sexual celibacy, since they “forbid marrying,” κωλύοντων γαμεῖν (1 Tim 4:3).

⁵⁵ διὸ δεῖ περὶ σωφροσύνας παιδευομένην γνωρίζειν, ἐκ πόσων τινῶν καὶ ποίων τοῦτο τάγαθὸν τῇ γυναικὶ παραγίνεται. φαμί δὴ ἐκ πέντε τούτων· πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰν εὐναν οἰσιότατος τε καὶ εὐσεβείας· δεύτερον δὲ ἐκ τῷ κόσμῳ τῷ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ... Stob., *Anth.* 4.23.61 (W.-H. 590).

supposedly more susceptible to temptation, but 1 Timothy echoes Hellenistic Jewish interpretations of Gen 3 that viewed Eve's temptation within a sexualized context.⁵⁶ Subsequently, Eve's gender inferiority, subordination, deception, and transgression have been transmitted to all women, who in essence become her true daughters and thus subject to all her hereditary female weaknesses. In sum, the author believes: (1) that women are secondary to men, both in creation as well as in the present reality of his audience; (2) that female nature is more susceptible to sexual trespassing; and (3) that gender-specific teachings about their adornment are necessary in order for believing women to learn how to attain salvation. His use of an example from Jewish scriptures is distinctive, but it conveniently supports the broad agreement about women's moral inferiority found in the other texts.

In general, what Christian women ought to "put on" is not depicted as morally-correct clothing as in *Melissa to Kleareta, On the Harmony, On the Moderation, Advice, and Oeconomicus*. Nor is modest adornment called "natural," as in *On the Harmony*, although the author's appeal to Eve and Adam leads to the idea that "male" and "female" are fundamentally God-created, and thus the essence of gender is built into the human race. Instead, Christian women must adopt attitudes and behaviors that can be visibly and audibly monitored: the "good works" of silence, subordination to husbands, sexual faithfulness within marriage, childbearing, and household management. Of course, even these "good works" are quite similar to the manifestations of moral virtue urged upon women in the non-Christian texts. In those sources, a truly "good" woman, one who is ἀγαθή and/or καλή, likewise conducts herself in an appropriately modest fashion within her domestic arena. Consequently, even the "good works" of 1 Tim ought to be recognized as "feminine," since the three female domestic roles of wife, mother, and mistress of the household are separate from, and yet precisely mirror those of men (husband, father, master) prescribed in other sources.⁵⁷ Thus, the Christian woman's body must be observably engaged in morally-appropriate feminine behavior.

In addition, both 1 Tim 2:9–15 and 1 Pet 3:3–4 demonstrate some distance from the Pauline metaphor of "taking off" the old human being, and "putting on" Christ or the new human being.⁵⁸ For example, in Romans Paul commands:

⁵⁶ Wagener traces this thinking from the Hebrew Bible, through the LXX, the *Apocalypse of Moses*, rabbinic texts, and Paul's use of the story in 2 Cor 11:3 (*Die Ordnung*, 105–06). She links the notion that women are easily sexually tempted (as well as erotically *tempting*) to the teaching on modest adornment in 1 Tim 2:9–10 (*ibid.*, 110).

⁵⁷ On the moral teachings for men vis-à-vis their households, see again, Balch, *Let Wives Be Submissive*. Xenophon's description of how the young wife ought to act within the household shows how her role is distinct from her husband's, *Oec.*, 7–10.

⁵⁸ Nils A. Dahl and David Hellholm find this idea in Rom 8:29; 13:14; 1 Cor 15:42–49; Gal 3:27; Eph 4:22, 24; Phil 3:21; Col 3:9f, among others ("Garment-Metaphors: The Old and the New Human Being," in *Antiquity and Humanity: Essays on Ancient Religion and Philosophy*,

“then let us lay aside the works of darkness and let us put on [ἐνδυσώμεθα] the arms of light ... Rather, put on [ἐνδύσασθε] the Lord Jesus Christ, and give no thought to the flesh to gratify its desire.”⁵⁹ While Paul recognizes that denying the desires of human flesh is part of the process of donning spiritual clothing, still he applies the metaphor to both male and female believers.⁶⁰ Alternatively, 1 Timothy and 1 Peter promote the practice of being appropriately clothed for women only, and thus shift the metaphor back toward a more concrete reality. Since making choices about hairstyles, jewelry, and other items of apparel becomes an exercise in moral development for believing women, but is not a concern explicitly raised for the men, we may reasonably suppose that these authors also presume that clothing itself is “feminine.”⁶¹ Paul may very well have shared the cultural perspective of 1 Timothy regarding women’s adornment, but, with the exception of his discussion of ritual head coverings in 1 Cor 11:2–16, he did not inscribe such teachings in his extant letters. Now, sometime in the generation or two after Paul, women are told to “take off” specific articles of clothing in order to demonstrate their faith by means of the proper presentation of their bodies. In 1 Timothy, Paul’s moving images of putting on Christ at baptism and dressing in the whole armor of God have been set aside by a creative employment of philosophical advice sustained by theological justifications.

The author of 1 Timothy adopts ancient opinions about gender, in particular about women – their nature, their conduct, their morality, which he perceives to be revealed by their adornment – and integrates these with his distinctive theological reflections on Jewish scripture and Pauline traditions in order to apply them to what he constructs as the realities of the believing communities. While his is the earliest extant Christian text to delineate proper adornment for women, it is certainly not the last. About a century later, both Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian take up the topic of feminine apparel, covering the same elements that are treated in the paraenetic sources examined in this study.⁶² For all of these an-

Presented to Hans Dieter Betz on His 70th Birthday [eds. Adela Yarbro Collins and Margaret M. Mitchell; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2001]: 139–58; here: 144–57).

⁵⁹ ἀποθώμεθα οὖν τὰ ἔργα τοῦ σκότους, ἐνδυσώμεθα δὲ τὰ ὅπλα τοῦ φωτός ... ἀλλὰ ἐνδύσασθε τὸν κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν καὶ τῆς σαρκὸς πρόνοιαν μὴ ποιήσθε εἰς ἐπιθυμίας, Rom 13:12, 14.

⁶⁰ This includes the military image of putting on “the whole armor of God” in Eph 6:10–17; cf. 1 Thess 5:8. Similarly, the baptismal reference in Gal 3:27–28 includes both sexes: “For as many of you as were baptized into Christ, have put on [ἐνεδύσασθε] Christ; there is not Jew or Greek, there is not slave or free, there is not male and female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus.”

⁶¹ Granted, 1 Tim does not warn men away from effeminate clothing practices; however, see the next note.

⁶² They offer much more extensive instructions on Christian women’s hair dressing, jewelry, clothing styles, perfumes, and cosmetics, while severely criticizing Christian men’s preoccupation with such things as “effeminate.” Clement’s teachings on the topic are found in *Paidagogos* 2.11 (clothing); 2.12 (shoes); 2.13 (jewelry); 3.1 (true beauty); 3.3 (men’s “embellishment”); 3.5 (behavior in the baths); 3.11 (clothes, earrings, rings, hair, make-up, and a smattering of other issues). Clearly he has read 1 Tim 2:9 since he quotes it as scriptural support for his rejection

cient thinkers, the adorning of a woman's body raises moral concerns because the female gender has a propensity for obtaining and displaying ornamental goods, it radiates sexual attractiveness and desires, and it possesses a capacity for virtue that is inferior to that of males.

How, then, should a virtuous Christian woman clothe herself? According to 1 Timothy, she must renounce her greedy desires for amusing baubles and trendy fashions that so appeal to her feminine nature. As a daughter of Eve, she must play down the female attributes of her body by avoiding the flashy ornamentation that would draw seductive attention to herself. The external minimizing of her physical features manifests her primary internal virtue of sexual restraint, a feminine *sôphrosynê* that signifies primarily her faithfulness to her husband. Furthermore, a Christian woman must figuratively adorn herself with the feminine good works specifically commanded for her: fulfillment of the domestic roles of wife, mother, and household manager; silent, subordinated learning in the assembly; participation in prayers; and other helpful ministrations to the saints. The entire self of a faithful woman is female through and through, with feminine good works and modest apparel being superimposed on her physical body which in turn overlies her inner nature. As the author of 1 Timothy adapts Pauline thought for his time and place, he takes up the moral-philosophical advice for women's adornment and synthesizes it with Paul's metaphors for dressing the new person "in Christ." For a female believer, the symbolic has become literal, so that the clothing of her physical body signifies both her pious faith toward God as well as her sexual faithfulness toward her own husband. That is why, for the author of 1 Timothy, such adornment is truly the height of fashion for virtuous Christian women.

of women's earrings (*Paid.* 2.13) and of facial make-up (*Paid.* 3.11). Tertullian's discourses on adornment include: *De pallia*, *De fultu Feminarum*, and *De virginibus velandis*. He quotes 1 Tim 2:11–12 as substantiation for the veiling of virgins. John Chrysostom and Jerome similarly teach about the proper apparel for Christian women. See John Chrysostom, *Hom. 1 Tim.* 8, 9; also, Hartney, "Dedicated Followers of Fashion;" and Herter, "The Sociology of Prostitution," esp. 83–98 on the clothing of *hetairai* as the opposite of decent female adornment.

Torture and Identity: Paganism, Christianity, and Beyond¹

David Konstan

Was the conception of the self in classical antiquity significantly different from the modern notion – assuming there was, or is, a single or predominant idea of the self, then or now? The question has been the subject of a number of recently published books which have made important contributions to our understanding of the issues at stake.² Nevertheless, the criteria that might distinguish the classical from the modern conception remain difficult to pin down. I have been looking for ways to make the differences more visible and have opted for what one might call the *via negativa*, seeking out not so much the contrasts between the positive views on the soul or body expressed in ancient and modern sources, but rather certain absences or gaps – aspects of the self that seem obvious today but which the ancients apparently failed to consider – and what these lacunae may reveal about the classical view and our own. Needless to say, this is a risky procedure: to falsify the claim that something does not exist in a given time and place, it suffices to produce a single instance to the contrary. The present paper

¹ An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference, “The Small World of Late Antiquity: Exploring Scholarly Cultures and Personal Networks in the Eastern Mediterranean of the Fourth to Sixth Centuries,” held at the University of Uppsala on May 21–22, 2010. I wish to thank the participants in the conference for their helpful comments and Denis Searby for organizing and hosting the event. I am grateful as well to the editors of this volume for their many helpful suggestions.

² See, for example, Richard Sorabji, *Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Shadi Bartsch, *The Mirror of the Self: Sexuality, Self-Knowledge, and The Gaze in the Early Roman Empire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Vincent Farenga, *Citizen and Self in Ancient Greece: Individuals Performing Justice and the Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Chiara Thumiger, *Hidden Paths: Self and Characterization in Greek Tragedy: Euripides' Bacchae* (BICS Supplement 99; London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2007); Pauliina Remes and Juha Sihvola, eds., *Ancient Philosophy of the Self* (New York: Springer Verlag, 2008); Shadi Bartsch and David Wray, eds., *Seneca and the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). On the self in Saint Paul, see J. Albert Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament: Literary, Social, and Moral Dimensions* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), 17–33, who notes in particular Paul’s adoption of the slave persona in Rom 7:22–23. For a couple of recent accounts, see Barry Dainton, *The Phenomenal Self* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), who affirms the phenomenological continuity of the self; Galen Strawson, *Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), who sees the self as “an inner conscious presence.” Both views raise perhaps more problems than they solve.

is something of an experiment or test trench, as the archaeologists say, and the reader is hereby invited to find counter-examples.

One of the practices that has often been interpreted as aiming at the annihilation of the self is torture, and it is accordingly a promising place to look for ways in which the self may have been conceived, especially since torture was widespread in antiquity and has by no means disappeared in the modern world. In brief, my argument is that one kind of torture, or rather, one of the purposes to which torture has been applied, in modern times had no counterpart in the classical and early Christian world. More specifically, torture was not employed for the sake of what is today called “brainwashing,” and would not begin to be used to this effect until much later, perhaps as late as the eighteenth century. This absence – if indeed the evidence bears out the claim – points, I believe, to a difference, if not in the construction of the self as such, a matter that is difficult to assess for any age, including our own, then at all events in the way the self was and is understood – a distinction that has had consequences both ideological and practical.

Prudentius’ Peristephanon

The last of the fourteen poems in Prudentius’ *Peristephanon*, which narrate the martyrdoms of various saints, is devoted to the persecution of St. Agnes. Agnes is first humiliated by being exposed naked in a brothel, where the one man who is so bold as to look at her becomes blind. Her persecutor, not daunted by this miracle, orders a soldier (*miles*) to draw his sword and carry out the commands of his prince.³ Prudentius continues:

- Ut vidit Agnes stare truce virum
 mucrone nudo, laetior haec ait:
 Exulto, talis quod potius venit
 70 vesanus, atrox, turbidus armiger
 quam si veniret languidus ac tener
 mollisque ephebus tinctus aromate,
 qui me pudoris funere perderet.
 Hic, hic amator iam, fateor, placet;
 75 ibo inruentis gressibus obviam
 nec demorabor vota calientia:
 ferrum in papillas omne recepero,
 pectusque ad imum vim gladii traham.
 Sic nupta Christo transiliam poli
 80 omnes tenebras aethere celsior.⁴

³ Prudentius, *Peristephanon*, 14.63–66.

⁴ Prudentius, *Peristephanon*, 14.67–80.

As Agnes saw the savage man standing with naked tip, she grew cheerful and said:

I exult that such a man, mad, fierce, violent and armed, comes to me rather than a mild ephebe, tender and soft, drenched in perfume, who would ruin me by the murder of my modesty. This is the lover – I confess it – who delights me, I shall meet his stride as he attacks me, and not defer his torrid desire. I shall receive his whole blade in my breasts, draw the force of his sword into my deepest bosom. Thus, as the bride of Christ, shall I overleap all the darkness of the firmament, loftier than the heavens.⁵

In an earlier paper, I noted the contrast that Agnes draws between the soldier, whose brutal assault Agnes welcomes, and the young *ephebe* who, she says, might truly have ruined her by corrupting her virginity.⁶ There is no mistaking the sexual imagery in which the attack of the soldier is described, and which clearly symbolizes the embrace of Christ, who is Agnes' true lover. But physical penetration by the sword poses no threat to Agnes' integrity. Insofar as the soldier is only a mortal man, he can mutilate Agnes' body, but he cannot tempt her mind or soul. This is not surprising in a martyr narrative. The body is vulnerable, but the spirit is firm and insensible of the pain that is inflicted, transported as it is by the vision of union with Christ.⁷ Prudentius' poem on the martyrdom of Eulalia makes the point clearly. She addresses her tormentor:

Ergo age, tortor, adure, seca,
diuide membra coacta luto!
soluere rem fragilem facile est,
non penetrabitur interior
exagitante dolore animus.

Come on, torturer, burn and cut, split my limbs compacted of clay. It's easy to break so fragile a thing, but my inner spirit [*animus*] will not be penetrated, though pain torment it.⁸

Driven to fury by her defiant words, the *praetor* orders the *lictor* to punish her savagely, though at the same time he concedes that what he most would wish is to dissuade her from her depravity, which has made her family wretched and destroyed the promise of marriage: all that it takes is a modest gesture of respect

⁵ Unless otherwise noted, all translations are the author's.

⁶ David Konstan, "Women, Boys, and the Paradigm of Athenian Pederasty," *differences* 13, no. 2 (2002): 35–56. The passage is also discussed briefly in Gillian Clark, "Bodies and Blood: Late Antique Debate on Martyrdom, Virginity and Resurrection," in *Changing Bodies, Changing Meanings: Studies on the Human Body in Antiquity* (ed. D. Montserrat; New York: Routledge, 1998), 99–115 [104]; cf. Michael Roberts, *Poetry and the Cult of the Martyrs: The Liber Peristephanon of Prudentius* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 101.

⁷ Cf. Averil Cameron, "Early Christianity and the Discourse of Female Desire," in *Women in Ancient Societies: An Illusion of the Night* (eds. L. J. Archer, S. Fischler, and M. Wyke; New York: Routledge, 1994), 152–68 [164].

⁸ Prudentius, *Peristephanon*, 3.91–95. Cf. Maud B. McNerney, "Rhetoric, Power, and Integrity in the Passion of the Virgin Martyr," in *Menacing Virgins: Representing Virginity in the Middle Ages and Renaissance* (eds. K. C. Kelly and M. Leslie; Cranbury, N. J.: Associated University Presses, 1999), 50–70 [63], for the rhetorical power of Eulalia (well named in this connection, her name means "fine speaker").

for the gods. But Eulalia is unmoved, and as the executioners tear at her breast and sides, she counts the marks as though they were the writing of God and a celebration of Christ; she neither weeps nor cries out, for the fierce pain does not touch her spirit (*animus*).

But if Eulalia, like many other martyrs, is not affected by appeals to her reverence for her parents and the possibility of having a family of her own, how is it that Agnes entertains an anxiety that a delicate adolescent might pose a threat to her chastity, even as she embraces the ferocious warrior who is about to take her life? The adult soldier can violate her body, but it would appear that a boy might have seduced her will. In my earlier paper, I saw this aside as a reflex of an age-old tradition to which Prudentius was heir – a tradition in which women are represented as especially vulnerable to the charms of a young man, or rather a boy, beardless and langorous: quite the opposite of a popular modern conception, according to which women swoon in the presence of a strong, experienced man – “tall, dark and handsome,” in the American cliché.⁹ Many examples can be cited from classical literature, and the pattern is well illustrated in art as well (e.g. fifth-century B.C.E. representations of Aphrodite and Adonis).¹⁰ Women were also thought to fall in love with effete types like Paris in the *Iliad*, rather than with a Heracles or a Theseus. Lucian, in an amusing dialogue between Zeus and Eros, has the father of gods and men complain that he is obliged to disguise himself as a swan or bull or even a shower of gold in order to possess a woman, upon which Eros advises him to shed his thunderbolt, let his hair grow long, don a flowing tunic, and imitate the dainty manner of Dionysus, if he wants to have success with the ladies (Zeus, incorrigibly macho, stoutly refuses to tart himself up this way).¹¹

Nevertheless, it is remarkable that Prudentius should have let slip even the slightest suggestion that Agnes might have succumbed, if not to physical abuse, then to the more subtle allure of a sexually attractive male, to the extent of abandoning (or at least contemplating abandoning) her commitment to virginity and presumably to the faith that enjoins it on her. Are there forms of pressure that

⁹ Needless to say, this image does not capture the rich variety of sexual attraction that is to be found today as well as in any age (think of the type of the “cougar,” or older woman who seeks the romantic company of younger men); however, a glance at the dust jacket of virtually any romantic novel, of the kind published by Harlequin for example, will confirm that it is a stereotype.

¹⁰ E.g., Louvre MNB 2109; Martin von Wagner-Museum [Würzburg] H 5333 = B. Savaiss-Soyez, “Adonis,” in *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae* 1:1–2. (Zürich : Artemis Verlag, 1981–). Cf. Aristophanes, *Lys.* 414–15; Apuleius, *Metam.* 9.28; further examples can be found in David Konstan, “Women, Boys, and the Paradigm of Athenian Pederasty.” Kenneth J. Dover comments, “The attributes which made a young male attractive to *erastai* were assumed to make him no less attractive to women.” Kenneth J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (London: Duckworth, 1978), 172.

¹¹ Lucian, *Dial. d.* 6 (OCT numeration). For discussion, see David Konstan, “Enacting Eros,” in *The Sleep of Reason: Erotic Experience and Sexual Ethics in Ancient Greece and Rome* (eds. M. Nussbaum and J. Sihvola; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 354–73.

indeed penetrate to the soul or *animus*, and can so alter people as to put their deepest commitments at risk? Can torture force a person, not only to submit to the wishes of the torturer, but also to change in their inner self – their *interior animus* – and sincerely adopt the view of the other?

Novels and Martyr Tales

The idea that the soul was somehow insulated from the body, and could maintain its integrity despite the punishments inflicted by a torturer, is familiar not only from the lives and martyrdoms of saints, for example that of Perpetua and Felicitas, but also from the pagan Greek novels.¹² Consider, for example, the words of Anthia toward the end of the *Ephesiaca* by Xenophon of Ephesus, perhaps the earliest of the surviving romances and possibly dating to the first century after Christ.¹³ When she is reunited at last with her husband, Habrocomes, Anthia embraces him and declares through her tears:

Husband and master, I have recovered you after wandering much land and sea, having escaped the threats of bandits, the designs of pirates, the outrages of brothel-keepers, bonds, graves, manacles, poisons and ditches, and I come to you, despite all, O Habrocomes lord of my soul, as I was when I first went from Tyre to Syria, and no one induced me to sin, not Moeris in Syria, nor Perilaus in Cilicia, nor Psammis and Polyidus in Egypt, nor Anchialus in Ethiopia, nor my master in Tarentum, but I have remained holy [ἄγνός] for you, having practiced every device of chastity [σωφροσύνη] (5.14.1–2).

Anthia is here asserting her unalterable devotion, to be sure, but she is at the same time affirming a sense of control over herself and her destiny, based on her commitment to physical and spiritual purity.

We may take another example from Achilles Tatius' novel, *Clitophon and Leucippe*. Almost fifteen years ago, Brent Shaw called attention to Leucippe's response when she is threatened with rape by the arrogant and violent Thersander who now has her in his power:

Take up all your instruments of torture, and at once; bring out against me the whips, the wheel, the fire, the sword. ... I am naked, and alone, and a woman. But one shield and defense I have, which is my freedom, which cannot be struck down by whips, or cut by

¹² *Pagan* is used here, and once below, simply to signal non-Jewish and non-Christian, and is not meant to suggest a coherent body of doctrine or practices.

¹³ The date is disputed. James N. O'Sullivan places it in the first half of the first century C. E., as the earliest of the novels, although most scholars are inclined to place it later than Chariton's *Callirhoe*. Tilg argues for a much later date, in the third century. James N. O'Sullivan, *Xenophon of Ephesus: His Compositional Technique and the Birth of the Novel* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1995); Stefan Tilg, *Chariton of Aphrodisias and the Invention of the Greek Love Novel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 85–92.

the sword, or burned by fire. My freedom is something I will not surrender – burn as you might, you will find that there is no fire hot enough to consume it.¹⁴

Shaw comments: “The body itself is seen to embody identity/self/freedom and can itself be used to resist the final acts of violence imposed on it. ... The presentation of Leukippê ... is that of a woman who recognizes that although her body is owned, she is not. Though a slave, it is her will or consent that is to be the final arbiter of the self.”¹⁵ I have argued elsewhere that the Greek romantic novels, and not least among them Xenophon’s *Ephesiaca*, may be said to bear witness to a new conception of personal autonomy, undoubtedly owing much to Stoic and Epicurean ideas of what is or is not “up to us” (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν), but also of a piece with the narratives of spiritual endurance and transformation that entered into the construction of Christian views of holiness and self-mastery.¹⁶ In the *Passio Perpetuae et Felicitatis*, Perpetua is so transfixed by the glory of her sacrifice that she does not even notice the pain she is enduring. Indeed, the narrator reports: “Perpetua, that she might taste some pain, being pierced between the ribs, cried out loudly, and she herself placed the wavering right hand of the youthful gladiator to her throat. Possibly such a woman could not have been slain unless she herself had willed it, because she was feared by the impure spirit.”¹⁷ Felicitas, in turn, who was pregnant, cried out when the birth pangs were upon her, inducing one of the jailors to remark: “You who are in such suffering now, what will you do when you are thrown to the beasts, which you despised when you refused to sacrifice?” And she replied, ‘Now it is I that suffer what I suffer; but then there will be another in me, who will suffer for me, because I also am about to suffer for Him.’” When it comes to matters of faith, the spirit is all the more inured to the distress of the body. To cite one more example (perhaps somewhat less familiar), in the *Passio Anastasiae*, the soon to be martyred Irene declares:

¹⁴ Achilles Tatius, *Leuc. Clit.* 6.21. This translation is from Brent D. Shaw, “Body/Power/Identity: Passions of the Martyrs,” *J ECS* 4, no. 3 (1996): 269–312 [271].

¹⁵ Shaw, “Body/Power/Identity,” 271.

¹⁶ See David Konstan, “Le courage dans le roman grec: de Chariton à Xénophon d’Ephèse, avec référence à Philon d’Alexandrie,” in *Roman IV: Vertus, passions et vices dans le Roman grec (Actes du colloque de Tours, 19–21 octobre 2006, organisé par l’université François-Rabelais de Tours)* (eds. B. Pouderon; Lyon: Presses de la Maison de l’Orient et de la Méditerranée, 2009), 117–26; David Konstan, “Reunion and Regeneration: Narrative Patterns in Ancient Greek Novels and Christian Acts,” in *Fiction on the Fringe: Novelistic Writing in Late Antiquity (Mnemosyne Supplements Series 310)*; ed. G. Karla and I. Nilsson; Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2009), 105–20. Cf. David Konstan, “Suche und Verwandlung: Transformation von Erzählmustern in den hellenistischen Romanen und den apokryphen Apostelakten” in *Askese und Identität in Spätantike, Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit* (trans. R. Höschele; eds. W. Röcke and J. Weitbrecht; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 251–68.

¹⁷ [Tertullian], *The Passion of the Holy Martyrs Perpetua and Felicitas* (ANF 3:699–706).

Just as my flesh would endure beasts, fire, beatings, or any other punishment, so too it will endure a fornicator, a dog, a bear, or a serpent. ... For the soul cannot be faulted for impurities to which it does not consent. ... Willingness brings with it punishment, but necessity brings the crown (*inquinenta enim quae anima non consentit non suscipit reatus. ... voluntas enim habet poenam et necessitas parit coronam*).¹⁸

Soul and Body Before Christ

This self-consciousness concerning the distinction between the body and the soul, and the conviction that the torments of the flesh cannot sway the mind, may well be symptomatic, not so much of Christianity as of a way of thinking that came into being simultaneously with Christianity, and is reflected in the novels as much as in martyr narratives.¹⁹ Both the Stoics and the Epicureans, to be sure, insisted that sages could be happy even on the rack, and hence were unshakeable in their wisdom. But inasmuch as both schools adopted a radically materialist view of nature, including the soul, they did not separate the self into a corporeal and a spiritual element. As Christopher Gill has recently observed, for both these Hellenistic schools, the self was “a psychophysical and psychological unit or structured whole,” in which the body is not sharply differentiated from the psyche, since they constitute a single continuous, consubstantial entity.²⁰ The self, then, is just this combination of psyche and *soma*. Thus, the Stoic philosopher Hierocles affirms that “an animal is a composite of body and soul, and both

¹⁸ Translation mine. *La Passio Anastasiae*, 17.10–20. Paola F. Moretti, ed., *La Passio Anastasiae: Introduzione, testo critico, traduzione* (Studi e Testi Tardo Antichi 3; Rome: Herder, 2006), 140. Moretti comments: “Tali affermazioni, che costituiscono un’aggiunta del redattore latino rispetto agli *Atti* greci, potrebbero essere la spia di un’attualizzazione del motivo romanzesco, che diverrebbe lo spunto per una presa di posizione su un problema vivo al momento della composizione della *PA*” (22). Cf. Choricus, *Oration* 3.2.13: πῶς οὖν τοὺς οὕτω τετυφωμένους ἐπαίδευσας τὰ τῶν ἀρχομένων φρονεῖν; ἦδεις ὡς φάλαγγες ὀπλιτῶν καὶ ψιλὸς ὄμιλος ἱππέων τε τάγμα καὶ βία χειρῶν καὶ ὅλως ἡ τοῦ πολέμου φύσις σωμάτων μὲν ἴσως, γνώμης δὲ κρατεῖν οὐ φιλεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ φιλονεικότεραν ποιεῖ πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἀσύμφορον ἄγουσα. (“So how did you [sc. Aratius] correct those who were so blind to the duties of subjects? You knew that phalanxes of hoplites, light troops, and arrays of cavalry, physical force and the nature of war in general can perhaps conquer bodies, but not the mind; it rather makes it more contentious, bringing it to prejudicial thinking.” The translation is by David Westberg and cited with permission.

¹⁹ In the Jewish tradition, for example in Maccabees, torture is sometimes applied to induce Jews to violate ritual prohibitions, for example by eating unclean meat; cf. 2 Macc 6:18–7:42. For Maccabees as a martyr text, see Daniel Boyarin, *Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 94. Boyarin nevertheless follows Bowersock in arguing that martyrdom, or rather the discourse of martyrdom, assumed new forms from the second century C.E. onward. G.W. Bowersock, *Martyrdom and Rome* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

²⁰ Christopher Gill, *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3. See also the review of Gill in David Konstan, trans. Laura Victoria Almandós Mora, “La idea del ‘yo’ en la filosofía clásica: comentario sobre un libro reciente de Christopher Gill,” *Literatura: Teoría, Historia, Crítica* 11 (2009): 399–407.

of these are tangible and impressible and of course subject to resistance, and also blended through and through.”²¹ A sage might, then, hold steadfastly to his convictions under torture, but this would be because the combination of body and soul was firm and secure, not because the soul was independent of the body.²²

To illustrate the classical attitude toward torture, we may take the account of the death of the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton in the Aristotelian *Constitution of Athens*:

Harmodius was at once dispatched by the spearmen, and Aristogeiton died later, having been taken into custody and tortured for a long time. Under the strain of the tortures he gave the names of a number of men that belonged by birth to families of distinction, and were friends of the tyrants, as confederates ... Finally, as do what he would he was unable to die, he offered to give information against many more, and induced Hippias to give him his right hand as a pledge of good faith, and when he grasped it he taunted him with giving his hand to his brother's murderer, and so enraged Hippias that in his anger he could not control himself but drew his dagger and made away with him.²³

Aristogeiton is defiant, but he is aware that his ability to tolerate torture has limits. To be sure, he can hold out against the pain that is inflicted, but he does not pretend that his mind or soul is free, whatever his body may suffer. Unless I have missed some relevant documents, this way of speaking, or of conceiving of the self, seems not to have been current in the pre-Christian periods.²⁴

One might imagine that the emphasis on the integrity of the soul or mind under extreme physical oppression could have been two-sided. For, if spiritually strong individuals could withstand every sort of punishment without yielding in their convictions, weaker sorts would not have been able to hold out and would have altered their beliefs in response to torture. Certainly, in the modern world, such a consequence of torture is envisaged, as I will illustrate in a moment. But this kind of radical discontinuity in the inner self, which is imagined as being subject to complete transformation under the pressure of physical or psychological distress, does not seem to have been entertained in the ancient world, whether classical or Christian. Before speculating on the reasons why this should have

²¹ Hierocles 4.39–42. *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, Vol. 1 (trans. A. A. Long and D. Sedley; 2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 314. See also Ilaria Ramelli, ed., *Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of Ethics, Fragments, and Excerpts* (trans. D. Konstan; SBLWGRW; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2009) for commentary.

²² To be sure, Plato and Aristotle were dualists, and maintained that body and soul are different substances. But, they too recognized that the soul was affected by the pain inflicted on the body.

²³ Aristotle, *Ath. pol.* 18.1–3 (Rackham, LCL).

²⁴ Cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 7.24: “Apollonius of Tyre says that, when Crates dragged him by his cloak away from Stilpo, Zeno said, ‘The proper way to seize philosophers, Crates, is by their ears: persuade me, then, and drag me off by them. But if you force me, my body will be with you, but my soul with Stilpo.’”

been the case, let me indicate what I take to be peculiar to modern applications of torture as opposed to their use in antiquity.

A Typology of Torture

By way of a rough classification of the purposes of torture, I identify six types, five of which, I believe, are common to classical antiquity and today. First of all (1), torture can be employed simply to punish or inflict pain; in this respect, it is principally an instrument of revenge, whether individual or social (as in the case of Aristogeiton). A subset of this function (2) is deterrence: the fear of punishment may have the effect of inhibiting contraventions of the law. Another function of torture (3) is to extract information: this is the use to which it was put judicially in Athens, for example, when it came to the testimony of slaves.²⁵ Connected with this use of torture (4) is that of forcing a confession, in which the individual subjected to pain testifies against himself. Yet, another purpose served by torture (5) is the affirmation of the power of the torturer, very often the state or ruler: the ability to inflict severe pain and humiliation is evidence of absolute supremacy, and serves as a symbol of dominance.²⁶ All these functions of torture were, I believe, practiced in classical antiquity. There remains, however,

²⁵ On torture as a means of extracting truth, see especially Page duBois, *Torture and Truth* (New York: Routledge, 1991); Virginia Burrus, "Torture and Travail: Producing the Christian Martyr," in *A Feminist Companion to Patristic Literature* (eds. A. Levine and M. Robbins; London: T & T Clark, 2008), 56–71. Cf. Jennifer R. Ballengee, *The Wound and the Witness: The Rhetoric of Torture* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009), 8: "The torturer believes that the body will release the truth if it suffers unbearable pain"; as Ballengee observes, Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1.15, had already realized that torture was as likely to produce falsehood. Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.4.1 notes that torture "is an extremely frequent topic [in orations], where one party labels torture a compulsion to reveal the truth, while the other calls it a cause of declaring what is false ... What's the point of saying more about it? The speeches of older and recent orators are replete with it."

²⁶ Ballengee remarks that martyrologies typically describe the *quaestio per tormentum* "in which an attempt is supposedly being made to extract from those accused of being Christian a 'confession' – a public recantation of the Christian faith and a profession of loyalty to the Roman emperor and customs ... However, the public torture of Christians might also serve as a reminder to Roman citizens of the power of the Roman government, discouraging others from becoming Christian and betraying Roman law. In this sense, the Roman empire utilizes the spectacle of martyrdom to write the message of its own potency on the body of the martyr." Ballengee, *The Wound and the Witness*, 97. The gruesome torture inflicted by Artaxerxes on Mithridates (Plutarch, *Art.* 16.2) evidently combined a desire for personal revenge with a display of the monarch's absolute power. Cf. Bruce Lincoln, *Religion, Empire, and Torture: The Case of Achaemenian Persia, with a Postscript on Abu Ghraib* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 85–96. Foucault says of torture: "Its aim is not so much to re-establish a balance ... as its extreme point, the dissymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the law and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his strength." Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Random House, 1975), 48–49.

one purpose of torture that is, I think, specific to the modern world. I illustrate it with reference to two literary texts, one from the twentieth century, the other dating to the eighteenth.

In George Orwell's novel *1984*, published in 1949, the protagonist, Winston Smith, gradually comes to perceive that the totalitarian regime under which he lives is based on an elaborate set of lies. After his opposition to the regime is discovered, he is subjected to brutal torture. His persecutor explains:

We are not content with negative obedience, nor even with the most abject submission. When finally you surrender to us, it must be of your own free will. We do not destroy the heretic because he resists us; so long as he resists us we never destroy him. We convert him, we capture his inner mind, we reshape him. We burn all evil and all illusion out of him; we bring him over to our side, not in appearance, but genuinely, heart and soul.²⁷

He must not only cease to resist the ever-present surveillance that is called Big Brother, he must embrace it: "You must love Big Brother. It is not enough to obey him; you must love him."²⁸ In the end, we are informed that Winston "had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother."²⁹

Orwell captures with particular clarity the difference between merely bowing before the regime as a result of torture and a change of heart or conversion that affects one's deepest beliefs and allegiances.³⁰ He was inspired, of course, by the Moscow trials held from 1936 to 1938, chillingly evoked by Arthur Koestler in his novel, *Darkness at Noon* (first published in German in 1940).³¹ It is still debated to what extent the confessions of subversive activity on the part of leading communists might have been sincere signs of repentance, even though they were certainly extracted by torture, as Nikita Khrushchev affirmed in his famous speech to the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956:

It became apparent that many party, Government and economic activists who were branded in 1937–38 as 'enemies,' were actually never enemies, spies, wreckers, etc., but were always honest Communists. They were only so stigmatized and often, no longer able to bear barbaric tortures, they charged themselves (at the order of the investigative judges – falsifiers) with all kinds of grave and unlikely crimes.³²

²⁷ Irving Howe, ed., *Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four: Text, Sources, Criticism* (2d ed.; New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982), 169.

²⁸ Howe, *Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four*, 187.

²⁹ Howe, *Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four*, 197.

³⁰ Cf. Elaine Scarry, *The Body in Pain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 46–51. Scarry's view is summarized by Ballengee: "the torturer uses torture to convey a general message of power to its victim, by destroying the subjective world of the tortured and replacing it with the torturer's own ideology." Jennifer R. Ballengee, *The Wound and the Witness: The Rhetoric of Torture* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009), 8.

³¹ George Orwell, "Arthur Koestler," in *Critical Essays* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1946). See Arthur Koestler, *Darkness at Noon: A Novel* (trans. D. Hardy; New York: Macmillan, 1941).

³² Nikita Khrushchev, "Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U.," n.p. [cited 20 April 2011]. Online: <http://www.marxists.org/archive/khrushchev/1956/02/24.htm>.

Today, techniques designed to alter beliefs are sometimes labeled “brainwashing,” a term that, according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, first occurred in an article by Edward Hunter in *New Leader* published on October 7, 1950.³³ The reference was to ostensible practices by the Chinese communists and derived from an expression in Chinese coined by the communists themselves. Notions of mind control have also been associated with religious or semi-religious cults such as Scientology and an entire profession dedicated to “deprogramming” victims of such coercive persuasion.³⁴ One manifestation of the modern anxiety over the potential for conversion under conditions of duress is the popular interest in the so-called Stockholm syndrome, a term coined by the criminologist Nils Bejerot after the robbery of a Stockholm bank during which the thieves held bank employees captive for six days in 1973. Some of the hostages became sympathetic to their captors and refused to testify against them.³⁵

Samuel Richardson's Pamela

I should make it clear that I am not taking a position here on the reality of the phenomena associated with thought control, but calling attention rather to the way in which it has become a pervasive theme in modern conceptions of torture. The danger is in projecting this notion back on to the uses of torture in other epochs in which there may not have existed a comparable ambition to alter the deep structure of the victim's beliefs. This is not to say, however, that the Stockholm syndrome and related psychological consequences of enforced stress and trauma did not exist before the twentieth century. As my second literary illustration, I wish to take the novel *Pamela* by Samuel Richardson, originally published in 1740, and often considered to be the first truly modern novel, as opposed to earlier fictions to which the British dismissively applied the label “romance.” The novel relates the vicissitudes of a poor but exceptionally pretty and gifted young woman in the service of Mr. B., a wealthy and spoiled aristocrat. Mr. B. conceives a passionate desire for Pamela and uses every means to corrupt her virtue, including confining her in a remote house under the guardianship of a stern and sometimes violent woman in his employ. In the end, moved by Pamela's unflinching chastity and resourcefulness in protecting it, Mr. B. falls genuinely in love with her and, despite the obstacle of class difference, marries her. Pamela, for

³³ “Brainwashing,” *Oxford English Dictionary*.

³⁴ The term “deprogramming” in this connection seems to have been coined by Ted Patrick in *Let Our Children Go!*, a book that advocated strongly coercive methods by which to rescue people from cultic brainwashing. Ted Patrick, *Let Our Children Go!* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1976).

³⁵ For a critical review of the evidence for such a syndrome, see M. Namnyak et al., “Stockholm Syndrome: Psychiatric Diagnosis or Urban Myth?” *Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica* 117 (2008): 4–11.

her part, comes gradually to see the better qualities of Mr. B. and happily accepts him as her husband.

What interests me here is the process by which Pamela, over the course of her captivity, begins to be enamored of him. When Mr. B. at last determines to set her free, Pamela experiences ecstasies of gratitude and then observes, rather surprisingly:

I think I was loth to leave the house. Can you believe it? What could be the matter with me, I wonder! I felt something *so* strange, and my heart was *so* heavy! I wonder what ailed me! But this instance of his goodness was so unexpected! I believe that was all! Yet I have a very strange heart still ... I'll take thee, O contradictory, ungovernable heart, to severe task for these thy strange emotions, when I get to my father's.³⁶

Although critics have not, to my knowledge, focused on this passage, it bears all the hallmarks of the Stockholm syndrome two centuries *avant la lettre*. As Pamela puts it a few pages later, "I have made an escape from my prison, only to be more a prisoner."³⁷ When Mr. B. finally makes clear his intention to marry Pamela legitimately, he affirms: "we have sufficiently tortured each other."³⁸ Indeed, he has suffered the indignity of having his desires frustrated by a poor servant's concern for her honesty and a brief pang of jealousy that was entirely of his own invention, whereas he has held Pamela prisoner and in isolation for weeks. What is it that has aroused, in these conditions, her love for him? When, much later, Mr. B.'s sister inquires of Pamela, "did you not love him all the time?" Pamela replies: "though I abhorred his attempts upon me, yet I could not hate him, and always wished him well; but I did not know, it was love."³⁹ It is as though the novel were attempting to cover its tracks.

In an important article published in 1992, Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse argued that Richardson's novel was indebted to a form of quasi-fiction written in the American colonies (Puritan prejudice did not tolerate actual novels) that was immensely popular, not only in the New World but in Britain itself. This form is the so-called captivity narrative, which related the experiences of women, for the most part, who had been seized by Native American Indians and, after living for some time in captivity, were freed.⁴⁰ In some cases, the prisoners came to appreciate the way of life they had experienced, and were unwilling to return to their own culture.⁴¹ This kind of identification gave rise, in

³⁶ Samuel Richardson, *Pamela: Or Virtue Rewarded* (ed. P. Sabor; London: Penguin, 1980), 280.

³⁷ Richardson, *Pamela*, 284.

³⁸ Richardson, *Pamela*, 303.

³⁹ Richardson, *Pamela*, 472.

⁴⁰ Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse, "The American Origins of the English Novel," *American Literary History* Vol. 4 No. 3 (1992): 386–410.

⁴¹ Cf. Frederick Turner, *Beyond Geography: The Western Spirit Against the Wilderness* (rev. ed.; New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 240. Turner relates modern captivity narratives to ancient Biblical and classical traditions.

turn, to a deep suspicion of all liberated captives. As Richard Slotkin writes: "To partake of the Indian's love or of his equivalent of bread and wine was to debase, to un-English the very soul."⁴² A radical de-programming of the sort that Cotton Mather applied to the wretched young woman, Mercy Short, was required. When this failed, there might be no remedy but to burn the indelibly contaminated soul at the stake.⁴³

Scenes of captivity are not foreign to the ancient novel, of course, and they are the very stuff of martyr narratives and saints' lives. Indeed, as I pointed out in my book, *Sexual Symmetry*, the basic structure of Richardson's *Pamela*, in which the heroine is a prisoner of an impassioned Mr. B., may be seen as an expansion of those episodes in the ancient Greek novels in which the protagonist comes under the power of a rival lover, for example when Anthia falls into the hands of Perilaus, the governor of Cilicia, who seeks to marry her in Xenophon of Ephesus' *Ephesiaca* (she resorts to poisoning herself to evade the unwanted wedding), or Leucippe when she is in the power of Thersander.⁴⁴ The difference is that these women hold out against every form of threat or torture, and though

⁴² Richard Slotkin, *Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600–1860* (Middletown CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 94. The anxiety over the corruption of the soul may have had something to do with Puritanism itself, and the requirement that anyone seeking membership had to testify publicly to a personal experience of conversion: in a sense, Puritanism presupposed a radical discontinuity in the self as the condition for election among the faithful. Cf. Jerald C. Brauer, "Conversion: From Puritanism to Revivalism," *JR* 58 (1988): 227–43; Gordon T. Smith, *Beginning Well: Christian Conversion and Authentic Transformation* (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 85–98. But personal conversion was promoted by strict control over the body and every aspect of the inner life. Thus, in his influential study of the reformation in England, Hill writes: "I want to emphasize the extent of the revolution in man's thinking and feeling which the imposition of the protestant ethic involved. Protestant preachers in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century undertook a cultural revolution, an exercise in indoctrination, in brainwashing, on a hitherto unprecedented scale. We only fail to recognise this because we live in a brainwashed society: our own indoctrination takes place so early, and from so many directions at once, that we are unaware of the process." Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), 324–25. See also Dick Anthony and Thomas Robbins "Conversion and 'Brainwashing' in New Religious Movements," in *The Oxford Handbook of New Religious Movements* (ed. J. R. Lewis; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 243–97. I should make it clear that any suggestion of a connection between Puritanism and conversion by duress is strictly hypothetical, and offered here simply as a possible area for further investigation.

⁴³ Richardson's novel differs importantly from such comic treatments as Shakespeare's *The Taming of the Shrew* (composed in the 1590s and first published in 1623): for although Petruchio subjects Kate, the shrew of the title, to deprivations, he does so on the excuse that nothing she desires is good enough for her; as Kate puts it (act 4, scene 3): "And that which spites me more than all these wants, He does it under name of perfect love." When she catches on to his ruse, she joins in the game; there is no hint she loves him the better for it.

⁴⁴ David Konstan, *Sexual Symmetry: Love in the Ancient Novel and Related Genres* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 207. Richardson took the name "Pamela" from Sir Philip Sidney's *Arcadia* (Sidney invented the name), which in turn was directly indebted to the ancient Greek novels, above all Heliodorus and Achilles Tatius; thus, the shift in the way the torments afflicting the heroine are imagined is particularly striking.

their bodies may be tormented, they remain, as we have seen, steadfast in their loyalty to their original beloved. There is no question of surrendering of their own free will, in Orwell's words. So too the martyred saints preserve their faith despite the severest punishments.

If I am right to say that the kind of torture exemplified in 1984 and encapsulated in the term "brainwashing" was not thematized in antiquity, not even in the Christian era, then what are we to make of its absence? We have seen that the inner self – the *interior animus* – was considered to be proof against the torments of the body, at least in the case of the novelistic heroes and heroines and the Christian martyrs. If weaker spirits yielded under the pressure of pain, they might reveal information or even condemn themselves, they might plead and promise conformity to the will of the agent of their suffering, without necessarily surrendering their convictions and converting in their hearts to another kind of worship, whether of a ruler, a strange deity, or a lover. Indeed, no one seems to have applied torture with precisely this aim in mind: it was designed to effect submission, not an inward transformation or the love of one's tormentor. Rather than being conceived as wholly malleable, something that can, in another of Orwell's images, be squeezed empty and filled with a new content, the self in antiquity was understood to be solid, as it were, the core of a person's coherence and continuity. Of course, one could be persuaded to change one's beliefs, but the means of doing so were not through the body, but by way of the mind. The virtue of the novelistic heroes and the saints was not that they maintained their convictions under pressure, but that they did not betray them in word or deed, in the behaviors that were demanded of them. The division between body and soul was a means of protecting the self.

An Exception? Augustine's Confessions

Yet, there would seem to be an important exception to the rule just stated. In a famous letter composed in 408 and addressed to Vincentius, a Rogatist bishop (an offshoot of the Donatists), Saint Augustine defends the use of compulsion on the part of the state to effect the conversion of the Donatists to orthodox Christianity.⁴⁵ Augustine, who was, as Peter Brown has observed, "the only Father of the Church to write at length on persecution,"⁴⁶ admonishes Vincentius: "You are of the opinion that no one should be compelled [*cogi*] to follow righteousness; and

⁴⁵ I thank Lieve van Hoof for bringing this letter to my attention and Peter Van Nuffelen for sharing with me a talk he gave (in Dutch) that included a discussion of Augustine's views, in which he compared Augustine's attitude toward the wayward to that of a parent exercising discipline over a child. Cf. Augustine, *Letters of St. Augustin* 93.2.8 (NPNF¹ 1: 384–5).

⁴⁶ Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography* (new ed.; Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 239.

yet you read that the householder said to his servants, Whomsoever you shall find, compel [*cogite*] them to come in [Luke 14:23].”⁴⁷ Augustine cites a number of other examples from both the Old and the New Testaments, and explains:

Moderate severity, or rather clemency, is carefully observed towards those who, under the Christian name, have been led astray by perverse men, in the measures used to prevent them who are Christ’s sheep from wandering, and to bring them back to the flock, when by punishments, such as exile and fines, they are admonished to consider what they suffer, and wherefore, and are taught to prefer the Scriptures which they read to human legends and calumnies.⁴⁸

Augustine adduces the penalty, approved by all Christians, including Vincentius, that was imposed for pagan sacrifice, which was a capital offense. But before we conclude that Augustine endorsed a form of brainwashing as a means of leading errant Christians to the true faith, we must look more closely at his argument:

You now see therefore, I suppose, that the thing to be considered when any one is coerced (*cogitur*), is not the mere fact of the coercion, but the nature of that to which he is coerced, whether it be good or bad: not that any one can be good in spite of his own will, but that, through fear of suffering what he does not desire, he either renounces his hostile prejudices, or is compelled to examine truth of which he had been contentedly ignorant; and under the influence of this fear repudiates the error which he was wont to defend, or seeks the truth of which he formerly knew nothing, and now willingly holds what he formerly rejected.⁴⁹

Augustine is not defending the application of torture as a means of converting those who have been misled, but rather invoking the fear of punishment as a way of inducing people to observe the faith and, as a consequence, to subject their convictions to deeper scrutiny. In principle, the threat of punishment by the state is no different from that of torment in the afterlife for unbelievers.

Augustine confesses that, “originally my opinion was, that no one should be coerced into the unity of Christ, that we must act only by words, fight only by arguments, and prevail by force of reason, lest we should have those whom we knew as avowed heretics feigning themselves to be Catholics [*fictos catholicos*].”⁵⁰ However, he came to perceive the efficacy of compulsion on the basis of manifest results: “there was set over against my opinion my own town, which, although it was once wholly on the side of Donatus, was brought over to the Catholic unity by fear of the imperial edicts, but which we now see filled with such detestation of your ruinous perversity, that it would scarcely be believed that it had ever been involved in your error.”⁵¹ What is required is for people to take the first step. He

⁴⁷ Augustine, *Letters of St. Augustine* 93.3.5 (NPNF¹ 1:383). Translations of Augustine revised and edited by Kevin Knight for the New Advent website.

⁴⁸ Augustine, *Letters of St. Augustine* 93.3.10 (NPNF¹ 1:385).

⁴⁹ Augustine, *Letters of St. Augustine* 93.5.16 (NPNF¹ 1:388).

⁵⁰ Augustine, *Letters of St. Augustine* 93.5.17 (NPNF¹ 1:388).

⁵¹ Augustine, *Letters of St. Augustine* 93.5.17 (NPNF¹ 1:388).

supposes that the threat of punishment provides some with an opportunity to do what they have all along wished, and to liberate themselves from the bonds of habit. For others, it is an incentive to discover the truth: "We knew not that the truth was here, and we had no wish to learn it; but fear made us become earnest to examine it when we became alarmed, lest, without any gain in things eternal, we should be smitten with loss in temporal things."⁵² Nowhere does Augustine imagine that the infliction of pain in itself will cause a breakdown in the structure of the psyche and allow it to be molded to new beliefs.⁵³

What, finally, of Saint Agnes' worry that, for all her contempt of torture and death at the hands of a Roman soldier, she might have been seduced by a young ephebe? I expect that Prudentius did not mean this to constitute a genuine threat to her integrity, but was merely emphasizing how little Agnes feared the violence of the soldier, if a seductive young boy was regarded as the greater danger.

⁵² Augustine, *Letters of St. Augustine* 93.5.18 (NPNF¹ 1:388).

⁵³ McWilliam states that this letter and Epistle 185 to Boniface a decade later "explain why Augustine came to endorse 'conversion' of the Donatists through coercion by the state. The bishop never doubted that the path he followed to his own conversion – a long journey of prayer, intellect and will – was the better one, but he came to believe that for those who could not or would not follow this path coercion was a kindness." This is true enough, provided we are clear about what Augustine meant by "coercion." Joanne McWilliam, review of D.E. Doyle, *The Bishop as Disciplinarian in the Letters of St. Augustine*, *J ECS* 11 (2003): 571–73 [572].

Apollo, Possession, and Prophecy

Fritz Graf

I.

Details of how the Pythia, the medium of Apollo in Delphi, communicated with her god and with her clients have always been highly debated, from Greek and Roman antiquity up to the present.¹ But at least in modern scholarship, there was never a doubt that she was in a state of possession and frenzy. The ritual means for achieving this state of mind were somewhat unclear already in antiquity, and modern scholars developed their own theories – but there is no suggestion that has not been subsequently refuted by another scholar. The following theories have been brought forward:

1. *Gaseous or mephitic emanations*: although such gases as a stimulant for the Pythia's mantic condition are attested in reliable ancient sources, it was rejected once the French excavations reached the bedrock under the adyton of the Delphic temple: there simply was no visible fissure in the solid rock out of which gas could have flowed, not to mention the cave some authors such as the geographer Strabo speak about.²

2. The analogy with *Dionysiac frenzy*, dear to nineteenth century scholars, and the *discordia concors* of Apollo and Dionysus made famous by Nietzsche in his *The Birth of Tragedy* was challenged and finally refuted by several scholars, most

¹ The bibliography is very large, as is to be expected. Useful guides are Pierre Amandry, *La mantique apollinienne à Delphes* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1950), 41–56; Herbert W. Parke and Donald E. W. Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1956), is fundamental for the sources; Joseph Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle: Its Responses and Operations* (Berkeley: University of California, 1978), focuses much more on the question whether the preserved oracles are genuine than on the function of the oracle; Sarah I. Johnston, *Ancient Greek Divination* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), offers a recent, succinct and very reliable account. I have talked about some aspects of this question at a conference on Apollo in Delphi. See my “Apollo, Possession, and Prophecy,” in *Apolline Politics and Poetics* (eds. L. Athanassaki, R. P. Martin and John F. Miller; Athens: European Cultural Centre of Delphi, 2009), 587–605.

² Attested already in the foundation myth told by Diodorus Siculus 16.26.1–4 who talks of a chasm in the ground from which some psychotropic substance emanated. Pausanias, *Description of Greece* 10.5.7 mentions ἀτμός (“vapor”); Strabo, *Geography* 9.3.5 p. 419 describes a cave with πνεῦμα ἐνθουσιαστικόν (“a breath that renders ecstatic”) under the tripod of the Pythia; see also Pliny, *Natural History* 2.208 on such *fatidici specus* (“oracular caves”). For more, Fontenrose, *Delphic Oracle*, 199–203, who states categorically “There is no reality whatever behind the vapors and chasm (203).”

recently by Christopher Forbes and Lisa Maurizio (without knowing of each other's work).³ The little information about the actual mantic session that we possess stresses the serenity and clear language of the Pythia, and the one session that ended with a Pythia in raging frenzy was an accident that led to the poor woman's death a few days later.⁴ For the same reason, Dodds' comparison of the Pythia with a nineteenth century spirit medium such as Madame Blavatsky is rather difficult to follow, as again Forbes and Maurizio showed. Already Plutarch insisted on the Pythia's active presence: "Neither the sound nor the inflection nor the vocabulary nor the metrics are the god's, but the woman's; he grants only the inspiration (*phantasia*) and kindles a light in her soul towards the future; such is her *enthousiasmós*, state of possession" (*On the Oracles of the Pythia* 7, 397 CD). And Plutarch is not the only author to insist on this: his contemporary, Dio Chrysostom, pointed out that Apollo would speak neither Dorian nor Attic nor any other human language, but that it was the medium's language one would hear. His corollary, that the Pythia was not much more than a translator, needs more emphasis than it received in the past: "That is why oracles are often unclear and deceive humans" (*Oration* 10.23). Thus, the Pythia is neither frenzied and talking in *glossolalia* nor a passive medium for the god's epiphany, but a translator who is as much *traduttore* as *traditore*, in the famous Italian saying.

3. A final idea was that the Pythia was *chewing laurel*; it has almost as often been rejected as asserted, but it is still with us.⁵ Scholars more than once insisted that "laurel is quite harmless" as to its alleged psychotropic qualities; even the negative outcome of the self-test of Traugott K. Oesterreich, the pioneering scholar of religious possession and trance, had no great impact on changing opinions.⁶ Ancient documentation is vague. There is no Greek or Roman text that

³ Dionysiac frenzy: most influential was E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley: University of California, 1951), 73. However, Pliny, *Natural History* 2.208 uses the term *temulentus* ("drunken") to describe the Pythia. For the refutation, see Lisa Maurizio, "Anthropology and Spirit Possession: A Reconsideration of the Pythia's Role at Delphi," *JHS* 115 (1995): 69–86, and Christopher Forbes, *Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and Its Hellenistic Environment* (WUNT 2.75; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995).

⁴ The accident: Plutarch, *On the Obsolescence of Oracles* 51, 438B.

⁵ Most recently in the otherwise sound entry on "Lorbeer" in *Der Neue Pauly*, vol. 7 (1999), col. 441, and in Veit Rosenberger, *Griechische Orakel: Eine Kulturgeschichte* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2001), 54, who combines the chewing of laurel with Bacchic ecstasy, one as implausible as the other. See already M. B. Ogle, "Laurel in Ancient Religion and Folk-Lore," *AJP* 31 (1910): 287–311, esp. 300–303 (somewhat rash); Kirby Flower Smith, *The Elegies of Albius Tibullus* (New York: American Book Company, 1913), 463 f. ("perfectly harmless").

⁶ Traugott K. Oesterreich, *Possession, Demoniacal and Other, Among Primitive Races, in Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and Modern Times* (trans. by D. Ibberson; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.: 1930; 311–331. Even Leicester B. Holland, "The Mantic Mechanism at Delphi," *American Journal of Archaeology* 37 (1933): 201–14, and C. Scott Littleton, "The Pneuma Enthusiastikon: On the Possibility of Hallucinogenic 'Vapors' at Delphi and Dodona," *Ethos* 14 (1986): 76–91, agreed on the harmless nature of laurel, but thought that the Delphians, in addition to laurel, burned hemp (*Cannabis sativa*) to help with the Pythia's ecstasy.

would clearly say that the Pythia was chewing laurel leaves; it is only some poetical texts that explain the frenzy of female seers such as Cassandra or the Sibyl from eating laurel.⁷ Modern pharmaceutical research was unable to find any psychotropic substance in *Laurus nobilis* L., Apollo's laurel; oleander that looked similar and could, therefore, be confused with it contains a heart stimulant, quite different from a psychotropic substance. Thus, the ecstatic property of the laurel is a symbolic construction without a foundation in reality: whereas Ovid juxtaposes laurel and thyrsus as Apollo's and Dionysus' ecstatic plants, Pliny states that laurel undoes the intoxicating effects of wine.⁸

II.

All this – the absence of mephitic gasses, the non-psychotropic qualities of laurel, the lack of any signs of 'frenzy' with the Pythia – does not mean that the Pythia, when prophesying, was in an ordinary state of mind. The Pythia could quietly and lucidly answer the questions of her clients and nevertheless be in that altered state of consciousness that her own culture associated with being possessed by Apollo. The expression of possession is as much culturally shaped as any other mental or emotional expression of *homo sapiens*; possession as a specific state of mind might have biological and thus anthropologically universal reasons, but it does not take the universal forms of expression that Oesterreich had assumed in his classical work.⁹ The common and already ancient assumption that, with the Pythia (or, for that matter, the Sibyl¹⁰), possession by the god would result in uncontrolled frenzy and "Dionysian" ecstasy, as had been assumed by most modern scholars, is contradicted by several texts, not the least by Plutarch who knew Delphic ritual extremely well.

What exactly was the "possession" which the Pythia experienced? The Greeks, as we know, used two different terms, *kátōchos* and *éntheos*, to denote these states of consciousness, and they were different not only in their etymology. *kátōchos* is both an active and a passive adjective. In its active sense, "holding down," it can designate a drug that prevents the fetus from being extruded, or the god Hermes who binds the tongue of a victim; as a noun in the Graeco-Egyptian Magical

⁷ Especially Lycophron, *Alexandra* 6 with the scholia; see also Tibullus 2.5.63.

⁸ Ovid, *Letters from Pontus* 2.5.67; Pliny, *Natural History* 17.239, see also Martial, *Epigrams* 5.4.

⁹ On the interaction between anthropologically given and culturally determined factors, see Erika Bourguignon, "Trance and Meditation," in *Handbook of Psychological Anthropology* (ed. P. K. Bock; Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994), 297–313, who writes, "For analytical purposes, it is possible to separate psychobiological from socio-cultural and personal elements in a given sequence of trance behaviors" (298).

¹⁰ Most impressively and lastingly through the description given by Vergil, *Aeneid* 6.45–101 (*bacchatur vates* 6.78).

Papyri, it means “binding spell.”¹¹ In its passive sense, it is a technical term to denote a person who is controlled by a divinity: a person whom the Greeks called “seized by the nymphs,” *nympholeptos*, would be a *kátōchos*, someone taken over and controlled by a divine force.¹² *Éntheos*, “having a *theós* inside,” is possessed in the sense that a superhuman (divine or demonic) personality has taken over the body of a human and is using it instead of his own divine body. While the first template of total control (*kátōchos*) underlies such modern nightmares as Huxley’s *Brave New World*, the second template (*éntheos*) underlies the *Invasion of the Body-Snatchers*.

As to the Pythia, the new contemporary consensus would point to what I just called the “Control Template,” and it has many ancient sources on its side, not the least Plutarch or Dio; already Aeschylus’s Delphic prophetess conforms to it when she defines her occupation as “I tell the future wherever the god leads me” (*Eumenides* 33). As a mode of divination, though, it has its drawbacks, as Plutarch and Dio were well aware: the Pythia as a controlled medium still possesses her own inertia; thus, her own material characteristics are liable to distort the message, to render it opaque and difficult to read. Dio, with a sophist’s keen sense for language, expressed this in terms of translation, the Platonist Plutarch was more materialistic: “Mantic inspiration, like erotic inspiration, uses the given material and moves the recipient of its motion according to the individual nature of each.”¹³ The god, that is, has to move the Pythia’s soul that, being a human soul, is more inert than his own, and the Pythia’s soul in turn has to move her vocal organs with their own bodily inertia, before Apollo’s answer reaches the ears of the recipients in a double “mechanical” distortion.

The “Body Snatcher Template” then, one would think, would be a better way to conceptualize of divination: the god who lacks a human form takes over a human body to express himself among mortals. Vergil’s description of the Sibyl in the sixth book of the *Aeneid* seems to conform to this, although the description is a complex fictional account: in a Bacchic frenzy, the Sibyl fights the god who wants to take her over.¹⁴ The template exists for the Pythia too, although we know it only through the words of someone who rejects it. “It is utterly simplistic and childish,” says one of the interlocutors in Plutarch’s *On the Obsolescence of Oracles*, “to believe that the god himself would slip into the bodies of the prophets (as in the case of the belly-talkers who were formerly called Eurykleai and are now

¹¹ Medicine: Aëtius 16.23; magic: Hermes in a defixio in *IG* III 86.2 (Athens, 4th cent. BCE) and in a binding spell in *PGM* VII 454 (4th/5th cent. CE).

¹² On a famous instance of nympholepsy, Archdamas of Thasos in late fifth cent BCE Athens, see William R. Connor, “Seized by the Nymphs. Nympholepsy and Symbolic Expression in Classical Greece,” *Classical Antiquity* 7 (1988): 155–89.

¹³ Dio Chrysostom, *Oration* 10.23 (“Do you really believe that gods and humans would speak the same language? ... From there stems the lack of clarity that has deceived many people.”); Plutarch, *On the Oracles of the Pythia* 23, 406B.

¹⁴ Vergil, *Aeneid* 6.

called Pythones) and that he would speak using their mouths and vocal chords as his instruments" (9, 414 DE). The resistance to the template has theological reasons: the divine is too different and too incompatible with the human world in order to simply slip into human bodies. But even so the critic in Plutarch, the skeptical Boëthus, has to agree that the template exists and that Apollo is part of it, in Delphi as well as elsewhere. Why else would the religious healers attacked by Hippocrates ascribe a specific form of seizure as coming from Apollo Nomios, and why would the "belly-talkers" (greek *engastrimýthoi*, "having speech in their bellies") be called *Pythones*, at least from early imperial time onwards¹⁵? Plutarch's use of the term is close to its first use in the story of Paul's exorcism on a girl "with a *python* as a spirit" near Thessaloniki (Acts 16:16). In the imperial East, Pythones were highly popular as informal and non-institutional sources of divination: the slave girl whom Paul healed was a considerable source of income for her owner who might have felt as bad about Paul's meddling as the Ephesian silversmiths did.

Plutarch himself has yet another reading of the Pythia's *enthousiasmós*, as he usually calls her state of consciousness. In the fundamental passage in *On the Oracles of the Pythia* 21, 404B–405A,, he states that "the god makes use of the Pythia so that he may be heard by us:" this can be read as following either of my two templates. Plutarch then adds: "What we call *enthousiasmós* results from two simultaneous movements in the soul [of the Pythia]: one movement is imparted by the god, the other one stemming from the soul itself," and these two movements, as Plutarch makes clear with an example from physics, result in one overall movement that is "a turbulent and irregular whirl." In other words: the god does not fully control the Pythia's soul, he introduces his own movement into a soul that has its own inborn movement; the result of the two movements is not a neat new vector, but a spiral whose turnings are unpredictable, such as happens when two objects that are turning each in its own tornado combine their drives. Apollo's control is not exercised from outside, it becomes part of the Pythia's inside, but is influenced by her own inertia: we deal, so to speak, with a sophisticated Platonic transformation of the "Body Snatcher Template". The justification for calling this *enthousiasmós* in a literal sense, I assume, comes from the fact that the first person singular in the Pythia's oracles is always Apollo, quite unlike the Sybil who speaks in her own first person.

Plutarch's analysis has yet another consequence, besides attesting to the prominence of the "Body Snatcher Template" even in the theologically sensitive

¹⁵ Hippocrates, *On the Sacred Disease* 4. On the belly-talkers see Amandry Mantique, 64f; Eric R. Dodds, "Supernormal Phenomena in Classical Antiquity," in *The Ancient Concept of Progress and Other Essays on Greek Literature and Belief* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 199 (originally published in *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research* 55 [1971]). They are attested since the 5th cent. BCE, with a growing body of evidence in Imperial times; Clement, *Protrepticus*. 2.11.2 confirms that in his time "belly-talkers ... still are highly honored by the crowd."

Plutarch. It reintroduces into the discourse about the Pythia what earlier scholars called “frenzy,” albeit in Plutarch’s philosophical transformation: the god’s intervention creates, in the Pythia’s soul, “a turbulent and irregular whirl.”¹⁶ Although Plutarch assumes that this creates strong mental turbulences, this is not reflected in the Pythia’s behavior; there is no reason not to assume that here (as in Plutarch’s other descriptions of the Pythia’s behavior), she stays outwardly serene and composed. But it impels me to rethink the ‘frenzy’ in Delphi once again, both as to the ancient ways of encoding the *manía* of the Pythia, and as to the modern insistence on it.

III.

Once again: culture, not biology determines the outward form that the world-wide psychological experience of possession takes in a specific instance: this form is always a cultural elaboration of psycho-physiological human possibilities. The Greek elaboration took several forms, from the quiet possession of the Pythia to the vehemence of maenadism or the Corybantic rites, or the epileptic seizures described by the Hippocratic doctor as the “Sacred Disease” (epilepsy). As this last example shows, culture also determines the distinction between illness and possession; Philo, the Alexandrian Jewish philosopher, could describe a clinical experience of mental problems “as if I were participating in Corybantic rites with overpowering possession”¹⁷ – the reference to Corybantism must come from Philo’s reading of Plato rather than from any ritual experience of his own. But in the case of the Pythia, there might be some uncertainty as to the cultural elaboration: although most accounts of Delphic possession show a Pythia who remained quiet and in full control, a few come very close to describing a “bacchic” loss of control.

The main instance is the account of how Delphi’s mantic properties were found (and here finally I come to *pneuma*). The story is repeated in several relatively late sources with only minor variations, starting with Diodorus of Sicily in the late first cent BCE. The central point is that it was a herd of goats that found the oracle. The goat is the animal whose preliminary sacrifice informs the priests whether the god would be accessible: the story explains why goats were used this way. The goats were grazing at the very spot of the later adyton; here, from a slim chasm in the ground, some subterranean gas (*atmós* or *pneûma*) was rising. Goats that happened to breathe it started to prance around in strange ways and to utter unusual sounds, a sort of goatish glossolalia. The goatherd became curious, inspected the place, got a whiff of the gas himself and promptly began

¹⁶ *On the Oracles of the Pythia* 21, 404EF.

¹⁷ Philo, *On the Migration* 35.3.

the same sort of outlandish behavior: Plutarch writes about his *enthousiasmós*, Pausanias makes him utter fully-fledged Apolline oracles. Whatever it was, the occurrence got known and attracted a crowd that experienced the same sort of mental dislocation. In order to contain the uncanny force and at the same time to profit from it, the inhabitants founded an oracle and attributed it to Gaia, goddess of whatever there is in the earth.¹⁸

Thus, it was the frenzy and the 'glossolalia' of the goats that started it all; even if we should read the enthusiasm of the goatherd in a low-key, his behavior impressed his fellow Delphians enough to found an oracle. Other cases of oracular frenzy in Apollo's sanctuaries are less obvious. Neither Claros nor Didyma, the other two main oracular shrines, present a clear picture, beyond the fact that the priest or priestess spoke under the god's control.¹⁹ The extant oracular texts are all hexametrical, with two exceptions: two Clarian texts from the later second century CE progress from detached hexameters to excited anapaests and iambics: this seems to stage the onset of progressively more ecstatic prophecy, and it shows that at least one writer of oracles could play with oracular frenzy at an Apolline oracle.²⁰ Literary texts give not much more. Cassandra in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* loses her serenity when seized by the god, but she breaks into what the chorus understand as lament, not as ecstatic behavior; her metrics are somewhat disputed, but at any rate they express mental disturbance (*Agamemnon* 1072 ff.). Vergil's presentation of the Sibyl's prophecy in *Aeneid* 6 combines spirit possession with extravagant motoric behavior: the Sibyl suffers from Apollo's presence and tries *magnum si pectore possit excussisse deum* (6.78); the god has taken her over, and it will not be easy to get rid of him again. The result is Dionysiac frenzy and a sort of rabies, not unlike what the Hippocratic doctor of *On the Sacred Disease* describes as the result of divine possession. The information the Sibyl imparts, however, is as lucid as anything Vergil wrote (everything else would contradict genre conventions anyway); but perhaps the somewhat convoluted and staccato syntax in the first two verses can be understood as to paint an altered state of mind:

*o tandem magnis pelagi defuncte periclis –
sed terrae graviora manent – in regna Lavini
Dardanidae venient – mitte hanc de pectore curam –
sed non et venisse volent: bella – horrida bella – ... cerno.*

¹⁸ Diodorus Siculus 16.26.1–4; Plutarch, *Obsolescence of Oracles* 42, 433C; Pausanias 10.5.7. Diodorus compiles earlier sources; his account must go back to a (Hellenistic?) local historian, who is not identifiable.

¹⁹ Johnston, *Divination*, 76–90.

²⁰ Oracle for Caesarea Troketta and for Callipolis, see the collection of Reinhold Merkelbach and Joseph Stauber, "Die Orakel des Apollon von Klaros," *Epigraphica Anatolica* 17 (1996): 17–25, again in Reinhold Merkelbach, *Philologica: Ausgewählte Kleine Schriften* (Stuttgart and Leipzig: Teubner, 1997), 173–183.

Oh, you who are done with all the perils of the sea – yet greater await you on land – the Trojans will come to the realm of Lavinium – put that care from your heart –: but will not enjoy their coming. War, fierce war, I see.²¹

Other Sibyls seem as lucid as this, otherwise the grave epigram of one could not insist on her quality as a “girl gifted with speech.”²² As a literary creation who is alive only in her hexameters, the Sibyl does not show a uniform picture of her possession; *manía*, ascribed to her from Heraclitus onwards, is an ambiguous term.²³

In Delphi, then, and perhaps in other Apolline oracles as well, there is a tension between the ritual of the oracles and the stories told about them, between practice and ideology. For practical reasons, any divinatory system tries to keep the line of communication between the divine source of information and the human client as short as possible; given the essential gap between god and human, some distance is unavoidable, and it is the medium that bridges the distance, be it a human medium such as the Pythia or a material one such as dice. The stories, however, extrapolate from the ritual to the much larger distance between humans and gods: being possessed by a god means losing a vital and central part of one's humanity – losing control, memory, and identity. Both moves are necessary for the function of the oracle where two incompatible worlds, god and humans, come together, and they supplement each other. This explains why in the literary and mythical discourse about Delphi, the ‘bacchic’ mood became the dominant metaphor for talking about the Pythia's experience, whereas the ritual reality looked very different.

Modern scholars have turned into a monolithic theory what in reality were complimentary moods, and they did so, as I suspect, less under the influence of Dionysiac images than under that of the Christian way of reading possession, although the two need not contradict each other; Nietzsche's mental break-down in Trieste, as reported by his friend Franz Overbeck, combined the two, as did, in a different vein, Voltaire's comparison of the Quakers' shaking prophesy to the Pythia.²⁴ This Christian paradigm goes as far back as the New Testament and the

²¹ Vergil, *Aeneid* 6.83–86 (translation A. S. Kline).

²² Epigram in Pausanias, 10.12.6.

²³ Heraclitus: Diels–Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* 22 B 92; on the Delphic Sybil, Pausanias 10. 12.3. On the Sibyl and her *mania* see Helmut Stumfohl, “Zur Psychologie der Sibylle,” *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 23 (1971): 84–103; Emilio Suárez de la Torre, “Sibylles, Mantique Inspirée et Collections Oraculaires,” *Kernos* (1994): 179–205; Sabina Crippa, “La voce e la visione,” in *Sibille e Linguaggi Oracolari. Mito Storia Tradizione. Atti del Convegno Macerata-Norcia, Settembre 1994* (eds. I. C. Colombo and T. Seppilli; Pisa: Istituti editoriali e poligrafici internazionali, 1998), 159–90; Cristiano Grotanelli, “Possessione e visione nella dinamica della parola rivelata,” in *Sibille e Linguaggi Oracolari. Mito Storia Tradizione. Atti del Convegno Macerata-Norcia, Settembre 1994* (eds. I. C. Colombo and T. Seppilli; Pisa: Istituti editoriali e poligrafici internazionali, 1998), 43–52. On *mania* see Maurizio, “Anthropology,” 77–79.

²⁴ Nietzsche: see esp. the letter to Heinrich Köselitz in *Franz Overbeck, Heinrich Köselitz (Peter Gast), Briefwechsel* (eds. D. M. Hoffmann, N. Peter, T. Salfinger; Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1998), 203–209; see also the letters to Erwin Rohde in *Franz Overbeck, Erwin Rohde,*

early Saints' Lives. Possessed figures in the New Testament such as the madman of Gadara can show violence, frenzy and lack of restraint; possessed figures in the early Saints' Lives are usually rather more colorful than the Gospel's relatively restrained stories. And storytelling, its laws and its aims should not be underrated when dealing with accounts of possession, as already the differences between the Gospel versions of the Gadara episode show.

IV.

There is yet another ideological story pattern: the ancient tales that the altered state of consciousness of the medium was induced by a substance. If we leave laurel aside, we are left with two sets of substances, liquids and gas; liquids are widespread, gas is extremely rare.

There is a traditional connection between oracles and springs: in Claros and Didyma, prophecy was triggered by water, and Delphi had two sources, the Castalia and the Cassotis: according to some late authors, the Pythia drank from either.²⁵ While neither the Delphic nor the Didymean water was explicitly described as special, the Clarian water had such power that it caused the early death of the prophet. Today Claros is submerged by groundwater, but there is no reason why this should be different water from the one that flowed in the sacred spring: if so, it is as innocuous as the Delphian or the Didymean water. In some other oracular shrines, blood replaced water as the stimulating drink, in Argos the blood of a goat, in Aegae in Achaea bull's blood; we don't even need to make experiments to realize that neither is hallucinogenic.²⁶

Delphi is the only place where water is rare as a stimulant, whereas the gaseous exhalation (*atmós* or *pneûma*) from the famous chasm is thought to be the regular stimulant. Ancient authors from Strabo, Diodorus and Cicero onwards were convinced of the chasm's existence (see above), and sometimes went to great lengths in its description, and the chasm was always connected with *pneuma*. Its singularity when compared to the ubiquitous spring water deserves more atten-

Briefwechsel (ed. A. Patzer; Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2000), 130f and 132f (I thank Barbara von Reibnitz for help with the bibliography). Voltaire: *Lettres philosophiques: Troisième lettre, sur les quakers*, ed. Frédéric Deloffre (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), 47 ("la prêtresse de Delphes n'eût pas mieux fait").

²⁵ Claros: Pliny, *Natural History* 2. 232. Didyma: Iamblichus, *On the Mysteries* 3.11 (On both see Herbert W. Parke, *The Oracles of Apollo in Asia Minor* [London: Thames & Hudson, 1985], 210–24). Delphi: Lucian, *Hermotimus* 70; Pausanias 10.24.7 (Cassotis); Eusebius, *Praeparatio* 5.28.9 (Castalia); on the Castalia, see also Clement, *Protrepticus* 1.11.1, Gregory Nazianzus, *Against Julian* 2.32; Armand Delatte, *Anecdota Atheniensi* (vol. 1; Liège: Imp. H. Vaillant-Carmanne, 1927), 325; all the material in Amandry, *Mantique*, 135–139.

²⁶ Argos: Pausanias 2.24.1; Aegae: Pliny, *Natural History* 28.147 (virginity ordeal according to Pausanias 7.25.13).

tion than scholars were willing to pay who simply derived the Delphic *pneuma* from Aristotelian and Stoic physics: but why only Delphi?²⁷

A possible answer has spectacularly resurfaced (in a literal sense) a few years ago: there was, after all, a natural phenomenon, a fissure and even the possibility of “mephitic” gas. Geological research – the very research for which archaeologists have been asking for almost a century, but recently undertaken for non-archaeological reasons – found two fault lines in the Parnassus region, the “Delphi fault” running east-west and the “Kerna fault” running northwest-southeast; they intersect more or less under the sanctuary of Apollo.²⁸ Fault lines can emit gas, and another fault line, visible under the temple of Apollo in Hierapolis/Pamukkale, emits toxic carbon dioxide that has been connected with Strabo’s description of a cave of Pluton in this city that could kill sparrows as well as bulls.²⁹ Although no gasses were found in Delphi, water samples from springs in the region were found to contain traces of methane, ethane and ethylene. Ethylene has a sweet odor and was used in small doses as an anesthetic in 19th century dentistry, but it can kill in higher doses.

The geological analysis gives a material reason for the unique stories about chasm and exhalation at Delphi, and not being a geologist, I am willing to suspend my skepticism. But of course things are more complex than the geological reports and their religious interpretation by geologists suggest. The natural phenomenon of fault line and possible gas is only one side; nature needs to be translated into culture. To take the simplest case: even if there were fissures in the rocks under the adyton that are not just the work of water (as the French excavators suspected) but rather of seism, these fissures are by no means the chasm that Strabo describes, “a hollow and deep grotto with a rather small entrance (Strabo 9.3.5),” and that would be large enough to swallow the bodies of Nero’s victims: the cave is a cultural translation and narrative elaboration of a very different starting point. The same is true for other details. The fumes, if there were fumes, do not contradict or refute the ancient *pneuma* theories: the assumption of *pneuma* was the most wide-spread physical theory in antiquity to explain natural phenomena, thus it became the Greek and Roman cultural translation not only of possible earth gas, but of the Delphic way of divination. The sweet odor that ethylene is said to have, finally, would not contradict the insight that the good smell (*euōdía*) of the Delphic *pneuma*, according to Plutarch, signals a

²⁷ Derivation from physics: Amandry, *Mantique*, 221–223.

²⁸ Jelle Z. den Boer, John R. Hale and Jeffrey Chanton, “New Evidence for the Geological Origin of the Ancient Delphic Oracle (Greece),” *Geology* 29 (2001): 707–771; Henry A. Spiller, John R. Hale and Jelle Z. den Boer, “The Delphic Oracle: A Multidisciplinary Defence of the Gaseous Vent Theory,” *Journal of Clinical Toxicology* 40 (2002): 189–196; John R. Hale, Jelle Zeilinga de Boer, Jeffrey P. Chanton and Henry A. Spiller, “Questioning the Delphic Oracle,” *Scientific American* (2003): 67–73.

²⁹ Strabo, 13.4.14 p. 630.

divine presence which is usually, in ancient narratives and presumably ancient experience, accompanied by good smell.³⁰

As to the effect of the gas on the Pythia, it seems too simplistic to assume that it was the anaesthetic effect chemists have pointed out, and that by sheer luck the dosage was always low enough not to harm her (with one possible exception), and that, by the same sheer luck, it always affected only the Pythia and never the others present with her in the *adyton*. But “the noble men of Delphi” or the “foreigners and the servants of the sanctuary” perceived the sweet smell “that escapes from the *adyton* as if from its source,” according to Plutarch (*On the Obsolescence* 50,437C): they were close enough to the Pythia to hear her voice and to smell the *pneuma*; but they did not start to prophesy. Most probably they were separated from her through only a flight of steps that led down from their level to her tripod. Given that any event involving an altered state of consciousness is shaped by the intersection of psychobiological and socio-cultural elements, there is no need to focus exclusively on the psychobiological element and look for a psychotropic substance as a trigger, be it gas or laurel.

Two better known cases in Greek religion help to understand what is at stake. Altered states of consciousness (*enthousiasmós*) in Greece are mainly associated with maenadism. Maenadic ecstasy was triggered by a large bundle of stimuli. Some were psychobiological, such as alcohol or the specific bodily movement that had a neurological effect.³¹ Others were clearly cultural: the costume of the maenads, the music of flute and drums, perhaps the entire ritual setting outside a woman’s daily routine. Another case are the Eleusinian Mysteries where the presence of Dionysian imagery points to the experience of trance after the arrival in Eleusis.³² Explanation focussed on the *kykeon*, the ritual drink used to break the fast after the arrival in Eleusis; but none of its ingredients has hallucinogenic properties, not even mint, despite the original suspicions of Karl Kerényi.³³ The only possible biological trigger is the result of a fast of three days and the ensuing procession of about eighteen miles from Athens to Eleusis in the heat of a Greek September day: this will have generated enough endorphines to create euphoria, as it happens with long-distance runners. The rest was done by the culturally

³⁰ For good smell and epiphany see the passages collected by Franz Bömer, *P. Ovidius Naso. Die Fasten* (vol. 2; Heidelberg: Winter, 1958), 313 (on *Fasti* 5.376), and N. J. Richardson, *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 252; for Delphi, see Amandry, *Mantique*, 222, and the commentary on Plutarch’s *Obsolescence of Oracles* by Andrea Rescigno, *Plutarcho: L’Eclissi degli Oracoli* (Naples: M. D’Auria, 1995), 469 f.

³¹ For the bodily stimuli see Jan N. Bremmer, “Greek Maenadism Reconsidered,” *ZPE* 55 (1984): 267–86, esp. 275–282.

³² Fritz Graf, *Eleusis und die orphische Dichtung Athens in vorhellenistischer Zeit* (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1974).

³³ Karl Kerényi, *Die Mysterien von Eleusis* (Zürich: Rhein-Verlag, 1962); a lab analysis proved the suspicions to be unfounded.

determined elements, the *kykeon*, the surroundings, the experience of a crowd of presumably several thousand initiates.

Eleusis with its high incidence of cultural and symbolical triggers, and maenadism with its equally high use of biophysiological ones (alcohol and bodily movement) are two possibilities for the combination of these elements in Greece; I would situate them on opposite sides of a spectrum. In both cases, the individuals concerned were ordinary Greeks without any personal predisposition for altered states of consciousness, which is to say: without any inbuilt psychobiological trigger beyond what we all have built into our physiology. The Pythia, in the other hand, must have been selected for exactly such a predisposition: although we are rather ignorant as to the criteria of selection, beyond her being female, a virgin, and of any social class, it seems a legitimate assumption that such a disposition was part of the criteria. In her case, then, we would expect even less outside stimuli that would not be culturally determined: there is need neither for psychotropic gas nor intoxicating plants. The smell had no different function than the water drunk in Claros, the blood ingested in Aegae and Argos, the laurel that some prophets, including the Pythia, might have chewed, or the water which the Didymaeon prophetess touched with her bare feet. All these things were the culturally determined triggers that prompted the medium's altered state of mind; being highly susceptible persons (which is, as I am aware, a pure guess), they could easily train themselves to snap into their special condition when drinking water down under the Clarian temple or smelling that sweet smell of whatever it was when they had seated themselves on the Delphic tripod, or even in the temporary absence of that smell. The *pneuma*, then, did the same as the pocket watch with the hypnotizer, not more and not less.

VII. History of Interpretation

Assessing the Origins of Modern Pneumatology

The Life and Legacy of Hermann Gunkel

John R. Levison

When Hans Schmidt stood, on a late winter day, in the Bartholomäus-Kirche in Halle, Germany, he reflected upon the stunning spell that Hermann Gunkel, who had died four days earlier, on March 11, 1932, had cast over scholarship. Schmidt traced for this auspicious and sober gathering the impact of Gunkel's life and scholarship. It is the purpose of this essay to reflect upon Gunkel's *Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes nach der populären Anschauung der apostolischen Zeit und der Lehre des Apostels Paulus* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1888), which was published while Gunkel was just a twenty-six year old *Privatdozent* in Göttingen.¹ In this short book, which he would refer to merely as a *Werkchen* or *Büchlein* – little work or little book – Gunkel proposed original theses that inaugurated the modern era in the study of early Christian pneumatology. This book would prove to be more than a mere benchmark in the study of the Spirit; it offered a fresh and definite point of departure that would dominate biblical and theological perspectives on early Christian pneumatology throughout the twentieth century.² After identifying three salient ways in which Gunkel defined the study of pneumatology, we shall evaluate one of his enduring legacies – the association of the Spirit with the spectacular and the spontaneous. Having then called for reparation of this legacy, we shall reflect upon the professional life of Hermann Gunkel, since the tenor and trajectories of his own life will help us to appreciate the cost that a challenge to contemporary assumptions about pneumatology may entail.

¹ This essay excerpts and adapts material from J. R. Levison, *Filled with the Spirit* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009). In Gunkel's preface to *Wirkungen*, 3rd ed., iii, viii. Ninety-one years after its appearance, the book was translated into English by R. A. Harrisville and P. A. Quanbeck II, with the title, *The Influence of the Holy Spirit: The Popular View of the Apostolic Age and the Teaching of the Apostle Paul* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979). Translations of Gunkel's *Wirkungen* are from this edition; translations of all other German sources are my own.

² The possibility, of course, of writing a diminutive study on the spirit fell to Gunkel in some measure because so little had been written by his academic predecessors and peers. More significant, I think, is that he chose his focus well. He devoted nearly two-thirds to the apostolic church, about one-third to Paul's writings, and a single line on the last page to the Fourth Gospel (Gunkel, *Wirkungen*, 101 [ET 127]): "Die Theologie des Johannesevangeliums weist die Abhängigkeit von Paulo hierin deutlich auf."

A Salient Trio of Contributions

Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes, as Hans Schmidt reminded the audience that had gathered in the Bartholomäus-Kirche forty-four years after its initial publication, “spricht ein in Wahrheit neues Wort ... Es ist kein Abschluß, sondern ein Anfang.”³ Because this study was so innovative, a beginning rather than a conclusion, Gunkel naturally parted company with prior scholars. He did so especially by opening three doors.

Gunkel opened a new door into the study of early Christian pneumatology by focusing upon the extraordinary *Wirkungen*, the inspired effects, of the Spirit. This new direction – what his distant senior colleagues clearly considered a misdirection – rejected the notion of spirit, in the German idealist sense, as the substance of human potential, as the force of ordinary human life. To this door we shall return momentarily.

Gunkel opened another door by contending that early Christian pneumatology needed to be understood in light of early Judaism. He rejected the tack of his predecessors, who had leapt readily, according to the model of biblical theology in his day, from the Old Testament to the New. This approach, of course, raised a variety of objections: Judaism could be seen to supplant the Hebrew scriptures: the canon would dissolve with the incorporation of other texts, such as 4 Ezra; Christianity would be said to lose its distinctiveness. Gunkel’s contention, of course, was that a consideration of Judaism would function to illuminate early Christianity and to underscore what was distinctive about it.

The third door had already been cracked by Gunkel’s predecessor’s, Bernhard Weiss and Otto Pfeiderer, though not to the extent that Gunkel’s study would fling it open. Pfeiderer and Weiss had already distinguished Pauline theology from the theology of the early church (e.g., Acts).⁴ Gunkel followed lockstep by launching, in the very first page of his study, into a critique of the biblical-theological scholarship that was occupied with Paul’s teaching on the Holy Spirit without setting it into the context of the apostolic church. Gunkel espoused instead an exposé of the teaching of Paul and the apostolic church that contains elements of both continuity and discontinuity. While Paul had much in common with the apostolic church, in Gunkel’s opinion, he also stood on his own, marking early Christian pneumatology with his own particular Pauline stamp.

It is difficult to imagine that a slender book of just over one hundred pages written by a budding scholar in his mid-twenties who would never again return

³ “It speaks in truth a new word ... It is no conclusion but a beginning.” *Theologische Blätter* 11, no. 4 (April 1932), col. 98. By “kein Abschluß” Schmidt means that this is a fresh start, free of Albrecht Ritschl’s conception of the spirit.

⁴ B. Weiss, *Lehrbuch der Biblischen Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (2nd ed.; Berlin: Hertz, 1873); O. Pfeiderer, *Der Paulinismus. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der urchristlichen Theologie* (Leipzig: Fues, 1873).

to the subject could have wielded such influence. Yet the originality of these three emphases rendered prior approaches to pneumatology passé; Gunkel's ability to chart a new course for pneumatology goes a long way to explain why he gained the intellectual high ground while forfeiting the political low ground of German university life, for this *Büchlein* became nothing less than midwife to the birth of more than a century of research into early Christian pneumatology. Although his publications would never lead him to full acceptance in the academic community, as we shall see, the impact of his little book was extensive, particularly in the further studies of the Spirit that it catalyzed.⁵ Within eight years, Martien Beversluis, from The Netherlands, adopted the word, *Wirkungen*, in the title of his massive *De heilige Geest en zijne werkingen volgens de Schriften des Nieuwen Verbonds*.⁶ Other prescient studies followed, taking Gunkel's study in disparate directions. The nineteenth century ended with Heinrich Weinel's *Die Wirkungen des Geistes und der Geister im nachapostolischen Zeitalter bis auf Irenäus*, which extended Gunkel's approach by emphasizing the effects of the Spirit as late as the second century CE.⁷ In 1910, Paul Volz paid serious attention to Early Judaism in the first substantive contribution to ancient pneumatology of the twenty-first century, *Der Geist Gottes und die verwandten Erscheinungen im Alten Testament und im anschließenden Judentum*.⁸ Hans Leisegang devoted two volumes to the origins of early Christian pneumatology, the first of which he gave to a publisher as early as 1916, although it lay on the publisher's desk and was not published until after the First World War. Leisegang addressed precisely the History of Religions question that Gunkel had raised, although he swung the pendulum in the direction of Hellenism – actually an idiosyncratic form of Hellenistic Judaism – rather than Judaism as the matrix of Christianity.⁹ The last volume in this relative

⁵ His book eclipsed others written slightly earlier, including H. H. Wendt, *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist* (Gotha: F. C. Perthes, 1878); J. Gloël, *Der heilige Geist in der Heilserkündigung des Paulus* (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1888).

⁶ Utrecht, 1896. 508.

⁷ Freiburg, Leipzig, Tübingen: Mohr, 1899. One paragraph in Weinel's forward (vii) provides both a superb précis and a tribute to the ongoing significance of Gunkel's little book: "Wer die Absicht hat, die Pneumatologie der ältesten Christenheit darzustellen, muss daher zuerst die Erlebnisse selbst beschreiben, auf denen sich die Lehre vom Geist aufgebaut hat. Es ist das bleibende Verdienst H. Gunkels ... diesen Weg zuerst als den rechten erkannt und mit Entschiedenheit bei der Behandlung einer Einzelfrage eingeschlagen zu haben. Einer Einzelfrage – Gunkel beschreibt nämlich nicht die Wirkungen des Geistes, sondern er will nur die Frage beantworten: 'An welchen Symptomen hat man im Urchristentum festgestellt, dass eine Erscheinung Wirkung des heiligen Geistes sei?' ... Er hat diese Frage so richtig und vollständig beantwortet, dass seine Ausführungen für alle weitere Forschung grundlegend sind."

⁸ Volz's notes are few. He refers to Gunkel (94–95, n. 1); page 110, n. 2 contains a reference to Gunkel's study of the psalms – not of the spirit. Nonetheless, Volz (78–145) too explored the effects of the spirit, such as inspired speech and poetry, prophetic and predictive speech, inspired writing and translation, and inspired wisdom.

⁹ It is perhaps a misrepresentation of Leisegang to suggest that he sought the roots of Christianity in Hellenism rather than Judaism. In fact, he saw Philo as a representative of the matrix

flurry of studies was penned by Friedrich Büchsel, in the twenties; Büchsel took his cue from Gunkel and Volz, against Leisegang, by dealing expansively with Judaism and by addressing, nearly from the start, the effects of the Spirit in a section entitled, “*Geistwirkungen und Geistvorstellung im alten Israel*.”¹⁰ During the same year, Hans von Baer addressed the issue of diverse pneumatologies in the New Testament, which Gunkel had deftly raised in a way that would now render this issue impossible to ignore.¹¹ This flurry of intellectual activity, all of it devoted to pneumatology, is an indication of how influential Gunkel’s *Werkchen* had been, with its trio of fresh perspectives on the mysterious nature of the Spirit, the indispensability of Judaism for understanding early Christian pneumatology, and the presence of diverse pneumatologies within the New Testament. Among the doors Gunkel opened, we shall pause in this essay to consider only one: Gunkel’s association of the Holy Spirit with inexplicable and mysterious experiences.¹²

A Fresh Perspective

The simple word, “effects,” in the title of Gunkel’s *Büchlein* set the grounds for a confrontation that would rarely take place visibly on the high ground of academic publications, but which may have been fought instead on the political plain by means of hindrances that plagued Gunkel’s professional career. By emphasizing the “effects” of the Spirit, Gunkel confronted – and perhaps alienated – one of the most influential professors at Halle, the famed Albrecht Ritschl, who associated Geist, in accordance with the sort of German Idealism that shaped his thought, with the moral sphere of human attainment, with human potential. Gunkel would discern in early Christianity a very different form of Geist, a *pneuma* that represented “das geheimnisvoll-Mächtige im menschlichen Leben.”¹³ “Hienach ist klar, was die apostolische Zeit sich unter dem ‘Geiste’ dachte: Die über-

that combined both cultures and provided the soil of Christianity. In an indirect way, Leisegang followed Gunkel by identifying the spirit’s primary effect as supernatural in origin, though Leisegang located that sort of extraordinary experience in the popular Hellenistic-Jewish mysticism which he believed Philo’s writings embodied. See further on Leisegang J. R. Levison, “The Spirit in the Gospels: Breaking the Impasse of Early Twentieth-century German Scholarship,” in *New Testament Greek and Exegesis* (ed. A. Donaldson and T. Sailors; Grand Rapids & Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2003), 55–76.

¹⁰ F. Büchsel, “Effects of the Spirit and Conception of the Spirit in Ancient Israel.” *Der Geist Gottes im Neuen Testament*, 5–14 (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1926).

¹¹ H. von Baer, *Der heilige Geist in den Lukasschriften* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1926).

¹² For a more extensive discussion of Gunkel’s legacy, see J. R. Levison, *Filled with the Spirit* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009) 3–13 (on the Spirit and the spectacular); 109–17 (on his simultaneous championing and relatively negative view of Early Judaism); and 225–35 (on diversity in the New Testament, which he overlooked); 428–29 (on his regret later in life).

¹³ “The mysterious and overwhelming in human life.” Gunkel, *Wirkungen*, 20 (ET 32).

natürliche Kraft Gottes, welche im Menschen und durch den Menschen Wunder wirkt.”¹⁴

The line in the sand that Gunkel drew between the association of Geist with human achievement and the presence of Geist in the supernatural drove a wedge between his own perception of early Christianity and the views of his predecessors.¹⁵ “Das Verhältnis beider, göttlichen und menschlichen Wirkens,” he wrote, “ist das des einander ausschließenden (conträren) Gegensatzes. Die Wirkung des Geistes ist also nicht etwa eine Steigerung des in allen Menschen befindlichen Natürlichen, sondern das schlechthin Uebernatürliche und daher Göttliche.”¹⁶

Gunkel would contend that this effect is apparent in both the book of Acts and Paul’s letters. In Acts, the Spirit is associated not with what is humanly comprehensible, with a discernible purpose, but with the inexplicable and overpowering effects it exercises over its witnesses. Peter, for example, responds to his midday vision of clean foods obediently, although he has no clue at the time that this vision will function as part of God’s plan to incorporate the Gentiles into the people of God.¹⁷ Such stories as these are an indication that

Die Constatierung einer Geisteserscheinung erfolgt nicht in dem Schema von Mittel und Zweck, sondern in dem von Ursache und Wirkung. Nicht um den Weltplan Gottes zu

¹⁴ “It is clear what the apostolic age had in mind by the term *Spirit*. It is the supernatural power of God which works miracles in and through the person.” Gunkel, *Wirkungen*, 23 (ET 35).

¹⁵ The distinction is clearest between F. C. Baur and Gunkel. In F. C. Baur, *Paul the Apostle of Jesus Christ, His Life and Work, His Epistles and His Doctrine* (trans. A. Menzies; London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate, 1875), Baur discusses the Spirit under the rubric, “Principle of the Christian Consciousness.” According to Baur’s interpretation of Paul, Spirit denotes consciousness of union with God, a spiritual consciousness as opposed to a fleshly one (126–28). Justification takes place when a human being receives the Spirit in the sense that his or her whole consciousness is placed in relation to God (161–63). Gunkel’s vision of early Christian pneumatology has nothing to do with Baur’s conception.

¹⁶ “The relationship between divine and human activity is that of mutually exclusive opposition. The activity of the Spirit is thus not an intensifying of what is native to all. It is rather the absolutely supernatural and hence divine.” Gunkel, *Wirkungen*, 21–22 (ET 34). Gunkel took Gloël to task for supposing that in the book of Acts the moral and religious life of the early Christians was an effect of the spirit. Even faith, he argued, is not attributed to the Spirit in Acts. Believers do not receive faith through a work of the Spirit; they receive the Spirit because they already have faith – though there are exceptions, including: Acts 6:5 and 11:24, in which faith and Spirit are intimately aligned; and Acts 9:31 and 13:52, where persistence in faith is an act of the Spirit. If the Spirit were associated with the ordinary, with the moral and religious sphere, Gunkel asked (Gunkel, *Wirkungen*, 8 [ET 18]), then why would Simon, the magician of Acts 8:18, have imagined that he could purchase the power to transmit the Spirit? Gunkel also argued that there is little in the Hebrew scriptures or Judaism to support the claim that the Spirit inspires the moral-religious sphere, though he cites (Gunkel, *Wirkungen*, 9 [ET 19]) as exceptions: Isa 11:1, 2; 28:6; 32:15 ff.; Ezek 36:27; perhaps Zech 12:10; Pss 51:13 and 143:10. On the Hebrew scriptures and Judaism, see Gunkel, *Wirkungen*, 6–10 (ET 16–21). With respect to Judaism, Gunkel fails to take into consideration Philo Judaeus, for whom the Spirit, when it is inbreathed, imparts the capacity for virtue.

¹⁷ Acts 10–11. Later, Paul is prevented by the Holy Spirit from entering Bithynia in Asia. Paul has no idea why this is so but obeys anyway. See Gunkel, *Wirkungen*, 10–14 (ET 21–26).

verstehn, glaubt man an den Geist, sondern um das Vorhandensein gewisser, zunächst unerklärlicher Erscheinungen mit Zuhülfenahme eines überweltlichen Faktors erklären zu können.¹⁸

What is the quintessential symptom of the Spirit's presence?¹⁹ The experience of glossolalia is. Speaking in tongues was, in the apostolic age, the "auffallendsten und charakteristischsten" effect of the Spirit.²⁰ In what would appear to irreverent spectators as madness and drunkenness, believers in the apostolic age would identify as the indisputable effect of God's Spirit.²¹

It took quite enough courage – or arrogance – for Gunkel to challenge so many of his professors and peers. Yet the most poignant dimension of this scenario is perhaps not that a young scholar launched such an unflinching critique of renowned German professors. More striking still is that his reconstruction of early Christian pneumatology, in which the effects of the Spirit lay, from Gunkel's perspective, exclusively in mysterious experiences, was so different from his own understanding of the Spirit, which echoed the beliefs of German Idealism. He included in a codicil to his study of the miraculous and mysterious effects of the Holy Spirit an expression of his own opinion on pneumatology:

Die Geistesgaben der apostolischen Zeit sind verschwunden, wenn auch in einzelnen christlichen Kreisen vielleicht Aehnliches bis heute beobachtet werden mag. Aber wir können diese wunderbaren Gaben auch entbehren. Denn noch heute erfahren wir täglich andere Geisteswirkungen in unserm Leben. Auch uns ist der Christenmensch ein Wunder Gottes.²²

Gunkel would express in poetry as well his personal conviction that there is no breach between the divine and human spirits, no divide separating the supernatural realm of the Spirit from the human realm:

Aus allem Handeln irdischer Geister
Webt sich ein Kleid der ewige Meister.²³

¹⁸ "An activity of the Spirit is ascertained not within the scheme of means and ends but rather within the scheme of cause and effect. Belief in the Spirit is not for the purpose of grasping God's plan for the world but for the purpose of explaining the presence of certain, above all inexplicable, phenomena by means of the transcendent." Gunkel, *Wirkungen*, 20 (ET 32–33).

¹⁹ Gunkel, *Wirkungen*, 21 (ET 33–34).

²⁰ Gunkel, *Wirkungen*, 18 (ET 30).

²¹ 1 Cor 14:23 and Acts 2:13 respectively. Other gifts of the Spirit, too, were attributed to the Spirit, and none was seen as an ordinary act that any Christian at any time could perform. Even such gifts as giving and mercy were recognized as acts that were especially sacrificial, spontaneous and magnificent acts effected by the Spirit. The believers at Macedonia, who provide more than amply despite their poverty, illustrate this sort of Spirit-inspired giving. See Gunkel, *Wirkungen*, 25 (ET 37–38).

²² "The gifts of the Spirit in the apostolic age have vanished, though in isolated Christian circles something similar may perhaps be observed to this day. But we can also do without these miraculous gifts. For even now we daily perceive other activities of the Spirit in our life. Even for us, the Christian is a miracle of God." Gunkel, *Wirkungen*, 76 (ET 96).

²³ "From all the commerce of earthly spirits/Is woven a gown of the eternal Lord." W. Klatt,

Small wonder that more than four decades later, Hans Schmidt described Gunkel's *Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes*, which grated so harshly against the beliefs of his own era, even his own convictions, not as "a conclusion but a beginning" and "a new word."

This uncanny ability, at such a young age, to lay aside his own nineteenth-century assumptions in order to unearth first-century points of view, the transference of the Spirit from the realm of the known to the mysterious, from the arena of human potential to that of an overwhelming force, had so much intellectual purchase that it effected an overhaul of pneumatology during the twentieth-century. No more than a year after the third edition of Gunkel's *Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes* was published, for example, Alfred Bertholet's article on "Geist und Geistesgaben im AT," in the first edition of *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, described "die Wirkungen der rûach" as "ursprünglich durchaus spontane ..." ²⁴ and its "Machtswirkungen" as "grossteils unheimlichen oder wenigstens geheimnisvollen" – words that might have been lifted from the pages of Gunkel's own *Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes*. ²⁵

An Unfortunate Legacy

The monumental shift in perspective that Gunkel's book precipitated brought with it a new problem for pneumatology: If the Spirit is to be associated exclusively with the supernatural and mysterious, what then is to be made of the spirit of life, the spirit that gives breath? Gunkel seems also to have stumbled over this nagging distinction between the Spirit as creative power and the Spirit as *super-additum*. Jesus' conception by the Holy Spirit, he argued, distinguished him from ordinary people who are chosen by God to be prophets by a work of the Spirit. Unlike other inspired people, Jesus was originally, through his conception by the Holy Spirit, inspired: "Vermittelt ist dieser Gedanke durch die Vorstellung von dem Geiste Gottes als schöpferischem Lebensgeiste, ein Gedanke, welcher von der Vorstellung vom Geiste als dem Principe göttlicher Wirkungen im Menschen und durch den Menschen gewöhnlich getrennt wird." ²⁶ This is a tricky distinction that Gunkel felt compelled to make between the spirit as creative life-giver and the Spirit as the cause of divine effects in human beings. Note the passive

Hermann Gunkel: *Zu seiner Theologie der Religionsgeschichte und zur Entstehung der formgeschichtlichen Methode* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969), 33.

²⁴ "The effects of the rûach" as "originally completely spontaneous ..." RGG 1st ed., 2:1199. The second edition (1928) is largely unchanged.

²⁵ "Powerful effects" as "unknowable in the main or at least full of mystery." RGG 1st ed., 2:1197.

²⁶ "This thought is conveyed by the idea of the Spirit of God as a creative spirit of life, an idea usually separated from that of the Spirit as a principle of divine activities in and through the person." Gunkel, *Wirkungen*, 6 (ET 16).

voice: "is usually divided." There is here a perplexing – and atypical – ambiguity in Gunkel's typically coherent façade.

This divide between the creative life-spirit and the Spirit as the principle of divine effects in human beings, which Gunkel introduced as little more than an aside, the threads of which he left dangling, would come to full flower in twentieth-century studies of pneumatology. It would become, as we will see, one of the most unfortunate and least examined legacies of twentieth-century pneumatology: theologians would absorb Gunkel's interpretation of the Spirit as wonder-worker and distinguish it from the allegedly less spectacular spirit that remains within from birth. Perhaps the least taxing way of demonstrating the flaws of this legacy is to survey a few influential dictionary entries.

In the third edition of *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*,²⁷ published in 1958, Gillis Gerlemann introduces an uneasy amount of ambiguity in the relationship between the "anthropological and psychological" Geist and the "charismatic" Geist.

Als anthropologischer und psychologischer Terminus bezeichnet *rûah* viel eher etwas Dynamistisches als etwas Konkretes. Der Lebens-G. der Geschöpfe wird nicht als ein Stoff, sondern als eine Kraftwirkung Gottes verstanden (Ez 37, 5.6.9; Gen 6, 17; 7, 15.22). Als eine von Gott ausgehende Kraft oder Eingebung macht sich der G. in Erscheinungen kenntlich, die eine Erhöhung der natürlichen Lebenskraft bedeuten. Menschen werden vom G. überfallen und zu ausserordentlichen Leistungen befähigt. Dieser charismatische G. ist ein konstituierender Faktor der Jahwereligion ...²⁸

The unifying point of this definition is that the Spirit is not so much material as power. Yet Gerlemann also introduces, inadvertently or otherwise, a distinction between the anthropological and psychological Lebens-Geist, under the category of "Terminus," and the charismatic Geist, a constitutive factor of Jahweh-religion.²⁹ What are we to make of a shift from the anthropological and psychological spirit to the charismatic Spirit, which is accentuated by a shift from the

²⁷ Bertholet, in the first edition of *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, derived both the spirit within human beings and the Spirit that exercises powerful effects alike from the notion of wind, thereby avoiding the possibility of this bifurcation. "Will man sich vom Wesen der *rûach* eine Vorstellung machen, so geht man am besten davon aus, dass im Gegensatz zur *nepesch*, die ursprünglich der Atem ist (vg. Hiob 41, 13), *rûach* von Haufe aus den Hauch, d.h. nicht bloss den Lebenshauch (I Mose 6, 17; 7, 15; Jes 11, 4; 42, 5), sondern auch den Lufthauch, d.h. den Wind bezeichnet. Dem entspricht es, dass die *rûach* in einer grossen Zahl von Fällen dem Menschen als etwas Gegenständliches gegenübertritt, dessen, er sich nicht zu entziehen vermag. ..." (RGG 1st ed., 2:1198).

²⁸ "As an anthropological or psychological term, *rûah* denotes something dynamic much more than concrete. The life-spirit of the creation is not understood to be a substance but a powerful action of God (Ez 37, 5.6.9; Gen 6, 17; 7, 15.22). As a power or inspiration that goes out from God, the Spirit makes itself known in appearances that signify the elevation of natural human ability. People are overcome by the Spirit and equipped for extraordinary achievements. This charismatic Spirit is a fundamental factor of Yahwistic religion." RGG 3rd ed. (1958): 2:1270.

²⁹ This includes such phenomena as prophecy and military power.

language of Terminus to constitutive factor? It is difficult to answer this question because Gerlemann's analysis plunges us into a region rife with anachronism: anthropological and psychological and charismatic are analytical terms that do not arise genetically from Israelite literature.

Notwithstanding the distinction Gerlemann creates, he appears nonetheless to understand the anthropological and psychological terminus, spirit, as the same power that raises human capacity, enabling people to accomplish extraordinary feats. Nothing could be farther from the case with respect to G. W. H. Lampe's entry in what was arguably one of the most pre-eminent English language reference works of the twentieth-century, *The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible*, which was published four years later.

Lampe begins his entry on the Holy Spirit with a lopsided description of the Spirit as "the mysterious power of God, conceived in the first place as the mode of God's activity, manifested especially in supernatural revelation to selected individuals ... possessed by a force which gave them marvelous strength, courage, wisdom, and knowledge of God's will and his dealings with men; later identified with the personal presence of God, and regarded as the distinctive endowment of his people."³⁰ The point of departure for "OT conceptions of the Spirit" is the drama of Israel's heroes, the judges, in which the Spirit "is a supernatural and unpredictable power, which takes possession of a man, and controls his actions like a tremendous inner force."³¹ Although he gives no indication of explicit reliance on Gunkel's study, Lampe's description of the Holy Spirit, like Bertholet's in the first edition of *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, is reminiscent of Gunkel's *Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes*.

Unlike Bertholet, Lampe introduces into the discussion a superfluous dichotomy between the human spirit and the divine Spirit that serves further to muddy the waters of pneumatology. In one of nine sections devoted to "OT conceptions of the Spirit," subtitled "in creation," Lampe discusses briefly the spirit as breath, wind, and life-breath.³² "In these last instances the thought is primarily of the 'inbreathing' by God of the life principle or 'soul' of living creatures, but although this life principle is not to be identified with the actual Spirit of God, it is represented by the Hebrew writers as an effect of its operations."³³ This statement is convoluted. What rationale can Lampe offer to explain why the spirit which God inbreathed is not the "actual Spirit of God?" None that I can see. Are we to assume that, because the Spirit of God must be a powerful and mysteri-

³⁰ IDB 2:626.

³¹ IDB 2:626–27.

³² These sections include: possessing Israel's heroes; inspiring rulers; transferred from ruler to ruler (Deut 34:9; Num 27:18–13); inspiring the prophets effecting sanctification and judgment; presence of God with Israel; eschatological expectation; creation; in relation to the being of God (e. g., Isa 34:16; 63:10–14).

³³ IDB 2:629.

ous *superadditum*, an endowment that is “manifested especially in supernatural revelation. . . .” then, as a consequence, the inbreathed spirit cannot be the “actual Spirit of God?”

The errant character of this distinction is exacerbated by another distinction Lampe fabricates between the actual Spirit of God and the human soul, for the notion of a “soul” is an anachronism better suited to the later Alexandrian Wisdom of Solomon and the writings of Philo than to Israel prior to the Greco-Roman era. Yet it is with this anachronistic dichotomy that Lampe, although (or perhaps *because*) he is such an astute scholar of patristic literature, characterizes the life-principle as a soul, as something that cannot finally be identified with the Spirit of God – though this soul is somehow the product of the actual Spirit’s operations.

Lampe’s influential entry illustrates the difficulties that emerge with the introduction of a dichotomy between the spirit of God as life-principle and the powerful Spirit of God. Ultimately, the life principle becomes the human soul, whose existence is dependent, in some inchoate way, upon the actual Spirit of God.

A generation later, the opening definition of the Holy Spirit in Friedrich W. Horn’s entry in the *Anchor Bible Dictionary* would prove as constrictive as Lampe’s: “The manifestation of divine presence and power perceptible especially in prophetic inspiration.”³⁴ Analysis of the Hebrew Bible begins with a discussion of the “Meaning of the Term.” One finds *rûah* as wind, demon, and, in what Horn calls “this essentially physical meaning,” the spirit as breath. Only after dispensing with these apparently lexical issues, does he address the “History of the Concept,” a section that begins with a different tenor: “References to the power of the Spirit of God in the OT period occur first with the charismatic judges and ecstatic prophets.” The bifurcation is clear: the meaning of the *term* includes the life-breath, while the history of the *concept* concerns the power of the Spirit. The life-breath is “essentially physical,” while the Spirit of God has to do with charisma and ecstasy.³⁵

This entry persists in propagating an unfortunate two-tiered evaluation of inspiration that is similar to Lampe’s – and with no fewer questions in its wake. Why begin the analysis of the *concept* of the Holy Spirit with charismatic judges and ecstatic prophets while reducing the divine inbreathing to an “essentially physical” meaning? The implication of this bifurcation is that they are not one and the same Spirit, though Horn does not explain why they are different from one another.

The end product of this brief survey is this fundamental question: *What is the relationship between the spirit that human beings possess from birth – the life-*

³⁴ ABD 3:260.

³⁵ The history of the concept undergoes specific phases: charismatic judges and ecstatic prophets, followed by kingship, the promise of the spirit for the messiah and the whole people.

principle or breath within – and the Spirit that exhibits awesome effects? These entries move away from a relationship of identity, or even continuum, to one of distinction, which is then framed in a variety of ways: an anthropological and psychological *Lebens-Geist* as opposed to the charismatic *Geist* (Gerlemann); a life principle or soul that “is not to be identified with the actual Spirit of God” (Lampe); an “essentially physical meaning” of spirit as breath *versus* the power of the Spirit of God in charismatic judges and ecstatic prophets (Horn); and a lexical *term* versus a *power* (Gerlemann) or a *concept* (Horn) with a history.³⁶

It is undoubtedly evident from the tone of my survey that I regard these entries to have espoused an artificial, anachronistic, and unnecessary division that serves only to obscure the worth that Israelite literature accords to the Spirit-breath of creation. There are many moments in Israelite history at which an endowment with the Spirit is pivotal. We can recall, for example, the judges, upon whom the Spirit rushes (e.g., 14:6), the Isaianic servant, upon whom God gives the Spirit (e.g., 42:1), the nation of Israel and nature itself, upon whom God pours out the Spirit (e.g., Isa 32:15), and the elders of Israel, upon whom God distributes the Spirit (e.g., Num 11:17).³⁷ Yet there are other moments when Israelite and early Jewish authors acknowledge the inspiration that arises, not in the wake of a charismatic endowment, but through the sheer force of life. The quintessential expression of this conviction emerges in the fury of Elihu, whose anger rises against Job and his feckless companions, who “found no answer, though they had declared Job to be in the wrong” (Job 32:3). Elihu stakes a claim for himself despite his youth: “It is the spirit in a mortal, the breath of the Almighty that makes for understanding” (32:8). Slightly later, the dam bursts, and Elihu floods the perplexed silence:

And am I to wait, because they do not speak
because they stand there, and answer no more?
I also will give my answer; I also will declare my opinion.
For I am full of words; the spirit within me lays siege works against me

³⁶ I have referred to these representative and influential reference works, but prominent theologians have followed suit. For example, M. Welker, in his insightful book, *God the Spirit* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994), begins with the narratives of the judges. It is more difficult to discern whether J. Moltmann (*The Spirit of Life: A Universal Affirmation* [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992]) and I. Congar (*I Believe in the Holy Spirit* [New York: Crossroad, 1999]) adequately take into consideration this dimension of inspiration. Congar (3–14) probably does not. He begins with a lexical study (“The Word”) and then turns, in a sub-section entitled, “The Action of the Breath of Yahweh,” to figures such as Balaam (Num 24:2) and the ecstatic experiences of Saul among the prophets (1 Samuel 10, 19). Moltmann (31–38) comes closer to this point of view when he argues that people can experience God in all things and, further, experience all things in God. Yet he devotes relatively little space to this notion of the human spirit as the divine Spirit before moving, in the next chapter, to the endowment or gift of the Spirit in Israel. Moltmann does, however, appear to move very clearly in this direction in his profound and provocative affirmation of the Spirit of Life.

³⁷ For further details, see my entry in the J.R. Levison, “Holy Spirit,” *NIDB* 2:859–79.

[כִּי מַלְחִי מַלִּים הִצִּיקתָּנִי רוּחַ בִּטְנִי].

My heart is indeed like wine that has no vent;

Like new wineskins, it is ready to burst.

I must speak, so that I may find relief;

I must open my lips and answer. (32:16–20)³⁸

Shaking with impatient rage is how Elihu depicts the impact of the spirit within him. The verb he chooses to describe the spirit's effect is used elsewhere of enemies' *bringing on* a siege, which results in such desperate straits that the Israelites will eat the flesh of their sons and daughters (Deut 28:53, 55, 57). Jeremiah describes such a siege, which will *afflict* Jerusalem (19:9), and Isaiah surprises with the image that God will besiege Jerusalem, as David had besieged it, and that "there shall be moaning and lamentation ... siege works against you" (29:2–3). Yet, imagines Isaiah, the many nations who fight against Jerusalem, "who *besiege* her," will evaporate (Isa 29:7). A later prophet in the line of Isaiah criticizes Israel for cowering before the fury of the *oppressor* who is bent on destruction (51:13). The verb is used as well of the relentless nagging of Delilah – her siege against his will – that finally drives Samson to divulge the meaning of a riddle (Judg 14:17) and the mystery of his hair (16:16).

This Hebrew verb does not communicate mere constraint. The spirit within Elihu lays siege works against his patience and attacks his restraint in the presence of inept elders. His heart is about to burst like fermenting wine in new wineskins. The verb translated, "besiege," suggests how palpably Elihu experiences the spirit within as a physical force that violently impels speech after a period of waiting. The sheer physicality of the spirit is apparent, furthermore, in its intimate association with the heart in the following line. Elihu's spirit lays siege works against him; his heart is ready to burst. No distinction between the spirit as a life-principle and the Spirit as the source of extraordinary feats or insight characterizes this statement. The way in which Elihu frames his compulsion to speak shatters any sort of contemporary effort to sequester the anthropological from the charismatic Spirit (Gerlemann), the life-principle from the actual Spirit of God (Lampe), or the essentially physical meaning of spirit from the impact of the Spirit upon judges and prophets (Horn). If Elihu began his monologue with reference to the spirit given by virtue of creation, when he said, "it is the spirit [רוּחַ] in a mortal, the breath of the Almighty [נִשְׁמַת שָׁרִי] that makes for understanding" (Job 32:8), he now continues by reckoning with the power of that spirit-breath to besiege him so that he will speak. The Spirit will invariably, claims Elihu, tumble out of his mouth, across his tongue, taking shape in the words that fill him – not just any words, but inspired words that will be full of wisdom (32:18).

³⁸ Translations of Hebrew are mine, in consultation with the NRSV.

In still other Israelite and early Jewish texts, the spirit within human beings, from birth to death, is referred to without reticence as a holy spirit. Arguably the most picturesque acknowledgement of the holy spirit within occurs in the tale of Susanna, a young woman of inordinate beauty and impeccable virtue. One day, having sent her servants to fetch what she needed, she bathed in a garden. Two elders, who had longed for her sexually, hid themselves in the garden. While Susanna's servants were away, the elders approached her and demanded that she have sexual relations with them or else they would accuse her of adultery with a young man. She refused. When Susanna, the following day, was put on trial, the word of the two elders was naturally taken as truth, despite her protests. God, however, "raised up the holy spirit of a young man"³⁹ ([Theodotion] Susanna 45). Daniel devised a plan to discern the truth: he interrogated each elder separately and asked under which tree each elder saw her committing adultery. Each elder identified a different tree, and so they were put to death – the same penalty that they had sought for Susanna.

What the tale of Susanna offers in story form, the Dead Sea Scrolls offer in prescriptive language. In the Damascus Document, which prescribes a way of life for communities related to the community at Qumran but scattered throughout Palestine, the human spirit is referred to as a "holy spirit:" "... to keep apart from every uncleanness according to their regulations, without anyone defiling his holy spirit [רוח קדשיו], according to what God kept apart for them. For all those who walk according to these matters in perfect holiness, in accordance with his teaching, God's covenant is a guarantee for them that they shall live a thousand generations" (CD 7.3–6; see 12.11).⁴⁰ Also in the Dead Sea Scrolls, in a portion that deals pragmatically with finances, including the prompt repayment of debts, there occurs an admonition against dishonesty.⁴¹ This admonition cautions against exchanging a holy spirit for money: "[Do not in your affairs demean] your spirit; do not for any money exchange your holy spirit [רוח קדשכה], for no price is adequate ..." (4Q416 fr. 2 II.7).⁴²

Philo Judaeus interprets the inbreathing of Gen 2:7 as an instance of inspiration. Philo Judaeus, for example, writes, in *On Planting* 18–19:

... our great Moses likened the fashion of the reasonable soul to no created thing, but averred it to be a genuine coinage of that dread [unseen] Spirit, the

³⁹ Greek reads, ἐξήγειρεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον παιδαρίου νεωτέρου.

⁴⁰ The possessive pronoun, "his," undoubtedly refers to a member of the community rather than to God because its antecedent is a member of the community rather than God. All translations of the Dead Sea Scrolls are from F. G. Martínez and E. J. C. Tigchelaar, *The Dead Sea Scrolls: Study Edition*. 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill and Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997, 1998).

⁴¹ For a discussion of this text, including the key themes of spirituality and poverty, see M. J. Goff, *The Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom of 4QInstruction* (STDJ 50; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 80–167, and on debt repayment and one's holy spirit, see 226.

⁴² For further details, see J. R. Levison, *The Spirit in First-Century Judaism* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 56–77.

Divine and invisible One, signed and impressed by the seal of God, the stamp of which is the Eternal Word. His words are 'God in-breathed into his face a breath of life;' so that it cannot but be that the one that receives is made in the likeness of Him who sends forth the breath.⁴³ The inbreathing of Gen 2:7 is not merely the impartation of a physical principle; it is the gift of divine presence, divine character.⁴⁴

These examples from Israelite and early Jewish literature, though selective, are intended to demonstrate that a bifurcation between the human spirit and the divine Spirit, which appears *mutatis mutandis* in influential twentieth-century reference works, cannot be justified in light of Israelite and early Jewish literature. Such dichotomies as those that are apparent in Gerleemann's distinction between the anthropological-psychological spirit and the charismatic Spirit, Lampe's soul and the actual Spirit of God, and Horn's essentially physical breath and the charismatic Spirit that inspires judges and prophets are not tenable. In particular, the initial endowment of God's Spirit at birth must not be reduced to an inferior presence, a merely physical reality, in comparison with later charismatic endowments.

Israelite and early Jewish conceptions of the Spirit, further, must be construed without recourse to anachronism. Gunkel was justified in identifying early Christian conceptions of the Holy Spirit with miraculous and mysterious effects. Early Christians did believe that filling with the Spirit was a special endowment, a *superadditum* that brought extraordinary abilities in the swells of its powerful wake. Yet twentieth-century scholars interpreted Israel's scriptures all too quickly in light of this early Christian conception of the Spirit. While early Christians did put their stock, even their self-definition, on the line in a subsequent experience of the Spirit, many Israelites and early Jewish authors did not. The Spirit which effected extraordinary insight was not invariably the product of a charismatic endowment; this inspiration, as the citation of Philo's interpretation of Gen 2:7 in *On Planting* 18–19 showed, was the product as well of the gift of spirit-breath at birth.⁴⁵

A Palpable Risk

This study of the Spirit in twentieth-century scholarship demands a reassessment of inspiration in such a way that it will no longer be possible to define the presence of the Holy Spirit exclusively as a subsequent endowment, as supernatural revelation that arrives wholly in a charismatic endowment, as the onslaught of the inexplicable and the advent of the mysterious. Nor should it be possible to caricature the initial instance of inspiration as a purely physical reality.

⁴³ Translations of Philo's works are from the Loeb Classical Library.

⁴⁴ On Philo's interaction with Stoicism, Levison, *The Spirit in First-Century Judaism*, 144–51.

⁴⁵ For a detailed analysis of this thesis, Levison, *Filled with the Spirit*, 14–86, 104–105, 109–53, 218–21, and 236–52.

This reassessment may be difficult because this view is so deeply entrenched, not only in reference works that reflect the legacy of Gunkel's *Büchlein*, but also in the growing global tide of Pentecostalism that privileges such phenomena as glossolalia, which Gunkel identified as the salient characteristic of inspiration in the early church.⁴⁶ In order to appreciate the cost of redefining the origins of pneumatology in this way, we may turn to the life of Hermann Gunkel. In his eulogy, Schmidt traced the lasting value of Gunkel's commentary upon Genesis, the enduring qualities of his form-critical analysis of the Psalms, and the variety of his contributions to a modern understanding of the private and public dimensions of Israelite prophecy.⁴⁷ What Schmidt barely mentioned in his eulogy was Hermann Gunkel's early work in the field of New Testament. Although he devoted most of his career to research on the Hebrew Bible, Gunkel had wanted, like his friends, Wilhelm Bousset, William Wrede, and Johannes Weiss, to become a New Testament scholar. He chose, therefore, to write a Habilitation at the University of Göttingen on the teaching of the Holy Spirit in the New Testament – a study that did not, in the years that lay ahead, serve him well.

After the Habilitation had been completed, on November 23, 1887, Gunkel's father requested, on behalf of his twenty-five year old son, a stipend to become a Privatdozent from the Prussian Cultural Minister. The letter that came from the Göttingen theological faculty was disheartening:

Die in den Kreisen der Theologischen Fakultät ... stimmen darin überein, dass seine wissenschaftliche Begabung bei aller Anerkennung seines Strebens keine hervorragende, seine Persönlichkeit bei aller Anerkennung seiner Charaktereigenschaften keine sympathische sei, und dass demgemäss seine Habilitation nicht gewünscht wird.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Gunkel, *Wirkungen*, 18 (ET 30). On the rise of global Pentecostalism, see W. Hollenweger, *The Pentecostals: The Charismatic Movement in the Churches* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1972); and P. Jenkins, *The New Faces of Christianity: Believing the Bible in the Global South* (Oxford: Oxford University, 2006).

⁴⁷ On Schmidt's eulogy, see n. 3. I have reconstructed Gunkel's biography from several reliable – and fascinating – sources: Klatt, *Gunkel*; W. Baumgartner, "Zum 100. Geburtstag von Hermann Gunkel," *Congress Volume: Bonn 1962* (SVT 9; ed. G. W. Anderson, P. A. H. de Boer, G. R. Castellino, H. Cazelles, E. Hammershaimb, H. G. May, W. Zimmerli; Leiden: Brill, 1963), 1–18; K. von Rabenau, "Hermann Gunkel auf rauen Pfaden nach Halle," *EvT* 30 (1970), 433–44; H. Rollmann, "Zwei Briefe Hermann Gunkels an Adolf Jülicher zur religionsgeschichtlichen und formgeschichtlichen Methode," *ZTK* 78 (1981), 276–88; R. Smend, "Wellhausen in Greifswald," *ZTK* 78 (1981), 141–76. Klatt's is the most thorough and informative. Baumgartner's is the most profound and humorous. Rollmann's is the most puzzling to me, as Gunkel's deferential tone toward Adolf Jülicher, whom he has never met, is very much that of a junior colleague to a senior one – despite Gunkel's enormous scholarly stature.

⁴⁸ "Those in the circles of the theological faculty ... agree that his scholarly ability, despite every acknowledgement of his effort, is not outstanding, that his personality, despite every acknowledgement of his personal qualities, is not congenial, and that accordingly his Habilitation is not wanted." For information on this period in Gunkel's life, see Klatt, *Gunkel*, 39–41.

Although the faculty encouraged him not to pursue the academic track and thus to forgo the second theological exam, on October 19, 1888, Gunkel was awarded his degree, and he received as well an annual stipend of twelve-hundred marks, beginning on April 1, 1889. It lasted two years, and its extension was contingent upon further accomplishments.

Although he was awarded a degree and stipend, Gunkel's *Werkchen* did not lead, early in his career, to a permanent post in New Testament at a German university. After he wrote his Habilitation and became a Privatdozent in Göttingen, the ministerial director of culture in Prussia, Friedrich Althoff, ordered Gunkel to move to Halle, where, at the time, there was no room for a Privatdozent in New Testament.⁴⁹ When a position at the university in Halle became available in 1889, following the publication of his book on the Holy Spirit in 1888, he was fourth on the list. Further, his inaugural lecture as Privatdozent on eschatological expectation in Judaism was judged to be immature. Gunkel was compelled by this unfortunate state of affairs to take advantage of an opportunity at a local *Hochschule*, where he became Privatdozent for the study of the Old Testament, although he was unprepared for the task with respect to Semitic languages and cultures. He also had few students at Halle, although he was apparently a gifted teacher, according to his colleague, Emil Kautzsch, some of his students, including Otto Dibelius and Walter Baumgartner, as well as Martin Dibelius and Rudolf Bultmann, who later attended his Berlin lectures.⁵⁰

With respect to this setback, Gunkel, years later, although not at the time, would talk positively of "gewissen Schickungen" that forced him to move "auf ein anderes, wenn auch verwandtes Fach."⁵¹ Schmidt, in the Bartholomäus Kirche, would note the resilience that developed in Gunkel: "Aber auch aus dieser Schwierigkeit wachsen ihm die Schwingen."⁵² Gunkel extended his competence from the New to the Old Testament by comparing two widely disparate texts, Genesis 1 and Revelation 12.⁵³ As a further sign of his tenacity, this book drew from the soil of his earlier lecture on Jewish eschatology, which had been deemed immature.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Klatt (*Gunkel*, 40–41) ventures several explanations, none of them, by his own admission, firm.

⁵⁰ Note especially Smend, "Greifswald," 166, and much of Baumgartner's encomium.

⁵¹ "Certain fates" that forced him to move "to another if also related field." Klatt, *Gunkel*, 164.

⁵² "But even out of this difficulty, he grew wings." *Theologische Blätter*, col. 99.

⁵³ That resolve is evident in Gunkel's ability, during those unheralded years, to write his first magisterial, independent book, *Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit, eine religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung über Gen 1 und Ap Joh 12* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1895).

⁵⁴ This book reflects not only tenacity but a certain malleability. Gunkel pored over Richard Lepsius' volumes on Egyptian monuments, and for an acquaintance with Babylonian culture he turned to his new friend, the Assyriologist, H. Zimmern, who translated relevant cuneiform texts for him. See Klatt, *Gunkel*, 42.

Gunkel never returned to the topic of pneumatology. Twenty-one years after he published his *Werkchen*, in 1909, Gunkel published only an unrevised third edition, despite urgent requests from the publisher to revise it.⁵⁵ On September 8, 1925, as a man of sixty-three years of age, Gunkel penned a letter to Adolf Jülicher, in which he described his sense of isolation during his earliest years as a scholar – presumably the years that encompassed his research on *Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes*:

Viele, viele Jahre lang habe ich auf Verständnis und Miterarbeit umsonst gewartet ... Welchen Gewinn hätte damals gehabt, wenn ich einen älteren Freund gefunden hätte, dem ich meine 1000 Fragen hätte vortragen können, und der mich beraten hätte! So habe ich den schweren Weg so lange Zeit hindurch allein gehen müssen. Vielleicht bin ich auch selbst an dieser Vereinsamung schuld gewesen, da ich wohl in jugendlichem Überschwang zu schroff in der Bekämpfung älterer Meinungen gewesen bin, obwohl ich mich immer gehütet habe, den Streit ins Persönliche zu ziehen.⁵⁶

Gunkel planned to make the acquaintance of Adolf Jülicher, whom he had never met, and he hoped that his conversation with Jülicher might be a sign “daß mein Leben, das mit solchem Sturm begonnen hat, in Frieden und Ruhe schließen wird.”⁵⁷ Within four years of his meeting with Adolf Jülicher, Hermann Gunkel became ill with gastro-intestinal pain and arteriosclerosis, and, within seven years, Hans Schmidt delivered a eulogy for him in the Bartholomäus-Kirche in Halle, Germany. The tone and content of his letter to Adolf Jülicher indicate that much in his professional life, in his opinion, was less than satisfactory; a survey of the academic posts he occupied provides evidence for why he was unsatisfied with his career. Gunkel was offered an außerordentlich professorship – a position lower in rank than an ordentlich Professor – in Halle on October 20, 1894. Despite his publications, he subsequently spent thirteen years, beginning on January 16, 1895, in a similar position in Berlin. He was first offered an ordentlich professorship at the age of forty-five, in 1907, in place of his teacher, Stade, and in Gießen rather than in his native Prussia.⁵⁸ Even as late as 1919, when Carl Heinrich Cornhill retired at Halle, the name of Gunkel, who was now fifty-seven years of age, did not appear on the list of candidates. Even a letter from

⁵⁵ Gunkel, *Wirkungen*, iii. For a brief summary of Gunkel's *Wirkungen*, see Klatt, *Gunkel*, 29–36.

⁵⁶ “Long, long years have I waited in vain for understanding and collegiality ... What a prize I would have had at that time if I had found an older friend to whom I could pose my 1000 questions and who might have advised me! So I have had to take the difficult way for such a long time thoroughly alone. Perhaps I myself bear the guilt for this loneliness because I, in youthful exuberance, was probably too blunt in opposition to older opinions, although I always took care not to drag the dispute into the personal realm.”

⁵⁷ “That my life, which began with such a storm, will end in peace and calm.” On Gunkel's letter to Jülicher, see Rollmann, “Zwei Briefe,” 281–82.

⁵⁸ Klatt, *Gunkel*, 43, n. 17, notes what the Prussian cultural minister wrote of Bousset: “Für Leute wie Bousset gibt es in Preussen kein Ordinariat.” Klatt supposes that the “Leute” must also have included Gunkel.

the cultural minister, written on March 9, 1920, demanding that a representative of the History of Religions School be appointed, had little effect upon the faculty, who responded on March 27 with a list that included Bertholet, Sellin, and Procksch – but not Gunkel. The cultural minister in turn rejected this list because none of these was a true representative of the History of Religions School, so finally, on June 29, 1920, Gunkel was appointed to an ordinary professorship in Prussia. That this decision met with the displeasure of the faculty is apparent in the dean's description, written on August 7, according to which Gunkel was offered the professorship because of the cultural minister's nomination but in the face of public anger.⁵⁹

Conclusion

This essay has raised the question of the relationship between the spirit that human beings possess through creation and the Spirit that produces spectacular effects. Hermann Gunkel's influential book on the Spirit raised this question by identifying inexplicable experiences, such as *glossolalia*, as the quintessential effects of the Spirit in early Christianity. With this thesis, he rejected an interpretation of the Spirit, along German Idealist lines, as the potential for human achievement or the principle of Christian consciousness (e.g., F. C. Baur). Subsequent reference works adopted the dichotomy between the human spirit and the divine Spirit. Scholars distinguished an anthropological life-spirit from the charismatic Spirit, a soul from the actual Spirit of God, or an essentially physical understanding of spirit as breath from the Spirit of God in judges and prophets. An analysis of these articles and of Israelite and early Jewish literature demonstrated that this dichotomy between the human spirit and the divine Spirit is not tenable. However, a concluding biographical sketch of Hermann Gunkel, whose career did not benefit from the influence of his first book, suggests that an attempt to undermine this dichotomy will be difficult, since, like pneumatologies rooted in German Idealism during Gunkel's day, this dichotomy is now entrenched in many of the most influential reference works of the twentieth-century.

Postscript

There is a measure of irony in turning to Hermann Gunkel's life to assess the cost of reassessing the starting point of pneumatology, since it is his legacy, represented by the views of Gerlemann, Lampe, and Horn, that must now be overturned.

⁵⁹ Information pertaining to this search can be found in Rabenau, "Pfad nach Halle," 438–41.

If the life of Hermann Gunkel provides any clue to the consequences of radically reassessing the origins of pneumatology, then we can anticipate that such a reassessment will not be received peaceably. Admittedly, much of the opposition that Gunkel experienced can be laid at the feet of his pioneering role in the development of the History of Religions School, which prompted enormous animus. Yet Gunkel's loyalties to an allegedly wayward methodology and its marginalized proponents is not the whole of the story. He called into question, at the onset of his career, a settled and sensible pneumatology, at least from the perspective of scholarship. Too much was at stake in terms of academic credibility and scholarly sanity vis-à-vis pneumatology. His emphasis upon the spectacular flew in the face of his distinguished predecessors and cost him dearly.

And now, a century after the publication of the third edition of Gunkel's *Werkchen*, too much may be at stake again, both in the risk of revising the academic study of pneumatology, which witnesses to the influence of Gunkel and his legacy, and in the life of the church, whose growth, in sheer numbers if not in spirit, lies with the current inexorable wave of neo-Pentecostal vitality. Perhaps in this scenario, which is at once promising and perilous, with its keen emphasis upon the mysterious effects – *Wirkungen* – of the Holy Spirit, there is room also to embrace the belief that the human spirit is a Holy Spirit, that God's inbreathing at birth is no less divine than the Spirit which prompts speaking in tongues, that the pulse of life-breath which rolls over human tongues in occasional wisdom and consistent virtue is the Spirit of God that broods over the abyss of human confusion and chaos.

Index of References

Hebrew Bible

<i>Genesis</i>		8:10, 19, 22	79
1	127 n. 14	9:14, 29	79
1–3	13, 22, 41, 46, 48, 55, 57, 58 n. 68	10:2	79
1:2	224	11:7	79
1:14	24	11:9–10	79
1:26	62 n. 4, 65	14:1–4, 16–18	79
1:27	46–47, 55–57, 56 n. 58, 57	14:4, 18	79, 82
1:28	21, 21 n. 3, 34	14:25	79
2	58	19–24	218
2–3	36, 56	32–34	70, 70 n. 31
2:7	34, 36, 46–47, 55–57, 325–326	33:3, 5	70 n. 30
2:10–14	224 n. 32	33:16	64 n. 9
2:23	182	33:7	77 n. 59
3	117–118, 279	34	70 n. 27
3:1	117	34:6–7	62 n. 4, 70, 70 n. 27
3:6	117	34:9	62 n. 4, 70, 70 n. 30
3:13	117		
3:19	34, 35 n. 42, 36	<i>Leviticus</i>	
3:20	36, 36 n. 43	15:16–18	30
3:21	56 n. 60	17:14	32
4:10–11	28 n. 19	18:24–25	30
6–9	22		
6:1–4	27, 31 n. 27	<i>Numbers</i>	
6:3	34	5:14, 30	133 n. 62
6:5	22 n. 6	11:17	323
6:17	320, 320 n. 28	22	195
7:15–22	320, 320 n. 28	24:2	323 n. 36
8:21	22 n. 6	24:6	77 n. 59
9:4–5	32	27:18–13	321 n. 32
12–50	218		
26:25	77 n. 59	<i>Deuteronomy</i>	
<i>Exodus</i>		5–26	218
1–18	218	6:5	130 n. 43
7:3–5	79	9–10	62 n. 4
7:5	79, 82	9:6, 13	70 n. 30
7:17	79	12:23	32
		28:12	26 n. 13
		28:53, 55, 57	324
		34:9	321 n. 32

- | | | | |
|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|----------------|
| <i>Judges</i> 14:6 | 323 | <i>Isaiah</i> | |
| 14:17 | 324 | 6:2–4 | 232 |
| 16:16 | 324 | 11:1, 2 | 317 n. 16 |
| | | 19:21 | 64 n. 9 |
| <i>1 Samuel</i> | | 28:6 | 317 n. 16 |
| 10, 19 | 323 n. 36 | 29:7 | 324 |
| | | 29:16 | 243 n. 69 |
| <i>2 Samuel</i> | | 32:15 | 317 n. 16, 323 |
| 7:8 | 252 | 34:16 | 321 n. 32 |
| 16:7–8 | 175 | 42:1 | 323 |
| | | 44:6 | 218 n. 6 |
| <i>1 Kings</i> | | 51:13 | 324 |
| 10:2 | 267 n. 21 | 63:10–14 | 321 n. 32 |
| | | <i>Jeremiah</i> | |
| <i>2 Kings</i> | | 10:13 | 26 n. 13 |
| 4:32–37 | 247 n. 111 | 12:12 | 131 |
| 13:20–21 | 247 n. 111, 255 | 19:9 | 324 |
| | | 29:2–3 | 324 |
| <i>Nehemiah</i> | | 51:16 | 26 n. 13 |
| 9:16, 17 | 70 n. 30 | <i>Ezekiel</i> | |
| | | 36:27 | 317 n. 16 |
| <i>Job</i> | | 36:32 | 64 n. 9 |
| 1:1–3 | 190 | 37: 5, 6, 9 | 320, 320 n. 28 |
| 1:21a | 37 | <i>Daniel</i> | |
| 32:16–20 | 323–324 | 2 | 43 |
| 32:3 | 323 | 2:18–19, 27–30, 47 | 43 |
| 32:8 | 323–324 | 4:29 | 133 n. 63 |
| 32:18 | 324 | 7 | 127 n. 14 |
| 38:22 | 26 n. 13 | 12:3 | 54 n. 54 |
| | | <i>Hosea</i> | |
| <i>Psalms</i> | | 4:12 | 133 n. 62 |
| 8 | 34 | 5:4 | 133 n. 62 |
| 25:9 | 175 | <i>Jonah</i> | |
| 41:6, 12 | 130 | 1:2 | 247 n. 105 |
| 49:6–21 | 35 n. 42 | 2:1 | 247 n. 106 |
| 50:14 | 130 n. 37 | 2:3 | 247 n. 107 |
| 51:13 | 317 n. 16 | 2:11 | 247 n. 108 |
| 56:5 | 59 | <i>Zechariah</i> | |
| 76:4, 7 | 130 n. 41 | 12:10 | 317 n. 16 |
| 78:39 | 59 | 13:2 | 134 n. 74 |
| 104:19 | 24 | | |
| 106 | 71 n. 32 | | |
| 106:20 | 62 n. 4, 65, 73 n. 39 | | |
| 135:7 | 26 n. 13 | | |
| 143:10 | 317 n. 16 | | |
| | | | |
| <i>Proverbs</i> | | | |
| 12:10 | 131 | | |
| 29:1 | 70 n. 30 | | |

Other Ancient Jewish Sources

<i>1 Enoch</i>		15:11	31
1-5	26, 26 n. 15	15:11-12	32
1:4-9	27	16:1	28, 31, 33
1:5-7	29	16:3	28
1:7	27	17-19	26 n. 15, 28
2:1	27	17-36	28
2:1-5:4	26	17:3	26 n. 13
2:2-5:3	27, 29	18:10-11	29
2:3	27, 27 n. 16	18:12-16	29
4:1	27	19:1-2	29
5:2	27	19:3	28
5:3	27	20-36	22 n. 6, 26 n.15,
5:5-9	27		28-29
5:6, 7	27	21:1-6	29
6-11	26 n. 15, 27, 27 n. 17,	21:7-10	29
	31, 33 n. 33	22	29, 33
6:1-2	31 n. 27	22:10	33
6:1-11:2	73 n. 42	25:3-26:2	29
7	38	26:3-27:4	29
7:3-5	28, 31	32:6	22 n. 6
7:5	38	41:4-5	26 n. 13
7:6	28, 38	60:12, 15, 19-21	26 n. 13
8:2	28, 31	104:4-6	54 n. 54
9	38	106:19	43
9:1	27		
9:2	28, 28 n. 19, 38	<i>2 Esdras</i>	
9:9	31	19:16, 17	70 n. 30
9:9-10	38		
10:15	33 n. 34	<i>2 Maccabees</i>	
10:16-11:2	28	3:7-34	162 n. 36
10:20-22	28	6:18-7:42	289 n. 19
10:7	28, 31		
10:8	28, 31	<i>3 Baruch</i>	
12:1; 14:8	221 n. 24	11:1-2	221 n. 24
12:4	30-31, 33, 38		
12-16	26 n. 15, 28, 30, 37	<i>3 Maccabees</i>	
15-16	30	5:27	188 n. 6
15:2-16:4	30		
15:3	30-31, 33, 38	<i>4 Maccabees</i>	
15:4	33	2:6	122 n. 46
15:4-5	31, 33, 38	4:1-14	162 n. 36
15:6-7	33		
15:8	32	<i>Aristeas</i>	
15:8-10	28, 33	135, 138	71
15:8-16:1	32		

- Assumption of Moses*
 10.1 134 n. 74
- Baruch*
 2:30 70 n. 30
- Genesis Rabbah*
 20:12 56 n. 60
- Joseph and Aseneth*
 10:17 162 n. 36
 12:1–15 162 n. 36
 13:11–13 188 n. 6
 14:2–15 162 n. 36
 15:2–6 162 n. 36
- Josephus*
 A.J. 1.60 119 n. 32
 A.J. 8.45–49 132 n. 56
- Judith*
 8:18 69
 8:19 69
- Philo*
 Cher. 92 72 n. 36
 Congr. 27 143 n. 131
 Decal. 52–81 71
 Det. 1 165 n. 49
 Her. 68 109 n. 53
 Leg. 1.57 154, 155 n. 16
 Migr. 128–131 154
 Migr. 35.3 304 n. 17
 Migr. 69 163 n. 39
 Mos. 2.2 217 n. 4
 Opif. 54 165 n. 49
 Opif. 134 48
 Plant. 18–19 325
 Plant. 18–19 326
 Somn. 217 270 n. 32
 Leg. 3.248 143 n. 130
- Qumran Literature*
 1Q26 13, 41
 1Q27 1 i 3–4 42
 1QH 4:27 55 n. 56
 1QH 5:15 45
 1QH 5:19–22 26 n. 14
- 1QH 5:30–31 45
 1QH 19:16–17 43 n. 9
 1QS 3:18 46
 1QS 4:22–23 55
 1QS 11:3–4 42
 1QS 11:9 45
 1QS 11:20–22 57 n. 64
 1QSa 1:6–7 44
 4Q402 4 12 43 n. 9
 4Q415–18, 423 13, 41
 4Q416 1 44
 4Q416 1 12 44, 45 n. 18
 4Q416 1 16 45 n. 17
 4Q416 2 ii 21 50 n. 42
 4Q416 2 iii 12 48
 4Q416 2 II.7 325
 4Q417 1 i 47
 4Q417 1 i 13–18 43–44
 4Q417 1 i 15–16 46 n. 22
 4Q417 1 i 16 46
 4Q417 1 i 17 47, 47 n. 27
 4Q417 1 i 3–4 43
 4Q417 1 ii 12 45 n. 17
 4Q418 123 ii 3–4 43
 4Q418 43 4 43
 4Q418 69 ii 44
 4Q418 69 ii 13 45
 4Q418 81 45
 4Q418 81 1–2 45, 48
 4Q418 81 4–5 43
 4Q423 42 n.6, 46, 48, 55
 CD 2:9–10 43 n. 9
 CD 3:20 55 n. 56
 CD 7:3–6 325
 CD 10:6 44
 CD 12:11 325
 CD 14:6–8 44
- Sirach*
 1–2 67
 1:1 73 n. 42
 1:1–2 75
 1:1–10 23
 1:1–15 76 n. 53
 1:3 23
 1:3–4 76
 1:4 77 n. 62
 1:9 72 n. 37

1:12–16	73 n. 42	8:3–4	75
1:13	25	8:13	81
1:14	74	8:17	77 n. 60, 78 n. 63
1:15	73 n. 42	8:17–21	76–78
1:16	73 n. 42, 76	8:18	78 n. 63
1:16–2:24	76	8:19	77, 78 n. 63
2	73 n. 42	8:20	77, 78 n. 63
2:1	76	8:21	77, 77 n. 60, 78, 78 n. 63, 79
2:10	164 n. 46	9:1–18	76
2:12–20	80	9:5–6	78, 78 n. 63
2:13, 16, 18	80	9:6–17	13
2:20	72 n. 37	9:13	78, 78 n. 63
2:21	76	9:13–17	62, 75 n. 50, 76, 77 n. 62, 78, 78 n. 63, 81
2:23	73 n. 42	9:14	78, 78 n. 63
2:23–24	73	9:15	77 n. 59, 78, 78 n. 63
2:24	76	9:16	78, 78 n. 63
3–5	67	9:17	78, 78 n. 63, 81
3:7, 13, 18	72 n. 37	10:1	65 n. 12, 73 n. 42
3:13	80	11–19	65, 75, 80
3:18	145 n. 148	11:1	65 n. 12
3:22	23 n. 8	11:2	65 n. 12, 77 n. 59
3:22–24	28 n. 20	11:5	65 n. 12
4:15	72 n. 37	11:13	79, 82
5:1–14	79, 82	11:15	66, 76 n. 54
5:3–7	80	11:15–16:4	66
5:8–16	80	11:16	66
5:10	131	11:17–12:22	66
5:17	80 n. 68	11:18	143 n. 131
5:17–23	72, 80, 80 n. 68	11:24–25	67, 67 n. 19
5:18	80 n. 68	12:6	69
5:20	80 n. 68	12:10	76
5:22	80 n. 68	12:23–27	66
5:23	80 n. 68	12:27	67, 67 n. 20, 79, 82
6–9	67	13–15	14, 61–62, 62 n. 3, 62 n. 4, 63, 66–67, 69, 72 n. 35, 73, 81–82
6:6	72 n. 37	13:1	62, 67, 67 n. 17, 67 n. 20, 68, 69 n. 24
6:12–16	75, 78	13:1–9	61, 66–68, 71–72, 74–75, 75 n. 50, 78, 81
7–9	13, 63, 82	13:1–15:19	66
7:1	77, 77 n. 58, 78 n. 63, 177 n. 14	13:2	67 n. 20
7:1–6	76–78	13:3	67 n. 20, 68
7:1–8:21	76 n. 56	13:3–5	68, 71
7:3	77, 78 n. 63	13:4	67 n. 17
7:6	77, 77 n. 58		
7:14	78 n. 63		
7:22	13		
7:25–26	75, 75 n. 51		
7:33	36 n. 44		
8	36 n. 44		

13:5	67 n. 17, 67 n. 20, 68	14:22–26	69, 72
13:6	67 n. 20, 69 n. 24	14:22–29	68
13:6–9	68	14:26	72, 72 n. 36
13:7	67 n. 17, 69 n. 24	14:27	69, 69 n. 24
13:8	72	14:29	67 n. 18, 69 n. 24
13:9	67 n. 20	14:30	69 n. 24
13:10	67, 67 n. 17, 67 n. 20, 67 n. 18, 69 n. 24	14:30–31	68, 72
13:10–19	66–67	14:31	70
13:11	67 n. 17, 69 n. 24	15:1	69
13:12	67 n. 17, 67 n. 18	15:1–2	70 n. 27
13:13	69 n. 24, 76	15:1–3	62 n. 4, 69, 81
13:14	67, 69 n. 24	15:1–6	66, 68–70
13:15	67 n. 18, 69 n. 24	15:2	70
13:16	69 n. 24	15:2–3	71–72, 75, 78
13:16–19	67 n. 18	15:4	69, 69 n. 24, 76
13:17	67 n. 18	15:5	69 n. 24
13:18	67 n. 18, 69 n. 24	15:6	69 n. 24
13:19	67 n. 17, 67 n. 18	15:7	67 n. 18, 77 n. 59
14:1	69 n. 23	15:7–13	66–67
14:1–3	69, 69 n. 23	15:8	67 n. 18, 69 n. 24, 77 n. 59, 77 n. 62
14:1–8	66	15:9	67 n. 18, 77 n. 59
14:2	69 n. 23, 69 n. 24	15:10	69 n. 24
14:3	69 n. 23	15:11	77 n. 59, 77 n. 62
14:4	69 n. 23, 69 n. 24	15:12	69 n. 24
14:4–5	69	15:14	69 n. 24
14:4–6	69	15:14–17	67
14:5	69 n. 23, 69 n. 24	15:14–19	66
14:6	69, 69 n. 23, 69 n. 24, 73 n. 42	15:15	67 n. 18, 69 n. 25
14:7	69 n. 23	15:16	67 n. 18, 77 n. 59, 77 n. 62
14:8	67 n. 18	15:17	67 n. 18, 69 n. 24
14:9–11	68, 72	15:18	69 n. 24
14:9–31	67–68	15:18–19	67, 67 n. 19
14:10	69 n. 24	15:19	69 n. 24
14:11	69 n. 24, 69 n. 25	16:1–4	66
14:12	68, 72	16:5	76 n. 54
14:12–14	68	16:7	22 n. 6
14:14	69 n. 24	16:8	79, 82
14:15	67 n. 18, 69 n. 24	16:11	70 n. 30
14:15–21	68, 73	16:15–29	72, 80, 80 n. 68
14:17	69 n. 24	16:16	80 n. 68
14:18	69 n. 24	16:17	80 n. 68
14:18–21	69 n. 24	16:18	79, 82, 80 n. 68
14:19	68, 69 n. 24	16:19	80 n. 68
14:20	67 n. 18, 69 n. 24	16:20	80 n. 68
14:21	69 n. 24	16:22	80 n. 68
14:22	69 n. 24	16:23	80 n. 68

16:24	74, 80 n. 68	39:31	25
16:24–17:14	23	39:33–34	25
16:24–18:14	23 n. 7	40:1	35 n. 42, 36–37, 37 n. 46, 38
16:25	80 n. 68		
16:26–28	23–24	40:1–10	35 n. 42
16:26–30	26	40:1–11	35–36
16:27	24	40:1–17	35 n. 42
16:29	80 n. 68	40:2–10	36
16:29–30	23	40:8–10	35 n. 42
16:30	24, 34, 36, 36 n. 44, 38	40:10	29
		40:11	35 n. 42, 36 n. 42
16:30–17:1	34	40:11–17	35 n. 42
17	81	40:12	35 n. 42
17:1	24, 33, 37	40:12–17	36 n. 42
17:2	34	40:17	35 n. 42
17:3	34	42:15–43:33	23, 25
17:4	34	42:17	26
17:14	23 n. 7	42:18	25
17:20	23 n. 7	42:23	25, 36 n. 44
18:4	81	42:24–25	25
18:6	69	43:1–12	25
18:13	79, 82	43:3–4	26
18:22	74, 81	43:6–7	24
18:24	74	43:8	26
19:1–5	79	43:11	26
19:15	72 n. 37	43:13–14	26
24	23	43:13–22	25
24:5–6	23	43:21–22	26
24:7–12	23	43:23–25	27
24:13–17	23	43:23–26	25
24:25–27	23	43:24	26
24:28	37 n. 46	43:25	26, 36 n. 44
33:7–15	23–24, 24 n. 12, 34	43:27–30	26
33:8	24	43:27–33	25–26
33:10	35, 35 n. 40, 35 n. 41, 37, 37 n. 46	43:31–32	26
		43:32	23 n. 8
33:11–12	34	44:16–18	22 n. 6
33:12	24	44:23	36 n. 44
33:13	35, 35 n. 41	45:16	36 n. 44
33:15	24	46:20	36 n. 44
39:12–35	23, 25	49:16	36 n. 44, 37
39:16–17	25		
39:21	25	<i>Susanna</i>	
39:25	25	45	325
39:25–29	29		
39:26–27	25	<i>Targum Pseudo-Jonathan</i>	
39:29–30	25	Tg. Ps.-Jon. to Gen 3:21	56 n. 60
39:30	26 n. 13		

Testament of Naphtali

3:4 72 n. 36

Testament of Solomon

11.3–7 44

*Graeco-Roman Sources**Achilles Tatius*

Leuc. Clit. 6 288 n. 14

Aelius Aristides

Orationes 5:51 163 n. 39

Aeschylus

Ag. 1072 305

Ag. 1293 176 n. 4

Ag. 1624 162 n. 36

Eum. 33 302

Eum. 253 176 n. 4

Eum. 1003–1047 165 n. 49

Pers. 299–301 163 n. 39

Aëtius 16.23

Aëtius 302 n. 11

Alcinous

Handbook of Platonism 16.2 213 n. 17

Anonymi Medici

De generatione et semine 22.2

179 n. 20

Apollonius Paradoxographus

Historiae Mirabiles 3206 n. 9

Apuleius

De Deo Socr. 13 132 n. 60

Dogm. Plat.

1.12.205–206 132 n. 60

Metam. 2.319 196 n. 41

Metam. 4.28–6.24 196

Metam. 6.24 196

Metam. 8.24–9.10 201

Metam. 9.28 286 n. 10

Metam. 11.15 162 n. 36

Metam. 11.22.5 142 n. 125

Metam. 11.26.3 147 n. 157

Aretaeus

Sign. acut. 1.5.7 132 n. 54

Sign. diut. 3.6.10 133 n. 63

Aristophanes

Lys. 787–794 133 n. 63

Lys. 414–15 286 n. 10

Plut. 640 163 n. 39

Aristotle

Ath. pol. 18.1–3 290 n. 23

Eth. nic. 1103a14–b25 107 n. 52

Eth. nic. 1145a15–1154b34 88 n. 9

Eth. nic. 1177b33 164

Eth. nic. 1179b4–1180a24 107 n. 52

Gen. an. 726b30–727a30 179 n. 23

Gen. an. 726b7–10 179

Gen. an. 727a2–3 179

Gen. an. 727a36 179

Gen. an. 728a18–22 179

Gen. an. 728a25–27 180

Gen. an. 730a28–30 180

Gen. an. 765b15f 179 n. 23

Gen. an. 777a3–4 179 n. 22

Metaph. 980a24ff 164 n. 46

Metaph. 986a 275 n. 46

Part. an. 646a13–24 177

Part. an. 648a12 179 n. 23

Pol. 1260a 272 n. 37

Rhet. 1375a22–1377b15 291 n. 25

[Aristotle]

Rhet. Alex. 25.1, 1436a 249 n. 126

Rhet. Alex. 30.4–5, 1438a 249 n. 127

Artemidorus Daldianus

Onir. 3.6 133 n. 72

Chariton

Chaer. 1.11.11 198

Chaer. 8.7.1–2 197

Choricius

Oration 3.2.13 289 n. 18

Cicero

De or. 194 121 n. 44
 De or. 2.36 157 n. 23
 De or. 2.46 171
 Dom. 127 120 n. 41
 Dom. 98 171
 Fam. 5.12.4 202 n. 69
 Fin. 1.42 153
 Fin. 1.71–72 153 n. 10
 Fin. 3.4 153 n. 10
 Fin. 3.5–6 153
 Fin. 4.16, 19 153 n. 10
 Fin. 5.18 153 n. 10
 Fin. 3.16 90 n. 16
 Fin. 3.21 91 n. 17
 Har. resp. 19 167 n. 56
 Leg. 2.26 166 n. 52
 Leg. 2.26 165
 Leg. 3.131 165 n. 49
 Leg. man. 13.36.42 171
 Nat. d. 2,8 167 n. 56
 Nat. d. 2:4 168
 Nat. d. 2:5 168
 Off. 1.112 155
 Off. 1.115 155
 Part. or. 31–32 249 n. 127
 Rosc. Am. 63 171
 Rosc. Am. 69 120 n. 40
 Rosc. Am. 69 120 n. 42
 Tull. 4 120 n. 41
 Tusc. 4.5 153 n. 10

Claudius Aelianus

Varia Historia 5.17 167 n. 55

[Demetrius]

Typ. Epist. 11 248 n. 125

Dio Chrysostomus

Dio Chrys. 3 Regn. 62 164 n. 46
 Dio Chrys. Or. 67.6, 7 143 n. 131
 Dio Chrys. Or. 10.23 300, 302 n. 13

Diocles of Carystus

Fr. 1.76–85 179 n. 21
 Fr. 1.84–87 179 n. 21

Diodorus Siculus

Diod. Sic. 16.26.1–4 299 n. 2
 Diod. Sic. 21.1.4 143 n. 131
 Diod. Sic. 16.26.1–4 305 n. 18

Diogenes Laertius

Diog. Laert. 1.59 120 n. 38
 Diog. Laert. 1.110 167, 167 n. 57
 Diog. Laert. 7.24 290 n. 24
 Diog. Laert. 7.110 137 n. 92
 Diog. Laert. 7.116 138 n. 103
 Diog. Laert. 7.123 137 n. 93

Dionysus of Halicarnassus

Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 11.35.4 131 n. 49

Epictetus

Diatr. 1.9.7 137 n. 92
 Diatr. 3.11.2 137 n. 92
 El. 137 176 n. 4
 Herc. Fur. 886 133 n. 72
 Ion 693 180 n. 26
 Ion 693 180
 Iph. taur. 73 176 n. 4

Euthymius Zigabenus

PG 129.784B 134 n. 76

Fragments

FGrHist 87 F 59 (Jacoby) 167 n. 56

Gaius Julius Solinus

Collectanea rerum memorabilium
 27.27 215 n. 20

Galen

De antidotis libri ii XIV
 111.9 (Kühn) 178
 De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis VIII
 6.6.3 178
 De semine 1.2.6–7 183
 De semine 1.2.12 184
 De semine 1.4.21 184
 De semine 1.12.8–9 180

- De semine 2.1.12–13 180 n. 25
 De theriaca ad Pisonem XIV 274.2 (Kühn) 179 n. 20
- De usu partium
 14.10 180, 184 n. 41
 De usu partium
 14.10–11 180
- Hesiod*
 Op. 281–283 163 n. 39
- Hierocles*
 Hierocles 4.39–42 290 n. 21
- Hippiatrica*
 Hippiatrica Cantabrigiensia
 99.3.8 179 n. 20
- Hippocrates*
 Coac. 120; 299 178, 178 n. 19
 Genit. 5.1 182
 Morb. sacr. 4 303 n. 15
 Prorrh. 2.7 178
- Homer*
 Il. 16.38–9 163 n. 39
 Il. 18.101–102 163 n. 39
 Il. 20.131 164
 Od. 4.539–40, 832–33 163 n. 39
 Od. 11.624 227
- Horace*
 Ars 352–58 202 n. 69
 Ep. 1.16.77 133 n. 65
- Iamblichus*
 Iambl. Mys. 3.11 307 n. 25
- Inscriptions*
 Hermes in a defixio in IG III
 86.2 302 n. 11
- [*Libanius*]
 Epist. Char. 5, 32 248 n. 125
 Epist. Char. 7, 54 248 n. 124
- Livy*
 Liv. 5.21.2–3 166 n. 52
 Liv. 8.9.5–10.14 166 n. 52
- Longus*
 Daphn. 3 202 n. 69
- Lucian*
 Alex. 5 132 n. 58
 Dial. d. 6 286 n. 11
 Hermot. 49 163 n. 39
 Hermot. 70 307 n. 25
 Musc. Laud. 7 206 n. 9
 Philops. 16 132 n. 55, 133 n. 68
 Philops. 31 133 n. 64
 Tim. 27 163 n. 39
- Lucillius*
 Anthologia Graeca
 11.76 131 n. 45
- Lykophron*
 Alexandra 6 301 n. 7
- Maximus of Tyre*
 2:10a–d 167 n. 57
- Musonius Rufus*
 Diss. 17.29–35 171
 Fr. 3 270 n. 30, 273 n. 38
 Fr. 8 142 n. 128
 Fr. 17 142 n. 128
 Oeconomicus
 7.10–43 273 n. 38
- Olympiodorus the Younger*
 Platonis Alcibiadem commentarii,
 4.8 152 n. 6
- Oppian of Apamea*
 Cynegetica
 3.191–207 215 n. 20
- Ovid*
 Am. 2.19.1–4 119 n. 37
 Am. 3.4.17 119 n. 36
 Am. 3.4.25–32 119 n. 37
 Metam. 3.562–71 119 n. 35

- Pont. 2.5.67 301 n. 8
- Papyrus*
- B. G. U. 1050 268 n. 24
- B. G. U. 1052 268 n. 24
- B. G. U. 1103 268 n. 24
- P. Bodm. X 238 n. 11
- P. Bodm. X 240 n. 23
- P. Bodm. X 244 n. 75
- P. Bodm. X 239
- P. Bodm. XX 239 n. 15
- P. Eleph. 1 268 n. 24
- P. Lips. 27 268 n. 24
- P. Oxy. 1273 268 n. 24
- P. Oxy. 1673:20 165 n. 49
- P. Oxy. 266 268 n. 24
- P. Ryl. 154 268 n. 24
- Pausanias*
- Descr. 1.1.4 167 n. 57
- Descr. 1.24.3 167 n. 55
- Descr. 2.24.1 307 n. 26
- Descr. 5.14:8 167 n. 57
- Descr. 7.25.13 307 n. 26
- Descr. 10.5.7 299 n. 2, 305 n. 18
- Descr. 10.12.3 306 n. 23
- Descr. 10.12.6 306 n. 22
- Descr. 10.24.7 307 n. 25
- Perictione*
- Stob. Anth. 4.23.61 263 n. 7, 269 n. 26,
270 n. 32, 273 n. 38,
278 n. 55
- Stob. Anth. 4.27.19 271 n. 33, 277 n. 53
- Stob. Anth. 4.28.19 261, 261 n. 1, 262
n. 3, 263 n. 7, 271
n. 33
- Philostratus*
- Vit. Apoll. 3.38 132 n. 57, 133 n. 63
- Vit. Apoll. 4.20 132 n. 55, 132 n. 58,
133 n. 71, 134
- Vit. Apoll. 4.20 132 n. 58
- Vit. Apoll. 4.25 132 n. 58
- Pindar*
- Pyth. 2.94-97 162 n. 36
- Plato*
- [Alc. maj.] 130d 152
- [Alc. maj.] 134d 163 n. 39
- Crat. 384c 165 n. 49
- Crito 45b 225 n. 39
- Leg. 872e2 176 n. 4
- Menex. 90b 165 n. 49
- Phaed. 60c 133 n. 65
- Phaed. 63e-64a 225 n. 38
- Phaed. 64a 226
- Phaed. 65c 196 n. 41
- Phaed. 66b-d 226 n. 40
- Phaed. 67d 207
- Phaed. 81c 77 n. 62
- Phaed. 81c-d 133 n. 63
- Phaed. 81e 216
- Phaed. 88b6-7 227 n. 44
- Phaed. 107a, d 227
- Phaed. 107c-109a 226
- Phaed. 107c1-115a8 226
- Phaed. 107d 230
- Phaed. 107e 231
- Phaed. 108c 231
- Phaed. 108e 227
- Phaed. 109a and 110b 228
- Phaed. 109b 227, 231
- Phaed. 109b-111c 226
- Phaed. 109c 227
- Phaed. 110a 227, 231
- Phaed. 110b 226
- Phaed. 110b-e 228
- Phaed. 110e 228
- Phaed. 111b 232
- Phaed. 111d-112d 228
- Phaed. 111d-118a 227
- Phaed. 112a 231
- Phaed. 112e 232
- Phaed. 112e-113c 228
- Phaed. 113d 229
- Phaed. 113e-114c 229
- Phaed. 114c 229, 232
- Phaed. 114d 230-231
- Phaedr. 247a 228 n. 46
- Phaedr. 250b-c 163 n. 39
- Pol. 563d-e, 571b-d 119 n. 30
- Resp. 466b16 179 n. 23
- Resp. 527d-e 164 n. 46

- Resp. 571d 195
 Resp. 587c 196 n. 41
 Resp. 589e 196 n. 41
 Resp. 614c 227
 Resp. 617e1 227
 Symp. 206c5 180 n. 25
 Tim. 41d–42b 213
 Tim. 42b–c 216
 Tim. 47a–b 164 n. 46
 Tim. 70b–d 228
 Tim. 91c1 184 n. 39
- Pliny the Elder*
- Nat. 7.174 206 n. 9
 Nat. 8.39 215 n. 20
 Nat. 2.117–118 157 n. 23
 Nat. 17.239 301 n. 8
 Nat. 2.232 307 n. 25
 Nat. 2.208 299 n. 2
 Nat. 28.147 307 n. 26
 Nat. 9.58 268 n. 23
- Pliny the Younger*
- Ep. 1.22.11 139 n. 109
 Ep. 7.27.11 133 n. 65
- Plutarch*
- Adv. Col. 140c 274 n. 42
 Adv. Col. 141e 267 n. 20
 Adv. Col. 142c 268
 Adv. Col. 142e 268
 Adv. Col. 144c–d 274 n. 42
 Cat. Maj. 18.5 143 n. 131
 Def. orac. 414d–e 303
 Def. orac. 433c 305 n. 18
 Def. orac. 437c 309
 Def. orac. 438b 300 n. 4
 Fac. 920a–945d 200
 Fac. 943a 205
 Gen. Socr. 592c–d 206 n. 9
 Is. Os. 351c–384c 200
 Is. Os. 360e 132 n. 60
 Is. Os. 361e 135 n. 79
 Mor. 1101e 130 n. 45
 Mor. 1a–86a 154 n. 14
 Mor. 597f 133 n. 72
 Mor. 612b–697c 154 n. 13
 Mor. 613b 154
- Mor. 613c 154
 Mor. 615c–619a 154
 Mor. 635a–d 154
 Pyth. orac. 7.397c–d 300
 Pyth. orac. 21 303
 Pyth. orac. 21.404e–f 304 n. 16
 Pyth. orac. 23.406b 302 n. 13
 Rom. 22.4 120 n. 39
 Virt. prof. 75–76 195
- Polybius*
- Polyb. 1.81 119 n. 31, 119 n. 34
- Porphyry*
- Abst. 1.29.4 152 n. 4
 Fr. 9 (Harnack) 125 n. 2
 Marc. 20 163 n. 39
- Proclus*
- Rep. 2.113 (Kroll) 206 n. 9
- Prudentius*
- Perist. 3.91–95 285 n. 8
 Perist. 14.63–66 284 n. 3
 Perist. 14.67–80 284 n. 4
- Pseudo-Galen*
- De definitionibus medicus 439
 179 n. 21
- Quintilian*
- Inst. 4.2.31–33 249 n. 127
 Inst. 5.4.1 291 n. 25
 Inst. 10.1–104 159 n. 29
- Rhetorica ad Herennium*
- Rhet. Her. 1.8.14 249 n. 127
- Sallust*
- Bell. Cat. 10:1–2 157 n. 23
- Seneca*
- Ben. 4.26.1 160
 De Brevitate Vitae 2.1 172 n. 72
 De Brevitate Vitae 7.10 172 n. 72

- De Brevitate Vitae
 10.2–3, 5 157 n. 23
 De Brevitate Vitae
 18.1–2 172 n. 72
 Clem. 1.23 121 n. 43
 Clem. 2.5.3 172
 Const. Sap. 8:2 168
 Ep. 2.5 161
 Ep. 4.2–6 161
 Ep. 6.1 161
 Ep. 6.5 162
 Ep. 14.3 161
 Ep. 15.1 160
 Ep. 15.5 160
 Ep. 16.3 172 n. 72
 Ep. 17:6 160
 Ep. 41.3 168
 Ep. 44.2 161
 Ep. 51.6–8 160
 Ep. 53.1–2 170 n. 67
 Ep. 53.8 160
 Ep. 57.11, 13, 18 161
 Ep. 59.14 168
 Ep. 74.10 161
 Ep. 74.17 161
 Ep. 79.11–13 168
 Ep. 91.8 170 n. 67
 Ep. 92.30 168
 Ep. 95.13–15 167
 Ep. 95.16–34 167
 Ep. 95.23 157 n. 23
 Ep. 95.47 167 n. 59, 168
 Ep. 95.48 168
 Ep. 95.7, 8 172 n. 72
 Ep. 98.7 172 n. 72
 Ep. 102.26 161, 167
 Ep. 108.37 172 n. 73, 172 n. 74
 Ep. 116.1 136 n. 86
 Ep. 120.13–15 168
 Ep. 120.22 155
 Ep. 124.17 157 n. 23
 Helv. 19.4 170 n. 67
 Ira 3.43.1 154 n. 11
 Marc. 1.3 159 n. 29
 Marc. 6.2–3 172 n. 72
 Marc. 19:6 167
 Marc. 22.3 170 n. 67
 Marc. 24.5 167
 Marc. 25.3 167
 Polyb. 6.56.6–8 167 n. 56
 Polyb. 9.6 172 n. 72
 Polyb. 9.6 170 n. 67
 Tranq. 14.3 170 n. 67
 Tranq. 15.6 171
 Vit. beat. 22.3 172 n. 72

Sophocles
 Aj. 1026 133 n. 72
 Phil. 110 164 n. 46
 Phil. 415–1212 163 n. 39
 Trach. 203–04 163 n. 39

Soranus
 Sor. Gyn. 1.33 183, 183 n. 37
 Sor. Gyn. 1.36 183
 Sor. Gyn. 1.37 183
 Sor. Gyn. 1.47 183
 Sor. Gyn. 1.61 183

Strabo
 Geogr. 3.14.16 167, 167 n. 57
 Geogr. 9.3.5 299 n. 2
 Geogr. 13.4.14 308 n. 29
 Geogr. 17.2.3 167, 167 n. 57

Tacitus
 Ann. 4.34–35 160 n. 29
 Ann. 15.44.2–5 156 n. 22
 Germ. 22.4 173

Terence
 Andr. 220–224 187

Theocritus
 Id. 7.99 131 n. 49

Theophylactus Bulgariae Archiepiscopus
 PG 123.508C 134 n. 76

Thucydides
 Hist. 1.22.4 202 n. 69
 Hist. 5.27.2 164 n. 46

Tibullus
 Tibullus 2.5.63 301 n. 7

Virgil

Aen. 6	302 n. 14
Aen. 6.45–101	301 n. 10
Aen. 6.78	305
Aen. 6.83–86	306 n. 21
Aen. 12.838–39	167 n. 56

Xenophon

Cyr. 4.2.15	163 n. 39
Oec., 7–10	279 n. 57

Xenophon of Ephesus

Ephesiaca 1.1.1–2	190
Ephesiaca 5.14.1–2	287

*New Testament**Matthew*

		1:40	132
1–2	252	1:41	136
3:7	248 n. 121	1:42	133 n. 70
5:17	157	1:43	136, 138 n. 102
6:28–30	247 n. 102	1:45	218
6:30	254	2:1–12	127
7:11	247 n. 109	2:2	140
7:21–23	138	2:5	143
9:30	138	2:8	130 n. 41
11:27	137 n. 100	2:12	133 n. 66, 135 n. 80
12:34	248 n. 121	2:21	139
12:40	247 n. 108	3:1	140
12:50	138	3:4	130 n. 42, 142
13:11, 16	137 n. 100	3:5	133 n. 68, 136, 138, 138 n. 102
14:33	138 n. 101	3:6	139 n. 107
16:12	138 n. 101	3:28	147
16:16	138 n. 101	3:35	138, 140, 142, 147
16:17	137 n. 100	4:8	247 n. 103
17:13	138 n. 101	4:10–12	146
17:23	138	4:13	135, 247 n. 104
18:27	136 n. 90	4:13–20	146
21:31	138	4:15	130 n. 38
22:29–30	33 n. 34	4:16	137, 142
26:53	144 n. 140	4:18	143, 148
27:50	5 n. 6	4:19	134 n. 77, 137
28:9	236	4:23	136 n. 87

Mark

1:2	125 n. 2	4:26–29	246 n. 99, 254
1:15	141	4:27	247 n. 101
1:22	135 n. 80	4:30	142–143
1:24	132 n. 55, 132 n. 56	4:35–41	126, 139
1:27	134 n. 74, 135 n. 80	4:38	134, 135 n. 82, 139 n. 107
1:29–31	139	4:40	135 n. 82
1:31	133, 133 n. 73, 140	4:41	134 n. 77, 135 n. 80

5:1	144 n. 138	8:22	140
5:6–8	132 n. 56	8:27–10:52	145
5:9	128, 144	8:31–33	136 n. 84, 145 n. 151
5:13	128 n. 28	8:32	136
5:15	133 n. 67, 133 n. 71, 135 n. 80	8:33	136, 142
5:17	135 n. 82	8:34	127
5:19	133	8:34–38	142 n. 129, 143, 145
5:21–43	139–140	8:35	130 n. 42
5:23	133, 133 n. 72	8:36	130, 130 n. 44
5:25	132	8:38	147
5:25–34	126, 133 n. 70, 134, 141	9–10	142 n. 126, 148
5:29	131	9:7	142 n. 126
5:33	135	9:18	126, 132 n. 54
5:34	133 n. 68, 133 n. 70, 140, 148	9:19	135
5:36	135, 140	9:22	131, 136 n. 88
5:38	135	9:27	133 n. 71
5:42	133 n. 66	9:30–32	145 n. 151
6:2	135 n. 81	9:32	136 n. 84
6:4	135 n. 82	9:33	145 n. 149, 145 n. 151
6:17–29	128 n. 32, 141, 144	9:33–37	146 n. 152
6:20	136 n. 91	9:33–50	145
6:26	136 n. 91	9:34	135
6:30–44	128 n. 32	9:35	141 n. 119, 145, 145 n. 147
6:34	131, 136	9:38	147 n. 159
6:45–52	138	9:38–40	145, 147, 147 n. 159
6:49	134–135	9:42	145
6:52	136	9:42–48	139, 142, 145, 148
6:53–56	138	9:50	145, 145 n. 149
7:10	142	10:2–12	142, 145
7:15–23	142	10:5	142
7:18	130 n. 40, 135–136	10:6	142
7:19	131	10:8	130
7:21	130 n. 39	10:14	136, 138, 138 n. 102
7:24–30	129, 132 n. 57, 139–140, 140 n. 115	10:14, 41–45	136 n. 85
7:32	140	10:17–27	143, 145
7:32–35	129 n. 34	10:17–31	126
7:35	133 n. 69	10:18	142
7:37	133 n. 68, 135 n. 80	10:19	142
8:2	136	10:22	137, 143, 148
8:12	130 n. 41	10:24	135 n. 80
8:14–21	136, 138–139, 143, 148	10:26	135
8:16	135	10:27	143
8:17	130 n. 40, 135	10:28	130 n. 44
		10:29	128, 147
		10:32	135 n. 80

10:35–45	127–128, 136, 144–145	13:37	137
10:44	141 n. 119	14:1–11	128 n. 29
10:45	130 n. 42, 136 n. 89, 142, 142 n. 126, 146	14:3–9	129, 141
10:46	140	14:4	144
10:46–52	129, 144	14:7	127
10:47	132	14:8, 22	131
10:52	127, 133 n. 73, 134, 140, 148	14:9	146
11	195	14:12–26	128 n. 32
11:12–14	128 n. 31	14:18–21	146
11:18	135 n. 80, 136 n. 91, 139 n. 107	14:19	146
11:22–24	138, 143	14:22	131
11:25	145	14:32–42	126
11:32	136 n. 91	14:33	137–138
12:12	136 n. 87, 136 n. 91	14:34	130, 136 n. 91, 137
12:17	142	14:36	143
12:24	136 n. 87, 142	14:38	5, 130 n. 41, 131
12:24–25	33 n. 34	14:66, 69	139
12:28–34	144	14:72	139
12:29	142	15:37	133, 133 n. 72
12:30	130 n. 38, 130, 130 n. 43	15:39	128 n. 25, 144
12:34	136 n. 87	15:40	135 n. 80, 139, 141
12:41–44	129	15:41	140 n. 112, 141 n. 119
12:44	141	15:43, 45	131
13	137 n. 96	15:47	135 n. 80, 141
13:5	137, 147	16:8	135 n. 80
13:6	147 n. 158	<i>Luke</i>	
13:7	137	1–2	252
13:8	137	1:3	242 n. 56
13:10	146	1:5–7	190
13:11	132 n. 55, 137, 139	2:13	163, 163 n. 38
13:12	147	3:7	248 n. 121
13:14	130 n. 40	4:32	218
13:19	142	4:33	132 n. 59
13:20	131	5:15	218
13:21	147	6:45	130 n. 39
13:21–23	139, 145	8:5	246 n. 99, 254
13:23	137	8:11	254
13:24	142, 142 n. 129	9:39	163 n. 38
13:26	139	9:45	138
13:28	137	11:13	247 n. 109
13:29	137	12:22	130 n. 44
13:33	137	12:28	247 n. 109
13:35	137, 139	12:34	130 n. 39
		14:23	297
		16:15	131 n. 48
		18:34	138

20:34–36	33	7:51	70 n. 30
21:9	137 n. 96	8	242 n. 57
22:44	138	8:1, 3	163, 164 n. 42
24:28	237	8:18	317 n. 16
24:36–39	236 n. 5, 237 n. 5	9:1	164 n. 42
24:39	237	9:1–19a	163
24:41–43	236	9:1–30	163
24:45	131 n. 48	9:3	163 n. 38
		9:19–30	165
<i>John</i>		9:31	317 n. 16
1:1	218	10–11	317 n. 17
1:1–5	218	10:44	218
1:1–18	168 n. 60	11:24	317 n. 16
1:9	245 n. 81	12	163
1:13	15, 175–177, 177 n. 14, 178–181, 181 n. 27, 184–185	12:1–25	164 n. 43
		13:27	187 n. 6
1:14	218	13:4, 13	170
3	185	13:51	317 n. 16
3:5	15	14:26	170
4:41	218	16:11	170
4:42	158 n. 26, 169 n. 61	16:14	131 n. 48
5:21	245 n. 87	16:16	303
6:23	245 n. 87	16:26	163 n. 38
11:16	195 n. 35	17:14	170
18:15	64 n. 9	17:16	131 n. 48
18:16	64 n. 9	17:16–21	167
19:34	176	17:16–34	165–166
20:24	195 n. 35	17:22–31	167
20:24–29	237	17:28	164, 168 n. 60
21:2	195 n. 35	17:30	187 n. 6
21:13	237	17:31	167, 169
		17:32–34	169
		18:18	170
<i>Acts</i>		19:13–17	147 n. 159
1:1	242 n. 56	19:21	131 n. 48
1:19	64 n. 9	19:39	198 n. 55
1:21–22	244 n. 80, 256, 256 n. 141	20:6, 13–16	170
2:2	163 n. 38	20:25, 38	173
2:13	318 n. 21	20:28	169
2:14	64 n. 9	21:1–3, 6	170
3:17	188 n. 6	21:11	173
4:16	64 n. 9	21:27–28, 31	170 n. 64
5	163	22:3	50, 190
5:39	165	22:6	163 n. 38
6:5	317 n. 16	26	164 n. 43
6:9	165	26:4–5	50
7–9	163	26:14	164
		26:29	170

Act 27–28	170 n. 62	1:28, 32	72
27:1	170	1:28–32	64, 72
27:1–8, 9–12, 13–44	170 n. 64	1:32	64, 80
27:1–44	169–170	2:1	73 n. 39
27:3	171	2:5–11	62 n. 4
27:9	171 n. 70	2:16	72
27:21–26	170 n. 63, 171 n. 71	3:21–26	81
27:23	170 n. 63	4:17	245 n. 87
27:23–24	170	5	118
27:31	171	5–8	98, 100
27:34	171	5:7	68
27:35	170 n. 63	5:9–10, 15, 17	247 n. 109
27:43	171	5:12	75
27:43, 44	170 n. 68	5:12–21	117, 117 n. 21, 118, 118 n. 27, 243 n. 72, 246 n. 92
28:1	170 n. 68		
28:1–10	170 n. 64		
28:2	171	5:14	55, 245 n. 83
28:6	163 n. 38	6:1–8:13	92
28:16–31	172 n. 75	6:12–23	245 n. 82
28:30	173	7	14, 97, 101 n. 36, 114 n. 8, 117–119 89, 100, 101 n. 37
<i>Romans</i>		7–8	102
1:1	244 n. 75	7:5–6	115, 115 n. 11, 116–118, 122
1:3	252	7:7–11	75
1:3–4	237 n. 8	7:7–12	14, 102, 114–116, 119
1:16–17	64 n. 8	7:7–13	115–116
1:18	64, 73 n. 39	7:7–24	8–9, 11
1:18–21	61 n. 2, 63, 72, 80	7:7–25	117, 118 n. 29, 119, 121
1:18–32	14, 61–63, 64 n. 8, 71–72, 72 n. 35, 73, 73 n. 39, 81, 81 n. 69, 82	7:7–8	92 n. 21
1:18–2:11	61 n. 1, 62, 62 n. 4	7:7–8:13	117 n. 22
1:19	64, 64 n. 9	7:8	116
1:19–20	61, 71, 75 n. 50	7:9	116
1:20	64, 72, 81, 81 n. 69	7:9–11	116
1:21	62, 64	7:10–11	117, 117 n. 22
1:22–23	64	7:11	115, 115 n. 11
1:22–27	72	7:12–13	14, 113–117
1:22–32	63–64	7:14–24	87–88, 100–101, 101 n. 37, 101 n. 38, 102, 102 n. 39, 103–109
1:23	57, 62 n. 4, 64, 71, 73 n. 39	7:14–25	101–102, 108
1:24	64, 72		100, 102, 113
1:24–25	64	7:14–8:13	103
1:26	64, 72 n. 36	7:15	102
1:26–27	64, 72	7:15–16	102–103
1:28	64–65, 72, 80–81, 81 n. 69	7:16	
		7:17–20	

7:18	102	<i>1 Corinthians</i>	
7:19	102, 113	1–4	51, 51 n. 44, 52
7:20	102	1:16	240 n. 22
7:21–23	103	1:17	218
7:22	10	1:26	51
7:23	100	1:26–31	145
7:23	5, 81, 101–102	2:6–16	50 n. 42, 95
7:24	103	2:7	52
7:25	5, 81, 101–103	2:12	49, 95
8	49	3	41, 51, 54, 58
8:1	105	3:1	51–53, 53 n. 53, 54
8:1–11	105, 106 n. 49	3:3–4	51
8:1–13	14, 88, 101, 102 n. 39, 105–106, 108	3:8	248 n. 120
		3:10–15	51
8:2	105, 117	3:16	49
8:3	237 n. 8	3:16–17	209
8:3–4	105	4:1	52
8:4	105	6:19	209, 246 n. 96
8:5	106	7:25	243 n. 61
8:5–8	106	11:2–16	266 n. 13, 280
8:6	95, 106	11:4	274 n. 43
8:7–8	49 n. 35, 51, 95	11:7	56 n. 59
8:9–11	106	11:23	243 n. 61, 256
8:11	106, 245 n. 87	12	11, 230
8:12–13	105, 106 n. 49	12:1–11	54 n. 55
8:14–39	92	12:2	221 n. 21
8:15, 23	245 n. 87	12:3–4	221 n. 21
8:18–25	75	12:8	52
8:21	53	14	11
8:22	38	14:14	5
8:28–30	81	14:23	318 n. 21
8:29	56	15	16, 41, 54–55, 57–58, 109, 238, 252, 254, 256–257
8:29; 13:14	279 n. 58		
9:5	237 n. 8		
9:19–22	252	15:3	243 n. 61, 256
9:20	243 n. 69	15:5–10	236
11:32–36	81	15:21	54
11:33	52	15:22	53, 56 n. 62, 117 n. 21, 245 n. 87
12:1	81		
12:1–2	63, 80–81, 81 n. 69, 82	15:23	244 n. 78
		15:35	235
13:12	280 n. 59	15:35–58	39
13:14	56, 280 n. 59	15:36	245 n. 87
14:10–12	72	15:36–38	247 n. 102, 254
15:2, 8	145 n. 150	15:39	235
15:33	248 n. 122	15:40–41	235
		15:42–49	235, 235 n. 1, 279 n. 58

- | | | | |
|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------|------------------------|
| 15:44 | 5, 39, 54 | 3:27 | 279 n. 58 |
| 15:44–49 | 53 | 3:27–28 | 280 n. 60 |
| 15:45 | 53, 55, 57, 245 n. 87 | 4:4 | 243 n. 71, 243 n. 72, |
| 15:45–49 | 42, 52–53, 117 n. 21, | | 252 |
| | 252 | 4:5 | 245 n. 87 |
| 15:47 | 53, 57 | 5 | 49 |
| 15:48 | 53, 57 | 5–6 | 89, 100, 106, 108 |
| 15:49 | 56–57 | 5:1–12 | 92, 98 |
| 15:50 | 53–54 | 5:1–6:18 | 99–100 |
| 15:50 | 236 | 5:13–16 | 94 |
| 15:51–54 | 109 | 5:13–26 | 99, 100 n. 35, 101 |
| 16:15, 17 | 240 n. 22 | | n. 37 |
| | | 5:13–6:10 | 92, 98 |
| <i>2 Corinthians</i> | | 5:16 | 93–94, 101, 102 |
| 1:12 | 52 | | n. 39, 181 |
| 3:6 | 245 n. 87 | 5:16–18 | 14, 89, 92, 96, |
| 3:18 | 56 | | 98–100, 100 n. 35, |
| 4:4 | 56, 56 n. 58 | | 101 n. 37, 102 |
| 4:16 | 5 n. 7, 10, 221 | 5:16–25 | 101–102 |
| 5:16 | 237 n. 8 | 5:17 | 93–94, 100, 100 |
| 5:17 | 11 | | n. 35, 101, 101 n. 37, |
| 6:18 | 243 n. 68, 252 | | 101 n. 38, 101 n. 39 |
| 8:9 | 145 n. 150 | 5:18 | 94, 102 n. 39 |
| 10:1–13:14 | 219 | 5:18–23 | 101 |
| 10:17–18 | 220 | 5:19 | 94 |
| 11:1–12:13 | 219 | 5:24 | 49 n. 35, 100 |
| 11:3 | 117 n. 21, 279 n. 56 | 5:25 | 98 |
| 12:1 | 219 n. 15, 220–221 | 6:8 | 53 |
| 12:1–5 | 219–222, 232 | 6:11–18 | 92, 98 |
| 12:2 | 222 | 6:16 | 248 n. 119 |
| 12:2–3 | 221 | 6:17 | 247 n. 115, 248 |
| 12:2–4 | 220 n. 20 | | n. 118 |
| 12:4 | 221–222 | | |
| 12:5 | 221 | <i>Ephesians</i> | |
| 12:11 | 219 n. 14 | 1:4 | 142 |
| <i>Galatians</i> | | 1:5 | 245 n. 87 |
| 1:2 | 244 n. 75 | 2:3 | 181, 246 n. 97 |
| 1:6 | 244 n. 76 | 2:14 | 237 n. 8 |
| 1:8–9 | 257 n. 142 | 3:1 | 244 n. 75 |
| 1:13–14 | 7 | 4:1 | 244 n. 75 |
| 1:17 | 244 n. 80, 256, 256 | 4:18 | 188 n. 6 |
| | n. 141 | 4:22, 24 | 279 n. 58 |
| 2:15–21 | 92 n. 21 | 4:32 | 145 n. 150 |
| 2:19 | 90 | 5:1 | 142 n. 128 |
| 2:19–20 | 89, 99, 103 | 5:25 | 145 n. 150 |
| 2:20 | 90 | 5:28–29 | 182 |
| 3:21 | 245 n. 87 | 5:30 | 237 n. 8 |
| | | 6:10–17 | 280 n. 60 |

Philippians

1:1 244 n. 75
 1:7, 13 248 n. 116
 1:9 244 n. 75
 1:22 243 n. 61
 1:22–26 222
 2:1–11 146
 3:2–11 92 n. 21
 3:4–11 7
 3:8 248 n. 117
 3:21 279 n. 58

Colossians

1:1–2 244 n. 75
 1:15 56
 1:22 237 n. 8
 3:9 279 n. 58
 3:10 56

1 Thessalonians

1:5 218
 2:19 244 n. 78
 4:4 50 n. 42
 4:15 244 n. 78
 5:8 280 n. 60
 5:23 5, 221 n. 22, 244
 n. 78

2 Thessalonians

2:3–4 243 n. 65, 245 n. 91

1 Timothy

1:3–7 278 n. 54
 1:4 218
 1:5 244 n. 73
 1:13 188 n. 6
 1:15 218
 1:18–20 278 n. 54
 2 262–264
 2:8 243 n. 69, 274 n. 43
 2:9 266, 267 n. 18, 270,
 280 n. 62
 2:9–10 279 n. 56
 2:9–15 278–279
 2:9–3:1a 262, 262 n. 3
 2:10 270, 277 n. 51
 2:11 270, 270 n. 31
 2:11–12 281 n. 62

2:13–14 278

3:1 218
 3:3, 8 267 n. 18
 3:11 262 n. 4
 3:16 237 n. 8
 4:1–3 278 n. 54
 4:3 278 n. 54
 4:7 218
 4:9 218
 4:12 146 n. 153
 5:3–4 267 n. 18
 5:3–16 262 n. 4
 5:6 267 n. 18, 268
 5:8 267 n. 18
 5:10 262 n. 4, 277, 277
 n. 52
 5:16 267 n. 18
 5:17–18 267 n. 18
 6:2 244 n. 73
 6:3–5 277 n. 50, 278 n. 54
 6:5–10 267 n. 18
 6:9 143, 277 n. 50
 6:17 277 n. 50
 6:17–19 267 n. 18

2 Timothy

1:5 262 n. 4
 2:8 244 n. 75
 2:11, 17 218
 2:14 278 n. 54
 2:16–18 278 n. 54
 2:17–18 242 n. 58
 2:18 244 n. 73
 2:23–26 278 n. 54
 3:6–7 278 n. 54
 3:9 244 n. 73
 3:13 278 n. 54
 4:3–4 278 n. 54
 4:4 218
 4:21 242 n. 56

Titus

1:1 244 n. 75
 1:10–14; 3:9–11 278 n. 54
 1:14 218
 2:3–5 262 n. 4
 2:8 218
 3:3 246 n. 92

Philemon

10, 13 248 n. 116
 16 247 n. 109

Hebrews

6:19 53 n. 52
 12:23 5 n. 6

James

1:8 5
 2:1–7 145

1 Peter

1:14 188 n. 6
 2:11 5, 181
 2:20–24 145 n. 150
 3 264
 3:1–6 263
 3:3 265–266
 3:3–4 279
 3:16–18 145 n. 150
 3:18–20 5 n. 6
 4:6 5 n. 6
 5:14 248 n. 122

2 Peter

1:16 218
 2:4 224 n. 29
 2:18 181

1 John

1:1 218
 2:16 181
 4:2 237 n. 7, 243 n. 70

2 John

2:7 237 n. 7

Revelation

1:8 243 n. 68
 3:17–19 143
 4:8 243 n. 68
 4:8–10 232
 13:8 223
 16:6 175 n. 2
 17:4 269 n. 21
 18:24 175 n. 2
 19:13 218
 22:2 224 n. 31

*Other Early Christian Literature**1 Clement*

56:6 243 n. 68

3 Corinthians

1 239–240, 242–244,
 248–249, 251
 1:2 242 n. 59
 1:5 243 n. 61
 1:8 251
 1:10–15 252
 1:12 252
 1:15 243 n. 72
 2 239
 3 239–242, 244–251
 3:1 251
 3:1–3 256
 3:4 249 n. 127, 256
 3:5–8 252
 3:7–8 253

3:9 243 n. 72
 3:9–18 253, 255
 3:11 243 n. 72, 254
 3:19 257
 3:19–21 256
 3:20 250 n. 131, 257
 3:21 257
 3:24 257
 3:24–32 254–256
 3:26 248 n. 102, 248
 n. 104
 3:29–30 248 n. 108
 3:32 244 n. 79
 3:32–33 242 n. 52
 3:34–40 256
 3:36–37 257
 3:37 246 n. 93
 3:38 250 n. 131
 3:39 257

<i>Acts of Andrew</i>	11–18	223
Acts Andr. (Cod. Vat. gr. 808, lns. 130–2)	11–21	231
205 n. 5	12	231
Acts Andr. (Cod. Vat. gr. 808, lns. 144–5)	13	231
205 n. 6	15	230
Acts Thom. 3	18	231
Acts Thom. 6–7	19–30	224
Acts Thom. 11	21, 41	231
Acts Thom. 12	23	224
Acts Thom. 15	29	224 n. 33, 232
Acts Thom. 17–29	31	231–232
Acts Thom. 22	31–44	224
Acts Thom. 22–23	41	231–232
Acts Thom. 23	206 n. 9	
Acts Thom. 24	210	
Acts Thom. 28	208, 213	
Acts Thom. 30	208	
Acts Thom. 32	213	
Acts Thom. 37	207	
Acts Thom. 45	213	
Acts Thom. 46	210	
Acts Thom. 48	209–210	
Acts Thom. 51–61	210	
Acts Thom. 53	207	
Acts Thom. 56	211 n. 16	
Acts Thom. 59	207	
Acts Thom. 61	211	
Acts Thom. 64	207	
Acts Thom. 69	213	
Acts Thom. 79	214	
Acts Thom. 83	213	
Acts Thom. 86	213	
Acts Thom. 87	210	
Acts Thom. 88	209	
Acts Thom. 94	208–209	
Acts Thom. 95	207	
Acts Thom. 98	210	
Acts Thom. 108–113	197	
Acts Thom. 119–133	212	
Acts Thom. 124	212	
Acts Thom. 148	210–211	
Acts Thom. 156	207, 209	
Acts Thom. 160	207	
<i>Apoc. Paul</i>		
1–2	223	
3–6	223	
7–10	223	
	11–18	223
	11–21	231
	12	231
	13	231
	15	230
	18	231
	19–30	224
	21, 41	231
	23	224
	29	224 n. 33, 232
	31	231–232
	31–44	224
	41	231–232
	<i>Arator</i>	
	Phaen. 5	168 n. 60
	<i>Athenagoras</i>	
	Leg. 21.6, 28.7	188 n. 6
	<i>Augustine</i>	
	Letter 93.2.8	297 n. 45
	Letter 93.3.10	297 n. 48
	Letter 93.3.5	297 n. 47
	Letter 93.5.16	297 n. 49
	Letter 93.5.17	298 n. 50, 298 n. 51
	Letter 93.5.18	298 n. 52
	Tract. Ev. Jo. 2.14	177 n. 14
	Tract. Ev. Jo. 2.14	182 n. 31
	<i>Barnabas</i>	
	Barn. 5.10	237 n. 7
	<i>Bede</i>	
	CCSL 120.596	145 n. 144
	CCSL 120.610	146 n. 154
	<i>Choricus</i>	
	Oration 3.2.13	289 n. 18
	<i>Clement of Alexandria</i>	
	Paed. 2.8	274 n. 43
	Paed. 2.11	274 n. 43, 280 n. 62
	Paed. 2.12	280 n. 62
	Paed. 2.13	280 n. 62, 281 n. 62
	Paed. 3.1	280 n. 62
	Paed. 3.3	274 n. 43, 276 n. 49, 280 n. 62

- Paed. 3.5 280 n. 62
 Paed. 3.11 274 n. 43, 280 n. 62, 281 n. 62
 Protr. 1.11.1 307 n. 25
 Protr. 2.11.2 303 n. 15
 Strom. 4.8.59–60 272 n. 37
- Didache*
 Did. 3:4 138 n. 105
 Did. 10:3 243 n. 68
- Diognetus*
 Diogn. 5.8, 6.2 5
- Eusebius*
 Hist. eccl. 4.22.5 242 n. 57
 Praep. ev. 5.28.9 307 n. 25
- Euthymius Zigabenus*
 PG 129.784B 134 n. 76
- Gospel of Philip*
 Gos. Phil. 65.2–5 246 n. 93
 Gos. Phil. 71.3–11 246 n. 93
- Gregory of Nazianzus*
 Against Julian 2.32 307 n. 25
- Hippolytus*
 In Cant. XV.3.1–4 141 n. 120
 In Cant. XV.3.4 141 n. 120
- Ignatius*
 Ign. Eph. 19:3 188 n. 6
- Irenaeus*
 Epid. 32 39
 Haer. 3.21.10 39
 Haer. 5.2.3 254 n. 139, 255 n. 139
 Haer. 5.5.2 255 n. 140
 Haer. 5.7.1 253 n. 134
 Haer. 5.7.2 255 n. 139
- Jerome*
 CCL 78.453 125 n. 2
- John Chrysostom*
 Hom. 1 Tim. 8, 9 281 n. 62
- Justin*
 1 Apol. 61.10 188 n. 6
 [Justin]
 Fr. Res. 8, 10 253 n. 134
- La Passio Anastasiae*
 La Passio Anastasiae, 17.10–20 289 n. 18
- Macrobius*
 Somnium Scipionis 1.2.8 199
- Martyrdom of Polycarp*
 Mart. Pol. 2.2 5
 Mart. Pol. 14:1 243 n. 68
- Melito of Sardis*
 Apology. Frag. 1. 188 n. 6
 Peri Pascha, 49 39
- Origen*
 Cels. 1.38 138 n. 105
 Cels. 2.24 137 n. 92
 Cels. 2.25 135 n. 78
 Cels. 3.32 206 n. 9
- Physiologus*
 Physiologus 9 214
- Polycarp*
 Pol. Phil. 5.2 146 n. 153
 Pol. Phil. 7.1 237 n. 7
- Preaching of Peter*
 Pre. Pet. Fr. 4 188 n. 6
- Shepherd of Hermas, Mandate*
 Herm. Mand. 3.6.5/14.5 143 n. 132
 Herm. Mand. 4.1.5 188 n. 6
- Tatian*
 Orat. ad Graec. 15.1 213
 Orat. ad Graec. 15.2–3 209

Tertullian

An. 2.3, 44.1 206 n. 9
Cult. fem. 2.8 274 n. 43
Pall. 4 276 n. 49
Res. 2 239 n. 15
Res. 18 253 n. 134

Theophylactus Bulgariae Archiepiscopus

PG 123.508C 134 n. 76

Modern Authors

- Abel, Karlhans 160 n. 30
 Ahearne-Kroll, Stephen P. 11 n. 38, 185 n. 43, 278 n. 54
 Alexander, Loveday C. A. 169 n. 62, 170 n. 62
 Alexander, Philip S. 29, 29 n. 21
 Alter, Robert 219 n. 9
 Althoff, Friedrich 328
 Amandry, Pierre 299 n. 1, 303 n. 15, 307 n. 25, 308 n. 27, 309 n. 30
 Anderson, G. W. 190 n. 15, 327 n. 47
 Annas, Julia 106 n. 51, 107 n. 51
 Anthony, Dick 295 n. 42
 Archers, Léonie J. 264 n. 10, 285 n. 7
 Argall, Randal A. 22 n. 4, 24 n. 11, 28–29, 29 n. 22, 29 n. 24
 Armstrong, Nancy 295
 Asher, Jeffrey R. 52 n. 49
 Attridge, Harold W. 198 n. 52, 204 n. 2
 Aune, David E. 77 n. 62, 219 n. 12
 Avalos, Hector 12 n. 45
 Avenarius, G. 202 n. 69

 Babbitt, Frank Cole 154 n. 14
 Bakhtin, M. M. 192 n. 20, 193 n. 26, 194 n. 27
 Balch, David L. 12 n. 47, 166 n. 53, 265 n. 12, 279 n. 57
 Ballengee, Jennifer R. 291 n. 25, 291 n. 26, 292 n. 30
 Balz, H. 137 n. 94
 Barclay, John M. G. 70 n. 27, 74, 74 n. 45
 Barrett, Charles K. 175 n. 3, 176 n. 6, 178, 178 n. 17, 181, 182 n. 30
 Barsby, John A. 187 n. 2
 Barthélemy, D. 43 n. 8
 Barton, Stephen C. 49 n. 31, 49 n. 31
 Bartsch, Shadi 6 n. 9, 152 n. 6, 283 n. 2
 Basore, John W. 157 n. 23
 Bassi, Karen 275 n. 47

 Baumgartner, Walter 327 n. 47, 328, 328 n. 50
 Baur, Ferdinand Christian 317 n. 15, 330
 Bautch, Kelley Coblentz 29 n. 21
 Beasley-Murray, George R. 177, 177 n. 13
 Beck, Roger 197 n. 48
 BeDuhn, Jason D. 56 n. 59
 Bellia, Giuseppe 66 n. 12
 Berger, Klaus 12 n. 39
 Bernstein, Moshe 9 n. 27
 Bertholet, Alfred 319, 319 n. 24, 319 n. 25, 319 n. 27, 321, 330
 Betz, Hans Dieter 3 n. 1, 10, 10 n. 30, 10 n. 31, 10 n. 32, 71 n. 34, 100 n. 35, 101 n. 37, 195 n. 38, 220, 220 n. 16, 257 n. 142
 Beversluis, Martien 315
 Bieringer, R. 42 n. 3
 Blackburn, Simon 151 n. 2
 Blass, Friedrich 92 n. 23
 Blickenstaff, Marianna 38 n. 51
 Blundell, Sue 271, 272 n. 36, 273 n. 40, 275 n. 47
 Bobzien, Suzanne 97 n. 30
 Boccaccini, Gabriele 22 n. 4, 32 n. 29
 Böcher, O. 131 n. 50
 Bock, Darrell L. 166 n. 53, 170 n. 69
 Bock, Philipp K. 301 n. 9
 Bockmuehl, Marcus 52 n. 46
 Bolyki, János 209 n. 12
 Bömer, Franz 309 n. 30
 Bonfante, Larissa 264 n. 10
 Bonnet, Maximilian 194 n. 33, 204 n. 2
 Boring, Eugene 221 n. 23
 Bornkamm, Günther 130 n. 38
 Börstinghaus, Jens 147 n. 156, 167 n. 57, 169 n. 62, 170 n. 65, 170 n. 66, 170 n. 69, 170 n. 70
 Bos, Abraham P. 208 n. 11
 Bost-Pouderon, C. 288 n. 16
 Bourdieu, Pierre 86, 86 n. 5, 128

- Bourgignon, Erika 301 n. 9
 Bourland-Huizenga, Annette 16
 Bousset, Wilhelm 49 n. 38, 327, 329 n. 58
 Boustan, R. D. 27 n. 17
 Bowden, John 8 n. 19
 Bowersock, G. W. 289 n. 19
 Boyarin, Daniel 49 n. 31, 289 n. 19
 Brakke, David 11 n. 33, 12 n. 44
 Brandenburger, Egon 8 n. 19, 41 n. 3
 Brant, J. A. 193 n. 24, 197 n. 48, 198 n. 53, 198 n. 54
 Brauer, Jerald C. 295 n. 42
 Braund, S. 121 n. 43
 Bremmer, Jan N. 194 n. 33, 206 n. 9, 209 n. 12, 210 n. 14, 210 n. 15, 223 n. 28, 230 n. 50, 238 n. 11, 309 n. 31
 Brennan, Tad 104 n. 44
 Breytenbach, Cilliers 171 n. 75
 Brink, C. O. 202 n. 69
 Brown, Peter 12 n. 42, 296 n. 46
 Brown, Raymond E. 52 n. 46
 Büchsel, Friedrich 316, 316 n. 10
 Bühler, Karl 158 n. 28
 Bultmann, Rudolf 7, 7 n. 12, 7 n. 13, 113, 113 n. 3, 114 n. 8, 188 n. 6, 218 n. 8, 221 n. 23, 328
 Burchard, C. 122 n. 46
 Burchell, G. 153 n. 8
 Burkert, Walter 10 n. 30, 198, 206 n. 9
 Burkitt, F. C. 203 n. 2, 216 n. 22
 Burn, Andrew R. 190 n. 13
 Burnet, John 3 n. 3, 225 n. 36
 Burrus, Virginia 291 n. 25
 Busch, A. 117 n. 24, 118 n. 27
 Byrne, Brendan 38 n. 51, 61 n. 2
- Calduch-Benages, N. 75 n. 48
 Calhoun, Robert Matthew 16, 244 n. 76, 245 n. 88
 Callicott, J. Baird 21 n. 3
 Cameron, Avril 285 n. 7
 Cancik, Hubert 155 n. 20
 Cancik-Lindemaier, Hildegard 155 n. 20, 161 n. 33
 Caquot, André 44 n. 12
 Carson, D. A. 63 n. 7
 Carter, W. 128 n. 22, 128 n. 23, 128 n. 28, 128 n. 31
- Cartlidge, David R. 196 n. 45
 Carver, Robert H. F. 200 n. 60
 Cary, Philip 6
 Casebolt, Carl J. 21 n. 3
 Castellino, G. R. 327 n. 47
 Cazelles, H. 327 n. 47
 Chanton, Jeffrey P. 308 n. 28
 Charlesworth, James H. 29 n. 22, 221 n. 24
 Chase, Michael 153 n. 8
 Chaumartin, F.-R. 121 n. 43
 Chazon, Esther 22 n. 5
 Chesnutt, Randall D. 61, 75 n. 50, 79 n. 64
 Clark, Elizabeth A. 12 n. 42
 Clark, Gillian 285 n. 6
 Clarke, James 240 n. 21
 Cleland, Liza 264 n. 10
 Clement, Paul A. 154 n. 13
 Clements, Ruth 22 n. 5, 43 n. 10, 45 n. 13
 Cohen, Jeremy 21 n. 3
 Collins, Adela Yarbro 10 n. 30, 11 n. 33, 12 n. 46, 129 n. 35, 130 n. 44, 144 n. 140, 145 n. 147, 145 n. 149, 280 n. 58
 Collins, John J. 8 n. 19, 22 n. 4, 23 n. 7, 29 n. 22, 29 n. 23, 32 n. 30, 43 n. 10, 44 n. 11, 45 n. 13, 45 n. 17, 46, 46 n. 23, 47 n. 28, 48 n. 29, 48 n. 30, 58 n. 68, 62 n. 2, 74, 74 n. 45, 75 n. 50, 116, 116 n. 18, 199 n. 59, 204 n. 2
 Colombo, Ileana Chirassi 306 n. 23
 Colson, F.H. 109 n. 53
 Congar, I. 323 n. 36
 Connor, William R. 302 n. 12
 Conzelmann, Hans 53 n. 52, 55 n. 57
 Cook, Johann 45 n. 17
 Copeland, Kirsty B. 230 n. 51, 230 n. 52, 232 n. 53
 Coppens, J. 66 n. 14
 Corley, Jeremy 24 n. 10, 32 n. 29, 36 n. 42, 36 n. 44
 Cornhill, Carl Heinrich 329
 Cosgrove, Charles H. 266, 266 n. 13
 Courcelle, Pierre P. 3 n. 1
 Cousland, J. R. C. 162 n. 36, 198 n. 54
 Cranfield, C. E. B. 118 n. 29
 Crippa, Sabina 306 n. 23
 Croom, Alexandra T. 264 n. 10, 268, 268 n. 23, 272 n. 36

- Czachesz, István 210 n. 15, 223 n. 28, 230 n. 50
- D'Ambra, Eve 262 n. 5, 264 n. 10
- Dahl, Nils A. 279 n. 58
- Daiber, Thomas 158 n. 28
- Dainton, Barry 4 n. 4, 283 n. 2
- Dalby, Andrew 271 n. 34
- Dancy, Jonathan 151 n. 2
- Daube, David 163 n. 40
- Davey, Francis Noel 176 n. 6
- Davidson, Arnold I. 153 n. 8
- Davies, J. G. 238 n. 10
- Davies, William D. 9, 9 n. 26, 50 n. 39
- Davis, James A. 51 n. 44
- de Boer, P. A. H. 327 n. 47
- de la Torre, Emilio Suárez 306 n. 23
- de Lacy, Phillip 184 n. 38, 184 n. 39, 184 n. 40
- de Roo, Jacqueline C. R. 61 n. 2
- Dean, Jr., O. C. 6 n. 11
- Debrunner, Albert 92 n. 23
- DeFilippo, Joseph 196 n. 40
- Deissmann, A. 139 n. 109
- Delatte, Armand 307 n. 25
- Deloffre, Frédéric 307 n. 25
- DeLong, Linwood 271 n. 34
- den Boer, Jelle Zeilinga 308 n. 28
- Dench, Emma 275 n. 45
- Denyer, Nicholas 3 n. 2
- deSilva, David A. 75 n. 49
- Dibelius, Martin 328
- Dibelius, Otto 328
- DiLella, Alexander A. 23 n. 7, 24 n. 10, 35 n. 42
- Dillon, John M. 6 n. 9, 200 n. 64, 208 n. 11
- Dimant, D. 50 n. 39
- Dinkler, E. 113 n. 3
- Dodds, Eric R. 300, 300 n. 3, 303 n. 15
- Dods, Marcus 175 n. 3, 176, 176 n. 8, 177, 177 n. 12
- Dodson, Joseph R. 61 n. 1, 62 n. 6, 73 n. 41
- Donaldson, A. 316 n. 9
- Donaldson, J. 288 n. 17
- Doniger, Wendy 217, 217 n. 3, 226, 226 n. 42
- Doody, Margaret A. 193 n. 23, 197, 198 n. 50, 198 n. 51
- Dormeyer, Detlev 166 n. 53
- Dorter, Kenneth 226 n. 41, 228, 228 n. 47, 229, 229 n. 48, 230 n. 49
- Dover, Kenneth J. 286 n. 10
- Doyle, D. E. 298 n. 53
- Drijvers, H. W. J. 194 n. 28, 194 n. 33, 197 n. 47
- duBois, Page 291 n. 25
- Ducos, M. 121 n. 43
- Dunn, James D. G. 49 n. 31, 49, 49 n. 34, 49 n. 37, 49 n. 38, 52 n. 45, 53 n. 52, 56 n. 61
- Dunning, Benjamin H. 7 n. 11, 39 n. 54
- Ebel, E. 147 n. 156
- Ebner, M. 128 n. 22, 128 n. 25, 144 n. 141, 144 n. 142
- Edgar, Campbell C. 268 n. 24
- Edmondson, J. C. 264 n. 10
- Edwards, Catharine 154 n. 12, 155 n. 18
- Egger, Brigitte M. 193 n. 24
- Eisen, U. E. 141 n. 120
- Elgvin, Torleif 41 n. 2, 42 n. 6, 54 n. 54
- Elkaisy-Friemuth, Maha 6 n. 9
- Elliott, J. K. 223 n. 27
- Eltester, W. 130 n. 38
- Emerson, C. 192 n. 20, 193 n. 26, 194 n. 27
- Engberg-Pedersen, Troels 9 n. 24, 10, 10 n. 29, 49 n. 33, 54 n. 55, 77 n. 62, 85 n. 1, 88 n. 10, 88 n. 12, 89 n. 13, 90 n. 15, 90 n. 16, 91 n. 17, 91 n. 19, 91 n. 20, 92 n. 22, 94 n. 26, 95 n. 27, 95 n. 28, 96, 96 n. 29, 98 n. 33, 100 n. 34, 100 n. 35, 100 n. 36, 103 n. 41, 104 n. 44, 106 n. 49, 106 n. 50, 109 n. 54, 110 n. 55, 114 n. 6, 118 n. 28, 219 n. 12, 236 n. 3
- Engel, Helmut 70 n. 27
- Erikson, E. 126
- Evans, C. 41 n. 1
- Evans, Craig A. 263 n. 6
- Falk, Daniel K. 9 n. 28, 51 n. 42
- Fander, M. 140 n. 112, 140 n. 113, 140 n. 115, 141 n. 116, 141 n. 120, 141 n. 123, 144 n. 143

- Fanthan, Elaine 266 n. 15
 Farenga, Vincent 6 n. 9, 283 n. 2
 Fassnacht, Martin 166 n. 53
 Feldmeier, R. 130 n. 43
 Ferguson, Everett 166 n. 53
 Fiedrowicz, Michael 166 n. 53
 Fischler, Susan 264 n. 10, 285 n. 7
 Fitzgerald, John T. 9 n. 24
 Fitzmeyer, Joseph A. 64 n. 9
 Flach, Dieter 159 n. 29
 Flannery, F. 144 n. 137
 Fletcher-Louis, Crispin H. T. 55 n. 56
 Focant, C. 129 n. 35, 144 n. 135
 Fögen, Thorsten 6 n. 10
 Fontenrose, Joseph 299 n. 1, 299 n. 2
 Forbes, Christopher 300, 300 n. 3
 Fornara, Charles W. 202 n. 69
 Fornberg, Tord 92 n. 22, 166 n. 53
 Forschner, Maximilian 155 n. 20
 Fotopoulos, John 12 n. 49
 Foucault, Michel 91 n. 20, 153 n. 8, 291 n. 26
 Fowler, Harold North 226 n. 43
 Frangoulidi, Stauros 194 n. 32
 Frankfurt, Harry 91 n. 18
 Frankfurter, David 12 n. 48
 Fredrick, David 6 n. 10
 Frevel, C. 125 n. 3
 Frey, Jörg 9, 9 n. 27, 9 n. 28, 10, 49 n. 36, 50, 50 n. 39, 50 n. 40, 51, 58, 58 n. 67, 58 n. 69, 159 n. 29, 244 n. 76
 Fritzen, W. 138 n. 106
 Frye, Northrop 189 n. 12
 Funk, Robert Walter 92 n. 23
 Funke, Hermann 162 n. 36
 Furnish, Victor Paul 220 n. 17

 Gabalda, J. 70 n. 27
 Gaca, Kathy L. 63 n. 7
 Gallagher, Shaun 4 n. 4, 151 n. 1
 Galvin, John P. 12 n. 39
 Gammie, J. G. 23 n. 7
 García Martínez, Florentino 9 n. 27, 9 n. 28, 42 n. 4, 43 n. 10, 47 n. 28, 51 n. 42, 325 n. 40
 Gaventa, Beverly Roberts 61 n. 1, 62 n. 6
 Gerlemann, Gillis 320, 320 n. 28, 321, 323–324, 331
 Gianotti, Giorgio F. 200 n. 61
 Gilbert, Maurice 24 n. 10, 35 n. 42, 36 n. 42, 65 n. 12, 66 n. 15, 67 n. 20, 69 n. 23, 70 n. 28, 70 n. 29, 75 n. 50, 76 n. 56, 78 n. 63, 79, 79 n. 66
 Gilchrist, J. M. 170 n. 62
 Gill, Christopher 6 n. 9, 15, 86, 86 n. 6, 87, 91 n. 19, 110–112, 151 n. 1, 152 n. 6, 153 n. 8, 155 n. 18, 289 n. 20
 Glancy, Jennifer A. 12 n. 43
 Gleason, Maud 274, 274 n. 44
 Gloël, J. 315, 317 n. 16
 Gnilk, Joachim 126 n. 10, 126, 126 n. 11, 130 n. 44, 143 n. 132, 147 n. 155, 147 n. 159
 Goering, Greg Schmidt 24 n. 12, 34, 34 n. 38, 35, 35 n. 40, 35 n. 41
 Goff, Matthew J. 10, 13, 39 n. 52, 42 n. 4, 42 n. 5, 43 n. 9, 44 n. 12, 45 n. 14, 46 n. 25, 47 n. 26, 48 n. 29, 54 n. 54, 58 n. 68, 325 n. 41
 Goffman, E. 126
 Golden, Mark 271 n. 34
 Gooder, Paula R. 220, 220 n. 17
 Goold, G. P. 198 n. 55
 Grabbe, Lester L. 71 n. 33, 75 n. 49, 75 n. 51, 77 n. 61, 80 n. 67
 Graf, Fritz 17, 206 n. 9, 299 n. 1, 309 n. 31
 Graver, Margaret R. 104 n. 44
 Green, Joel B. 12 n. 40
 Greschat, K. 140 n. 111
 Grimal, Pierre 160 n. 30
 Grindheim, Sigurd 51 n. 44
 Grobel, Kendrick 7 n. 12
 Grotanelli, Cristiano 306 n. 23
 Gruen, Erich S. 188 n. 3
 Gummere, Richard M. 155 n. 19
 Gundry, Robert H. 5 n. 8, 221 n. 23
 Gunkel, Hermann 13, 17, 61 n. 1, 313, 313 n. 1, 313 n. 2, 314–315, 315 n. 5, 316, 316 n. 9, 316 n. 12, 316 n. 13, 317, 317 n. 14, 317 n. 15, 317 n. 16, 317 n. 17, 318, 318 n. 18, 318 n. 19, 318 n. 20, 318 n. 21, 318 n. 22, 318 n. 23, 319, 319 n. 26, 320, 326–327, 327 n. 46, 327 n. 48, 328–329, 329 n. 55, 329 n. 57, 329 n. 58, 330–331
 Guttenberger, Gudrun 140 n. 111, 156 n. 22

- Habel, Norman C. 21 n. 2, 38 n. 51
 Hachmann, Erwin 161 n. 32
 Hadot, Ilsestraut 161 n. 33
 Hadot, Pierre 153 n. 8
 Hägg, Tomas 198 n. 51
 Haight, Elizabeth H. 199 n. 60
 Hale, John R. 308 n. 28
 Hall, Jonathan M. 188 n. 3
 Hällström, Gunnar af 238 n. 10, 238 n. 14
 Hamacher, Ulf Gregor 161 n. 31
 Hamilton, H. 219 n. 11
 Hamilton, Mark W. 6 n. 10
 Hammershaimb, E. 327 n. 47
 Hanson, J. Arthur 196 n. 41
 Hardy, D. 292 n. 31
 Hare, D. R. A. 130 n. 38, 130 n. 44, 147 n. 155
 Harlow, Mary 264 n. 10, 276 n. 47
 Harrill, J. Albert 11, 11 n. 33, 11 n. 34, 11 n. 35, 12 n. 47, 283 n. 2
 Harrington, Daniel J. 41 n. 2, 42 n. 4, 42 n. 6, 43 n. 10, 44 n. 12, 46, 46 n. 20, 46 n. 23, 50 n. 42
 Harrison, Stephen J. 194 n. 27, 195 n. 34, 196 n. 40, 196 n. 43, 200 n. 61, 200 n. 63, 200 n. 64, 200 n. 66, 200 n. 68, 202
 Harrisville, R. A. 313 n. 1
 Hartman, L. 130 n. 45, 131 n. 47
 Hartney, Aileen M. 276 n. 48, 281 n. 62
 Hartsock, Chad 164 n. 46
 Harvey, W. Wigan 255 n. 139
 Heckel, Theo K. 10 n. 30
 Heidegger, Martin 7
 Heil, John P. 52 n. 49
 Heininger, Bernhard 163 n. 39
 Hellholm, David 92 n. 22, 166 n. 53, 279 n. 58
 Hempel, C. 9 n. 27, 49 n. 36
 Hengel, Martin 8 n. 19
 Hennecke, Edgar 240 n. 21
 Hense, O. 142 n. 128
 Herkommer, Elmar 202 n. 69
 Herter, Hans 271 n. 34
 Herzer, Jens 244 n. 76
 Heskell, Julia 275 n. 47
 Hilhorst, Anthony 203 n. 1, 210 n. 14, 223 n. 28, 224 n. 34, 230 n. 50
 Hill, Christopher 295 n. 42
 Himmelfarb, Martha 32 n. 29
 Hoffleit, Herbert B. 154 n. 13
 Hoffman, Marc David 306 n. 24
 Hofius, O. 113 n. 5
 Hofmann, H. 196 n. 46
 Hofmann, Heinz 194 n. 31, 194 n. 32, 199 n. 60, 200 n. 62
 Hogan, Karina Martin 13
 Høglund, Kenneth G. 61 n. 1
 Holland, Leicester B. 300 n. 6
 Hollenweger, W. 327 n. 46
 Holloway, Paul A. 11 n. 38, 185 n. 43, 278 n. 54
 Holmes, Brooke 12 n. 43
 Holquist, M. 192 n. 20, 193 n. 26, 194 n. 27
 Holzberg, Niklas 194 n. 29
 Hommel, Hildebrecht 156 n. 22
 Hooker, M. D. 130 n. 41, 146 n. 151, 147 n. 159
 Horn, Friedrich Wilhelm 154 n. 12, 155 n. 20, 170 n. 62, 322, 322 n. 34, 324, 331
 Horrell, David G. 12 n. 46
 Horsley, Richard A. 22 n. 4, 41 n. 3, 53 n. 52, 55 n. 57, 57 n. 65, 57 n. 66, 58 n. 67, 144 n. 137
 Hörschele, R. 288 n. 16
 Hoskyns, Edwyn C. 176, 176 n. 6
 Hovhannessian, Vahan 238 n. 11, 239 n. 20240 n. 21, 240 n. 22, 240 n. 23, 240 n. 24, 240 n. 26, 241 n. 35, 241 n. 37, 241 n. 42, 242 n. 52, 243 n. 66, 247 n. 113, 250 n. 131
 Howe, Irving 292 n. 27, 292 n. 28, 292 n. 29
 Hübner, Hans 62 n. 6
 Huizenga, Annette Bourland 263 n. 6, 276 n. 48, 278 n. 54
 Hultgren, Stephen 41 n. 3, 42 n. 3, 52 n. 49, 52 n. 49, 56 n. 58, 58 n. 67
 Hunt, A. S. 268 n. 24
 Hurley, Robert 153 n. 8
 Huxley, Aldous 302
 Ilberg, John 183 n. 36
 Instone-Brewer, D. 268 n. 24
 Isenberg, Wesley W. 246 n. 93

- Jackson, Frank 151 n. 2
 Jaeger, F. 142 n. 127
 Jäger, U. 131 n. 51
 James, Paula 196 n. 44
 Jansen, L. 58 n. 67
 Janßen, Martin 244 n. 76
 Jedan, C. 58 n. 67
 Jenkins, P. 327 n. 46
 Jervis, Ann 71 n. 34
 Jervis, L. A. 118 n. 28
 Jewett, Robert 5 n. 8, 8 n. 19, 8 n. 20, 8 n. 21, 48 n. 31, 81, 81 n. 69, 101 n. 36, 105 n. 48, 119 n. 29
 Jochum-Bortfeld, Carsten 127, 127 n. 20, 128–129, 129 n. 34, 133 n. 70, 143 n. 133
 Johnson, Luke T. 165 n. 48
 Johnson, Mark 38 n. 50
 Johnston, Sarah Iles 299 n. 1, 305 n. 19
 Joly, Robert 182 n. 33
 Jones, H. S. 217 n. 2
 Jones, Ivor H. 74 n. 44
 Jülicher, Adolf 327 n. 47, 329, 329 n. 56, 329 n. 57

 Kaminsky, Joel 35 n. 39
 Kampen, John 9 n. 27
 Karla, G. 288 n. 16
 Karlsen, Turid 236 n. 3
 Käsemann, Ernst 7 n. 12, 118 n. 25
 Kauppi, Lynn Allan 165 n. 50, 166 n. 53
 Kautzsch, Emil 328
 Keck, Leander E. 66 n. 13
 Keener, Craig 176, 176 n. 5, 178, 178 n. 15, 178 n. 16, 181, 181 n. 29
 Keith, Alison 264 n. 10
 Kelhoffer, James A. 11 n. 38, 185 n. 43, 278 n. 54
 Kelly, J. N. D. 238 n. 14
 Kelly, K. C. 285 n. 8
 Kenney, E. J. 196 n. 46
 Kerényi, Karl 188, 197, 197 n. 48, 309, 309 n. 31
 Keyser, Paul-Gerhard 62 n. 6
 Khrushchev, Nikita 292–293, 293 n. 32
 Kidd, Reggie M. 267 n. 18
 Kierkegaard, Søren 7, 155 n. 20
 Kinukawa, H. 128 n. 29, 141 n. 122
 Kister, Menahem 42 n. 3, 47 n. 26, 50 n. 42, 50 n. 42, 52 n. 49, 58 n. 67
 Klatt, W. 318 n. 23, 327, 327 n. 47, 327 n. 48, 328 n. 49, 328 n. 51, 328 n. 54, 329 n. 55, 329 n. 58
 Klauck, Hans-Josef 167 n. 58, 204 n. 2, 210 n. 14, 219 n. 10,
 Klawans, Jonathan 27 n. 18, 32 n. 32
 Klijn, A. F. J. 194 n. 33, 204 n. 2, 238 n. 11, 239 n. 17, 240 n. 24, 240 n. 26, 241 n. 37, 241 n. 42, 250 n. 133
 Klostermann, Erich 63 n. 8
 Kneissl, Peter 157 n. 23, 159 n. 29
 Knight, Kevin 297 n. 47
 Koch, Dietrich-Alex 70 n. 31
 Koester, Helmut 51 n. 44
 Koestermann, Erich 156 n. 22
 Koestler, Arthur 292, 292 n. 31
 Kohl, Margaret 7 n. 12
 Kolarcik, Michael 65 n. 12, 66 n. 13, 66 n. 15, 67 n. 19, 70 n. 27, 70 n. 28, 75 n. 48, 77 n. 61
 Kollmann, B. 129 n. 33
 Konradt, M. 122 n. 46
 Konstan, David 17, 160 n. 30, 193 n. 24, 285 n. 6, 286 n. 10, 286 n. 11, 288 n. 16, 289 n. 20, 290 n. 21, 292, 296 n. 44
 Köselitz, Heinrich 306 n. 24
 Koskeniemi, E. 132 n. 58
 Köstenberger, Andreas J. 177, 177 n. 13
 Kraemer, Ross Shepard 194 n. 30
 Kraus, Wolfgang 157 n. 22
 Krauter, Stefan 14, 113 n. 2
 Krenkel, Werner A. 181 n. 28
 Kroll, Wilhelm 206 n. 9
 Krüger, H.-P. 131 n. 51
 Krüger, Julian 162 n. 34
 Kuefler, Matthew 73 n. 39
 Kuen, Gabrielle 160 n. 30
 Kuhn, Heinz-Wolfgang 50 n. 39
 Kuhn, Karl Georg 9, 9 n. 25, 50 n. 39
 Kümmel, Werner Georg 14, 113, 113 n. 4, 114 n. 8
 Küster, V. 128 n. 24
 Kuula, K. 118 n. 26

- Labahn, Michael 6 n. 11, 132 n. 54, 138 n. 105, 155 n. 20, 157 n. 25, 157 n. 26, 158 n. 26, 170 n. 62, 171 n. 69
- Laird, Andrew 195 n. 39
- Lakoff, George 38 n. 50
- Lambrecht, Jan 103 n. 41
- Lamp, Jeffrey S. 41 n. 3
- Lampe, G. W. 321, 321 n. 30, 321 n. 31, 321 n. 33, 322–324, 331
- Lampe, Peter 236 n. 4
- Landgraf, G. 120 n. 40
- Lang, Manfred 15, 132 n. 54, 154 n. 11, 154 n. 12, 155 n. 20, 157 n. 25, 157 n. 26, 158 n. 26, 158 n. 27, 159 n. 29, 164 n. 42, 165 n. 49, 166 n. 53, 169 n. 62, 172 n. 75
- Lange, Armin 9 n. 27, 42 n. 6, 44 n. 11, 46 n. 20, 49 n. 36, 50 n. 42, 125 n. 4
- Larcher, C. 61 n. 1, 70 n. 27
- Latte, Kurt 166 n. 52
- Lazarus, R. S. 126
- Lee, Michelle W. 54 n. 55
- Lee, Mireille M. 6 n. 10, 273 n. 40
- Lehtipuu, Outi 6 n. 11, 238 n. 10, 238 n. 13
- Leinhäupl-Wilke, Andreas 166 n. 53
- Leisegang, Hans 315, 315 n. 9
- LeMon, Joel M. 21 n. 2
- Lentz, John Clayton 164 n. 43, 170 n. 63
- Lepsius, Richard 328 n. 54
- Leslie, M. 285 n. 8
- Levine, A. J. 38 n. 51, 291 n. 25
- Levison, John R. 17, 37 n. 46, 116, 116 n. 19, 316 n. 9, 316 n. 12, 323 n. 36, 323 n. 36, 325 n. 42, 326 n. 44, 326 n. 45
- Lewis, C. S. 189 n. 11
- Lewis, J. R. 295 n. 42
- Lewis, Sinclair 191 n. 16
- Lichtenberger, H. 9 n. 27, 49 n. 36, 113 n. 2, 116 n. 17, 117 n. 23, 125 n. 4
- Liddell, H. G. 217 n. 2
- Liedtke, Max 162 n. 35
- Lietaert, B. J. 138 n. 105
- Lieu, Judith 188 n. 3
- Lincoln, Bruce 291 n. 26
- Lindemann, Andreas 166 n. 53
- Lindemann, G. 131 n. 51
- Linebaugh, Jonathan A. 62, 62 n. 4, 62 n. 5, 63 n. 7, 64 n. 9, 70 n. 27, 71 n. 35, 73 n. 40, 73 n. 41
- Lipsius, Richard A. 194 n. 33
- Littleton, C. Scott 300 n. 6
- Llewellyn-Jones, Lloyd 264 n. 10
- Loader, William 32 n. 31
- Löhr, Hermut 154 n. 12
- Long, Anthony A. 97 n. 30, 104 n. 45, 105 n. 46, 152 n. 6, 153 n. 8, 155 n. 17, 156 n. 20, 156 n. 21, 290 n. 21
- Longenecker, Bruce W. 49 n. 31
- Losemann, Volker 157 n. 23, 159 n. 29
- Lucas, Alec J. 13, 61 n. 1, 62 n. 4, 63 n. 8, 64 n. 10, 65 n. 11, 71 n. 32, 73 n. 42
- Lücking, Stefan 128 n. 29, 144 n. 134, 166 n. 53
- Lührmann, D. 131 n. 46, 145 n. 151, 147 n. 159
- Luttikhuisen, Gerard 55 n. 56, 238 n. 11, 239 n. 17, 249 n. 128
- Lutz, Cora 270 n. 30
- MacDonald, Dennis R. 194 n. 28
- Mackay, T. W. 238 n. 11, 238 n. 12, 239 n. 16, 239 n. 18, 240 n. 21, 241 n. 31, 241 n. 38, 242 n. 48, 242 n. 54, 242 n. 55, 244 n. 74
- Malherbe, Abraham J. 221 n. 22, 248 n. 124, 248 n. 125
- Malina, Bruce J. 86, 86 n. 3, 86 n. 4, 146 n. 152, 164 n. 41, 164 n. 46, 165 n. 47, 165 n. 51, 167 n. 57, 170 n. 64, 170 n. 69
- Marcus, J. 129 n. 35
- Marguerat, Daniel 171 n. 75, 172 n. 76
- Maritz, Petrus 155 n. 20
- Marjanan, Antti 237 n. 9
- Martin, Dale B. 8, 8 n. 22, 8 n. 23, 8–10, 49 n. 32, 52 n. 48, 56 n. 61, 73 n. 39, 85–86, 86 n. 2
- Martin, Troy W. 12 n. 49, 15, 177 n. 11, 179 n. 21, 179 n. 22, 179 n. 23, 180 n. 25, 180 n. 26, 182 n. 32, 183 n. 33, 183 n. 34, 183 n. 37
- Martyn, J. Louis 85, 85 n. 1, 86, 92 n. 23
- Mastin, B. A. 177, 177 n. 13
- Maurizio, Lisa 300, 300 n. 3, 306 n. 23
- May, H. G. 327 n. 47

- May, Margaret Tallmadge 180 n. 24, 184 n. 41
- McDonagh, F. 199 n. 57
- McGushin, Edward F. 153 n. 8
- McHugh, John F. 175 n. 2, 177, 177 n. 13, 181 n. 27
- McInerney, Maud B. 285 n. 8
- McWilliam, Joanne 298 n. 53
- Meeks, Wayne A. 166 n. 53
- Mehl, Andreas 160 n. 29, 162 n. 35
- Meiser, Martin 14, 135 n. 81, 138 n. 104
- Melcher, Sarah J. 12 n. 45
- Mendonca, P. Dominic 170 n. 62, 170 n. 71
- Merkelbach, Reinhold 188, 197, 197 n. 48, 198, 198 n. 51, 305 n. 20
- Merklein, H. 142 n. 124
- Mertens, K. 142 n. 127
- Merz, Annette 265 n. 12
- Messing, Gordon W. 242 n. 60
- Milik, J. T. 43 n. 8
- Miller, Walter 155 n. 18
- Mitchell, Margaret M. 11 n. 33, 71 n. 34, 220 n. 16, 248 n. 125, 280 n. 58
- Mitsis, Philipp 153 n. 9
- Moessner, David P. 171 n. 75
- Moltmann, J. 323 n. 36
- Moltmann-Wendel, E. 141 n. 118, 141 n. 119, 141 n. 121
- Montserrat, Dominic 6 n. 10, 285 n. 6
- Mora, Victoria Almandós 289 n. 20
- Moreschini, Claudio 199 n. 60
- Moretti, Paola 289 n. 18
- Morris, Leon 178 n. 16
- Moss, Candida R. 12 n. 45, 12 n. 48
- Mount, Christopher N. 11, 11 n. 36, 11 n. 37, 11 n. 38, 49 n. 33
- Mueller, Hans-Friedrich 160 n. 29
- Muenchow, Charles 12 n. 39
- Muir, John 21 n. 3
- Müller, J. 113 n. 1
- Müller, M. 88 n. 10, 114 n. 6
- Najman, H. 47 n. 28
- Namnyak, M. 293 n. 35
- Newman, J. H. 47 n. 28
- Newsom, Carol A. 6 n. 9, 26 n. 14, 45 n. 15
- Neyrey, Jerome H. 86 n. 3, 166 n. 53
- Nickelsburg, George W. E. 22 n. 4, 27 n. 16, 28 n. 19, 29 n. 22, 31 n. 28, 32 n. 29
- Nicolini, Lara 194 n. 32
- Niederwimmer, K. 129 n. 35
- Nietzsche, Friedrich 299, 306, 306 n. 24
- Niklaus, Peter 306 n. 24
- Nilsson, I. 288 n. 16
- Nissinen, Martti 32 n. 30
- Nitzan, Bilhah 42 n. 6
- North, Helen 278 n. 54
- Nussbaum, Martha 122 n. 45, 286 n. 11
- Oakes, Peter 100 n. 36
- O'Brien, Peter T. 63 n. 7
- Oegema, G. S. 125 n. 4
- Oesterreich, Traugott K. 300, 300 n. 6
- Ogle, M. B. 300 n. 5
- Økland, Jorunn 12 n. 46, 110 n. 55, 236 n. 3, 238 n. 10
- Olbricht, Thomas H. 9 n. 24
- Olson, Kelly 264 n. 10, 266, 266 n. 14, 267 n. 17, 267, 267 n. 19, 268 n. 24, 269 n. 28, 270 n. 29, 271 n. 34
- Omerzu, Heike 125 n. 1, 140 n. 111, 172, 172 n. 76
- Orwell, George 292, 292 n. 31
- Osiek, Carolyn 12 n. 47
- O'Sullivan, James N. 287 n. 13
- Overbeck, Franz 306
- Owen, H. P. 63 n. 7
- Parfit, Derek 151 n. 2
- Parke, H. W. 299 n. 1
- Parry, D. W. 44 n. 11, 54 n. 54
- Parsons, Mikael C. 166 n. 54, 195 n. 38
- Passaro, Angelo 66 n. 12
- Patrick, Ted 293 n. 34
- Patzer, Andreas 306 n. 24
- Pearson, Birger A. 57 n. 64, 237 n. 9
- Peck, A. L. 176, 177 n. 10
- Penner, Todd 12 n. 45, 275 n. 46
- Penny, Donald N. 238 n. 11
- Perdue, Leo G. 13, 21, 21 n. 1
- Perkins, Judith 12 n. 41, 188 n. 3, 193 n. 24
- Perry, John 151 n. 1

- Pervo, Richard I. 15, 163 n. 41, 166 n. 53, 166 n. 54, 169 n. 62, 194 n. 30, 195 n. 38, 198 n. 52
- Pesch, R. 129 n. 35, 131 n. 47, 147 n. 155, 147 n. 159, 147 n. 160
- Pestman, P. W. 268 n. 24
- Peters, Ted 236 n. 4
- Peterson, David G. 164 n. 41, 166 n. 53, 169 n. 62, 170 n. 69, 171 n. 72
- Pfeiffer, Robert H. 77 n. 61
- Pfleiderer, Otto 13, 314, 314 n. 4
- Pheasant, Felicia 6 n. 10
- Pietersma, Albert 57 n. 63
- Pilch, John J. 164 n. 41, 164 n. 46, 165 n. 47, 165 n. 51, 167 n. 57, 170 n. 64, 170 n. 69
- Pilhofer, Peter 147 n. 156, 167 n. 57
- Piovanelli, Pierluigi 222 n. 25
- Plant, I. M. 261 n. 1
- Plessner, H. 131, 131 n. 51
- Pomeroy, Sarah B. 263 n. 8, 263 n. 9, 268 n. 22, 274 n. 42
- Popovi_, Mladen 6 n. 10
- Porter, Stanley E. 61 n. 2, 68 n. 22
- Potter, Paul 6 n. 10
- Pouderon, B. 288 n. 16
- Prato, Gian Luigi 35 n. 42
- Prieur, Jean_Marc 194 n. 28
- Procksch, Otto 330
- Puech, Émile 54 n. 54
- Quanbeck, P. A. 313 n. 1
- Rabens, Volker 10 n. 29, 49 n. 33
- Rackham, H. 157 n. 23, 164 n. 45
- Räisänen, H. 115 n. 10
- Ramelli, Ilaria 160 n. 30, 290 n. 21
- Rankin, O. S. 24 n. 12
- Rappaport, U. 50 n. 39
- Reardon, Brian P. 190 n. 15
- Reed, Annette Yoshiko 27 n. 17
- Reese, James M. 63 n. 7, 68 n. 21, 75 n. 46, 76, 76 n. 52, 76 n. 53, 77 n. 62
- Rehak, Melanie 189 n. 10
- Rehmann, Luzia Sutter 38 n. 51
- Reichert, A. 115 n. 12
- Reinbold, W. 129 n. 33
- Reinmuth, Eckhart 127, 127 n. 12, 127 n. 13, 127 n. 14, 127 n. 15, 127 n. 16, 128 n. 25, 137 n. 97, 137 n. 98
- Reitzenstein, Richard 49 n. 38
- Remes, Pauliina 6 n. 9, 89 n. 13, 151 n. 1, 283 n. 2
- Rescigno, Andrea 309 n. 30
- Rey, Jean-Sébastien 42 n. 4, 45 n. 16
- Reydams-Schils, Gretchen J. 6 n. 9
- Reymond, Eric D. 35 n. 42
- Richards, Kent H. 21 n. 2
- Richardson, N. J. 309 n. 30
- Richardson, Peter 71 n. 34
- Richardson, Samuel 293, 294 n. 36, 294 n. 37, 294 n. 38, 294 n. 39, 295, 295 n. 43, 296 n. 44
- Riches, J. 199 n. 57
- Ricks, S. D. 54 n. 54
- Riefstahl, Hermann 200 n. 61
- Riemann, F. 126
- Rigaux, Béda 52 n. 46
- Rist, John M. 160 n. 30
- Rist, Martin 238 n. 11, 240 n. 21, 248 n. 123, 250 n. 130
- Ritschl, Albrecht 314 n. 3, 316
- Robb, Carol S. 21 n. 3
- Robbins, M. 291 n. 25
- Robbins, Thomas 295 n. 42
- Roberts, A. 288 n. 17
- Roberts, Michael 285 n. 6
- Robertson, Donald S. 194 n. 32
- Robinson, James M. 230 n. 52, 246 n. 93
- Robinson, John A. T. 7 n. 12
- Röcke, W. 288 n. 16
- Roetzel, Calvin 49 n. 33
- Rohde, Erwin 306 n. 24
- Roig Lanzillotta, Lautaro 15, 203, 203 n. 1, 203 n. 3, 203 n. 4, 203 n. 7, 203 n. 8, 204–205
- Rollmann, H. 327 n. 47, 329 n. 57
- Roloff, Jürgen 170 n. 69
- Römheld, K. F. D. 125 n. 4
- Rordorf, Willy 238 n. 11, 239 n. 17, 239 n. 19, 240 n. 21, 240 n. 23, 240 n. 24, 240 n. 25, 240 n. 27, 240 n. 28, 240 n. 29, 240 n. 30, 241 n. 32, 241 n. 33, 241 n. 36, 241 n. 39, 241 n. 40, 241 n. 41, 241 n. 43, 241 n. 44, 241 n. 45,

- 241 n. 46, 241 n. 47, 242 n. 49, 242 n. 50, 242 n. 51, 242 n. 53, 242 n. 54, 243 n. 66, 250 n. 132
- Rosenberger, Veit 300 n. 5
- Roskam, H. N. 127 n. 21
- Rost, Betina 159 n. 29
- Rothschild, Clare K. 71 n. 34, 159 n. 29, 185 n. 43, 244 n. 76
- Rousselle, Aline 6 n. 10
- Russell, Donald A. 219 n. 11
- Russell, Robert John 236 n. 4
- Sailors, T. 316 n. 9
- Salfinger, Theo 306 n. 24
- Sanders, E. P. 218 n. 5
- Sanders, J. N. 177, 177 n. 13
- Sandy, Gerald N. 194 n. 31, 196 n. 46
- Sänger, D. 122 n. 46
- Sassi, Michela Maria 275 n. 46
- Satlow, Michael L. 11 n. 33, 12 n. 44
- Satran, David 22 n. 5
- Scarpato, Giuseppe 70 n. 27
- Scarry, Elaine 292 n. 30
- Schäfer, Jan 164 n. 42
- Schaumberger, C. 141 n. 117
- Schechtman, Marya 153 n. 8
- Schenke, Ludger 177, 177 n. 13
- Schiffman, L. H. 42 n. 6
- Schipper, Jeremy 12 n. 45, 275 n. 46
- Schlam, Carl C. 199 n. 60
- Schmelting, Gareth 192 n. 21, 194 n. 29, 197 n. 48
- Schmid, Wilhelm 153 n. 8
- Schmidt, Hans 314, 314 n. 3, 319, 327, 327 n. 47, 328, 328 n. 52
- Schmidt, Karl Matthias 9 n. 24
- Schmithals, Walter 49 n. 38, 113 n. 5, 131 n. 46
- Schneemelcher, Wilhelm 194 n. 28, 194 n. 33, 197 n. 47, 222 n. 26, 240 n. 21
- Schnelle, Udo 5 n. 8, 6 n. 11, 125 n. 3, 127, 127 n. 17, 127 n. 18, 127 n. 19, 132 n. 54, 157 n. 25, 157 n. 26, 158 n. 26, 221 n. 23
- Schnotz, Wolfgang 158 n. 28
- Schökel, Luis Alonso 23 n. 7, 24 n. 10, 34 n. 37
- Schoors, A. 50 n. 42
- Schottroff, L. 133 n. 73, 139 n. 110, 140 n. 112, 140 n. 114, 141 n. 123, 144 n. 143
- Schroer, S. 128 n. 30, 129 n. 34
- Schröter, Jens 159 n. 29, 171 n. 75
- Schuller, Eileen M. 9 n. 28, 45 n. 15, 51 n. 42
- Schürmann, H. 132 n. 59
- Schüssler Fiorenza, E. 141 n. 117
- Schütrumpf, Eckart 157 n. 23
- Scornaienchi, Lorenzo 6 n. 11
- Scott, R. 217 n. 2
- Scroggs, Robin 48 n. 31
- Sebasta, Judith Lynn 264 n. 10, 269 n. 28
- Sedley, David 104 n. 45, 105 n. 46, 290 n. 21
- Seidel, Christina Elisabeth 153 n. 8
- Seifrid, Mark A. 63 n. 7
- Seigel, Jerrold 4, 4 n. 4, 4 n. 5
- Seim, Karlsen 238 n. 10
- Seim, T. K. 110 n. 55
- Sellin, Ernst 330
- Senft, C. 142 n. 126
- Sepilli, Tullio 306 n. 23
- Shaw, Brent D. 12 n. 48, 287–288, 288 n. 14, 288 n. 15
- Shear, Jonathan 151 n. 1
- Sheppard, Gerald T. 34 n. 35, 34 n. 36
- Shiner, W. 138 n. 103
- Shoemaker, Sydney 151 n. 2
- Shulman, David 12 n. 44
- Shumate, Nancy 194 n. 31
- Sidney, Philip 296 n. 44
- Sihvola, Juha 6 n. 9, 89 n. 13, 104 n. 44, 151 n. 1, 283 n. 2, 286 n. 11
- Skehan, Patrick W. 23 n. 7, 24 n. 10, 35 n. 42
- Skemp, Vincent 24 n. 10, 32 n. 29, 36 n. 42, 295, 295 n. 42
- Smend, R. 327 n. 47, 328 n. 50
- Smith, Gordon T. 295 n. 42
- Smith, Kirby Flower 300 n. 5
- Smith, Steven D. 188 n. 3
- Smyth, Herbert Weir 183 n. 34, 183 n. 35, 184 n. 42, 242 n. 60, 246 n. 110
- Söding, Th. 139 n. 107
- Sommer, Benjamin D. 6 n. 10

- Sorabji, Richard 4 n. 4, 151 n. 1, 152 n. 6, 153 n. 8, 283 n. 2
- Sorensen, E. 133 n. 61
- Spiller, Henry A. 308 n. 28
- Spittler, Janet E. 15, 209 n. 13, 214 n. 18, 215 n. 19, 215 n. 21
- Stacey, W. D. 7 n. 12
- Städele, Alfons 262 n. 6, 270 n. 32
- Stanton, Graham N. 49 n. 31
- Starr, James 98 n. 33, 219 n. 12
- Stauber, Joseph 305 n. 20
- Staubli, T. 128 n. 30, 129 n. 34
- Stefanut, Romulus 15–16
- Stegemann, Hartmut 45 n. 15, 128–129 n. 33
- Stegemann, W. 146 n. 152
- Stein, R. H. 129 n. 35, 130 n. 41, 130 n. 43, 130 n. 44, 144 n. 139, 146 n. 151, 147 n. 155, 147 n. 159
- Stendahl, Krister 7, 7 n. 14, 7 n. 15, 7 n. 16, 7 n. 18, 9 n. 25, 50 n. 39
- Stephens, Susan 193 n. 24
- Sterling, Gregory E. 41 n. 3, 43 n. 10, 51 n. 44, 52 n. 45, 57 n. 64, 58 n. 67, 199 n. 59
- Steudel, A. 42 n. 4, 129 n. 33
- Stevenson, C. 200 n. 60
- Stewart-Sykes, Alistair 39 n. 53
- Stout, Ann M. 264 n. 10, 268 n. 23
- Stowers, Stanley K. 8–9, 9 n. 24, 10–11, 114, 114 n. 9
- Strange, S. K. 100 n. 35
- Straub, J. 142 n. 127
- Strawson, Galen 4 n. 4, 151 n. 1, 283 n. 2
- Strecker, C. 128 n. 32
- Strohmaier, Gotthard 176 n. 9
- Stroumsa, Guy G. 12 n. 43
- Strube, S. A. 140 n. 115
- Strugnell, John 41 n. 2, 43 n. 10, 44 n. 12, 46, 46 n. 20, 46 n. 23, 50 n. 42
- Stumfohl, Helmut 306 n. 23
- Suerbaum, Werner 159 n. 29
- Suhl, Alfred 170 n. 66
- Sullivan, Kevin P. 55 n. 56
- Suter, David W. 32 n. 29
- Sutton, E. W. 157 n. 23
- Swain, Simon 187 n. 3
- Swancutt, Diana M. 275 n. 46
- Tannehill, Robert C. 170 n. 68
- Tanner, Klaus 154 n. 11
- Tatum, James 200 n. 61, 200 n. 63
- Taylor, Charles 87 n. 8, 151 n. 1, 151 n. 2, 151 n. 3, 151 n. 5, 151 n. 7, 152
- Taylor, Joan E. 270 n. 32
- Temkin, Owsei 183 n. 36
- Tennenhouse, Leonard 295 n. 40
- Testuz, Michel 238 n. 11, 239 n. 16, 239 n. 18, 241 n. 35, 241 n. 38, 241 n. 44, 242 n. 54, 250 n. 131
- Theissen, Gerd 12 n. 39, 87 n. 9, 128 n. 22, 128 n. 32, 128 n. 33, 131 n. 52, 132 n. 57, 134 n. 75, 144 n. 138, 145 n. 145, 145 n. 146, 199 n. 57
- Theobald, Michael 118 n. 27, 177, 177 n. 13, 178 n. 16, 178 n. 18
- Tholuck, A. 114 n. 8
- Thomas, Samuel I. 43 n. 7
- Thumiger, Chiara 6 n. 9, 283 n. 2
- Tigchelaar, Eibert J. C. 9 n. 27, 42 n. 4, 43 n. 10, 43 n. 11, 44 n. 12, 46 n. 19, 47 n. 27, 50 n. 42, 52 n. 47, 53 n. 53, 55 n. 56, 58 n. 69, 325 n. 40
- Tilg, Stefan 287 n. 13
- Tiller, Patrick 22 n. 4
- Tobin, Thomas H. 204 n. 2
- Toohy, Peter 271 n. 34
- Trethaim, Terence E. 21 n. 2
- Tronier, H. 88 n. 10, 114 n. 6
- Trudinger, Peter L. 21 n. 2
- Tucker, Gene M. 21 n. 2
- Tucker, Paul 275 n. 46
- Turner, E. G. 239 n. 16
- Turner, Frederick 295 n. 41
- Turner, Mark 30 n. 25, 38, 38 n. 50
- Ugolini, Gherardo 163 n. 39
- Ulrich, E. 44 n. 11
- Uro, Risto 32 n. 30
- Valantasis, Richard 12 n. 42
- Vall, Gregory 37, 37 n. 47
- Vallette, Paul 194 n. 32
- van Belle, Gilbert 155 n. 20
- van den Heever, G. 193 n. 24, 197 n. 48, 198 n. 53
- van der Eijk, Philip J. 179 n. 21

- van der Horst, Pieter Willem 164 n. 42
- van Hoof, Lieve 297 n. 45
- van Kooten, George H. 6 n. 11, 41 n. 3, 46 n. 23, 49 n. 31, 53 n. 52, 54 n. 55, 58 n. 67, 203 n. 1
- Van Nuffelen, Peter 297 n. 45
- van Ruiten, Jacques 230 n. 50
- Vander Stichele, Caroline 12 n. 45, 275 n. 46
- VanderKam, James C. 27 n. 16
- Vegge, Tor 162 n. 36
- Vermeylen, J. 75 n. 48
- Vernant, Jean-Pierre 15, 217, 217 n. 1
- Vogel, Manuel 154 n. 12
- Vogt, Thea 126, 126 n. 5, 126 n. 6, 126 n. 7, 126 n. 8, 126 n. 9, 134 n. 75, 136 n. 83, 139 n. 108
- Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet) 306, 307 n. 24
- Volz, Paul 315, 315 n. 8, 316
- von Baer, Hans 316, 316 n. 11
- von Bendemann, R. 113 n. 6
- von Gemünden, P. 122 n. 46, 128 n. 32, 131 n. 52, 136 n. 86, 136 n. 95, 137 n. 95
- von Harnack, Adolf 125 n. 2, 157 n. 24
- von Lips, Hermann 52 n. 44
- von Rabenau, Konrad 327 n. 47, 330 n. 59
- von Radke, Gerhard 160 n. 29
- von Reibnitz, Barbara 306 n. 24
- Wacker, M.-Th. 140 n. 112, 141 n. 123, 144 n. 143
- Waetjen, H. C. 128 n. 27, 144 n. 136, 144 n. 137
- Wagener, Ulrike 265 n. 12, 269 n. 26, 279 n. 56
- Walbank, F. W. 202 n. 69
- Walker, Michelle 236 n. 4
- Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew 268 n. 23, 269 n. 28, 271 n. 35, 274 n. 45
- Wallis, R. E. 288 n. 17
- Walsh, P. G. 200 n. 60, 200 n. 61
- Walter, Nikolaus 62 n. 6
- Walter, Uwe 157 n. 23
- Warne, Graham J. 6 n. 11
- Warnecke, Heinz 170 n. 66
- Wasserman, Emma 10 n. 29, 49 n. 35, 88, 88 n. 11, 100 n. 36, 102 n. 40, 105 n. 47, 114, 114 n. 7, 115, 115 n. 13, 116, 116 n. 14, 116 n. 15, 116 n. 16, 116 n. 17, 117 n. 20, 119 n. 33, 121 n. 43
- Watson, Francis 71 n. 35
- Weber, Max 128
- Wehnert, Jürgen 170 n. 66
- Weinel, Heinrich 315, 315 n. 7
- Weiss, Bernard 176, 176 n. 7, 177, 314, 314 n. 4
- Weiss, Johannes 327
- Weissenrieder, Annette 12 n. 49, 177 n. 11, 179 n. 21, 179 n. 22, 179 n. 23, 180 n. 25, 180 n. 26, 182 n. 32, 183 n. 33, 183 n. 34, 183 n. 37
- Weitbrecht, J. 288 n. 16
- Weitzman, Steven 11 n. 33, 12 n. 43
- Welker, M. 323 n. 36
- Wendt, H. H. 315 n. 5
- Wengst, Klaus 185 n. 43
- Werman, Cana 43 n. 10
- Westermann, Claus 36 n. 45
- White, John L. 248 n. 124
- White, L. Michael 9 n. 24
- White, Lynn 21 n. 3
- Whitmarsh, Tim 188 n. 3, 193 n. 24, 197 n. 49
- Wilckens, Ulrich 49 n. 38, 113 n. 2
- Wilkins, Eliza G. 3, 3 n. 1, 13
- Williams, David A. 50 n. 38
- Williams, Michael Allen 237 n. 9
- Wills, Lawrence M. 29 n. 20, 191 n. 18, 199 n. 59
- Wilson, R. McL. 194 n. 28, 194 n. 33, 197 n. 47, 222 n. 26, 240 n. 21
- Winkler, John 6 n. 10, 201 n. 65, 201 n. 68, 201–202
- Winn, A. 128 n. 26
- Winston, David 67 n. 16, 69, 69 n. 26, 70 n. 27, 72 n. 36, 75 n. 48, 77 n. 61
- Winter, Bruce W. 265 n. 11, 267 n. 15, 268 n. 23
- Wischmeyer, O. 125 n. 3
- Wiseman, C. G. 196 n. 39
- Wiseman, T. P. 196 n. 39
- Wittkowsky, Váim 168 n. 60
- Wlosok, Antonie 200 n. 61
- Wold, Benjamin G. 42 n. 4, 43 n. 11, 45 n. 18, 46 n. 20, 47 n. 27, 50 n. 42

- Wormell, D. E. W. 299 n. 1
Wray, David 6 n. 9, 152 n. 6, 283 n. 2
Wrede, William 327
Wright, Addison G. 76 n. 56, 77 n. 60
Wright, Archie T. 27 n. 17
Wright, Benjamin G. 22 n. 4, 22 n. 5, 29
n. 20, 32 n. 29, 57 n. 63
Wright, John P. 6 n. 10
Wright, William 203 n. 2, 204 n. 2
Wyke, Maria 6 n. 10, 264 n. 10, 285 n. 7

Xeravits, G. 58 n. 68

Young, Iris 264 n. 10

Zacharias, H. D. 41 n. 1
Zacharias, H. Daniel 263 n. 6
Zeitlin, Froma 193 n. 24, 197 n. 49
Zeyl, Donald J. 213–216
Ziegler, Detlef 164 n. 42
Ziegler, Joseph 73 n. 41
Ziener, Georg 75 n. 47, 75 n. 50
Zimmerli, W. 327 n. 47
Zimmerman, Reuben 155 n. 20
Zimmern, Heinrich 328 n. 54
Zsengeller, J. 58 n. 68
Zupko, J. 100 n. 35